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INTRODUCTION 
Most discussions of Karl Marx's e.nd Friedrich Engels' s 
views on the Polish question consist of short articles in 
historical magazines o~ chapters in books concerning some other 
problems, except for a few recent publications in the Polish 
People's Republic. A considerable part of these discussions is of 
a polemical nature. The Polish socialists and communists have bee 
repeatedly involved in controversies over the right interpretatj_on 
of Marx's and Engels's statements on the Polish question. 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, when the socialist 
movement was rapidly gaining ground among the Poles, the heated 
discussion centered around the question as to whether the Polish 
socialists ought to continue the fight for national independence in 
order to assist in the destruction of the reactionary governments 
Prussia, Austx·ia, and Russia. Drawing on Yiarx' s and Engels' s 
statements, the PPS (Polsl~artia Socialisteczna (Polish Socialist 
Party J ) maintained that the two communist leaders had never 
avered in their· support of the restoration of Poland. Consequent-
ly, the PPS continued to fight for a strong and independent Polish 
1 
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state. But Rosa Luxemburg, the leading Polish Marxist, rejected 
the policy of the PPS as "patriotic socialism. 11 She insisted that 
although Marx and Engels had favored the restoration of Poland 
in the 1840's, they had turned against it later on. Moreover, in 
v.iew of the rap.id economic changes, which would soon bring about 
the liberation of the oppressed classes, it was no longer necess 
to fight against national oppression. Restoration of Poland had 
become a mere ":p_etit-bourgeois utopia. 11 
The controversy was .intens.ified through the .intervention 
of the Russian Marxist Vladiinir Iliich Ulianov (Lenin). He 
condemned the policy of the PPS as narrowmindedly nationalistic. 
1 However, he also r.idiculed Rosa Luxemburg for having rejected the 
r.ight to national self-determinat.ion which Marx had favored .in the 
interest of the revolution. But he praised her support of a 
revolutionary collaboration between the Polish communists in the 
Polish Kingdom and the Russian communists. In the tradition of 
Russ.ian radicals s.ince the 1820' s, Lenin hoped for the realizat.ion 
of a close Polish-Russian aliiance. Although this alliance failed 
to materialize at the t.ime of the Russ.ian Revolut.ion of 1917, .it 
was finally reaiized with the creat.ion of a Polish People's 
Republic under communist rule in 1945. 
S.ince 1945 the Polish communists have maintained that the 
Polish question has definitely been solved. They no longer seek 
answers to the problem of Polish political .independence in Marx's 
3 
and Engels's writings. But they have been faced with a different 
problem-~to defend the viewpoint of the Polish Communist Party 
which maintains that only a close collaboration with the Soviet 
.Union guarantees the territorial i:rltegrity of Poland and Polish 
independence. After the Polish unrest of 1956 Polish Marxist 
historians even endorsed the teachings of the realist school of 
Polish historiography which condemned the nineteenth century 
uprisings against Russia as a foolish disregard of Polish-Russian 
power relations. Marx's and Engels's writings have also been 
searched for evidence in support of Polish-Russian collaboration. 
In 1954 Celina Bobi£ska, a leading Polish Marxist 
historian, published a study on Marks i Eng~ls a S;erawy Polskie 
("Marx and Engels and the Polish Question") in Warsaw. Her 
intention was 
to illustrate the fundamental problems from the Polish 
point of view--for example, the development of the 
left-wing splinter groups of the Polish national liber-
ation movement towards an uyderstanding of the high 
demands of Marx and Engels. 
On ti1e basis of her studies she concluded that since the 1850' s 
Marx and Engels had welcomed the first signs of a closer Polish-
Russian collaboratio~, while after the Polish insurrection of 
1863-64, they had definitely become convinced that "the future of 
Poland lies in the common revolutionary collaboration with Russi • 
1celina Bobinska, Marx und En els ueber 
trans. by Rudolf Fabel (Berlin: 
2Ibid.J!, :p. 203. 
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According to Bobi£ska, Lenin adhered faithfully to Marx's 
and Engels's concept of Polish-Russian collaboration. Ile prepared 
its future realization during his leadership when the Russian 
proletarian party became the only strong defender of Polish 
liberation. But Bobinska indicated that the Polish communists had 
their share in making the contemporary Polish-Russian alliance 
possible. They relinquished Polish pretensions to the former 
eastern territories of the old Polish Republic White Russia and 
the Ukraine. According to Bobi~ska this complied with Marx's 
and Engels's wishes. However, she refrained from asking whether 
the present-day western Polish border was also envisioned by Marx 
and Engels .. 
Bobinska's arguments helped to bolster the official Polish 
communist viewpoint that the Polish People's Republic has truly 
achieved national independence through the generous support of the 
Soviet Union. Her arguments also served as a warning to the Polis 
socialists who are strongly opposed to the contemporary Polish 
solution. From Bobifiska' s vie'\vpoint the opposition of the Polish 
socialists is futile and reactionary because even Marx had 
considered Polish-Russian collaboration as the only means to 
achieve liberty. 
The Polish social democrats have fought this contention. 
On January 23, 1962 Adam Ciollrnsz, a leading Polish social 
democrat in the post-war emigration, published.a lengthy article 
in the Polish newspa.per Orzel Bialy y SyreJ.!£ (White Eagle and 
5 
Siren [London] ) in which he charged the Polish communists with 
having misinterpreted Marx's and Engels's statements on Poland. 
Since the two men had a true understanding of a "democratic 
policy," they hoped Poland would become a strong and completely 
independent state between Germany and Russia. 
In Ciolkosz's opinion only the PPS had rightly understood 
Marx's and Engels 1 s wishes for Poland because it fought for a 
strong and -independent Polish state. Bobinska, instead, has 
followed in the path of Rosa Luxemburg. She denies the Polish 
people the right to become the "master of its own history." 
Ciolkosz insisted that, contrary to Bobinska's opinion, the 
present day Polish solution has net secured national independence 
for the Poles. Poland has become a mere "outpost" of the Soviet 
Union, that is, a negligible member of the Russian bloc. It 
exists by the grace of the Soviet Union. 
Over the years three major contentions have emerged from 
the Polish controversy concerning the rj.ght interp:r.etation of 
Marx's and Engels's statements on Poland: (1) that Marx and Engels 
never gave up their hope for the creation of a strong and inde-
pendent Polish state; ·(2) that after an initial phase of enthusiarri 
for the restoration of a great Polish state they finally lost 
interest in the Polish national question; and, (3) that Marx and 
Engels believed that the Poles could only secure for themselves an 
independent national life by close collaboration with the Russians. 
6 
In the author's opinion, the variety of interpretations i~ 
partially due to the willfulness of the interpreters to select 
only those statements of Marx and Engels which have suited their 
purpose. This procedure has been facilitated by the following: 
(1) many statements of Marx and Engels were intended to fight 
political opponents, and as a result their statements were 
contradictory; (2) Marx ~nd Engels never wrote a comprehensive 
study on the national question, the question of minorities, the 
peasant question, or the organization of the state--problems which 
have a bearing on the Polish question. 
Such shortcomings have also influenced the interpretation 
of Marx's and E:ngels's Polish views in the western world. Western 
interpretations range from an emphasis on Marx's and Engels's 
enthusiasm for a restoration of Poland, to a recently more 
pronounced trend to differentiate, as Rosa Luxemburg did, between 
an initial phase of great interest in Polish national independence 
and a second phase of a gradual decline of this interest. Western 
interpreters in general seem to be more interested in the anti-
Russian views of Marx and Engels. Consequently, there is a 
tendency to interpret their Polish views in the light of their 
Russian views. 
It is sµrprising that modern historians have not asked 
to what extent Marx's and Engels's views on the Polish question 
were a result of thei-r preoccupation with the German question 
7 
which in turn had a bearing on their attitude towards Russia. In 
the author's opinion, this omission has greatly impeded a complex 
insight into the views of Marx and Engels. Therefore, it is the 
major aim of this dissertation to examine the relations between 
Marx's and Engels's concern with Germany and their attitude on the 
Polish question. 
It is true that Marx and Engels were in the first place 
social revoiutionaries. Their foremost aim was the overthrow 
of the old political, socio-economic European order and the 
establishment of a communist society. Consequently, their interest 
in national, territorial,and foreign political questions was 
subordinat~d to that final aim. These questions were often treate~ 
as a convenient means to agitate for the final communist revolutiD~ 
Although Marx and Engels spent the greater part of their 
lives outside their mother country, the German question was of 
major concern to them. While they agitated for a German social 
revolution, they also supported the demand for the creation of 
Q.rossdeutschla!l.,q, of a German state with strategically safe 
box·ders and including the Habsburg territories. Marx and Engels 
regretted German weakness. Their intense concern with the question 
of power caused them to admire historical figures like Napoleon I 
and Peter the Great. But they were also convinced that a German 
communist revolution would definitely overcome German weakness and 
would secure for Germany a strong position in Central Europe. 
8 
Because of Marx's and Engels's concern with German 
strength, they opposed the concept of a Slavic union which the 
Russian political exiles Michael Bakunin (1814-76) and Alexander 
Herzen (1812-70) had propagandized ·since the 1840's. In the 
opinion of these Russians a Polish-Russian alliance would be an 
initial step towards the liberation of all the Slavs from Turkish 
as well as German rule. Marx and Engels were quite aware of the 
consequences of a Slavic power bloc for Germany. They hoped that 
the Poles would not collaborate with the Russians. 
It was not without justification that Slavic leaders, 
foremost among them Michael Bakunin, maintained that Marx's and 
Engels's statements on Poland and the Slavic problem were dictated 
by their interest in Germany. \Vhen Marx and Bakunin fought over 
the leadership of the First International, they were also involved 
in a controversy over the future reorganization of Central 
Eastern Europe, that is, after the socialist revolution. 
Since the 1860's Marx and Engels had become convinced 
that the German workers would be the leaders of a future revolution 
which in their opinion would make an end to Slavophile dreams. 
But the actual historical development was far different from their 
expectations. It we.s Russia which staged the first communist 
revolution in 1 917, and at the end of World \Var II it was the 
Soviet Union which emerged as the leading European power. It 
extended its sphere of influence over Central Eastern Europe and 
9 
Eastern Germany. It was also instrumental in the demarkation of 
the new Polish western border, the Oder-Neisse line. Indeed, the 
present-day situation coincides to a large degree with the early 
political hopes of Bakunin, but it has nothing to do with Yarx's 
and Engels's political calculations. 
CHAPI1ER I 
THEORY OF REVOLUTION: GERMANY 
Kar.l Marx and Friedrich Engels grew up in the post-
Napoleonic era in the Rhineland when German dissatisfaction with 
the anachronistic political and economic structure of the Gorman 
Confederation was steadily increasing. Since 1815 Germany had 
been composed of thirty-nine large and small political units 
surrounded by customs barriers. Political decentralization had 
its counterpart in the lack of an economic union vvhich presented 
tho greatest obstacle to the development of Germany into a 
modern stace. 
Since the twenties the manufacturing bourgeoisie 
petitioned the German governments for the removal of the customs 
barriers which had been prom1sed in the Vienna treaties of 1815. 
At the time of the revolutionary upheavals of 1830-31, the more 
radical demand for the political unification gained momentum for 
the first t:Lme. A few years later Prussia partially met the 
10 
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demand for changes with the founding of the Zollverein in 1833 
which marked the beginning of the economic union of Germany.3 
Even before 1833 Prussia had held an influential position 
in Germany because Prussia possessed the best military organiza-
tion as well as the largest territory scattered across the five 
parallel rivers which flow through Northern Germany. The founding 
of the Zollverein considerably strengthened Prussia's position 
in Germany and enabled Prussia to take the lead in the economic 
development of Germany. As the years passed by,·more and more 
members of the influential circles in the German states were 
attracted to Prussia. 
The· manufacturing bourgeoisie of- the Rhineland, which had 
been annexed to Prussia in 1815, became the foremost supporters 
of the extension of the Zollverein to all of the German states. 
The bourgeoisie advocated political unification under Prussian 
leadership. Yet, at the outset of the mid-nineteenth century, it 
was not so certain that the completion of the economic union would 
prepare the way for German unification by the House of Hohenzollern. 
It was still possible that Austria might unite Germany. Besides, 
many of the liberals, predominantly in Southern Germany, were anti-
3The founding of the Zollverein was largely due to the 
conversion of the Prussian enI""igf.it"ened bureaucrats to economic 
liberalism after 1815. Cf. William Otto Henderson, The State and 
ih~ Inftu~~ial Revolution i~ Prussia (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1958), pp. 7b-95. 
--
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Prussian, and the radical movement, which was still in its infancy, 
agitated for a revolution of the masses to achieve German 
unification. 
When Marx and }Jngels reached adulthood, the Zollverein 
had contributed to the expansion of manufacturing.4 In spite of 
this progress Germany was still predominantly an agricultural 
country in which two thirds of the population were peasants.5 Yet, 
there existed differences in the level of the social and economic 
development. The most 'backward conditions preva~led in the 
territories east of the Elbe river where town life was far less 
developed than west of that river. Even Berlin, the capital of 
Prussia, was rather provincial and poor. The peasant masses in 
East Pr~ssia, Silesia, Pomerania, etc. were ruled by a small 
privileged class of aristocratso Except for some areas in Silesia, 
where manufacturing had made progress, these conditions had more i 
common with the Eastern European countries, Poland and Russia, tha 
with the rest of Germany. 
--"41n 1839 an English observer of German economic condition 
reported to his government that since 1833 Germany had made 
immense p.cogress in all the protected branches of manufacturing, 
particularly in the production of woolen and cotton goods which 
were no longer imported from England. Fredrick List, 1'Iatiopal 
-~s~em ?f.-~£.t:tti.£.a...3=..~~onon'!.I, trans. by G. A. Matile (Phil"aaGIPhia, 
Pa~:~pincott & Co., 1856), p. 467. 
5Rudolf. Stadelmann, Soz,iaJ-~.~~litische G_eschic.h_te der 
Revolution von 1 f2l1¥- (2d. ed.; Darmstadt: WissenSC11a:ffIIC'110 
ifo"cngeseTI.schaft, 962), pp. 9-28. 
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Southern Germany was as yet untouched by the industrial 
revolution. It presented a different picture with its mass of 
burghers, artisans, and peasants which made for social homogeneity. 
In comparison, the social and economic order was much more 
differentiated in the Rhineland. The Prussian province was 
economically the most advanced part of Germany. Commerce and 
manufacturing were thriving. Cologne, the most important commer-
cial center. of Northwestern Germany, had a wealthy bourgeoisie. 
Although the Rhineland ·held a preeminent position in the economic 
life of Germany, even this region had very little which resembled 
modern industry. Nor did the Rhineland own an industrial center 
comparable to Manchester in England. 
The differences in the level of socio-economic development 
led to differences in political outlook. In the mid-forties, when 
Marx and Engels had entered the ranks of European revolutionaries, 
conservatism prevailed in Eastern Germany and liberalism in 
Western Germany. The opposition to the reactionary governments wa 
divided. The moderates were willing to make concessions. But the 
radicals were convinced that the existing conditions could only be 
changed through a complete reconstruction of Germany.6 The 
Rhineland was the center of opposition to the obstructive policies 
of the smaller and larger German governments. Though social 
and poli tice.l motives played a certain role in this fight, economic 
motives prevailed.? 
The most powerful politico_.economic German thinker in 
the forties was the Southern German liberal Friedrich List. In 
the twenties he had emigrated to the United States for political 
reasons. This was a docistve experience in his life which 
mae;nified his awareness of the anachronistic economic and 
political conditions iri his mother country after_ his return in 
the early thirties. Until his death in 1846 he continued to 
agitate for the promotion of German industrialization through the 
extension of the ~11 ver..£:_in to all of Germany. 
List opposed the propaganda of the .German radicals for a 
German revolution in order to achieve German political unificatio~ 
He claimed that a revolution was neither feasible nor practical 
because the masses were too backward to have nationwide interests.8 
Only the development of a large middle class through the extension 
of manufacturing would create national feeling. As long as 
Germany remained a predominatly agricultural country, political 
7:F'ritz -c.;b"on, .Der rote Handschuh (Frankfurt am Main: 
Athenaeum Verlag, 1961},p. 7t:--
8Tho German philosopher Georg Hegel had expressed the 
same idea in bis Philosophy of History. He was convinced that the 
predominance of o.grTCil:rtU.:c"e"" impedecrthe grovrtb of self-conscious-
ness and oi' an interest in the political life., The Ph_ij._osoph;y: of 
!~E:e.1_, trans. and ed. by Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Random 
House, Inc., 19~-5), p. 125. . 
1 ·~ ... 1a'll'm;~~~y=m:;li.l..'!IB:="!l:~~~.....,.~~~::.~~~~i::::ftW~i!2£.'$-7.~=~-r~~---=:c.,,..~tat:-...-.... c.:><~"fir~1~~ 
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unification would not save Germany from being exploited or 
threatened by its neighbors. Therefore, List concluded that 
polj_tical unification should come about through an evolutionary 
process leading to the economic union and the creation of a 
modern economic order. The Prussian state which had initiated the 
Zoll~erein was predestined to take a leading role in the 
unification of Germany, including the Habsburg territories.9 
Possessing a strong industry, a considerable population, 
and a large territory extending from the North Sea and Baltic Sea 
to the Adriatic Sea and from the Rhine to the borders of the Polish 
Kingdom, the new Germany would become a truly independent and 
powerful nation in European politics. 1 O List 1 s interest in Germe.n 
economic_ progress was intimately connected with his concern over 
__ German political weakness in Europe. It was largely dictated by 
power political considerations. Yet, his concern with social evils 
and his desire to raise the living standard of the people should 
ot be overlooked. 
The theories of List were particularly welcomed by the 
Rhenish manufacturing bourgeoisie. It could hardly have been 
expected that List's demands for the industrialization of Germany 
Friedrich List, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Ludwig 
Hausser (3 vols.; Stuttgart ana ~uebingen: Cottascher Verlag, 
1850-51 ) , II, 4L1-6. 
lOList, Hc:-.:l~.onal System, pp. 26Li--65. 
16 
would impress the small bourgeoisie which represented the core of 
the democratic movement and fought for its survival in a changing 
world. But in the revolutionary theories of :V.1arx and Engels, 
which were elaborated in the mid-forties, the demand for 
industrialization found a foremost place, although for reasons 
which were very different from those of List. Industrialization 
was regarded as the preparation for the final liberation of man. 
Consequently, Marx and Engels were as much conerned as List with 
the political and economic backwardness and disunir,y of Germany. 11 
Their acquaintances with the economic and political conditions of 
the Western European countries had increased their consciousness 
of German backwardness. 
11 Evide1;t°1y :Viarx and Engels became acquainted with List's 
ideas in the forties. According to the German historian Fritz 
Cahen "List v1as JvT.arx 1 s unsuccessful competitor for the leftist 
press in Cologne du.ring a brief period in 1842. 11 Fritz M. Cahen, 
_Qp. cit., p. 77. In the winter o:r 184Li--li-5 En.gels wanted to VTrite 
a critique of List's economic theory. In 1847 he stated that 
List he.d produced the best bourgeois economic literature. Cf. 
Franz Mehring, Karl Ma~e Stor_Y. of His Life, trans. by Edward 
Fitzgerald, Annitt~PaperbacR:s "(Aiin A.rbOr, Mich.: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 106, 130. Cf. also the 
repeated references by Marx and Engels to List in their 
discussions on protectionism and free trade, in Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe: Vler~± 
Schrif~gn., Briefe, ea. 15y 15avid Boi·-isovich Goldenach on be a f of 
°{he Marx-£~nstitute in Moscow, Vol. I: 7 Parts; Vol. III: 
4 Parts (Frankfurt am Main: Marx-Engels-Archiv, Verlags-
gesellschaft, GmbH, 1927-31), I/4, 38Li-, 385; I/6, 311, 428, 432. 
On the following pages the Gesamtausgabe \'Till be ref erred to as 
MEGA. · 
-
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Since 1844, when their l.ifelong fr.iendship began, Marx 
and Engels agreed that a true revolutionary must be interested in 
the problems of the day and study them in detail in order to 
criticize .intell.igently actual political and social conditions. 
But a true revolutionary must also be intensely interested in 
history. An understanding of the past revealed the truth about 
contemporary conditions and helped to formulate the answer to the 
future task· of solving the social questions. 12 
Marx and Engels delved repeatedly into the German past 
and compared it with the more fortunate history of the Western 
. European countries in order. to find an answer to the present ills 
of Germany.· They .insisted that .in France and England the 
bourgeoisie had performed a histor.ical mission because .it had 
helped to destroy feudalism and to develop both countries .into 
modern states. France was praised as the model of political 
development which led to the pol.i ti cal centralization and to the 
creation of a unified nation in the French Revolution. But Marx 
12cr. Marx's critique of the Young Hegelians for their 
lack of interest in a "detailed treatment of actual cond.itions" 
late in 1842. Mehring, .212• cit., p. 46. Cf. Marx's cr.itique of 
the French socialists in the Deutsch-Franzoesische Jabrbuecher 
(a German radical journal) in'""'J?ebruary, 1844. Marx stated that 
their ideas were too abstract and that they studied neither the 
discrepancies .in the "political state" which revealed social truth 
nor the histor.ical development of society. MEGA, I/1 , 573-75. 
Cf. also Marx and Engels's insistence on the need for an under-
stand.ing of historical phenomena. Marx and Engels, Die heilige 
.E?.milie, in~' I/3, 294-300. • 
18 
and Engels had an even greater admiration for England as the model 
of economic development which brought about the industrial 
revolution in the mid-eighteenth century. Both the French 
Revolution and the English industrial revolution gave birth to 
modern bourgeois society which meant historical progress over 
feudal society. 13 
Marx and Engels pointed out that the German Empire had no 
made any political or economic progress since the Middle Ages. 
They blamed the decay of the German Empire on the German 
/ 
bourgeoisie. Because of a preoccupation with local affairs, the 
German bourgeoisie had failed to become an active agent in large-
scale political measures and economic enterprises. It also had 
failed to develop Germany into a modern state. Germany's 
- backwardness was fully exploited by the powerful English and 
French bourgeoisie. Even when _the French bourgeoisie staged "the 
most colossal revolution11 in the history of the world and 
conquered Europe, and when the English bourgeoisie effected the 
industrial revolution and 11the commercial subjugation of the 
world, 11 the German bourgeoisie VTas unable t1to develop into a class 
with common national :i.nterests. 111 4 Summing up their contemptuous 
175. 
l3Marx a~d Engels, Die de~tsche Ideolo1ie, in ~' I/5, 
Cf. also Die heili~e Famili~, in l"fEGA, I/ ~298-99. 
14Die deutsche Id~ologie, in MEGA I/5 175. 
- _, ' 
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critique of late eighteenth century Germany, Engels stated that a 
11mean, sneaky, miserable, and shopkeeping spirit" marked the whole 
German people. 15 To him their lack of initiative and daring was 
appalling. 
When Engels was an old man, he still lamented the 
"wretchedness" of German history. In a letter to the German socia 
democrat Franz Mehring of July 14, 1893, he stated: 
In studying German history • • • I have always found that 
a comparison witb the corresponding French periods produces 
a correct idea of proportions because what happens there 
is the direct opposite of vrhat happens in our country ••• 
There, a rare objective logic during the whole course of 
the process; with us, more and more dismal dislocation. 
Engels regretted that the German Empire could not prevent "the 
plundering of German territory on a large scale" because it did 
not develop into a centralized state like France. But he was 
relieved to note that 
Since our workingmen have placed Germany at the head 
of the historical movementl it is easier to swallow 
the disgrace of the past.lo 
In the 1840 1 s Engels and Marx had studied with a similar 
feeling of relief the French conquest of Europe at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. They argued that the beginning of a 
regeneration of Germany was due to the French revolutionary wars 
f5Engels,., "Letter I to Northern Star," October 25, 1845, 
in~' I/IV, 462. ~ 
( 
16Engels, De~ deutsche Bauernkriep;, ed. by Franz Mehring 
Berlin: Buchhandlung·-vor:waerts;-'T9b1f), ___ p •. 14~ 
20 
and to a foreigner Napoleon I. (Marx and Engels were great 
admirers of this man.) They claimed it was Napoleon's historical 
mission to usher Germany into the modern age and to prepare the 
way for a centralized German state. He had liberated the Germans 
from the rotten German Empire, created modern communications, and 
had reduced the great number of smaller states, vestiges of the 
. 17 
medieval German political structure, by creating larger ones. 
Engels criticized the Germans because they did not 
understand Napoleon's mission to destroy outdated forms of 
European life. Napoleon was the "great conqueror" who knew how to 
use power. But the Germans judged him on moral grounds. They 
·called him ·an "arbitrary despot" although he was "the represent-
ative of the revolution in Germany ••• [where] his so-called 
reign of terror was badly needed. 1118 Engels condemned the Wars of 
Liberation of 1813-11+ as an "act of insanity" because they 
strengthened reactionary forces in Germany. From the historical 
viewpoint the Germans had no right to revolt against the French 
occupation and Napoleon because the French nation had initiated the 
French Revolution, and Napoleon was its symbol and its executor. 
In Engels's opinion neither individual suffering, nor national 
17Die de~tsche Ideologie, in MEGA, I/5, 176-77. 
18 Engels, "Letter I to Northern Star," in ~' I/Li-, 1+84. 
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oppression, nor the partition of a nation's territory justified 
a revolt against the forces which represented progress. 
When Marx and Engels turned their attention to the 
German situation in the post-Napoleonic era, they admitted that 
a new Germany was in the making. But it was still far behind 
England and France. Although the German bourgeoisie had finally 
acquired an .interest in nat.ion-wide political and economic 
problems, it was still confronted vri th the task of overthrowing 
the old social order and creat.ing a centralized national state, 
a. task which the French bourgeo.isie had performed .in 1789. The 
question which both Marx and Engels asked was whether the German 
bourgeoisie· would carry out that revolution. 
Before Marx began to collaborate closely with Engels, he 
had elaborated a revolutionary theory for Germany which rejected 
the possibility of a bourgeois revolution. It is quite probable 
that Marx's experiences in the Rhineland during his collaboration 
with the liberal newspaper ,F]l.einische Zeitun,g (Cologne) in 1842-43 
supported his doubts regarding the revolutionary initiative of the 
German bourgeoisie~ 1 9 
-19The ~:isc.~e. ~ei t™ we.s founded in Janu~ry, 1842 ~Y 
the weal thy Rheni11h '6ourgeoisie in order to further 1 ts economic 
interests, particularly the extension of the _&ollver~ to all of 
Germany. In the beginning Marx was only a contributor to the 
newspaper, but from October, 181+2 to March, 1843 he was .its editor. 
It is noteworthy that the office of an editor was first offered to 
List whose ideas the weo.l thy Rhenish bourgeoisie favored. But he 
declined the of fer because at that time he collaborated vri th the 
~11E.e_~}Be .AugE?_l?,.l]]'J::;er._J-!f"~s the leading liberal German newsp. a.pa. "'r"l' 
f. L:i..st, §£.~~1-~1!~Jt~~.~£h!:ille.n,, I, 130 • 
..... ~~~~~~~~:2);::~,;;.r-'...'.A~ .. ~~..zr. ~.;::.~~~~~-~!;.~.::t!'<L<m:a;:.~ 
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Through his involvement in the political and economic 
questions of the day, Marx became convinced that even in the 
Rhineland, the most progressive part of Germany, feudal conditions 
were still prevalent. The Diet was· not truly representative; the 
lando~ners held a strong position in it and were able to use their 
legislative powers to further their own interests. Marx was 
exasperated because the bourgeoisie did.not firmly oppose the 
attempt of ~he landovmers to deprive the peasants of their 
customary rights. The ·bourgeoisie did not press _hard enough for 
the right of the public to attend the sessions of the Rhenish Diet, 
and it acquiesced too easily in the tightening Prussian 
h . 20 censors ip •. 
In 18L~3 Marx's thoughts centered around the problem of 
how to achieve the true liberty of man. His increasing antagonism 
to the bourgeoisie coincided with his rejection of Hegel's ideal 
state and of French revolutionary principles as a means to achieve 
that endo 
Hegel had taught that man was intended to be free and 
tha.t his freedom would be realized in a state in which "justice 
and law ••• were conceived as appertaining to every free man, 11 
and in which all citizens wouJ:.:1 collaborate for the attainment of 
the common good--the realization of the moral law. 21 In the 
20 Cf. MEGA, I/1, 18Li--85, 228, 271-76, 300, 303, 328. 
21 Philoso.EE.Y- o.f Heg~\, pp. 65, 284. 
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review Deutsch-:.Franzoesisch£ Jahrbuec_her (Paris), on which 
Marx collaborated after bis emigration to Paris in November, 1843, 
he argued that the Hegelian ideal state was merely the fully 
developed "political state. 11 It wo-uld not liberate man. This had 
been proven by the development of the modern political state 
since the }!'ench Revolution. 
Although Marx praised the French Revolution as a most 
significant. historical event, he held that it had made serious 
mistakes which ought to be avoided in the future. The French 
Revolution merely achieved the partial emancipation of man because 
it aimed at political liberation. 22 It failed to abolish private 
property, the basis of individual ego:Lsm and social ante.gonism. 
The modern political state, follovdng the French revolutionary 
·- principles, granted freedom of property, of trade, and of religion 
instead of abolishing these three evils. This permitted the rise 
of a bourgeois society and of anarchic conditions in the social 
sphere. 
According to Marx the Jewish situation, in particular, 
proved the shortcomings of the modern political state. Although 
they 1aere politically emancipated, the Jews remained enslaved to 
Judaism, the embodiment of the capitalist spirit--of self-interest, 
-2'2~vr =::---;-z K . t . k i1arx, ur ri i_,_ 
( 1 8h4) , :i.n MEGA, I/ 1 , 61 7. 
in ~' Ifl;--5°96-98. 
der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie" 
Cf'. also Marx, 11 Zur Judenfrage" (1844), 
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profit-making,and the rule of money, evils in which the Christian 
bourgeois society equally indulged. Only by rejecting Judaism 
and supporting the abolition of private property would the Jews 
liberate themselves and simultaneously work 11 for the emancipation 
of humanity itselr. 1123 
Convinced that the modern political state failed to 
liberate man fully, Marx concluded that the German revolution must 
aim at more· radical changes and transcend a mere political 
revolution. Besides, in his opinion the Germans.would be unable 
to follow the example set by the French Revolution. The success 
of that Revolution was due to the close collaboration between the 
bourgeoisie- and the lower classes. However, the German bourgeoisie 
lacked both the generosity to identify itself with the "popular 
_ mind" and the capacity for leadership. Marx even doubted that the 
German bourgeoisie had the courage "to conceive the idea of 
emancipation from its own standpoint." Moreover, the concept of a 
bourgeois revolution had become "antiquated or at least 
problematical" because of the "development of social conditions 
and the progress of political theory. 1124 
11 Zur Judenfrage, 11 Ibid., pp. 601-060 
2411 zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, 11 in 
I/1 , 617- 1 8. 
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While Marx questioned the possibility of a German 
bourgeois revolution, he passionately believed that Germany was 
predestined to make a social revolution which would initiate the 
final liberation of man, including the Jews. 
Marx argued that in spite of the political and economic 
backwardness of Germany the German people were the equals of the 
English and the French because of their achievements in the 
philosophical criticism of state and law. This criticism vn1ich 
culminated in Hegel's philosophy also led the Germans to the 
burning question of the modern age, the question of returning to 
man his dignity. It was merely a question of turning German 
philosophical theory into revolutionary action in order to achieve 
11univers_al human emancipation." 
Marx argued that the essential precondition of the future 
German revolution was 
the formation of a class with radical chains, ••• a 
class which is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere 
of society which has a universal character because its 
sufferings are universal, and claims no particular right 
because the wrong committed against it is not a 
particule.r v.rrong but wrong as such.25 
x practically admitted that a German proletariat did not yet 
exist. It was merely in the process of development as a result of 
the industrial expansion. But he expect9d that, as the proletariat 
grew, it would furnish "philosophy" with the "material weapons" 
'5- . ~ .. 
Ib:id., p$ 619. 
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required to overturn the existing order because the proletariat 
was prepared to reject the whole social order. 
"Philosophy," said Marx, "is the head of this emancipation 
and the proletariat its heart. 1126 He meant that the radical 
. 
intellectuals who interpreted philosophy were destined to become 
the new revolutionary leaders--a generous element which would 
identify itself with the popular mind. Vlhen their radical ideas 
~ 
had penetrated the masses, the German proletarian revolution would 
transcend the partial revolution of the French Jacobins. The 
German proletariat would emancipate itself and thereby the whole 
of humanity. 11The emancipation of the German is the emancipation 
of man, 1127 -proclaimed Marx. The German proletariat would bring 
about the total transformation of society. The conceptual image 
__ of perfection presented by philosophy would become reality. The 
implication was that Germany could leap with a salto mor.!_§.]-~ over 
the necessary stages of its historical development. The German 
revolution would be both political and social. It would overthrow 
the old powers and dissolve the old society. Marx's revolutionary 
expectations went far beyond the modest hopes of the German 
democrats, including Arnold Ruge, the editor of the Deutsch-
Franzoesische Jahrbuecher, for the creation of a German republican 
democratic state. 
-2bll?.1:£.' p. 621. 
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When the Silesian weavers revolted in the summer of 1844, 
Marx interpreted this event as proof that the revolutionary ardor 
of the German proletariat was superior to that of the Western 
European proletarj_at because the German proletariat had already 
acquired "the consciousness" of being a separate class. Therefore, 
it was the theoretician of the European proletariat just as the 
English proletariat was the economist and the French, the 
politician. 28 
In the following months under the influence of Engels, 
Marx receded from his utopian expectations regarding the German 
revolution. He accepted Engels's view that the first proletarian 
revolution would take place in England. 
Ever since the winter of 1842-43, Engels had had the 
__ opportunity to study social and economic conditions of large-scale 
industry in England. He became convinced that economic factors 
represented a decisive historical force, a.nd that they formed the 
basis of the development of existing class antagonisms. In 1844 
he declared that England's salvation from the appalling social 
conditions lay with the modern English working cle.ss which had 
become the slave of the factory ovmers. In his book Die Lage der 
arbeitenden Klasse in~, published in Leipzig in 1845, he 
2CSMarx, "Der Aufstand der schlesischen Weber," Vorwaerts 
(Paris), Summer, 1946, quoted in Mehring, op. _£it., p. 84. 
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maintained that England was on the brink of a revolution because 
class antagonism was rapidly deepening with the extension of large-
scale industry. The English revolution would enable the Chartists, 
the organized :E.'nglish workingmen, to take over political power 
and to precipitate a social transformation through the overthrow 
of the bourgeois Oi·der based on private property. 29 
In 1846 Marx with the assistance of Engels developed the 
decisive factors of historical materialism. He maintained that 
the economic production in each historical epoch determined the 
social structure as well as the political and intellectual history 
f the period, and that the class struggles of the past had now 
eached a stage at which the industrial proletariat was destined 
o free the whole society from exploitation by freeing itself· from 
exploiting bourgeoisie.30 
This revolutionary theory was further elaborated in the 
ommunj_st Manife~. It was largely derived from the observation 
f conditions in Western Europe, particularly in England. It did 
ot apply to German conditions, and it assumed that England, the 
ost industrie.lized country, would become the leader of the 
proletarian revolution. 
9Die Lag.e der arbettenden Klasse in Englan£1, in ™' 
I/4, 222-23-;-24t7~ 
7-71. 
30cf. in particular Die d~utsche Idea~~' in~' I/5, 
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The question is ·what d.id the revolution mean to Marx and 
~ngels on the eve of the Revolution of 1848. And here it has to 
be noted that the two friends were primarily concerned with 
Germany. This has been too often overlooked~3 1 Yet, it 
influenced their idea of the revolution. 
In the pre-March period Marx and Engels frequently 
discussed German contemporary conditions e.nd problems in newspaper 
articles. This was one means of agitating for a German revolution. 
Before 184.8 Marx and Engels had an outspoken preference 
for Prussia. They were typical Northern Germans with a superiority 
complex towards the Southern Germans who were regarded as backward 
and who were often treated with contempt. 
At the time that Marx collaborated with the Rheinische 
Zeitung, he supported the pro-Prussian course of the paper. 
Thereby, he did not commit any noticeable violence to the 
convictions he held at that time. Although he loathed "Prussian 
despotism," he was convinced that Prussia was the most advanced 
part of Germany: Prussia had initiated liberal economj.c policies, 
and in Prussia German philosophical development had reached a 
climax with Hegel's critique of state and law. Thus, Marx's 
pr·o-Prussian sympathies expressed themselves chiefly in a defense 
3'1cr. George Lichtheim, !i,arxism, an 
fil]_c!;[, Praeger University Series ~N'ew York: 
Inc., 1962), p. 51. 
___ , ______ _ 
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of Prussian economic policies and in repeated references to North 
German science as against the superficiality of French and South 
German theories. 
The preference for Prussia· was an important element in 
Marx's and Engels's revolutionary calculations. In 1846 Engels 
pointed out that the Prussian bourgeoisie, particularly in the 
Rhineland, was the most progressive German bourgeoisie. It had 
the greatest interest in the unification of Germany. Therefore, 
Engels considered Prussia as "the center of modern German 
history • • • and the battlefield on which the future fate of 
Germany will be determined. 1132 Neither Southern Germany nor 
Austria wou·ld have any decisive influence on the future German 
revolutionary movement. In Engels's opinion Austria was still a 
11half-barbarian country" because its "paternalistic despotism" 
had not yet encountered any opposition. The German revolution 
would be initiated in Prussia. 
In 1847 Engels was definitely convinced that only a 
bourgeois-democratic revolution was possible in Germany at that 
time. In his pamphlet per Sta,t~?- g~o in Deutschland, written in 
March, 184?, he stressed the progressive character of a capitalist 
development in Germany and promoted a bourgeois revolution for the 
- . 3'2Engels, "Letter III to the !1Qr.thern Star, 11 April 5, 
1846, in !J!<3!, I/Lh 492. 
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sake of German national development. The revolution was an 
urgently necessary and inevitable event. Therefore, Engels 
rejected any fight against liberal measures, and he condemned the 
"anti-capitalist and anti-liberal tirades of the true socialists", 
in particular, Moses Hess and Karl Gruen. It was the duty of the 
communists to support a successful bourgeois rebellion against the 
absolutist regime in Germany.33 
Marx went along with Engels's belief in the necessity 
of a bourgeois revolution although he never seems to have been 
convinced that such an outcome was likely on German soil. 
In 1847 Marx and Engels discussed in the Bruesseler 
Zeitung (Brussels), a radical newspaper, the events in Prussia 
and particularly in the Rhineland. They advised the German 
_ proletariat to support the agitation of the German bourgeoisie for 
protective tariffs. In the long run bourgeois interests would 
serve the interests of the proletariat. Protective tariffs would 
further the expansion of German industry and strengthen the 
bourgeoisie for her fight against feudalism and absolutism. 
The development in Prussia in the spring of 1847 seemed 
to confirm Engels's hope that a German revolution would soon 
- 33Engels~ "Der Status Quo in Deutschland 11 (1847), in 
~' I/6, 231-49. Cf. also Engels 1 s animosity against the true 
socialj.sts in "Die wahren Sozialisten" (1847), in MEGA, 73-116. 
(Both manuscripts remained unpublished at the time~ 
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develop. At that time pressing financial needs compelled the 
King of Prussia William IV to call together the United Diet, a 
feudal body along corporative lines. The situation was 
reminiscent of the spring of 1789 in France when Louis XVI had 
called a similar body under similar pressures. Marx and Engels 
advised the proletariat to support the Diet if it demanded- trial 
by jury, equality before the law, abolition of forced labor, 
freedom of -the press and of association, and the convening of a 
truly representative body. But the Diet merely asked for the 
right to convene regularly. There the matter rested. 
In the .£9D11.aunist Manifesto, which Marx and Engels began 
to prepare ·late in 1847, they stressed again the progressive 
character of a capitalist development in Germany and fought the 
_ reactionary nature of all countertendencies, including socialist 
;nes.34 
Although the prognosis of the near advent of a radical 
revolution was entirely derived from the development in Western 
Europe, Germany was tacitly included as being a member of the 
progressive West. This was in keeping with Marx's and Engels's 
earlier statements. 
In the Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher, Marx had 
·nsisted that the Germans, although politically and economically 
33 
backward, vmre the equals of the French and English people in the 
philosophical field. 
In August, 1841+ Engels declared proudly: "I may assume 
that it is generally admitted that Germany, France, and England 
are the three leading countries of contemporary history. 1135 
Engels explained that leadership in Europe belonged to these three 
countries because each one of them had gone through a significant 
revolution. France had made a political revolution, Germany had 
achieved a philosophical revolution, and England had passed through 
a social revolution since the mid-eighteenth century. From a 
world-historical viewrioint the English revolution was of the 
greatest importance. Although social oppression existed on the 
continent, it had become a decisive factor in the historical 
development only in England. Engels said that in England "the 
misery and poverty of the working classes • • • has national and, 
more than that, world-historical significance. 1136 While the 
working classes of France and Germany had not yet succeeded in 
exercising any significant influence on the development of their 
countries, the advanced English industrial proletariat was rapidly 
moving towards a radical social revolution. 
in~, 
3'511 Die Lage Englands, 11 Vorvraerts, August 31 , 18L1.L1-, 
I/4, 29;5. 
36Ibid., p. 296. 
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Although Engels ascribed the greatest significance to the 
ocial changes in England, his implication was that all three 
evolutions were interdependent. As Marx had observed, there was 
o social revolution without a political revolution nor without a 
hilosophical goal--the restoration of the dignity of man. 
onsequently, Germany was not to be excluded from a preemi11;ent 
osition in revolutionary Europe. 
Engels's insistence on Western European leadership fore-
the rigid East:..west anti thesis which cha.racterizes the 
ommunist Y.ianifesto. Already Hegel had drawn a dividing line 
between Western Europe_ which had developed a high concept of 
individual liberty; and Eastern Europe which was still apathetic 
because of the predominance of agricultural activities. Although 
there existed gradual transitions from Western to Eastern Europe 
in the level of economic development, the Manifesto maintained that 
the difference between the two parts of Europe was absolute. The 
exaggeration of Western European superiority was in tune with 
Marx's and Engels's contempt for the peasants and their supposedly 
reactionary character, and it corresponded to the prevailing 
superiority complex of the Western European educated classes. 
In the ~' Marx and Engels again stressed the role 
vhich the ·western European bourgeoisie had played in tho overthrow 
of the medieval feudal structure characterized by particularism, 
he lack of political c~mtralization, and the prevalence of 
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agriculture. Since the sixteenth century the immense expansion 
of world trade and manufacture under the leadership of the 
Western European bourgeoisie shattered the 11old local and national 
seclusion and self-sufficiency" and rescued many people from the 
"idio.cy of rural life. u37 The uninterrupted economic expansion 
promoted the rise of a new class, the industrial proletariat, 
predestined to destroy the old reactionary classes--the nobility, 
the bourgeqisie, and the landovming peasantry--to abolish 
private ovmership of the means of production, to end nationalism, 
and to create a just world order. 
The Manifesto excluded any possibility that the revolu-
tionary inttiative for man's liberation from oppression could 
come from Eastern Europe, an idea which at the time was favored by 
the revolutionary Russian emigrant Michael Bakunin vlith whom Marx 
and Engels had collaborated on the p~u~~ch-F~anzoesi~~ 
Jahrbuecher in 1844. The ~festo made it quite clear that the 
development of Eastern Europe had been prevented bece.use it had 
remained outside the main currents of historical progress. 
Eastern Europe had not participated in the great age of discoveries 
nor in the industrial revolution. Consequently, it had failed to 
overcome medieval conditions. Because of its backwardness 
Eastern Europe had fallen under the leadership of the Western 
36 
European bourgeo.isie: 
Just as .it [the bourgeo.isie] has made the countryside 
dependent upon the towns, so it has made barbarian 
and semi-ba.rbar.ian countr.ies dependent on the civilized 
ones, the peasant
3
nations on bourgeois nat.ions, the 
East on the West. b 
The Manifesto impl.ied that the coming proletarian 
revolution would continue Western European leadership. In the 
Deutsche Ideologie Marx and Engels had already explained that a 
communist revolution could never proceed from the rural areas but 
only from the cities.39 Thia allegation was repeated in the 
Communist Manifesto. Consequently, from the viewpoint of Marx 
and Engels any revolutionary movement in Eastern Europe, where 
1 ~ l~gc majority of the people were still peasants~ could only 
have a relative signif.icance. It might at best serve as an 
instrument in furthering the communist revolution. So the 
Manifesto announced the readiness of the communists to collaborate 
\Vith the most advanced revolutionary group among the Poles, that 
is, the left wing of the Polish democrats.40 
The quest.ion was whether at that t.ime the Polish radicals 
were willing to collaborate with the communists. Indeed, 
38Ibid. 
-
39MEGA, I/5 50. Cf. also Engels, 0 Die.Kommunisten und 
Karl He.inzen~" Deutsche Bruesseler Zeitung, October 3, 1847, in 
~' I/6, 2~5-86. 
4o~, I/6, 556. 
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the ideas proclaimed in the Manifesto created a precarious 
situation for the realization of such collaboration. Polish 
radicals supported the traditional concept of international 
solidarity which was propagated by the European Left and which 
stressed the fraternization of peoples on the basis of equality. 
Many of the Polish radicals wero also in favor of the Slavic idea 
according to which the Slavs would play·an important role in the 
regeneratioµ of Europe. The Ma.nifesto challenged both ideas. It 
defended the concept of leadership of the most advanced and most 
revolutionary people, and it stressed the importance of Western 
Europe in the future radical revolution. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE POLISH QUESTION 
Relations b2,_tyzee_~ Poles and Western Europeans after 1815 
In November, 18!~7 Marx and Engels made their first public 
statements on the Polish question as participants of an inter-
national meeting of radicals in London. By that time a long-
establishetl tradition of revolutionary contacts existed between 
Western European ci.nd Polish radicals. 1 
In the post-Napoleonic era, when the underground 
Carbonari movement spread from Western to Eastern Europe, hope for 
a European-wide uprising against the political and territorial 
arrangements of the Vienna treaties of 1815 stimulated col-
laboration among French, Italian, German, and Polish Carbonari. 2 
---~-· 1For a gene~al survey on the European Left see David 
Caute, Jhe ~et_~n ~oEe ?inse 1z89, World University Library 
(New York ana 'l'oronto :McGraw 'I-f:LII"l3ook Co., 1966). 
2Marian Kukiel, "Lelewel, Mickiewicz and the Underground 
Movement of European Revolution {1816-33)," The Polish Review, 
V (Summer, 1960), 59-77. 
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But the European insurrections of 1830-31 did not develop into a 
European-wide revolution. The Polish uprising against the 
Tsarist government, which broke out in the Polish Kingdom on 
November 20, 1830, remained isolated. The insurgents aimed at the 
restoration of the Polish borders of 1772. But they did not 
receive any help from outside. Within a few months the Tsarist 
government crushed the revolt. Subsequently, Nicholas I deprived 
the Polish f(ingdom of all the constitutional rights granted by 
Alexander I. 
The fate of the Polish uprising called forth an immense 
reaction of sympathy for the Poles among all the Europeans who 
desired cha.nges. The conviction was widespread that the Polish 
revolt had prevented Nicholas I from realizing his plan to invade 
France, suppress the Paris uprising, and restore the ~:U.? .9E2· 
The enthusiasm for the Poles was accompanied by a tremendous 
spread of Russophobia in Europe which had earlier been restricted 
to Fra.nce.3 
Suddenly a large number of Europeans became convinced that 
the Russj_an :E.."npire had emerged from the Napoleonic Wars as a 
= 3For a s:.rvey. of European Russophobia see Raymond T. 
McNally, "The Origins of Russophobia in France, 1812-30, 11 
Amer:b£?1L}~.1f2:.~2..Y2:£!, XVII (April, 1958) 173-90; Oscar J. R'arnm(;m, 11li're0 1''.Alrope versus Russia1 1830-1B5lr," Th? An_!_e_ri~Qan S;J.a_Y2-c ~ Th:..st European Review, XI (February, 19;2) ~·27-Zi-~ 
J(onn ~wos"l:rreason, 1·~ of Russo12h2.P.ia _?.n Great Britain 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U"ni verstty Press, 1 95'0). 
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power to be reckoned with in European affairs. In fact, within 
one century, since Peter the Great had turned the face of Russia 
towards the West, the Russian Empire had made a formidable 
westward advance due to the progressive dismemberment of the 
Polish Republic (Rzeczposp2lita Po~) since 1772.4 The Fifth 
Partition of Poland, dictated by the Vienna treaties of 1815, had 
turned Poznania and West Prussia over to Prussia, and Galicia to 
Austria. The Russian Empire retained Lithuania, White Russia, and 
the Eastern Ukraine, 83% (about 239.000 sq. mi.).of the former 
Polish territories.5 Since 1815 the western border of the Russian 
:E}npire had extended from Finland to the Black Sea. Moreover, with 
the creation of the Polish Kingdom ruled by the Russian Tsar the 
:E}npire had acquired a western outpost which was driven like a 
wedge into Central Eastern Europe. 
The expansionist drive of Russia filled European liberals 
and radicals w:Lth great apprehension for the future fate of 
Ghe Rzecz:Bospol:i. ta Polska which originated from the Union 
of Lublin in 13b9 iS-aiso calfecf"'Ifistorical Poland, or Polish 
Commonwealth, or Polish-Lithuanian State. For general information 
on Polish history see the standard nork: .'fll_~.§lmbr:Ld_ge Hi,stor;L.2.! 
Po1~ 2 from .A.~i.?.'lJ:..~tus II to P=k..lsur!B}):i (169'7-1935), ed. by Wo 1'~ 
e daway, J.1!. '15enson~ o. ttalecki, TI. Dyboski. (Cambridge: The 
University Press, 1941;, and Oskar Haleck.i, A History of Poland, 
trans. by Monica M. Gardner (rev. ed.; New tort::' lloyFUb"frsliers, 
1966). 
. 5wilhelm Feldman, Q_~schichte der p,2.l~ischen Id~eR~in 
eit 9~esse2l..J..eilun~~n (1722::1.2TIT (PiuniCii: l<. tfiaeri'6ourg, 191 
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European liberty and civilization. Although Prussia and Austria 
collaborated with Russia for the preservation of the ~j;atus guo 
in Europe, Russia was considered the worst enemy of progress. It 
was stigmatized as the center of Etiropean reaction and as a 
barbaric country. Both liberals and radicals agitated for the 
dissolution of the Russian Empire and the restoration of Poland. 
But only the radicals were unanimous iri their demand for a 
revolutionary war against Russia waged by the revolutionary 
European people.6 
The agitation for a war against Russia and European 
revolutionary solidarity was supported by the radical Polish 
emigrants who had participated in the Polish uprising, among them 
Joachim_Lelewel (1786-1861), the former head of the Polish 
Carbonari in the 1820 1s; Karol Stolzman (1793-1854); and 
Stanislaw Worcell (1799-1857). 
After their arrival in Western Europe, these men 
contacted former members of the Carbonari movement (which had 
-bAithough the Rnglish and French liberal bourgeoisie 
regarded Poland as a welcome ally against the Russian pov1er, it 
had no interest in European wars and did not wish to rush into a 
war for the Poles. Among the leading German liberals the 
Southern Germans becrune the foremost champions of a war against 
Russia.. But their interest in the Poles was largely determined by 
their opposition to Prussia., Cf. Georg w. Hallgarten, Stud=b.!€:!! 
ueber die deutsche Polenfreundschaft in der Periode der""11a'erz-
TeVO!iif:r~-Tf.1Unfcnand~denoourg-: i928T;""pp; ~T1 • 
disintegrated in 1831) and particularly the Italian radical, 
Giuseppe Mazzin:i (1805-72). In the following years Mazzini 
became the foremost defender of Polish liberation. Mazzini was 
convinced that a future European revolution would only be 
successful if it transcended the goal of the French Revolution, 
the realization of individual liberty. It must proclaim. the right 
to national liberty because in a large part of Europe it did not 
yet exist. 7. 
In a letter to Lelewel of June 25, 1832, Mazzini expressed 
his belief that a revolutionary reorganization of Europe, which 
would include the restoration of Poland, could only be the result 
of the 11uniyersal association of the nations. 118 In Switzerland 
on April 15, 1834, Lelewel's compatriots Stolzman and Ludwik 
Mieroslawski (1814-78), together with Italian and German emigrants, 
helped Mazzini to found the organization Young Europe. Mazzini 
was convinced that Poles, _Germans, and Italians were predestined to 
initiate the movement for European unification because they had not 
yet achieved a unified national state. Young Europe was conceived 
-fG'iuse:ppe Mazzini, "Sulla iniziative rivoluzionaria 
d'Europa 11 (1835), in sg.gti .s~_elt~;J ed. by Giuseppe Sati:tonastaso, 
Scrittori politici itab .. anl,Vor. XLII (Bologna: Nicola 
Zanichelli, Edi tore, 1 9L~8), p. 187. 
8Adam Lewak, "Giuseppe Mazzini e 1 1 emigrazione polacca," 
Il Ri~~1rn.epto J_~alian~, XVII (1924), 125, quoted in Guenther 
yck, 11Nazzini 1 s Young Europe, 11 Jotu"nal of .Qentral Europ2211. A.ffag_eJ 
VII (January, 1958), 358. 
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as the vanguard of that movement. The statutes of the organization 
proclaimed that "nationality is sacred." They condemned national 
oppression, stressed the right of each nation to liberty and 
equality, and demanded the founding of a European republican 
federation in order to protect the liberated nations from any kind 
of overlordship in the future and in order to realize the 
"brotherhood of mankind. 119 
From the beginning the organization Young Europe was 
weakened because it did not succeed in bringing together all the 
major revolutionary groups within a given nation. The Polish 
Democratic Society (TO\'p.rz~stwo pemokram~e Polskie), which was 
founded in·1832 in Paris, was unwilling to support Young Europe 
although the Polish members felt that it was an excellent 
_ instrument "to fortify the cause of Polish democracy • • • and 
to ensure the collaboration of foreign democrats." 10 The 
organization was dissolved by order of the Swiss government in 
1836. It was the first important international of revolutionaries 
in the fight against the monarchic order in Europe. 
During the following years members of the left wing of the 
Democratic Society continued to associate with Mazzini and his 
-9Giuseppe Mazzini i Seri tt:L edi ti ed inedi ti, ed. under the 
direction of Mazzini (9 vols .. ; MiTano: G. 158.'elTI";"-Editore, 
1861-77), v, 34; 
10 Cf. Stolzman 1 s letter of April, 1834, quoted in Eyck, 
"Mazzini's Young Europe," p. 362 .. 
:wwn 
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followers. Untj_l his death in 1857 Stanisl'aw Vlorcell, the "father 
of Polish socialism," was a close friend of Mazzini. 11 
Mazzini's ideas were especially attractive to the Polish 
democrats because he stressed the right to national self-
deter~ination. Moreover, Mazzini never wavered in his support of 
the restoration of a democratic Poland from "the Baltic to the 
Black Sea and from the mouth of the Nie·men to that of the Dnieper" 
as a bulwax:-k against Russia. A restored Poland would prevent the 
Russian Er.apire from forcing all the Slavs into a "monstrous 
unitary empire which would impose its dictatorship upon all of 
Europe. 11 It would enable the Poles, the "most Westernized Slavs," 
to spread Western European ideals among the more backward Eastern 
Slavs and to continue their ancient civilizing mission among 
them. 12 
The political concept of a restored Poland as a European 
bulwark against Russia corresponded to the traditional Polish 
propaganda in Western Europe ever since the late eighteenth 
century. This propaganda was now taken up by the Polish Democratic 
-1·1 ·-Willi.am James Linton, ~1ropean Republicans. Recollec-
t:i.ons of Mazzini and His Friends (London: '.Lawrence and ""'Till"llen, 
1]92), .PP• 311.1--42. 
12Giuseppe Mazzinj_, Lettere slave, with a Foreword by 
Fabrizio Canfor~ (Bari: Giuseppe Lat·er-za & Figli, 1939), 
pp. 73-?Li·· 
Society. 13 The political program of the Society outlined in the 
Manifesto of 1836 called for the restoration of Poland "from the 
--
Oder and the Carpathian mountains to the Borysthenes and the 
Dwina, [and] from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 111 4 
The political program also included a demand for the 
liberation of the peasants. This was largely due to the influence 
of the left-wing democrats led by Lelewel. Their insistence upon 
the social ~evolution led to contacts with the Chartist movement 
in England, and even with the communist German Workers Educational 
League (Deutscher .Arbeiterpildun~verein) in London,and with the 
secret communist League of the Just, the precursor of the 
Communist L~ague. 1 5 Yet, these contacts were much less enduring 
than those with the Hazzinians. 
13For information on Polish anti-Russian propaganda see 
Feldman, Geschichte der Polj.tischen Ideen, pp. 43 ff. 
l4~Ianifesto, p. 16, quoted in R. Fe Leslie, Reform and 
Insl.!££~~.ion inHll§S;LQ.p. Po1
4
tnf 18_26-1 ~.2. (London: Un"ive'i-si ty of 
toiiCion, ~~e-i.:>ress, 9 3), p. 12. . 
·i5StanisJ:aw Worcell was acquainted with the Chartists 
George Julian Harney, William James Linton, and James V/atson. Cf. 
Celina Bobinska, 1.-ra~~.~l~eber polniscl}_e, Prob_;!.~ P: 73. 
Worcell, Kurol St'Olzman, and <lozef~e in con-cact with the 
German Workers Educational League and the League of the Just. Cf o 
Engels, On the History of the Communist Lea{£ue, in Marx-Engels iele,s;tr::.flVor!:t's~TlTos·co\vr - FOre-ign~l'.:anguage Pl10I:Lshing!l'Ouse;l951 ) , 
I, 31 o. '.Cudwik Oborski collaborated nith the Chartists and the 
German Workers Educational League. Cf. Helmut Krause, Marx und 
En 'els und da2-zeit~}l.C?.e.?_~~.}l,S§land, l1arbu:ger Abhan~Tungen 
zur Gesc1ic te und-Y~ultur Osteuropas, Vol. I (Giessen: Wilhelm 
Schmitz Verlag, 1958), p. 18. 
--- ~ 
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In the thirties and forties the aforementioned revolu-
tionary groups, including a variety of others like the Fraternal 
Democrats and the exiled Societe Democraj?j.gue Frangaise, maintainec 
contacts through international meetings which continued to pro-
pagandize the idea of international solidarity and the fraterni-
zation of the people. Meetings were frequently held in support of 
the restoration of Poland, and special committees for the 
regeneration of Poland were organized. The English Chartist 
leaders George Julian Harney and Ernest Jones were actively engaged 
in the pro-Polish propaganda campaign. 16. 
In these international circles of the mid-forties, Marx 
and Engels met with Polish left-wing democrats, among them 
Stanislaw Worcell, Ludwik Oborski, and Joachim Lelewei. 17 From 
November, 1847 to February, 1848, Marx collaborated with Lelewel in 
the newly founded international organization,the Democratic 
Association (~'Association D__cmocratigue) in Brussels, of which 
Marx and Lelewel were vice-presidents. At that time Marx and 
Engels were great admirers of the aging Lelewel who was not only 
-.,.;Cf. Mark Hovell~ J'he __fharti_et Movemen,.i (Manchester: 
The University Press, 1918;, pp. 28'°'5"=6: 
· 
17rn the mid-forties Marx and Engels worked together with 
the German Workers Educa.tional League and the Fraternal Democrats 
which the Chartists also collaborated with. Marx and Engels were 
on friendly terms with the Chartists, Feargus O'Connor, Jones, and 
Harney. Engels wrote for the Chartist newspaper, No}-"therE .§taF. 
Cf. Hovell, op. cit., pp. 285-6. For :Marx and EngeYSi s Tulisli 
contacts cf. J:To"Ofiis'Ea, op • .C.i t!.., pp. 70-3. 
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an outstanding Polish revolutionary, the "father of Polish 
democracy," but also a remarkable historian. 18 Indeed Lelewel 
remained the only Pole of renown with whom they entertained close 
and very friendly relations. These relations ended with the 
outbreak of the Revolution of 1848. 
An Interpretation of Polish Histol'.l, 
During the period of their enthusiasm for Lelewel, Marx 
and Engels favored the basic concept of his revolutionary theory 
that an agrarian democracy was the proper solution for Poland, a 
concept which they rejected in later years. Lelewel derived his 
belief in the agrarian democracy from his democratic and 
romanticist interpretation of the Polish past which he presented to 
the Western· European public in his two-volume work L'histoire de 
Pologne published in 1844 in Paris. Although Engels did not 
- mention the book before the summer of 181+8 in the Neue Rheinische 
Ze~tung (Cologne), it may be assumed that Marx and Engels had 
become acquainted with Lelewel's work before 1848, and that a great 
deal of information on Polish conditions was derived from it. l9 
· ·=rnFor a biography of 
.!l.Q.a9,lhiULbelei'@.,l_ ( 1 Z..86-1861 ).t 
l' Auteur, 1927). 
Lelewel see Stanislas Kaczorowski, 
Histori~n p~lo_n.§~? (Paris: Pour 
- l9(Since Marx and Engels did not know Polish, they only 
had access to the translated Polish literature. There is no 
evidence that in the forties Marx and Engels had a thorough 
knowledge of it.) In the summer of 1848 Engels also referred to a 
work by Lu~wik Mieroslawski on the,..insurrection of 1830-31, Debat 
Thtr-2~.la Fevol~ip_p .e~ la contre-reyo_l,ution en..E.olog~. Engels 
t ought highly of the book. Many years earlier. Engels had praised 
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Yet, their interpretation of the Polish past was different 
from Lelewel's. 
Lelewel was a Slavophile. 20 He maintained that the 
democratic principle of individual ·liberty and equality which the 
West ~ad only recently discovered had been an integral part of the 
Slavic social and political structure of the early Middle Ages. 
In the later Middle Ages under the rule· of the Piasts, the Poles 
were able t.o infuse an expanding civilization with the ancient 
democratic traditions of the Slavs. They created an aristocratic 
democracy which was far superior to the Western European feudal 
system based on the "enslavement" of the individuai. 21 
Ac.cording to Lelewel the principle of equal rights shared 
by all the Polish nobles attracted the nobles of Lithuania and 
~ (roughly modern White Russia and the Ukraine) to such an exten 
that they were willing to enter into a union with the Poles in 
the 11excellentn work on the Polish insurrection by the Polish 
count Roman Soltyk. In his opinion it was superior to another 
work on the Polish uprising by the German Friedrich von Smitt 
published in Berlin in 1839. Engels was certain that Smitt had 
written the book 11by order of the King of Prussia." Cf. Engels's 
letter to Wilhelm Graeber, October 8, 1839, in ~' I/2, 539. 
20cr. his praise of the Slavic spirit: 
L'histoire ~ Po+ogne, trans. by E. Rykaczewski 
librairie Po ona1Ge, 184l1-), II/2, 187. 
21 Ibid., I, 78, 91; II/2, 61-65,83. 
Joachim Lelewel, 
(2 vols.; Paris: 
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1569.22 Lelewel considered the Union of Lublin as the climax of 
Polish history. It represented the "first" attempt in Europe to 
organize a vast political entity on the basis of a voluntary 
federation. Lelewel suggested that the Europeans ought to learn 
from the Poles and use the federal principle for a regeneration of 
Europe. 23 
Lelewel maintained that the Union enabled the Poles to 
perform a civilizing mission among the more backward White-
Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians. But the Poles failed to 
accomplish the second task--to integrate the vast territory of 
the Union, which extended to the Dnieper, under the guiding 
principle of the extension of liberty. 
Lelewel claimed this failure was due to the infiltration 
of Polish political thought at the turn of the sixteenth century 
---
with the paternalistic notion of Roman law and the principle of 
absolute power. Under the influence of these Western }Airopean 
concepts, the Polish nobles sought concentration of power. They 
curtailed the liberties of the townspeople and enslaved the 
22
'l.1he term Rus designates the Kievan state which existed 
from the nineth to t~thirteenth century A.D. with Kiev and 
Novgorod as its centers. Michael Hrushevsky, A History of the 
Ukraine, trans. by o. G. Frederik.sen with a ForewordbyGeorge 
VernaCfsky (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 39-41. 
23 . Lelewel, OJ2. _cit., II/2, 107. 
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peasants completely. 24 They also aimed at the subjugation of the 
Cossacks. The Polish nobles rejected the demand of the Cossacks 
to send representatives to the Polish ~elm (Diet). They would not 
grant aristocratic privileges to the Cossacks and were reluctant 
to include the Cossacks into the Union as equal partners of Poles 
and Lithuanians. 25 
Lelewel concluded that the revolt of the Cossacks in the 
1640's, which developed into a widespread peasant uprising, marked 
the beginning of the decay of the Polish Republic. The revolt led 
to the first triumph of the Tsar of Moscow over the Poles when the 
Cossacks placed their territory east of the Dnieper under his 
protection with the treaty of Pereiaslav in 165Lh 
In Lelewel's opinion the restriction of liberty was the 
. 
2411These unhappy people [the peasants] were regarded by 
their seigneurs as non-human beings with whom they could do what 
they wanted, sell them like cattle, force them to work like 
animals, and take their life." Lelewel, gp. cit., II/2, 248. 
25Ibid., pp. 264 ff. In 1963 the Slavic Review published 
a series of~icles which reopened the old' controvei .. sy over the 
significance of the Rzec~~~a Polska. The noted Polish 
historian Oscar Hale"C1'2Lmaintainea-i;liaf":rt had been a true 
federation based on a large amount of local autonomy. But Joseph 
Jackstas and Oswald Backus III opposed this view. They argued that 
the main aim of the Poles was to extend their ovm power in the 
Union. At first they enlarged their territorial possessions at the 
expense of Lithuania, and in the se·1enteenth century they tried to 
destroy the Cossacks. The oppressive Polish policies weakened the 
Union and led to .its decay. Cf. Oswald P. Backus III, Oskar 
Halecki, and Joseph Jakstas, 11The Question of ~e.c.zl?..9spoli~ 
E.Qlska," Slavic Revi~, XXII (September, 1963), 41r:32, 439-50. 
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main cause of Poland's decay. He did not lament the economic 
backwardness of the Polish Republic. He claimed that the lack of 
prosperous towns and a wealthy middle class had at least prevented 
the Polish ki.ngs from establishing absolutism, the enemy of 
individual liberty, in Poland. Consequently, Lelewel believed 
that the regeneration of Poland depended in the first place upon 
the restoration of the ancient Slavic democratic principles and 
the extension of liberty and equality to all the people. 
Lelewel's interpretation of the Polish past had little 
in common with Marx's and Engels's approach to history. He did 
not measure the progress of a nation by its ability to create a 
unified national state and to expand the manufacturing activities. 
Neverth~less, Marx and Engels retained a great esteem for Lelewel 
as a historian, but only because he had taken up the social 
question and had presented the enslavement of the peasants as a 
major question of Polish history.26 They did not share Lelewel's 
enthusiasm for tho democratic spirit of the Slavs, the 
aristocratic democracy, and the civilizing mission of the Poles. 
Nor did they care for Lelewel 1 s support of political decentraliza-
tion and federalism nor for his antagonism to the Vlestern European 
development. 
~In 1858 Marx stated that Lelewel belo.nged to the 
historians who "initiated a real progress in contemporary 
historiography • • • because they penetrated from the outward 
politj_ca.l forms to the internal social life • .. • With his 
L 
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In their interpretation of Polish history, Marx and 
Jt::Ugels followed the same method which they applied to German 
history. They compared Polish history with the ideal historical 
pattern--the Western European development from medieval 
decentralization to a progressive political centralization, and 
from the medieval prevalence of agriculture to the growth of towns 
and the expansion of commerce and manufacturing. The result was 
that they could not help but consider Polish history a failure. 
Other Germans had done so. Georg Hegel had a very low 
opinion of the Polish past. To him the celebrated ancient 
Polish liberty was merely an instrument of the nobles to limit the 
King's power. The nobles had wished to preserve the backward 
medieva~ institution of an elective monarchy. But they lacked 
political insight. By preventing the development of a strong 
political center, the nobles had permitted the destruction of 
Poland to take place. Polish history served as a warning that 
"the state must have absolute authority in order to survive."27 
Friedrich List also attrj.buted the decay of the Polish 
Republic to the short-sightedness of the nobles ·who did everything 
thorough' examination of the economic conditions which made of the 
free Polish peasant a serf, the venerable Lelewel has done more 
to explain the reasons for the subjugation of his fatherland than 
the whole gang of scribblers whose repertoire consists of 
invectives against Russia." New York Dail;y: Tr,i12Q_~, May. 11, 1858. 
27The Pffiloso;ehy -~f Hegel, pp. 46-65. 
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to maintain the old feudal order. List stressed their lack of 
economic insight. The Polish nobles were unable to understand 
that in the modern age the survival of the state depended upon 
its economic strength. Consequently, they had opposed the 
adoption of the Western European mercantilist policies. However, 
only the development of a native industry and of populous cities 
would have strengthened Poland and preserved i.ts "independence and 
political preponderance over less civilized neighbors." Poland 
was "erased from the list of nations for want of. a strong middle 
class" interested in economic progress. 28 
The basic position of Hegel and List concerning Polish 
history was also adopted by Marx and Engels. They maintained 
that the decay of Poland and the ensuing Polish partitions 
resulted from the continuation of a medieval political, economic, 
and social system. 
Although Marx's and Engels's statements on the Polish 
past extend over several decades, they may be treated in a 
comprehensive manner at this point because their basic inter-
pretation of Polish history remained consistent. This inter-
pretation also agreed· with their evaluation of the historical 
development as presented in the Communist Manife~. 
des 
in 
of 
28F;.ied~ich List, "Die Freiheit und die Beschraenkungen 
auslaendischen Handels vom historischen Gesj_chtspunkt" (1839), 
ye~amme;!J~_i?s.hr:,iften, II, 65. Cf. also Lis.t, Nat~l Sy.s.te111 
Pol_:ht~~CJ,1.,~.Q.QJE~, p. 273. 
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Marx and Engels repeatedly acknowledged a certain analogy 
in the history of Poland and Germany when they compared it with 
the Western European development towards the elimination of the 
feudal system since the sixteenth century. Engels observed that 
in England feudalism was undermined through the alliance of the 
gentry with the towns. In France this was done through the 
political centralization under an absolute monarch who profited 
from the opposition between the nobility and the bourgeoisie. 
Simultaneously, Poland and Germany were unable to overcome 
medieval decentralization which resulted in the lack of a strong 
political center in both countries. While Germany consisted of 
a great number of large and small political units, Poland was 
composed of a conglomerate of feudal provinces. 
Engels insisted that the Polish political system was 
even more backward than the German. Germany had developed in the 
Middle Ages a "complex feudal hierarchy" which was a flmuch higher 
form" of political organization than the Polish aristocratic 
democracy. In later centuries centralization uas at least 
achieved j_n the single German states under absolutist rule. But 
the Polish aristocratic democracy "based on bondage" perpetuated 
the complete weakness at the center. According to Engels it was 
"one of the most.primitive systems of social organization" and 
--
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reminiscent of conditions in the territories conquered by the 
Germanic peoples at the beginning of the Middle Ages. 29 
Engels related the political backwardness of Poland to 
the economic conditions. The Polish constitution prevented 
11unified national action" because the liberum veto allowed any 
deputy to dissolve the Diet and even to annull its previous 
d . . 30 ecisi.ons. Simultaneously, the lack of prosperous towns and 
an expanding industry increased the internal weakness of Poland 
an4 diminished its defensive strength at a time when Poland's 
"neighbors progressed, formed a middle class, developed comr.a.erce 
and industry, and created large towns."3l The political and 
economic weakness sentenced Poland to perish. The country became 
an "easy prey" of its powerful neighbors who devastated it in 
never~ending wars and turned it into their "tavern." 
Over the years Marx's and Engels' s basic convj_ctj_on that 
the political, social, and economic backwardness of the Polish 
republic helped to destroy that state remained unchanged. But 
'2"9Friedrich Engels, "Der deutsche Bauernkrieg," Neue 
Rheinische Zeitung, Politisch-oekonomische Revue, No .. 5,May-
Octo15e"i~115~cf. by Karl Marx, facsimile ed., with a Foreword 
by Karl Bittel (Berlin: Ruetten & Loening, 1955), p. 258. 
30Friedrich Engels, "Die ausvraertige Poli tik des 
russischen Zarentums," Die Neue Zeit, VIII (1890), 148. 
3 i Frederic 1'ngels, "What have the Working Classes to do 
with Poland?" ( 1866), .Arch].v fuer di2, Geschichte des §g~ialis™ 
g_nd de!: Ar'!?='?l:..~g~..;n_g, VITf916 J, z:rg:-
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when they dee.lt with the question of the ultimate causes of Polish 
backwardness, they made some startling and contradictory 
, 
statements. Such repeated inconsistencies were for the most part 
dictated by a desire to ridicule an· opponent. They indicate how 
necessary it is to be careful in the interpretation of Marx's and 
Engels's statements and to differentiate between basic positions 
and transitory assertions derived from their temporary involvement 
in some pol~mics. 
Generally, Marx and Engels attributed the economic 
backwardness of the Polish Republic to the feudal aristocracy who 
subjugated the common people to further their own agricultural 
interests. But in 18L~8 Engels ventured the staggering explanation 
that the German emigrants had the greatest responsibility for 
Polish economic and political backwardness. His intention was to 
ridicule the popular German argument that for centuries the 
German emigrants had performed a civilizing mission in the Slavic 
countries,including Poland. 
Engels stated that the history of the Slavs proved their 
inability to initiate the development of tovms and trades. The 
Slavs were "predominantly an agricultural people, hardly qualified 
for the management of urban trade. u32 Engels cla:Lmed that the 
~;ich Engels, 11 m_e Polendebatte in Frankfurt, 11 
Neue Rhej_nische Zeittm,.g, (in later footnotes referred to as !:IB2i) 
August §, 1 8L~8 .- -- , 
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German eastward emigration since the Middle Ages had not promoted 
economic, political, or cultural progress among the Slavs. The 
Germans had reached "the peak of their development with the 
1?2tit-bourgeoisie of the medieval towns" where the desire for 
great enterprises was absent. They never outgrew the Eetit-
bour~ois mentality. Consequently, the German emigrants in the 
Slavic towns did not rise above their old position of artisans 
and small traders. This was also true in Poland. 
According to Engels the Germans helped to prolong 
medieval conditions in Poland because they were unable to exploit 
the excellent opportunities for large-scale commercial and 
industrial enterprises, but, above all, because they were 
separati13ts. 
The Germans • • • obstructed centralization, the most 
powerful political means for the fast development of a 
country, by their different language, by separating 
themselves from the Polish people, and by their 7. 
thousandfold different privileges and municipal laws.J3 
~hey also prevented the formation of Polish towns with a Polish 
bourgeoisie. German backwardness had hindered the modernization of 
Poland and the creation of a unified nation state. 
Several months later, when Engels fought Pan-Slav demands, 
lhe contradicted himself without any scruples. He praised the 
German civilizing mission among the Slavs. He declared that the 
____ """"" ___ ..,.,...._,._., ________ ,.""""""""'""'-' _, _____ --~-------""' 
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German reconquest of the territories between the Elbe and Warthe 
rivers, which had been inhabited by the Slavs since the seventh 
century, was "in the interest of civilization." The Germans had 
reached a higher stage of industrial, commercial, agricultural, 
and cultural development. Germanization enabled the Slavs to 
participate in a "historical development which would have remained 
entirely foreign to them had they been left to themselves." 
Especially, the subjugation of the Austrian Slavs to German rule 
was one of the "worthiest deeds" in Germany history. Engels 
made one reservation regarding the Poles. Although they had as 
little inclination towards the trades as the other Slavs, they 
were less retrograde.34 
But two years later, in 1851, when Engels returned to the 
subject of the German ~ na_yh Ost~, he insisted that even the 
Poles had profited from German superiorj_ty. He stated that among 
the Slavs "the Western Slavs (Poles and Czechs), in particular, 
are essentially an agricultural race. 1135 Consequently, it was 
quite natural that the Germans and also the Jews, who were 
"certainly Germans rather than Slavs," developed trade and 
manufacture in the Slavic tovms and organized commercial relations 
34Friedrich Engels, "Dem okra tischer Panslavismus, " 
~' February 16, 1849. · 
. 35Karl Marx, ;Revo.J-2t;Lo]J. and Coun~er-RevoltliC?P, or Germa& 
2:_n 18!±.§_, trans. and ed. by E!Ieanor Marx Avellilif"T.Conaon: s. 
Sonnennchein, 1896), p. 59. 
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with the rural areas. The annexation of the western Polish 
territories by the Germans was due to the economic inferiority 
of the Polish Republic. It represented the last phase of the long 
process of disintegration which the Slavic element underwent since 
the Middle Ages. 
In 1902 the German l'iarxist historian Franz Mehring crit-
icized in a scholarly fashion the shortcomings of Marx and Engels 
in their in~erpretation of the Polish historical development. He 
agreed that Marx and Engels were right to attribute Poland's 
decay to the lack of political centralization and urban development 
However, their analysis of the ultimate causes of Polish 
backwardnes.s was wrong. It vms unreasonable to ascribe Polish 
conditions to the presence of German emigrants or to the supposed 
inability of the Poles to organize an urban industry.36 The 
economic abilities of individuals and nations, said Mehring, were 
not determined by their racial origin. Besides, Marx's and 
Engels's contention concerning the Poles had been disproved by the 
industrial progress in the Polish Kingdom since the 185o•s. 
Apparently Mehring assumed that Marx's and Engels's statements on 
Germans and Poles were made in good faith and were free of any 
polemical implications$ 
36 Aus ~-;.m li terari?cl?:f.n Nac~lass vron Kf-rl Marx t.. .Friedrich 
1'!!./itl.sk up.q_'P .. erd:inanc1'"..cyl~le, ed. wi :Cn a Forewora by-Franz 
Mehring (L~ vols.; Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz Nachf., GmbH, 1902), 
III (Introduction), 28-30. 
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According to Mehring the geographical position of Poland 
was the major cause of its decay.37 Already in the Middle Ages, 
when Constantinople was the center of world trade, Poland lay 
outside of the great trade routes. With the discovery of the 
New World the Polish state was still further removed from the 
great trade routes. This had a worse effect upon Poland than upon 
Germany because the Polish economy was more backward. The urban 
development, which had just begun, was ended, while the power of 
the great landowners increased. 
When Poland became the granary of Western E.'urope in the 
modern age, the landovmers monopolized the production of grain as 
well as the grain trade. They enforced the prohibition of the 
exportat.ion of Polish goods and the unlimited importation of forai.§: 
goods. They enslaved the peasants and ruined the Polish merchants 
and artisans. Mehring observed that by ruining the tovms the 
lando\~1ers also destroyed the basis of the great political, social, 
and economic evolution which marked the passage from the Middle 
Ages to the modern age in Western Europe.38 
Twentieth century historians have verified Mehring's 
assumption that the growth of grain export led to social changes 
----·~----~,._..~~~-:;7 ~., p. 26. 
38rt is.noteworthy that Mehring's critical approach to the 
writings of Yiarx and Engels is completely absent in the worl<;: of 
the contemporary Marxist historian Celina Bobinska. Cf. Bobinska, 
~!_£;! .. i.• .. t pp. 39-53. 
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and the ensle.vement of the peasants. The Polish historian Jan 
Rutkowski has stated that a system of tribute-payments in money 
and in kind prevailed in the High ~tiddle Ages when new land was 
colonized. The Peace of Torun (1466), which had given Poland an 
outlet to the Baltic Sea, marked the beginning of the transition 
to an extensive system of labour services. This development 
coincided with the growth of grain export.39 
The Ukrainian historian Michael Hrushevsky also emphasized 
the influence of the grain export upon the social structure. He 
declared that in the Ukraine of the sixteenth century (then a 
part of Poland) "serfdom made its initial appearance in Western 
Ukraine vrhere the demand for grain (for export) first appeared in 
the latter half of the sixteenth century. "l~O The findings of these 
historians confirmed that in the Polish Republic commercial 
expansion, accompanied by the growth of a money economy, did not 
weaken feudalism but strengthened it. 
In the mid-fifties Marx and Engels no longer adhered 
to the simple statement made in the Communist Manifesto that the 
development of commerce undermined feudalism. In his work ~ 
39Jan Rutkowski, HistQ.!Ee elo~~i.9,~~- de la Pol~tne avant 
les par.t_a~es, trans. by Ma~a ows ca, aris: U"niversi e, 
ins ti tut cfi"~tudes slaves, bibliotheque polonaise, Vol. I (Paris: 
Champion, 1927), .pp. 31-.36. . 
40Hrushevsky, fl. H_j.stori of the ~V~rain<!, pp. 172-74. 
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.!}:a:eital, whose basic .ideas were formulated in 1857-58, Marx stated 
that commercial expans.ion must not necessarily lead to the 
destruction of feudalism.4 1 
Neither Marx nor Engels applied this new .insight to their 
interpretation of the Polish past. Both were aware of the 
recrudescence of feudalism in Eastern Europe in the modern age. 
Engels called it a "second serfdom.u However, he did not go into 
an analysis· of this phenomenon.42 
When, .in 1856, ·Marx discussed the reappearance of 
servitude .in the Polish Republic, he ascr.ibed it to the end of 
"the wars of conquest and colonization." He maintained that, 
contrary to· the assumption of Lelewel and his school, the g_m:!-_n_£ 
- ,_,, = "4TM~x observed that the "d.issolving .influence" which 
-- commerce vrill have upon the old economtc order depends upon the 
char·acter of this system, "its solidity and .internal articulation"; 
and, in particular, "what new mode of production will take the 
place of the old mode of production itself." In connection with 
this observation Marx mentioned that 11in the antique world the 
effect of commerce and the development of merchant capital always 
results in slave economy .. " ,Q£E.,ital, III, 390, quoted in Maurice 
Dobb, ~tu~}~~e Dev~,;.9Pll!el]_t Q.f 9a_Eital:i.sl}! (rev. ed.; New 
York: mternationari>Ublishers, 19b'_3), p. lr2• Cf. the comments 
of th0 English economist Maurice Dobb on the influence of the 
growth of a money economy upon the medieval social structure and 
his comments on Marx's position. 11There seems, in fact, to be as 
much evidence that the growth of a money economy ~se led to an 
intenGification of serfdom as thore is evidence t~IT was the 
cause of the feudal decl.ine." Dobb, opus. cit., pp. 37-43. 
42:E.ngels's letter to Marx, December 16, 1882, in Karl 
Marx and F.r.iedr.ich E-.agels, Correspondence 1846-18.95. A Select.ion 
~1L.CQ...DQ~e:g..iar;z. an£. Not~~' trans. and ed. bYJ)OiiaT0rr (London: ·• 
n • .uawrence, ~at. , W5li1, pp. 407-08. . 
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(the ancient agrarian commune) had never been fully independent. 
Because of the patriarchal relations between the domains of the 
aristocracy and the £2P:ina, the peasants enjoyed only a relative 
freedom. When the aristocracy was·no longer able to acquire new 
land .through conquests or colonization, these patriarchal 
relations led to "servitude." The peasants, who were'!i.ncapable 
of playing the role of a real middle class, became ••• the 
1'.Y.!UPenprolgtari& (wretched proletar~at) of the aristocracy. "L:-3 
Marx made this statement at the time when he prepared 
Das Kapital. In this work he discussed the dissolution of the 
peasant classes in Western Europe under the impact of the 
industrial.revolution. This process was presented as the necessary 
preparation for the _ ent1--ance into the new age of ma.n's freedom. 
From the beginning of the fifties Marx and Engels were 
definitely against a repetition of the agrarian policies of the 
French Revolutiono They claimed that if ovmership of the land 
were granted to the peasants, this would only delay the 
liberation of the rural proletariat.44 Simultaneously, they had 
43Marx's letters to Engels, October 16 and 30, 1856, in 
!1.fil':!, III/3, 152-53, 157-58. . 
-44In 1850 :Marx and Engels warned the members of the 
Communist League not to repeat the mistakes of the French 
Revolution which had surrendered the landed estates to the peasant 
but left the problem of the rural proletariat unsolved. The 
German workers, they wrote, "must demand that the confiscated 
property remains public property and be converted into workers' 
settlements, to be cultivated by the associated agricultural 
proletariat;." This passage occurs in "The .Address of the CentrStl 
also lost interest in Lelewel's concept of a pease.nt democracy 
as a means to solve the Polish question. Indeed, that interest 
seems to have been restricted to the years 1847-48. But even 
then it was not rooted in their ideology because in the Communist 
Manifesto Marx and Engels had expressed the conviction that the 
peasants were not an independent revolutionary force, and that as 
le.ndovmers they were even a reactionary force. 
During the brief period when Marx and Engels favored the 
Polish demand for a peasant democracy, they were predominantly 
interested in the second phase of Polish history which began 
with the First Partition of Poland in 1772. This phase was 
characterized by growing awareness of the political and agrarian 
problems which considerably deepened after the insurrection of 
1830-31. 
Yiarx and Engels shared the view of Lelewel and his 
school that the so-called period of reforms following the First 
Partition of Poland would have saved the Polish Republic if the 
partition powers had not destroyed this reform worA. Like Lelewel 
they regarded the Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791 as the climax 
of this i)eriod. Yet, .Lelewel had some reservations about the 
Constitution. 
Authorl:Cy-to the c·ommunist League," April, 1850. Cf. Max Eastman, 
Ca12~tci:!._<in4__ 0th£!' Writinf?..~ (New York: 1933), p. 364, quoted in 
David Mitrany, l"iarx against the Peasant; a Study in Social 
Do_£,matism (Cha:p'el Hill! On'iversity' o1 Nortn Carolina: Pr·ess, 1951), 
p. 43:--
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Lelewel, who was opposed to the concentration of 
political power, criticized the attempt of the magnates to replace 
the elective monarchy with a hereditary one in 1791. In his 
opinion the hereditary monarchy was· a regression from the 
aristocratic republic which at least safeguarded partial liberty. 
However, Lelewel observed that the Constitution meant 
progress in so far as it had lessened class differences. The 
bourgeoisie. was granted the right to send eighty representatives 
to the Diet. The peasants were placed under the.protection of 
the Common Law and were guaranteed individual liberty. But 
Lelewel lamented that the bourgeois representatives had little 
influence upon the decisions of the Diet, and that the stipulationi:: 
regardi~g the peasants were wholly inadequate. The Constitution 
failed to grant the peasants the right of citizenship and the 
right to own the land they tilled. The extension of liberty, said 
Lelewel, was meaningless without the confirmation of the property 
principle.45 
4/Lelewel, O]. cit~, I, 221-22, II/1, 128-29. Cf. the 
comments of the Ukrainian socialist, :Mykhaylo.Lozynskyj, on the 
Constitution of Nay 3, 1791. He observed that even if the 
Constitution had been put into practice, the peasants would have 
remained· at the mercy of the big landowners because they ovmed 
nothing. The peasants ~ould have been unable to exercise their 
right--granted to them in par. 4 of the Constitution--to negotiate 
directly with the landovmers and to exchange their residence for 
another one, under the condition of having fulfilled their 
contract. M.ykhaylo Lozynskyj, Marx-Engels-Liebknecht ~ro 
y_id budovania Polshchi ( "Marx-Eng'eJ.s-LreoI01ecliT on tlie estora ti on 
of POJ:aiid11)- O~v:Ci:ll ~ p. , 1 906) , p. 13. · 
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Engels 1 s evaluation of the Constitution of 1791 was less 
cautious than Lelewel's. First of all, he did not agree with 
Lelewel's opposition to the centralization of power. In fact, 
he viewed the rise of the magnates since the seventeenth century 
as "the only way to overcome the antiquated conditions of Polish 
democracy" at that time. The destruction of the old constitution 
could have become the basis for a successful reorganization of 
Poland. The Polish magnates forfeited this possibility by an 
alliance with Poland's oppressors at the time of the First 
Partition in 1772 in order to preserve their power. 
According to Engels the betrayal of Polish interests by 
the magnates brought about 
an alliance ••• of the szlachta [gentry], the bourgeoisie, 
and-partially the peasants against the oppressors of 
Poland and against the magnates.46 
The alliance meant progress because the allies fought not only for 
political independence, but also for social changes. 
In Engel's opinion the Constitutj.on of 1791 was the "firs 
attempt at reform" by the revolutionary forces released in 1772. 
The Constitution proved 11how well the Poles had understood that 
their j_ndependence was inseparable from the destruction of the 
magnates and the agrarian reform. 1147 The Poles were the first 
___ c_4i_6N-· R-.z-,-A-ugust 20, 1848. 
47Ibid. 
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Eastern Europeans who proclaimed that the 11patriarchal-feudal 
barbarism" in Eastern Europe could only be destroyed through an 
11agrarian revolution" similar to that of the French Revolution 
of 1789 in the rural areas. This was the 11merit" of the Polish 
natio;n. 
In his interpretation of the Constitution Engels simply 
discarded the fact that this document was the work of the Polish 
aristocracy (the magnates and the szlachta), and that the intended 
reforms were rather modest because the aristocracy would not 
legislate against itself. Besides, his expectation of a 
successful peasant uprising in Poland contradicted his conviction, 
shared by Marx, that the victory of a peasant uprising depended 
upon bourgeois leadership.48 But urban development was weak in 
- Poland, and a politically active Polish bourgeoisie was just 
beginning to develop. 
48cf. the interpretation of the French agrarian revolution 
by the Russian historian Nikolai Kareew. He pointed out that at 
the beginning of the French Revolution, when the bourgeoisie had 
to collaborate with the· nobles, the peasants were merely freed 
from obligatory services. Extensive land reforms were only 
brought about when the bourgeoisie dominated the revolutionary 
scene. The bourgeoisie confiscated the land of the nobles and 
granted ?- large part of it to the peasants as their property. But 
these far-reaching agrarian reforms had actually not been plo.nned 
by the bourgeoisie. They resulted from the desire to consolidate 
bourgeois power. Nikola1 I. Kareew, ]=es p~~~-e~_la ,guest!_on 
1?.§1Y_~a111~.~ .E'.P_ France dans l~ dernier~Ldu:]c\rI~I<r siE1c):e, trans. 
by C. W. Woynarovffika (Paris: Vl. Giard & E. Briere, 1 899), 
PP • 54 1 ·- Z1- 2 • 
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Mehring called Engels's interpretation of the Constitution 
of 1791 11the worst of the historical errors" made by Engels.49 
He attributed Engels's lack of historical insight to the influence 
of Lelevml and his "illusions" about the reformers of 1791 • 
However, Lelewel was much more critical of the Constitution. 
Mehring would not admit that Engels 1 s overstatements were rather 
conditioned by his campaign in 1848 against those German political 
groups who .did not wish to get involved in a war against Russia fo 
the sake of the Poles.· Engels was anxious to prove that it was 
necessary to support the Poles because they were revolutionary. 
He insisted that they had overcome the feudal mentality in 1791. 
Since that .time the Poles had played a vital role in the 
revolutionary fight against the reactionary powers Russia, Prussia, 
and Austria because they did not merely aim at national 
independence but also at a social revolution. 
Actually neither Marx nor Engels had any illusions about 
the revolutionary intentions of the ~zlach~. Thus, in 1856 Marx 
referred to the aristocratic character of the uprising of 1793, 
and he criticized Tadeusz Kosc:i.uszko, the leader of the 
insurgents, because he had been reluctant to organize a peasant 
revolt knowing that it would have been directed against the 
aristocrats.50 
III/3, 
49Aus_.9:.em literarischen Nachlass, III (Introduction), 33. 
50Marx's letter to Engels, Deceniber.2, 1856, in llf.9!, 
157-58. 
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Engels was particularly critical of the insurrection 
of 1830-31. This insurrection had been led by the magnates, 
among them Prince Adam Czartoryski, who were not interested in 
winning the masses through far-reaching peasant reforms. Even the 
progressive members of the szlachta favored only moderate reforms. 
Although Lelewel became a member of the provisional government, he 
was unable to further the cause of agrarian reforms which the 
Polish radicals considered as a prerequisite of a successful Polis 
insurrection. The Diet made only one concessio~. Land was 
promised to those peasants who would participate in the 
insurrection, but this did not effect a mass uprising. 
Whenever .Engels discussed the insurrection of 1830-31, 
he stressed the lack of revolutionary initiative. On February 22, 
1848 he stated: 
The insurrection of 1830 was neither a national 
revolution (it excluded three quarters of Poland) nor 
a social and political revolution; it did not bring 
about any changes in the conditions of the people; it 
was a conservative revolution.51 
A year later, on February 18, 1849, Engels made the sarcastic 
remark that the insurrection had only one significance--namely, it 
contributed to the success of the Paris insurrection. Therefore, 
"the whole of Europe sympathized with the magnates who indeed 
initiated the movement. 1152 
51™, I/6, 412-13. 
. 52NRZ, February 18, 1849.. Cf. Mazzini·' s letter to 
Lelewel, December 20, 1831, in which Mazzini stated that the fv]j_sh 
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In 1850 Engels compared the insurrection of 1830-31 
with the uprising of the German nobles against the princes early 
in the sixteenth century. The German uprising failed because the 
'nobles were not willing to abolish-servitude which alone would 
have secured the support of the peasants against the princes. 
The Polish insurrection failed for similar reasons. The szlachta 
made no attempt to win the collaboration of the peasants through 
their emancipation. It had not the least desire to renounce 
voluntarily all its privileges and the greater part of the 
sources of income. The szlachta preferred to collaborate with 
the magnates.53 
While Engels condemned the szlachta, he praised Lelewel 
for havi.ng supported the political liberation of the Polish 
people, including the Jews, and land reforms in 1830-31.54 He 
called Lelewel a highly gifted man "who wished to turn the national 
cause into a cause of liberty, and who wished to identify the 
interests of all the European people with those of the Polish 
people. 1155 
insurrection of 1830-31 conferred upon Poland "the right to belong 
to the great European federation" because the insurrection saved 
the Paris uprising. Mazzini, Scritti editi ed inediti, II, 275. 
53Neue Rheinische Zeitung, No. 5, May-October, 1850, 
PP. 258-59. 
Cf. 
54Engel~ 1 s speech of February 22, 
also~' August 20, 1848. 
55MEGA, I/6, 413. 
1848, in ~' I/6, 413. 
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Neither Marx nor Engels showed any interest in the 
agitation of the Polish Democratic Society for the restoration of 
Poland in the thirties and forties. They could hardly have cared 
for this organization. Most of its members, even the intel-
ligentsia, belonged to the szlachta.56 This contributed to a 
wavering policy of the Democratic Society regarding the peasant 
question because the szlachta was not interested in major 
political or social changes. 
The Manifesto.of the Democratic Society_, published in 
1836, proclaimed the politica~ liberation of the people and also 
the "unconditional restoration of the ownership of the soil to 
the peasants. 11 This corresponded to the wishes of Lelewel, the 
leader ~f the left-wing democrats.57 But the discussions on the 
~~revealed the opposition to extensive land reforms.58 
56Baron Georg von Manteuffel-Szoege, Q.~.§.C]}ich~e. de_~ 
~o.111:,isch;<es 2.£1k~s waehrend seiper Unfrei~_ei t,..,.,.J_772-1914 [Berlin: 
uncker &Humnofcff-;19)0), p. 97. · . 
57In 1833 Lelewel stated that since the peasants had 
never legally surrendered their right of landownership to the 
szlachta, they were still the rightful owners of the lando "Tresc 
RU'braE.ewicza uwagi natl konsti tuc ja 3 maja.~co do prawa wlasnosci 
gruntu (July 5, 1833), 11 {"Hemarks of Kubrakiewj_ch on the Constitution 
of May 3 regarding the right to landed property1.1 ) in Joachim 
Lel~wel,. ~E];_ki-~uis~ictw_a~ tulaczkj. pols~iej_ (11Nritings of 
Polish }.migrantsi9~russels :H359), p. 3'5, quoted in Leslie, 
Reform and Insurrection, p. 7o 
--
58only tenant farmers were to be granted full ormership 
Of the land. No redistribution of the land was intendedo Cf. 
"Uwagi Centralizacyi przy dyckussyi natl Manifestem 11 (''Remarks of th 
Centr·al Committee of the Democratic Society on the discussions 
of the Manifesto'1) ~if2_st T2.::f.~z~~stwa pemot:r-atic~.fo}_sf'>:?-..£.g,£ (Poit:Lars: 1863), p. b'7, quoted in Leslie, op. cit., p. 13. 
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In the following years the Democratic Society became less radical. 
The majority of its members were mainly interested in the 
restoration of the borders of 1772. The agitation for peasant 
reforms was reduced to a political expedient. 
When in the mid-forties the Democratic Society prepared 
another uprising in the Grand Duchy of Poznania (then called 
Posen) and in Galicia, the insurrectional instructions stressed 
above all the fight for the territorial restoration of Poland, 
and, secondly , the political liberation of the people and the 
need for land reforms.59 Ovmership of the land was to be granted 
to the tenant farmers, but the landless would receive 11five acres 
of land" only if they actively participated in the insurrection 
against __ the occupation powers.60 
The same moderate program was proclaimed in a. Manifesto 
issued by the provisional revolutionary government in Cracow on 
the first day of the Cracow insurrection (February 22, 1846). The 
Manifesto promised the abolition of serfdom and feudal 
obligations, and offered land from the domains to "the man who 
59Ludwik Mieroslawski, the agent of the Democratic 
Society in Posen, told his collaborators that the insurrection 
would best be furthered by granting land to the peasants. Yet, he 
also declared that the ~e,j!!! of a liberated Poland was to have the 
final decision on the peasant question: "It is not our concern," 
he said, "to solve the economic and social questions, but these 
questions are a useful political means." Boleslaw Limanowski, 
His·~o~~§._~YLtEl~~ie j :!1-e.J2.o_c_~<?2Z~FOW__j_ ("History of 
ForisnJJeillocracy--in t e Post- )arti ti on Epoch 11 )'Zurich: n. p. , 
1901), p. 58. . 
60Limanowski, 012._. __ gt_. , p. 60. 
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fights for the people. 1161 In spite of these promises the peasants 
did not actively support the uprising. 62 They remained indifferen 
even when the insurrection -took a more radical turn under the 
influence of Edward Dembowski, a leading defender of the communal 
ovmership of the land, and when revolutionary decrees abolished 
the aristocracy as a class, with all its titles and privileges.63 
The Cracow insurrection ended ·in complete failure on 
March 4, 1846. It is noteworthy that Marx and Engels did not 
comment on the insurrection before February 22, _1848. Yet, the 
b"iJbid:-
62In Western Galicia the Polish peasants rose in open 
revolt against the insurgent szlachta. Leslie has maintained that 
this uprising was caused by the general opposition of the Polish 
nobles to agrarian reforms. The peasants believed that the 
insurgent szla.chta desired to enslave them still more. Leslie, 
OJ>. cit., pp:- 19-20. 
63Edward Dembowski has been highly praised by the East 
German :Marxist Felix-H. Gentzen as "the ideologist of the peasant 
plebeian masses" and "the most consistent revolutionary democrat." 
Felix-Heinrich Gentzen, GSolB~oJ-_en im Januaraufstand; das 
Qr:o~§.!ier.z,.Q,g.~1 Pof?$en,_ 1§..:!) : -1±,, 'Scnriftenreihe aCS-!nstJ.:Cuts fuer 
allgemeine Geschichte derR'U.illboldt Universitaet, Berlin, Vol. I 
(Berlin: Ruetter & Loening, 1958), p. 3Lh Dembovrnki was 
convinced that only a revolution would solve the peasant question. 
It would destroy the feudal order and make an end to the domination 
of the great landowners. Then "a new order of social justice 
would be established, no longer based on individual property, but 
on the common ownership of the nab.onal wealth. 11 Mlynarski U zr6d2~1™ polskie j_demp..2.£.C3.2J.i ("Documents. on Polish Democracy"~--:­{Warsaw: 1950J, pp. 125, 126, quoted in Gentzen, p. 34. But in 
spite of his radical leanings Dembowski had to seek not only the 
support of the intellectuals in Warsaw, but also of the smaller 
landovmers in Western Galicia to further his revolutionary aims. 
Leslie, 212· cit., p. 15. 
74 
uprising had called forth a great excitement among the radical 
circles, particularly in Paris. On March 18 and 22, 1846 the 
radical Paris newspaper Democratie Pacifique hailed the 
insurrection as an event of immense importance. According to 
this newspaper the Poles, who earlier had merely fought for 
national independence, had finally caught up with the European 
democratic movement. They proclaimed "the liberation of the 
oppressed people and social reforms." This proved that the Poles 
had understood that the peasant question was the leading question 
in Eastern ~'urope. They were the only revolutionary force in 
Eastern Europe and would undermine Austrian and Russian 
autocracy. 64 
Marx and Engels discussed the Cracow uprising for the 
first time on February 22, 1848 when the international Democratic 
Association of Brussels held a meeting to commemorate this event. 
Marx admitted in his speech that the uprising represented an 
important revolutionary progress of the Poles. However, he 
insisted that compared to the aims of a communist revolution the 
uprising had a limited significance. The insurgents did not 
intend to abolish private property. They wished to destroy 
feudalism by granting political equality to the people and the 
ovmership of the land to the peasants. The insurrection was 
merely a re-enactment of the French Revolution. 
----· Q 64L. l · · t 8c:: iman ovm~-tl, £E.=~_..:.., p. .1. 
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Nevertheless, Marx praised the Poles because they were 
the first Europeans who had outgrovm national aspirations 
and had combined "the cause of nationality with the cause of 
democracy and the liberation of the oppressed classes." The 
Cracow insurgents understood that mere national liberation from 
foreign rule would not result in the liberation of the people 
from an oppressive government. They were 
deeply convinced that only a democratic Poland can be 
independent, and that Polish democracy ••• without 
an agrarian movement which turns the 9erf s into 
modern free lando\vners is impossible. b.'.? 
Marx concluded that since the Cracow uprising the liberation of th 
Poles had become "the point of honor of all the European 
democrats." 
Engels used similar arguments in his speech. He praised 
Lelewel for having inspired the insurrection which was marked by 
a "democratic ••• almost proletarian boldness.u He insisted 
that the insurgents did not care whether their demands endangered 
the interests of the aristocracy. They subordinated their 
national easpirations to a higher aim--the destruction of "feudal 
aristocratic Poland" and the creation of a "modern, civilized 
democrattc Polandtt which could truly become the "advanced sentinel 
of civilization." Engels remark implied that the Poles had not 
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yet fulfilled a civilizing mission. Engels observed that because 
of the Cracow insurrection the Polish question had become the 
immediate concern of all the European democrats. "Until the 
year 1846 our duty was to revenge a crime. From now on we must 
support allies, and we will do it. 1166 
Apparently Marx and Engels were convinced that the Cracow 
insurrection had gotten rid of aristocratic leadership, which did 
not correspond to the facts. Furthermore, Marx and Engels did 
not distinguish between the two phases of the insurrection. When 
they insisted that the aims of the insurgents did not go beyond 
those of the French revolutionaries, they must have had in mind 
the first phase of the insurrection because its last phase was 
marked by the attempt of Dembowski to introduce the communal 
ovmership of the land. However, the first manif estoes merely 
promised a partial curtailment of aristocratic privileges. Only 
Dembowski proclaimed the end of aristocratic rule, of all 
privileges and titles. 
There is no evidence that Marx and Engels knew anything 
about Dembowski, 67 or that they v1ere interested in the Polish 
·-65 ' 
~., p. Li-14. 
67cr. Bobi:rl:ska's statement: "Apparently Marx and Engels 
did not know much about the actual persons and groups who were 
responsible for the revolutionary democratic character of this 
insurrection." Bobinska, op. cit_._, p. 91. 
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socialist group ~ Polski which was founded by Polish emigrants 
in England in the 1830's. This group, which rejected the private 
property principle, agitated for the communal ovmership of the 
land and the liquidation of the great landed estates, long before 
such demands were voiced in the Polish territories (e.g. by the 
radical Plebeian League in Poznania).68 
In later years Marx and Engels acknowledged the existence 
of a social;i.st trend among the Poles. They stated several times 
that the Cracow insurrection had also socialist tendencies. When 
in the fifties Marx referred to the political trends of the Polish 
emigration, he not only mentioned the aristocratic and democratic 
but also th,e "socialist" group which was pushed into the 
foreground by the Cracow uprising of 1846. 69 
In spite of their doctrine which stressed the economic 
basis of historical progress, Marx and Engels did not discuss 
in detail the actual economic changes in contemporary Poland--not 
even in 18L~7-48 at the time of their most enthusiastic statements 
on the revolutionary spirit of the Poles. No sources 
_69Gesammel te Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich 
12;~~~l.822~8b2, ea.-:-by~N: RJasanottC2vols., 2d ed.; 
Stuttg&rt: :-H. W. Dietz Nachf., GmbH~ 1920), II, 340. Cf. also 
Marx, 11 Do meetingu w Genmvie, zwolanego na pamiatk~, 50-ej 
rocznicy Rewolucyi Polskiej 1830 r." ("To the Meeting in Geneva, 
Convoked to Commemorate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Polish 
Revolution of 183011 ), Arc_hiv fl~r di~.~esghichte des Sozialismus 
ill!L~J1.r?~j_te_r}:>,e~:[eeun1:5, VI (1916"), 220-2-r.-. 
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are available which disclose the extent of Marx's and Engels's 
information about economic changes in mid-nineteenth century 
Poland. 
In January, 18L~8, Engels spoke about economic changes in 
Eastern Europe. He stated that in "Russia industry develops at a 
powerful pace and turns more and more even boyars into bourgeois." 
But in relation to Poland he merely spoke of the restriction of 
servitude which helped to weaken the aristocracy and to create 
a free class of peasants 11 of which the bourgeoisie is everywhere 
in need."70 Engels did not mention that since 1820 the Polish 
Kingdom had entered the industrial period. VJany foreign 
manufacturers, particularly from Germany, wer~ invited to come to 
Poland. The transition to big :industry began in the course of the 
fifties. The Russian-Polj_sh customs union of the mid-fifties 
especially contributed to the industrial expansion. In the 
following years Lodz rapJdly became the center of the textile 
industry.7 1 There is no indication that Marx and Engels ever 
showed any particular interest in the progress of industrialization 
in mid-nineteenth century Poland v1hich slowly but surely undermine 
the old social structure. 
In the late forties, when Marx and Engels displayed a 
great enthusiasm for the revolutionary spirit of the Poles, they 
--..-....4-J,;. ___ ro 
. '7 Engels "Die Bewegungen von 184 7, 11 Deuts_che B,r}lesseler 
Zeitung (Brussels~, January 23, 1848, in ~,°J7b, 396. 
71 Aus dem literarischen Nachlass, III (Introduction), L~4. 
?9 
apparently expected changes in Poland rather from the readiness 
of the Poles to stage insurrections than from a modern economic 
development. This was contrary to their basic convictions. 
·consequently, the Poles were assigned a subordinate role in the 
revolutionary scheme. 
Comments on a Polish Revolution 
The question has yet to be answered what kind of future 
policies :Marx and Engels expected of the radical Poles on the 
eve of the Revolution of 1848. Their viewpoint.can be derived 
from the speeches they made on November 29, 1847 at the London 
meeting of the Fraternal Democrats, and on February 22, 1848 at 
the Brussels meeting of the Democratic Association--meetings 
which were organized to commemorate the Polish uprisings of 
1830-31 and of 1846 respectively. 
Marx's and Engels's speeches were primarily manifestatkns 
of their communist ideology. It was the current conviction of 
the European radicals that the enmity between the nations was the 
result of the uconspiracy of the kings." The overthrov1 of the 
territorial and political arrangements of the Vienna treaties 
and of the monarchic order would make an end to national 
hostilities. Marx offered a different explanation. He maintained 
that the privat~ property principle was not only responsible for 
the exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, but also 
of the poorer nation by the wealthier one. This caused the 
---""'WWW A ii!U • 
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hostility between classes as well as nations. When private 
property was abolished, the nations would be able to unite. 
In order that the nations can really associate, they must 
have common interests. In order to have common interests, 
the present property relations must be abolished because 
they cause the exploitation of one nation by the other.72 
Marx called upon the Chartists, who were present at the 
London meeting, to initiate the proletarian revolution. As on 
other occasions, he stressed the point that England was the most 
industrialized country. Therefore, if the English bourgeoisie 
were destroyed, then the power of the bourgeoisie would be 
weakened everywhere. The victorious revolution of the English 
proletariat would be "the signal for the liberation of all the 
oppressed nations." 
In his speech Marx made no attempt to flatter the 
national feelings of the Poles. In his laconic way Marx declared: 
"Indeed, the old Poland is lost. 11 The old European society was 
doomed to perish through the abolition of private property. This 
would also liberate the Poles from oppression. Marx advised the 
Poles to expect their final liberation from the English 
proletariat. 
The victory of the English proletariat over the English 
bourgeoisie is ••• decisive for the victory of all the 
72 . 11Reden von Marx und Engels ueber Polen in London am 29. 
November, 181+ 7," ~' I/6 1 360. 
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oppressed people over their oppressors. Therefore, 
Poland is not to be liberated in Poland but in 
England.73 
With one sentence Marx shoved aside the aspiJ:ations of the Poles 
to play a leading role as protectors of European liberty. He 
presented the Polish question as a mere appendix to the leading 
question which according to him was the English proletarian 
revolution. This corresponded to the revolutionary theories of 
the Communist :Manifesto. A backward country like Poland could 
not play a decisive revolutionary role. 
Engels also maintained in his speech that 11 the liberation 
of all the European countries" depended upon the victory of the 
English workingmen over the established political and social 
order.74 
In their Brussels speeches Marx andEngels avoided such 
extremist statements.75 This might have been due to the presence 
of Lelewel and of a less radical audience. Now, the two friends 
pref erred to stress the importance of independent revolut:ionary 
action in Poland. They insisted that if the peasants were 
liberated through a Polish social revolution, this would help to 
undermine the status guo in all of Eastern Europe. Beyond that, 
73Ibid •. 
74 . Ibid., p. 361. 
75 11Reden von Marx und Engels ueber Polen in Bruessel am 
22. Fe bruar, 1 848, 11 11.~, I/ 6, 1+09-1 4. 
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hngels's main concern was to propagandize the need for a 
revolutionary collaboration between the Germans and Poles. 
In his London speech of November, 1847, Engels had 
already referred to the question of German-Polish relations. He 
stated that German participation in the Polish partition '\vas a 
dark stain in the history of the German nation which ought to 
be erased. This was a current argument of German radicals in. the 
fight against the established German governments. Engels 
maintained that the liberation of the Poles from German overlord-
ship would be the major task of the German radicals in the future 
German revolut1on. Polish liberation was the prerequisite of 
German unification. "A nation," said Engels, cannot be free 
if it continues to oppress other nations."76 
Only two years earlier, when discussing the territorial 
settlements of the Vienna Treaties of 1815, Engels had complained 
the.t the Germans had not profited from their victory over 
Napoleon. The lack of political leadership and "partly a sort 
of ridiculous disinterestedness" prevented the Germans from 
strengthening their position in Europe. Not only was France 
enabled to keep Germany weak by supporting particularism, but the 
two great German states Prussia and Austria even allowed Russia 
to advance further west though this was aga:Lnst their own 
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immediate interests. In Engels's opinion Prussia and Austria 
should have annexed as much of Polish territory as possible. 
He lamented that 11 Russia got the best part of Poland. 1177 But he 
consoled himself with the thought that soon a complete re-
organization of European society would put an end to "such 
imbecilities." 
The discrepancy between the statements of November, 1845 
and November, 1847 resulted from the different objectives which 
Engels pursued each time. In 1845 he intended to ridicule the 
shortcomings of German diplomacy which were the result of German 
disunity. Then, he ascribed German disunity to German backwardnes 
and French.rivalry. However, in 184-7 Engels emphasized that 
German participation in the partition of Poland prevented the 
unification of Germany. This time, he was anxious to,convey the 
message to the Poles the.t the German radicals had the greatest 
interest in the liberation of the Poles because they desired 
the unification of Germany. Therefore, the Poles should rely 
upon the German revolution for their liberation. 
In his Brussels speech Engels elaborated this argument. 
He spoke of the irrevocable alliance between Germans and Poles 
. 
which had been founded at the time of the Cracow insurrection 
77Engeis, "Letter II to florther_A_~," November 8, 1845, 
in ~' I/L1-, 488. 
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when the Poles revealed their "democratic passions." He stressed 
the need for a German-Polish revolutionary collaboration against 
Russia and Austria. Both the German and the Polish people had 
''the same enemies, the same oppressors." Engels remarked: 11 The 
Russian government lies as heavy upon us as upon the Poles." The 
first condition of the liberation of the Germans and Poles was 
the overthrow of the old political order in Germany and the 
destruction of the Prussian and Austrian governments. But the 
success of a German democratic revolution would depend upon a 
common war of Germans and Poles against "the barbarian hordes of 
Austria and Russia." Wben Russia vms driven beyond the Dniester 
and Dwina rivers, the reactionary Prussian and Austrian govern-
ments wquld be overthrown, and only then would Poland and Germany 
.~ be free.78 A liberated Poland would become the shield of a 
democratic Germany. Engels made no definite statements as to 
the territorial extension of the new Poland. He defended the 
ideas current among Western European radicals that Russia must be 
destroyed to secure revolutionary changes in Europe, and that a 
democratic Poland must be an ally of the West. 
Whatever Marx and Engels said about the revolutionary 
progress of the Poles, they did not retreat from their principle 
proclaimed in the Communist Manifesto that the more advanced 
_____ .. ________ ,,,,_,n . ...,"""'™™""''*"'""""'_...._. ______ __,,,,,.,,.,.,,__,,...,_ ___ .,.,J 
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country must effect the liberation of the less advanced one. 
Although Polish revolutionary unrest might help to undermine the 
established order, the revolution must proceed from West to East. 
In case of a communist revolution of the English proletariat, the 
Poles were to expect their definite social liberation from 
England. But in case of a democratic revolution in Germany, 
Polish national liberation would be effected under the leadership 
of the Germans. Collaboration with the Poles, which Marx and 
Engels supported in their speeches as.well as in the Communist 
Manifesto, was not to be based on the principle of the equality 
of the collaborators. 
The question was whether the left-wing Polish democrats 
were willing to collaborate with the communists. In this respect 
_ the attitude of leading Polish left-wing democrats towards the 
Democratic Association of Brussels is revealing. 
This organization had originally been founded in 
August, 1847 with the assistance of the London Communj_st League 
to which :Marx and Engels belonged. Early in November, 184 7 it 
was reorganized as an international left-wing democratic union. 
Marx and Lelewel became vice-presidents under the presidency of 
the Belgian Lucien Jottrand. The organization was supported 
by the ChartistsJ by French, Dutch, and Swiss democrats, by 
members of communist .groups in Brussels and London, and by the 
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Fraternal Democrats. It agitated for the federation of all the 
nations On the basis Of equality.79 
Although the Democratic Association supported the 
right to national j_ndependence, Lelewel soon found himself in a 
difficult position. His compatriots believed that the organization 
was communist, and that its German members tried to interfere 
with Polish affairs when they helped to· prepare the Brussels' 
meeting of November 29, 1847 in commemoration of the Polish 
80 insurrection of 1830. 
,. 
Lelewel's friends, Stanislaw Worcell, Jozef Wysocki, and 
Karol Stolzman, were outraged when Marx, as the official 
representative of the Democratic Association, attended the London 
79In an address to the Brussels organization the Fraternal 
Democrats stated that the aims of the European democrats should be 
11 the sovereignty of the people and the fraternity of the nations." 
But this aim could only be achieved with the help of 11 the real 
people, the proletariat, 11 which was predestined to become the 
"savior of humanity." While the landowners and the capitalists 
were only interested in dividing the nations, the proletariat alore 
wished to bring about their fraternization. The Belgian historian 
Louis Bertrand has called this document the forerunner of the 
fomn}E_~~~tJi~[~~~o. Louis Bertrand, L'his~o~re d~_la democra~ 
2L.cl1L.§2.£ialisme en BE'.~8'.g~me dermis 18]1 (2 vOis.; 
Dechenne,1906), i, 26 - (. . 
_ 80]!ist;y_§gii~..,yj_1].e_tI9.§S:_lbil'l1§l-1§lewela, ("The Letters of 
Joachim Lelewel, Written in Exile") ed. by Helena Wigckowska (6 vols.; Cracow: Nakladom Polskiej Adademii Umiej~tnosci, 
1948-56), III, 414. 
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celebration of the November insurrection, prepared by the Fraterna 
Democrats, and contacted the Chartists at this meeting. Wysocki, 
in particular, sharply criticized Lelewel for the relations of the 
Democratic Association with the "radical communists," meaning the 
Chartists. 81 
Repeatedly Lelewel tried to reassure his compatriots 
concerning the principles of the organization. There was no need 
to be alarm~d over the "imaginary communism" of the organization 
and the so-called German interference with Polish affairs. 
Besides, it really did not matter whether communists belonged to it 
or not. The organization was "useful," and it might be of 
"advantage". to the Polish cause. Lelewel also rejected the 
opposition to the Chartists. He remarked: "They alone have 
excellently taken up the Polish question in London. 1182 
In his search for supporters of the Polish cause, Lelewel 
had no scruples about associating with communists. He continued to 
entertain friendly relations with Marx and Engels. He did not 
shrink from signing a resolution of the London Communist League nor 
from participating in the New Year's celebration of the German 
'lorkingmen's Association with which Marx and Engels collaborated.83 
1Ibid., pp. 418-19. 
82Ibid.,. p. 419. 
B3Marx "Do meetingu w Genewie, " Ar chi v fuer die Geschichte ~~~s' und_de~.E._eit~r,beweguE.~' VTT19,Tb), 221. t!f. ais"o 
isty em~_e;racy_il18Joacn1n1.:;t...}e.lewelri., III, 422 .• 
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On this occasion Lelewel proposed a toast "to the welfare and 
prosperity of a united, indivisble, democratic, and powerful 
Germany."84 Lelewel shared the hope of many Polish democrats 
that a democratic Germany would give up its Polish possessions. 
When, after the Paris insurrection of February 28, 1848, 
Marx and Engels went first to Paris and then to the Rhineland, 
their relations with Lelewel ended abruptly. 85 Marx's and 
Engels 1 s ho.pe, expressed in the Communist Manifesto, for a 
fruitful collaboration.with the most revolutionary Poles--meaning 
the left wing of the Polish democrats--was not fulfilled for the 
time being. 
Bobinska has remarked that a strong bond existed between 
the comniun:i.sts Marx and Engels and the democrat Lelewel because 
they shared a common "bellef in the indestructible revolutionary 
powers of the Polish people and in the European revolution. 1186 
However, this corn .. mon belief was not sufficient as a basis for a 
lasting collaboration because their basic political principles 
were so contrary. 
. . 84Joachim Lelewel P~lsk_.fu__dziej_e i rze.2.~L.i~ ("Poland, 
Its History and Problems"~ Uosen: 11564)~ 555, quoted in 
Bobinska, op. cit., p. 71. 
85v!i th the exception of a short letter addressed by 
Lelewel to Marx in li'ebruary, 18L~9, no correspondence occurred until 
1860 when Marx wrote a brief insignificant letter to Lelewel. Cf. 
Bobinska, on. cit., p. 73. 
86Bobinska, op~ £it.:., p. 71. 
89 
As was earlier explained, Lelewel considered private 
property as the basis of man's liberty. He believed in the 
revolutionary capacities of the peasants. Although he favored 
collaboration of the Polish democrats with the West, he did not 
think that Polish liberation depended upon the importation of 
Western European political concepts into Poland. As a Slavophile 
he believed that the revival of the ancient Slavic democratic 
principles would secure liberty for the Slavs. Marx and Engels, 
instead, condemned the property principle as an instrument of 
oppression. They believed that the revolutionary principles 
which were born in the Vlest would effect the true liberation of 
man, that the industrial proletariat would be instrumental in 
staging the final revolution, and that this revolution would 
proceed from West to East. 
Lelewel shared Marx's and Engels's conviction that there 
existed a basic antagonism between Eastern and Western Europe 
which was the result of the different historical development 
of the two parts of Europe. But while Marx and Engels praised the 
political and economic progress of Western Europe, Lelewel 
insisted upon the moral superiority of the Slavs. Their different 
viewpoints symbolized the tensions _between Eastern and Western 
Europeans. 
Lelewel 1 s belief in the democratic spirit of the Slavs 
was generally shared by the Polish democrats. The Slavoph1le 
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trend among the Poles helped to keep open a line of communication 
with Russian revolutionaries. In the mid-1840's the Russian 
emigrant Michael Bakunin, who at the time had become a well-
known figure in Western European radical circles, tried to exploit 
Polish Slavophilism in order to further Polish-Russian 
revolutionary collaboration. There is reason to believe that 
his propaganda stimulated Marx's and Engels's interest in the 
Polish fate. 
Bobirtska, who has emphasized the common bond which 
united Marx and Engels with Lelewel has been reluctant to 
interpret the relations between Lelewel and Bakunin.87 Yet, 
these relations were based on a much firmer ground because the 
basic P?litical convictions of the two men were very similar. 
Besides, their relations indicated at least the possibility of 
Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration which at that time 
was hardly taken into serious consideration by Western European 
radicals. 
Already in the 1820's the secret Polish National 
Patriotic Society (~_owarz;ystwo P~trio_tyczne Nar:,.~) collaborated 
with the Russian underground in the hope that the overthrow 
87Bobin~ka has only superficially ref erred to the 
relations between Lelewel and Bakunin. Bobinska, OE· cit...:., p. 73. 
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of Tsarism would bring about the restoration of Poland. 88 In 
later years the Polish radicals, among them Lelewel, repeatedly 
praised the Decembrist uprising of 1825. They also stressed the 
common racial origin of Poles and Russians. They were not 
opposed to Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration provided 
that Poland would be restored. 89 
Bakunin became acquainted with· Lelewel in 1844 in 
Brussels, a short time after he had collaborated with Marx on the 
Deutsch-Franzoesische Jahrbuecher. While Bakunin ·was neither 
attracted to Marx nor to Engels, whom he met in September, 1844, 
it seems that his first encounter with Lelewel touched an 
emotional chord in him. Lelewel was willing to different1e.te 
between the oppressive Russian government and the Russian people, 
-- .. "88Cf'. 1'~ykhaylo Lozynskyj, Polskyj i ruslsyj reMolucyjtJj 
ruch i Ukraina ( 11The Polish and Russian-:Revoiut:Lonary ·ovemen 
ancf"lhe Ukraine") (Lviv: n.p., 1908), pp. 6-7. 
B9The German historian R-1.ron Georg Manteuff el-Szoege 
has compared German-Polish and Russian~Polish relations in the 
nineteenth century. He pointed out that the former lacked the 
emotional appeal to co::nmon origins and common "supranational 
beliefs" in the restoration of the ancient Slavic liberties through 
the destruction of Tsarist autocracy. Manteuffel-Szoege, O.]. cii.:., 
pp. 68, 110. But Nanteuffel-Szoege overlooked the Polish-Russian 
territorial problem which in the nineteenth century, at critical 
moments, helped to undermine Polish-Russian relations. For a 
discussion of Polish-Russian relations in the light of the 
territorial proolem see the above quoted work by Mykhaylo 
Lozynskyj, Polsk;tj_ i rusk;t.;i F.evol~.Cl.ii.!hLt.J'uch j. Ukr~. 
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He was a Slavophile like Bakunin. He also came from a pre-
dominantly agrarian country and was interested in the peasants 
as a revolutionary element.90 
Bakunin stated in his Confession that his intense 
interest in Poland began in 1844, in the year when he met 
. 91 Lelev1el. It may well be that this encounter with Lelewel 
stimulated his interest in the Polish question. This was 
certainly not the only reason. Another reason for his interest 
was the violent European Russophobia, and the agitation of the 
radicals for the destruction of Russia and the restoration of the 
Polish borders of 1772. 
90~urces on the relations between Lelewel and Bakunin 
are scanty. Historians who have tried to analyze these relations 
have arrived at different conclusions.· The Ukrainian Mykhaylo 
Drahomanov stated that Lelewel did not have a decisive influence 
- on Bakunin. The two men simply shared a common belief in the 
ancient Slavic democracy. Drahomanov assumed that Bakunin may have 
tried to organize a Slavic League before 1848, and that Lelewel 
supported Bakunin's attempt. Correspondence de Michel Bakounine, 
trans. by Marie Stromberg and ed. witn a 'l?o':reword and .l'i.nnotatlons 
by Mykhaylo Drahomanov (Paris: Perrin et CJ.e, 1896), p. 360. The 
anarchist Fritz Brupbacher maintained that Bakunin turned from 
internationalism to nationalism under the influence of the 
nationalist Joachim Lelewel. 1'1:i.chel Ba.kounine, Conf essiol!, trans. 
by Paulette Brupbacher and ed. with a Foreword b'Y::Fritz Brupbacher 
and with Annotations by Max Nettlau (Paris: Les Editions Rieder, 
1922), p. 302. The French historian Benoit-P. Hepner stated that 
Bakunin conceived his own idea of a revolutionary Pan-Slavism under 
Lelewel's influence in 1844. Benoit-P. Hepner, Bakounine et le 
Panslavisme revolutionnaire (Paris: Librairie Pnrcel Riviere et 
vl.e , 19""°50"), p. 225. mward Halett Carr declared that Lelewel 
taught Bakunin that Poland had a proper history, and that.it was as 
much oppressed by the Tsarist government as Russia. Edvmrd Halett 
Garr, N:Lchael Bakunin (London: Macmillan, 1937), p. 147. 
91Bakunin, Coufession, p. 71. 
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Although Bakunin shared the hope of the European 
radicals for the overthrow of the old European order, since 1844 
he became increasingly concerned with the fate of Russia in case 
of a European revolution. In the following years in articles 
and in speeches Bakunin insisted that a European war against 
Russia we.s not necessary. The Russian people themselves would 
soon make a revolution and overthrow the Tsarist government. 
They were ttdemocratic in their instincts and habits.n They 
would also liberate the Poles. 
Bakunin ultimately hoped for the creation of a "federal 
republic composed of all the Slavic states" under the leadership 
of Russia.92 At the time of the Cracow uprising he proposed to 
the Central Committee of the Polish Democratic Society in Paris 
to work for Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration in the 
Polish Kingdom, Lithuania, and Podolia. His ulterior motive was 
his desire to prepare the creation of the Slavic federal republic. 
But the Polish Central Committee declined the offer.. Although 
Bakunin was often annoyed by what he called a superiority complex 
of the Poles in relation to the Russian people, he was firmly 
convinced that the salvation of a revolutionary Russia lay in a 
close collaboratj_on with a revolutionary Poland. According to 
Bakunin the basis for a Russian-Polish alliance was the common 
L 
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racial origin of Russians and Poles, and their common political 
aim--thc overthrow of the Tsarist government.93 He gave an 
unmistakable anti-German slant to his agitation for Russian-Polish 
revolutionary collaboration. He maintained that it would be 
instrumental in the "destruction of despotism in Europe" and in 
the liberation of all the Slavs under Turkish as well as under 
German rule. 94 
Bakunin's defense of a Russian-Polish alliance was an 
attack against the convictions cherished by the European radicals 
that Russia must be destroyed to save the European revolution, and 
that Poland must be restored as a bulwark of free Europe. 
When in mid-December of 1847 Bakunin was expelled from 
France at the request of the Russian ambassador for his agitation 
against the Tsarist government, he went to Brussels. There he 
was made a member of the Democratic Association. But he did not 
participate in the activities of the organization, and he did not 
attend the meetings of the German communists at the invitation of 
Marx. He disliked the company of Marx and Engels because they 
93cf. Bakunin's letter to his friend Varnhagen von Ense 
f October 12, 1847, in Bakunin, Confession, p. 308. 
94cr. Bakunin's speech of November 29, 1847, which he 
ade at 8. Paris banquet to commemorate the Polish insurrection of 
1830-31, in Mikhail Bakunin, .Sobran]-~ sochinennii i pisem ("Collected Works· and LettersT1 ) ed. witii AnnotaFions by-Y. 11. 
teklov (4 vols.; :Moscow: Izdatelstvo vscsoiuznogo obshchestva 
olitkatorzhe.n i ssylno-poselentsev, 1934-36), III, pp. 270-79. 
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constantly attacked the bourgeoisie but were themselves 
"ingrained bourgeois from head to foot. 11 95 He also became 
alienated from Lelewel whom he considered as a "complete cypher 
in politics.". Nevertheless, he orgc.i.nized a Polish banquet with 
Lelewel, held on February 14, 1848,in commemoration of the 
Decembrists.96 
The speech which Bakunin made ·on this occasion was not 
printed. According to his statement in his Confession, it 
contained an elaboration of his earlier argument.s. He spoke about 
Russia and Poland, the "mission of the Slavs to regen~rate the 
decadent western world!' and about the "imminent" European 
revolution.which would destroy the Austrian Empire.97 
Lelewel, who also made a speech, politely warned Bakunin 
not to drear.i too much about the future destiney of the Poles and 
Russians before the overthrow of the Tsarist government. In 
Lelewel's opinion it was the first duty of the revolutionaries to 
raise the question of the people's liberty. "Let us awaken their 
democratic spirit, and then everything will be decided according 
to the will of both nations. 11 98 Although Lelewel stressed the 
brotherhood of Russians and Poles, he reminded Bakunin of the 
95carr, llichae~ Bakunin, p. 153. 
961istY. ~lpj-gracyj_ne Joachima Lelew.~lc:-, III, 418. 
97B9.kunin, Confession, p. 96. 
981 1 1 p 1 k d . . . ,., . . in . . ,. ~ ewe , ¥:2 s ,.a'-TI~ie J.§.. 1 ~~~S:J'L-:.~' Lirr.~nu .TSkJ.., ,£p. c;11,... , p. / 7. xx> 546, quoted 
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question of the territorial restoration of Poland which Bakunin 
had failed to discuss. Lelewel claimed that if the people of the 
former eastern Polish territories were granted the right to 
self-determination, they would join the Poles. 
It may well be assumed that Marx and Engels knew about 
Bakunin's propaganda for a revolutionary Russian-Polish 
collaboration in Brussels although no sources are available. In 
the light of this assumption Engels's sudden emphasis on the 
need for a German-Polish alliance against Russia in his Brussels 
speech of February 22, 1848 may be interpreted as an indirect 
polemic against Bakunin. Bakunin's concept of a Slavic mission 
to regenerate Europe, which was to be initiated through the 
Russian-Polish alliance, was absolutely contrary to the convictions 
of Marx and Engels. Backward nations could not become the 
--· 
champions of the liberty of man. The Communist Manifesi£, issued 
in February, 1848, advised the Slavic world to expect its 
liberation from the industrially advanced Western Europeans. In 
retrospect the statement made in the Comm_·~gli..~.:t-l:~festo in favor 
of a collaboration of the communists with the most progressive 
Poles impresses as a hastily inserted addition to meet the need 
of the moment, that is, to fight a Russian-Polish collaboration. 
It was a favorite argument of Marx and Engels and also 
Of Bakunin that the collaboration with the Poles was the 
:prerequisite for a successful revolution in their ovm countries. 
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However, this argument barely veiled their desire for the con-
solidation of national power. No doubt, both parties considered 
the Polish alliance also as a means to strengthen their own 
countries. The Poles had the misfortune that their country was 
situated between two rising powers. Already in the forties the 
question was opened as to what would happen to Poland in case 
of a radical revolution in the neighboring states. The question 
was not answered during the life-time of Marx and Engels because 
no radical revolution occurred. The following analysis of Marx's 
and Engels's policies and statements since the late forties will 
help to indicate what the fate of Poland might have been in case 
of a Germa.n radical revolution. 
CHAPTER III 
PROPAGANDA FOR A RADICAL GERiv'i.AN REVOLUTION 
The Internal Problem 
---
In the Communist Manifesto, issued shortly after the 
Paris uprising of February 24, 1848, Marx and Engels had 
definitely predicted the imminent outbreak of a European-wide 
social revolution led by the industrial proletariat. But the 
European turmoil of 1848-49 bore no close resemblance to their 
prediction. The revolutionary movement spread neither to England 
nor to Eastern Europe, and the accent of the revolutionary 
programs was on gaining political liberty. Besides, Central 
Europe, where well-defined nation-states did not yet exist, 
experienced a surge of nationalism which became an integral part 
of the democratic programs. Marx and Engels adapted their own 
revolutionary program to this development in order to further 
their ultimate revolutionary aims. They even became supporters 
of German imper~alist policies. 
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After the outbreak of the Paris insurrection, both 
Marx and Engels went to Paris. There, in March, 1848, they 
organized a revolutionary committee to promote the German 
Revolution. The committee issued a rather moderate revolutionary 
program. This was in keeping with the conviction which Marx 
and Engels had arrived at earlier that Germany was not yet ready 
for a communist revolution. The program demanded the nationali-
zation of the feudal estates, the mines, and the transport system 
and the organization of national workshops "in the interest of 
the German proletariat, the petit-bourgeoisie, and the 
peasantry." One of the foremost revolutionary demands-was the 
creation of a German republic, one and indivisible. 1 The program 
did not refer to the future territorial extension of a German 
republic nor the future fate of the nationalities under German 
rule. 
At the outset of the German revolutionary movement, a 
radical reorganization of Germany did not seem to be impossible. 
In mid-March the Vienna and Berlin insurgents had driven the 
army from the capital cities and forced the governments to hold 
parliamentary elections. A considerable fraction of the German 
democratic party agitated for the overthrow of all the existing 
governments and the reconstruction of Germany on a republican 
1 Mehring, Karl M~~j The Story of. H_;L~, p. 154. 
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democratic basis. It was plausible to suppose that the 
Revolution might enter a republican phase as it had done in France 
But the creation of a German republic depended upon the developmen 
of the revolutionary movement into ·a mass movement. 
Vfl1en in mid-April Marx and Engels arrived in the 
Rhineland, there was no indication of the emergence of such a 
2 
mass movement. The labor movement was in an embryonic state. 
Even the democrats vrere only a minority and weakened by the lack 
of central leadership.· Marx tried at first to g~in the allegiance 
of the Cologne working class movement. When he failed, he 
collaborated with the Cologne Democratic Un:Lon. He soon became 
the editor-:in-chief of the radical newspaper, the Neue Rheinische 
ZeitunG_ (Cologne), whose publication had been in preparation by 
the democrats since early April.3 Engels became a member of the 
editorial staff. 
2cf. the analysis of the German Revolution by the German 
historian Wilhelm Mommsen. He maintains that the German 
revolutionary movement was v1eakened by the split between liberals 
and democrats in April, 1848. The democrats remained a minority. 
The majority of the German people were not willj_ng to fight for 
a radical revolution. This prevented the creation of a German 
republic. Mommsen, Gro2sse v.nd Versagen des deutsch8_£ 
.fulergeptu~~' pp. 122~3(). 
3cf. the statements on the early Cologne days of Marx 
by P. H. Noyes, ~..f'~.zation and Re:volutiol}_. Work~~-Cla~ 
Associations in "fne L~erraan-1-t"evolutions ofl ~ \Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University ress, 19 , pp. 115-23. · 
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~appeared for the first time on June 1, 1848.4 It 
was.subtitled "An Organ of Democracy." Although Marx and Engels 
had made every effort to eliminate the direct influence of the 
~emocrats on the newspaper, they continued to maintain a 
tactical alliance with the democrats. They were convinced that 
the liberals would not advance one step unless driven on by a 
popular movement. 
Marx and Engels tried to stiffen the opposition of the 
democratic minorj_ty to the liberals and the ·conservatives in the 
Frankfurt and Berlin Assemblies. They also supported the decision 
of a democratic Congress, held in Frankfurt in June, 1848, to 
found a nationwide unj4 ted democratic organization. When Cologne 
became the seat of a central committee, representing all the 
Rhenish and Westphalian democratic associations, Marx became 
its "intellectual leader. 115 However, the movement for a nation-
wide central democratic leadership made no progress in the rest 
of Germany. 
The only political issue on which Marx and Engels agreed 
vdth the democrats was the demand for a German republic. However, 
4Hereafter the abbreviation NRZ stands for Neue 
Fheinisch.e Zei tun_g. - -
5rn September, 18L1.8 the Prussian authorities proceeded 
against the Cologne democratic organizat:Lon. EYen NRZ was 
suspended from September 27 to October 12, 1848. cr:--Mehring, 
~cit., p .. 172. 
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they did not share the predilection of the democrats for the 
federal principle which was also supported by the liberals. 
In the first issue of .llB1! the editors proclaimed that 
·the German Revolution must aim at the creation of a German 
republic, one and indivisible. They explained that they did not 
wish to "present any utopian demands for the immediate 
establishment" of a centralized German state. As yet the 
revolution was in its first stages. It had still to pass through 
a radical phase. The editors warned the left-wing delegates in 
the Frankfurt National Assembly that the German question could 
not be solved by decrees. 
German unity and a German constitution 
achieved through a mass movement which 
into action through internal conflicts 
against the Ee.st. 6 
can only be 
will be forced 
and a war 
In the meantime it would be necessary to temporize and, instead 
of cling:i.ng to ideological convictions, to watch the 11 general 
trend of the German development 11 and to take only "the immediately 
possible and practical steps" in order to further the Revolution. 
The democrats were condemned for their support of a 
federal republicanism. A federation of German autonomous states 
could not become the final constitution of a united Germany. In 
the opinion of Marx and Engels federalism was a medievalism. 
b ~' June 1 , 1 8L1-8. 
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It did not fit into the modern age. It might only successfully 
be applied, if at all, to very large areas. NRZ called the 
democratic leaders, who wished to preserve the old territorial 
units, including Prussia, in a federal union, "retrograde and 
petit-bourgeois. 117 The dissolution of Prussia was the first 
prerequisite of German unification. Even a democratic Prussia 
would "prevent German unity," that is, the creation of a 
centralized German state. 
The editors of NRZ considered centralization a universal 
remedy for all the evils in Germany, its political, social, and 
economic backwardness. Centralization would destroy all the 
relics of the Middle Ages, above all particularism. It would 
modernize Germany. A centralized government would facilitate 
the 11concentration of capital and manpower" and permit Germany to 
participate actively in the modern era of an expanding 
industrialization. Industrial growth in turn would further 
economic centralization, the counterpart of political centralization 
Industrialization had already helped to remove many old-fashioned 
custom barriers in Germany. If it could freely develop in a large 
German centralized state, its modernizing influence would even be 
greater.8 
organ of 
7 Cf. th'; critique of the Berliner -~Ze:L trug,sballe, 
the Berlin democrats, _NRZ, Augus£ '2.v-;-' L~O. 
8 ~' January 5, 1849. 
the 
--
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According to ~ neither the old ruling class nor the 
bourgeoisie would draw any advantages from the modernization of 
Germany--its unification or economic expansion. Industrializatio1 
would guarantee the predominance of the cities over the rural 
areas, that is, over the reactionary aristocracy and the priest-
hood. Industrialization would also destroy the bourgeoisie by 
ending the private O\n1ership of the means of production. This 
would benefit the people. As did the Communist Manifesto, .!Qlli 
proclaimed that the "rule of the cities was. revolutionary." 
Whoever wished for the unification of Germany and its economic 
expansion helped to prepare the advent of the communist 
revolutiorr. Many years later, when Germany was close to being 
united by Bismark, Engels triumphantly wrote to Mr:J.rx that, 
without knowing it, the Prussian statesman was doing part of 
their job.9 
It may be assumed that even in 1848-49 Marx and Engels 
would have been satisfied with a solution of the German question 
which fell short of their radical demand for a centralized 
German republic, if only it were a step forward. Indeed, they 
could hardly have expected the realization of their radical 
~-9cr. ~gels's lotter to Marx, August 15, 1870, in 
~, III/4, 366. 
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demand because the Germans in general were not in favor of a 
centralized German state. NRZ's agitation for it was an isolated 
occurrence. 
In June, when the publication of ~ began, much of the 
revolutionary ground which had been won in March had been lost 
e.gain. The prospect that the Revolution might enter a radical 
phase had diminished considerably. Conservatism was slowly 
recovering from the initial defeat by the German uprisings. It 
was significant that the Frankfurt National Constituent Assembly, 
which had met for the first time on May 18, appointed the 
Austrian Archduke John as regent of Germany (Reichsregent). This 
strengthened the position of the princes. Moreover, the liberals, 
vn10 were opposed to a republican solution of the German question, 
hoped to win the adherence of the King of Prussj_a to the national 
cause in spite of the increasing conservatism of the Prussian 
government. 
From the outset the editors of NRZ scrutinized the German 
scene for any signs of an approachtng internal crisis that might 
accelerate the Revolution. 10 But even the short lived Vienna 
uprising j_n October, 18Li-8 did not strengthen the Hevolution. 
--ToMarx's and E.'ngels's concentration on political 
problems was reflected i.n their editorial policy. ~ rarely 
covered news concerning the working class. Cf. Noyes, .2.I?.~cit., 
p. 116. 
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As the months passed by, the editors of NRZ became 
-
completely disenchanted with the German Revolution. They 
expressed not only a deep contempt for the liberals, but also 
for the democrats who lacked a radical revolutionary spirit. 
Repeatedly they compared the weakness of the German Revolution 
with the efficiency of the French Revolution. Over and over 
again the readers were reminded that the French revolutionaries 
had introduced a new European order through the abolition of 
feudal and provincial· privileges and the creation of a 
centralized French democracy which welded all the inhabitants 
of France into one nation of Frenchmen. 11 According to~ 
the French revolutionary achievements resulted from the 
willingness of the proletariat to accept the leadership of the 
bourgeoisie. 
In the summer of 1848 .!IBE, maintained that at the outset 
of the Revolution the German bourgeoisie might have acted the 
part of the French bourgeoisie in 1789. However, the German 
bourgeoisie made no attempt to assume 11a more or less democratic 
attitude" in order to w-ln "the people as its ally. 1112 In 
another instance NRZ claimed that the German bourgeoisie could no-' 
have exercised revolutionary leadership in Germany even if it 
--rrNRZ~ September 3 and December 5, 18L}8. 
121'!?1.!!., July 11, 1848. 
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wore truly revolutionary because the German proletariat had 
become class-conscious. 
At the very moment when it [the German bourgeoisie] 
threatened feudalism and absolutism, it was 
threatened by the proletariat and by that part of the 
bourgeoisie which shares the interests and ideas of 
the proletariat.13 
In order to protect the recently acqui.1.·ed political power, the 
bourgeoisie struck an alliance with the old society and favored 
a constitutional monarchy. 
NRZ condemned the bourgeoisie because it had not made 
the slightest attempt to create a centralized German state. This 
would have been a revolutionary act. It should have been 
preceded by the organization of a strong revolutionary center 
such as Paris had been during the French Revolution. The success 
of the German Revolution could only have been ensured through the 
creation of a central dictatorial authority exercising executive, 
legislative, and judicj.al powers. 14 The insurgents failed to 
accomplish this most tu·gent task. Consequently, the German 
Revolution did not develop into a nation-wide unified movement. 
It consisted of many isolated uprisj.ngs throughout Germany. The 
old territorial divisions and even the old struggle between 
'-T3Ibid.: December 15, 1848. 
14 . ~., July 11, 18L1-8. 
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Prussia and Austria for the hegemony in Germany continued as if 
the Revolution had never occured. In the opinion of the editors 
of NRZ, the German Revolution was nothing but a farce. Germany 
had become "the laughing stock of all Europe. 111 5 
The existence of a National Constituent Assembly in 
Frankfurt did not console the editors of ~· They did not 
consider Frankfurt as a revolutionary center. To them the 
Frankfurt Assembly was merely a classical example of German 
revolutionary incompetence. Although it claimed to represent all 
of revolutionary Germany, the Assembly had neither the courage 
to dictate its ovm internal and foreign policies to the princes, 
nor did the Assembly dispose of an efficient army to enforce its 
will. The old German federal army with its "miserable disunity" 
/ had not been replaced by a people's army similar to the levee 
en masse at the time of the French Revolution. 
Marx and Engels were much more concerned about the 
failure of Berlin to stage a successful revolution than about the 
weakness of Frankfurt. This is quite understandablevhen taking 
into consideration that the two men thought in terms of power. 
If Berlin had become the center of the Revolution, the 
revolutionaries would have been able to dispose of the Prussian 
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army, a powerful tool to enforce revolutionary changes in the 
rest of Germany. 
Before March, 18Li-8, Marx and En.gels had regarded Prussia 
as the future leader of a German revolution. But the Prussi.an 
revolutionary movement remained far behind the earlier expectat:i.C!ls 
of Marx and Engels. NRZ ridiculed the Berlin insurgents for 
having failed to change Berlin into the capital of a new 
Germany. The newspaper sneered: 
Berlin, far from being a German Paris, is not even a 
Prussian Vienna. It is not a capital. It i·s a 
residence.16 
The decline of the initial revolutionary drive in Prussia 
was a severe disappointment to Marx and En.gels. The liberal 
ministry under the bourgeois Ludolf Camphausen, which had been 
formed on March 18, 1848, had offered no resistance to a close 
collaboration with the Crovm. In April a law was passed which 
provided for the election of a Prussian Constituent Assembly. 
The new Prussian Constitution was to be dravm up in agreement 
with the Crown. Because of this clause the position of the Crovm 
was strengthened, and the Prussian Constituent Assembly, which 
met in Berlin on May 22, was prevented from acting independently. 
In the following weeks the opposition of the Prussian conservatives 
to liberalism was steadily gaining headway. Subsequently, this 
16Ib·· , 
--1:.9:.. ' August 27, 1848. 
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led to the formation of increasingly more conservative ministries 
and the eventual elimination of the Berlin Assembly as an active 
body in November, 18~.8. 
Marx and Engels observed the political development in 
Berlin vlith particular interest because it symbolized the general 
trend of the Revolution. They tried to stiffen the resistance 
of the left wing in the Berlin Assembly to the growing conservatism 
of the government. They led a sharp campaign against the 
camphausen and Hansemann ministries because the bourgeois members 
collaborated vlith the King and the aristocracy. They ascribed 
the growth of conservatism to the failure of the liberal 
bourgeoisie· to oust the reactionary civil and milita~y officials, 
11 the defenders of Pl"ussian feudalism," from the government at the 
outset of the Revolution. 
foreJgn goli ti~ 
NRZ maintained that the weakness of the Revolution was 
reflected in the lack of an aggressive foreign policy of both 
Frankfurt and Berlin. The Frankfurt Assembly should have 
imitated the French revolutionaries who considered it their duty 
' 
to liberate their neighbors. The editors of NRZ did not mention 
-
that this so-called liberation turned into the annexation of the 
territories closest to France and the creation of dependent 
sister republics which were tributary to the French government. 
---
1 1 1 
What mattered to the editors was that the aggressive French 
foreign policy had helped to undermine the old political and 
social order in Europe. 
NRZ claimed that Germany had a long tradition of 
oppressing its neighbors, a tradition which had been established 
by the reactionary German governments. Since the outbreak of the 
Revolution even the liberal bourgeoisie had become a strong 
supporter of oppressive government policies. The liberals failed 
to collaborate with the insurgents in Italy, Prague, and the 
Grand Duchy of Poznania against Austrian and Prussian rule. 
In the opinion of ~ only a people's government would 
make an end to the oppression of Germany's neighbors because it 
would realize the "international policy of democracy." In the 
summer of 1848 !I.E.?! stated: "Germany will free itself to the 
same extent that it will grant liberty to the neighboring 
nations. 111 7 The majority of the German middle class and the 
German proletariat had already understood that "the liberty of the 
neighboring peoples • 
• • 
was a guarantee of their orm liberty. 11 
The liberation of the peoples under German rule would help to 
destroy the old ruling classes and their reactionary policies. 
However, as long as the Russian Empire remained intact, neither 
the liberation of the oppressed peoples nor the final destruction 
of the internal enemies of the German Revolution were guaranteed. 
1 1~., July 3, 1848. 
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Although before spring, 1848, Marx and 1ngels had 
occasionally referred to Russia, the violent campaign against 
that state only began v1ith the publication of ~· The attacks 
.upon the Russian Empire were the familiar ones. The Russian 
"colossus" was viewed as the bastion of European reaction, "the 
enemy of European culture," and a country with a predominantly 
Asiatic character which threatened Europe, mainly Germany, with 
a military invasion and destruction. Repeatedly ~ warned the 
Germans not to underestimate the military strength of the 
Russian army. Although the Russian soldiers were underfed, they 
had a great power of endurance. Russia was a real danger. 
According to NRZ Russia was the greatest threat to 
German unification. As long as the Russian Empire existed, the 
German reactionaries would always conspire with Russia against 
German liberation, and Germany would remain under the tutelage 
of this Empire. The war against Ru_ssia was badly needed in 
order to awaken the revolutionary initiative of the people, to 
push the German Revolution into a radical phase, and to unite 
Germany. NRZ insisted that the watchword for the war against 
Russia should be the restoration of Poland. The Polish question 
was one of the most important issues in the revolutionary 
propaganda of Marx and Engels. 
----------------------------= 
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The support of the Polish cause had become a tradition 
in German liberal and radical circles since the 1830's. 18 The 
general argument was that only the restoration of Poland and the 
destruction of Russia would allow for the unification of 
Germany. 19 
In the first month of the German Revolution, liberal 
newspapers like the jl.ugsburger All_gemeine Ze_it}l~ and democratic 
newspapers like the Deutsche Reform (Berlin), iscued by Arnold 
Ruge, supported unanimously the restoration of Poland and a war 
against Russia. They argued that it was necessary to prevent a 
Russian invasion of Europe as well as Polish support of Russian 
P 1 . 20 ans avism .. 
The ltberal Prussian ministry under Ludolf Camphausen 
(March-May, 1848) also favored the restoration of Poland as a 
means to realize the German national state. The foreign minister 
Baron von Arni.m-Suckm1, who favored a constitutional German 
IBFor in.formation on German pro-Polish propaganda in the 
period preceding the German Revolution cf. the Cambridge ~stor~ 
.Qf_Poland 2 frornw-O-ugE_stu.s II to Pilsudsk:h (1697-T9°35), p. )55.f. 
also Hermann Buddensieg, ,,Heidelberg and Krasinski," The Polish 
Review, VIII (Spring, 1963), 55-67. 
19Hallgarten, ·studien ueber die deutsche Polenfreundschaft, 
in der Periode der Haerzrevolulion, pp. 15=)0.H' . 
20cr. Walter Bleck, Die Politischen Parteien und die 
R9.s.~~.:..l'r€!-E_e in den Jap.renJ_"'B48"-l12. (Posen: Hofbuchdruckerei 
W. Decker & Co., 19141, Po 10. 
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monarchy under Prussian leadership, tried to convince the Prussian 
King Frederick William IV of the necessity to fight. Russia and 
to restore Poland. 
The Polish democrats, in turn, addressed manifestoes to 
the German people in which they called for a German-Polish war 
against Russj.a and the restoration of Poland as a means to 
liberate the Germans from Russian domination. 21 Polish democrats 
tried to obtain guarantees from the Frankfurt Vor-Parlament for 
the cession of Poznania and Galicia. The more moderate Poles 
submitted petitions to the Prussian King Frederick William IV 
and to the Austrian Emperor Ferdinand I in which they asked for 
Polish autonomy in Poznania and Galicia respectively. 22 
The question of the immediate surrender of Poznania and 
_ GaU.cie., supported by the German demo era ts, caused dissent in 
the Frankfurt Vor-Parlament. Nevertheless, a unanimous resolution 
was passed on the Polish question. The resolution stated that the 
partition of Poland was a "disgraceful wrong," and that it was the 
sacred duty of the German people to work for Polish restoration. 
--z; Ibid., pp. 6-8, 77-78. 
22Prince Adam Czartoryski, the leading Polish conservative, 
wished to solve the Polish question on the basis of legality. 
Before the outbreak of the Poznanian insurrection he conducted 
secret negotiations about the creation of an autonomous small 
Poznanian stci.te united with Prussia in a personal union. · Stefan 
Kieniewicz, ~or.eczenstwo olskie w owstaniu poznanskim ("The 
Polish Socic y in tne ·osen surrec ion-rrr-1\V'arsaw: Rozprawy 
Historyczne, Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawski0g.o, 1935), pp. 83, 
159. 
L 
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Late in April, 1848 the Frankfurt Committee of the Fifty 
issued a similar moderate statement in favor of Polish 
restoration. The National Constituent Assembly was to decide 
on the fate of Poznania and Galicia. 
In the meantime, the initial German and Polish 
expectations of the immediate outbreak of a war against Russia 
had faded. 23 The German liberals began to fear a military 
involvemant with Russia. Simultaneously, the events in Poznania 
contributed to diminish the enthusiasm of the liberals for the 
Polish cause. 
By the end of April the Poznanians staged an. insurrection 
because the Prussian King had not fulfilled his promise to grant 
autonomy to the Grand Duchy. On April 24 Frederick William IV 
had issued an order that the predominantly German part of the 
Grand Duchy should be excluded from a national reorganization of 
Poznania. On May 2 the Federal Diet ratified this order. The 
fate of Poznania had been decided without regard to the wishes of 
Frankfurt. Several days later, on May 9, the Polish insurrection 
in Poznania was put do"vvn by the Prussian e.rmy. 
23In Mar;b Prince Czartoryski and radical Poles like 
Karol Libelt and Ludwik Mierosl"awski, who stayed in Berlin, were 
convinced that the Prussians were only waiting for an invasion 
of the Polish Kingdom by Polish insurgents and for a Russian 
attack upon Prussia in order to begin the war against Russia. Cf. 
Hallgarten, op. cit., pp. 47-48. 
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In mid-April, when Frankfurt had not come forth with a 
definite decision on the Polish question, the democrats had still 
hoped that Prussia at least would initiate the liberation of the 
Poles. 24 Consequently, they were deeply disappointed with the 
high-handed procedure of tht: Prussian government. They violently 
attacked the reactionary forces in Prussia as the main obstacle 
to Polish restoration. The Polish question became a convenient 
means of revolutionary agitation against Prussian reaction. 
The editors of ~ shared the great disappointment of 
the democrats with Prussian policies. The newspaper repeatedly 
condemned Prussia's failure to conduct a vigorous pro-Polish 
policy at the outset of the German Revolution. Prussia should 
have profited from the enthusiasm of Germans and Poles for a 
military cooperation against Russia and from the threat of a 
Russian invasion of the Grand Duchy. It should have precipitated 
a clash of arms with Russia by the liberation of the Poles in 
Poznania. This would have strengthened the Revolution. 
NRZ warned that the suppression of the Poznanian 
insurrection and the partition of Poznania might force the Poles 
to collaborate with the Russians who were eager to exploit the 
~4Cf. Deutsche Reform, April 18, 1848, quoted in Bleck, 
~1b, p. 65 •. 
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Prussian mistakes. In June ~ referred to a :Manifesto of 
Nicholas· I published in the Polish Kingdom. 25 'l'he Tsar declared 
that it was his duty to protect the Catholic Poles in Poznania 
and Galicia, who were the Christian brothers of the Orthodox 
Russians, and to organize a crusade against the oppressors of 
the Slavs. 
NRZ ascribed Prussia's failure to make war against 
Russia to the influence of the Prussian reactionaries in the 
government. NRZ clain1ed that the reactionaries .wished to maintain 
good relations with Russia in order to prevent the development of 
a radical German Revolution. 26 Russia was against the 
restoration of Poland and even against granting autonomy to the 
Poles in Poznania, and the policy of the Prussian government 
_ reflected this attitude. 
~ ref erred to a Russian memorandum which threatened 
a Russian invasion if the smallest part of Poznania wero 
-~---z5NRZ June 2L1-, 1 848. 
_, 
26The Polish historian Jozef Feldman maintained that the 
"extremely skillful and clever tactics of Russian diplo:.1acy," that 
is, the pressure of Russia U})On Prussia, caused Prussia to 
abandon its support of a war against Russia. Cf. Jozef Feldman, 
§J?.F~JY~~...YL.1§.~~8_!:. ( 11The Polish Questi9n in ~8L1-~ 11 ) (Cracow: 
Acade11ya1fm.IejE:Ltno8ci, 1933), p. 130. Bobinska, ins-cead, agrees 
with Marx and ~ingels. She claims that the Prussian lib0rals 
withdrew their support of a war against Russia because of their 
countor-revolutionary attitudee They were afraid that the war 
might lead to the creation of a German republic. This led to 
their subservience to Russia. Bobinska, .op. _c~~·, p. 115. 
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reorganizea. 27 ~pointed out that in spite of this threat the 
Prussian government had withdrawn troops from the fortresses of 
Poznan and Koenigsberg (East Prussia) and sent them to the Rhine 
where no Russian danger existed. This, according to ~' proved 
that Prussian policy was as much "a Russian one" as before the 
Revol~tion. 28 When Russia threatened, Frussia obeyed. Prussia 
continued to be a mere "eastern· province of Russia," regard.ing the 
West as an "enemy" and the East as a "fr.iend" and "savior" in 
spite of its enslavement by Russia. 
In the opinion of ~' Prussia's failure to lead the 
German Revolution, to support the liberation of the Poles, and 
to declare war against Russia was a vic.ious c.ircle of events 
which originated from the half-hearted Revolution. The editors 
were convinc-ed that the Revolution would enter a re.dical phase if 
the Russians invaded German territory. They claimed that the 
German situation showed "numerous analogies" to the French 
development after 1789. In their opinion the German reactionaries 
were anxious to enter .into a military alliance with Russia which 
might have the samo consquences as in France .in 1791. NRZ 
-
threatened that .in case of a Prusso-Russian alliance, the 
German people would unite with the French to sa1re the Revolution. 
~27NRZ, June 23-24, 1848. 
281'!21i., June 24, 1848. 
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"Together • • • they will wage the war of the West against the 
East, of civ.ilizat.ion against barbarism, of the republic against 
autocracy.u29 The unification of Germany would be forged in t1the 
storms of Viar and revolution .. 11 
As long as ~ was published, the editors were forever 
hoping for an immediate Russian invasion of Germany •. In June 
German-Russian relations were still strained. When the rumor was 
spread that. a Russian invasion was imminent, NRZ rejoiced that 
Nichole.s I might soon intervene in Prussian affairs. 
The Bastille has not yet been stormed. Meanwhile, 
an apostle of the revolution approaches irresistibly 
from the East • • • The Tsar will save the German 
Revolution by centralizing it.30 
With the same enthusiasm ~ speculated about the 
consequences of a Russian invasion of Galic.ia and Silesia .. NRZ 
-
assumed that the invasion would cause an uprising of the 
dissatisfied Siles.ian workers and peasants who would destroy both 
the Russ.ian invaders and the Prussian reactionaries .. 
Silesia will suffer terribly from a Russian invasion, 
but Sile.sia itself .is absolutely in need of the Russian 
.invasion for its liberation from all the feudal rubbish.31 
Many months later, in mid-April, 18L~9, !JBZ speculated age.tn a.bout 
the effect of a Russian invasion upon Silesia.. ~ still expected 
--·z9Ibid. , June 25, 18L1.8. 
30ibid., June 18' 1848.. 
311El-2. .. ' June 20, 1848. 
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that a Russian .inve.sion would be tbe signal for a mass upris"i.ng of 
tbe Silesian peasants against the nobles who continued to exploit 
them in spite of the abolition of serfdom.32 
Late in April, 1849 ~hoped that the Revolution would be 
pushed into a radical phase through an alliance of the reactionary 
powers Russia and Austria against the Hungarian war of independenc 
which had started in December, 18L~8. 33 . In the last ~ issue of 
May 19, 1849 the expectations of the editors rose to a feverish 
height. They proclaimed that the Hungarian war against Austria 
had a great revolutionary significance. The war would lead to an 
alliance between the revolutionary Hungarians, Poles, and Germans. 
NRZ ventured to prophecy' that this alliance would result in the 
- . 
dissolution of Austria and Prussia, while Russia would be pushed 
back "to the borders of Asia. 11 Should Austria attempt to pre11ent 
the threatening Central European revolution through an alliance 
with Russia, this would merely accelerate the advent of the 
revolution. The editors insisted that a Russian invasion of 
Hungary would be the signal for a European war against the 
reactionary forces. They were obsessed with the idea that a 
repetition of the :E'rench revolutionary wars was imminent. 
A fewv.eeks, maybe a few days, will decide the outcome, 
and soon the l!rench, the Magyar, the Polish, and the 
--32Ibid. ,· April 13, 1 848. 
331..1?.:b£. , April 29, 1849 .. 
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German revolutionary armies will celebrate their 
fraternization under the walls of Berlin.34 
The Revolution would be saved. 
Marx's and Engels's expectations of a Russian invasion 
of Germany rose to such feverish heights because they knew that 
neither the German liberals nor most of the German democrats were 
willing to support an aggressive foreign policy which would draw 
Germany into a war with Russia. Since the spring of 1848 and 
increasingly so in the summer of 1848 when Russian troops were 
deployed along the German Eastern border, the majority of the 
Germans had lost interest in a war against Russia and in the 
liberation of Poland.35 Even the democrats, who continued to 
favor the restoration of Poland, merely agitated for the convocat:kx. 
of a b'uropean Congress in which the two "great civilized nations 11 
of Europe, France and England, and a liberated Germany, were to 
participate. The task of this Congress would be to effect the 
liberation of Poland by treaties.36 
·- 34NRz:: }iay 1 9, 18li-9. 
35Helmut Y...rause, Marx und Engels und das zeitgenoessiscl10 
Russlap£, Marburger AbhandTungen zur GescEicfi-te" un'C.l-XUltur 
tisteuropas Vol. I (Giessen: Wilhelm Schmitz, 1958), p. 21. 
36cr. the speech of Arnold Ruge in the Frankfurt Assembly, 
July 26, 1848, in Steno$r§t_:ehischei:_J?.._eri_c.ht u_t?.Per die Verhan~luJ}~ 
~e:: de~j;_E.E_1lc-m s_onst,I5D~r.~?.~~~ionaTversnm:illung zu._ l:~~ am 
a:tn, ed. bywof • .Franz W1garCl in the name oi~ Editorial 
UOmmiss:i..011 of the National Assembly ( 9 vols.~ Leipzig: Brei tkopf 
und Haertel und B. G. Teubner, 1848), II, .11 ~5. Cf. also Manifesto 
Of the Central Committee of the German democrats in Cologne, 
August 1 , 1 81~8, ~' August 1 0, 1 848. 
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In the summer of 1848 Engels declared that the foreign 
policy of the German democrats was as reactionary as that of the 
bourgeois liberals. The failure of the liberals to declare war 
against Russia at the outset of the Revolution had prevented the 
unification of Germany and the destruction of the feudal order. 
Engels claimed that the liberals preferred to support the pro-
Russian foreign policy of the old ruling classes because they 
knew that ~ war against Russia would lead to the destruction of 
the bourgeois class after a "short dream of power.n37 
As to the democrats, Engels insisted that they were 
bound to support the status guo in Eastern Europe as much as the 
liberal bo~rgeoisie because they def ended also the bourgeois 
property principle. The democrats were not a revolutionary force. 
They merely paid. lip service to Polish liberation. They did 
not agitate for a war but for the convocation of a European 
Congress to solve the Polish question. Engels claimed that it 
was ridiculous to expect the restoration of Poland from a 
European Congress. In order to achieve this task, the European 
bourgeoisie would have to exert pressure on Russia. This might 
lead to open hostilities. But the bourgeoisie did not wish for 
a war against Russia. Therefore, it would refrain from any 
3'7NRz, ·August 20, 1848. 
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strong measures in support of the Polish cause. Only a 
revolutionary war against Russia would solve the Polish question 
and save Germany from the reactionary aristocracy and bourgeoisie • 
. The insinuation that even the demo era ts would be ruined by the 
war belonged to ~s propaganda tactics which threatened the 
victory of radicalism, although the radicals were a minority. 
While Engels attacked the democrats for merely paying 
lip service to the Polish cause, the liberals and conservatives 
condemned the democrats for their continuation ()f pro-Polish 
propaganda. This helped to keep the controversey over the 
Polish question alive in Germany. The controversy centered around 
the two problems whether German participation in the partition 
of Poland had been a crime, and whether the restoration of Poland 
would be in the interest of Germany. The heated battle of 
arguments, used either to condemn the partition of Poland or to 
support it, reached a climax in the three days debate on the 
Polish question in the Frankfurt Assembly. 
The majority was convinced that it was in the best 
interest of Germany not to touch upon the Polish question. The 
problem of Polish independence was too explosive and might hinder 
the solution of the German national question. New motions which 
declared the partition of Poland a "disgraceful wrong" and the 
restoration of Poland 11the sacred duty of the German people" were 
overru1ed. 
L-----
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The position of the supporters of the status quo, mainly 
conservatives and liberals, was most eloquently presented by the 
democrat Wilhelm Jordan, who subsequently went over into the 
liberal camp. He condemned the democrats for their lack of a 
realistic approach to the Polish question. He maintained that 
their arguments in defense of Polish restoration were not 
substantiated by facts. The partition of Poland was not a crime 
but a historical necessity. Poland had not been in step with 
the historical development towards liberty. It had failed to 
liberate the serfs. Therefore, it remained weak. Poland alone 
was responsible for its ruin. Jordan declared: "History 
• • • 
always mercd.lessly stamps out that nation which no longer has 
the strength to maintain itself among the great nations."38 Only 
strong nations had a right to survive. 
According to Jordan the democrats were also wrong in 
assuming that the Poles were revolutionary and that a restored 
Poland would turn democratic. The insurrections of Cracow and 
Poznania were not staged to liberate the people but to safeguard 
the interests of the aristocracy. Even a restored Poland would 
still be a state composed of "noblemen, Jews, and serfs."39 It 
38stenographischer Bericht, II, 1144. 
39 . Ibid., p. 1150. 
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would not be a revolutiona.ry element in Eastern Europe. 
Consequently, Poland could not become_a bulwark of revolutionary 
Europe. Besides, such a bulwark was not needed. The Russians 
were on the brink of a revolution.4° They would liberate the 
Poles. 
Jordan attacked the democrats because they exaggerated 
the danger of Russian aggressiveness. The restoration of Poland 
was a much greater danger to Germany. The Poles would never 
relinquish their claim 11to the green bridge of Koenigsberg." A 
liberated Poland would immediately ally itself with Russia in 
order to win access to the Baltic Sea, necessary for the existence 
of a modern Polish state. Only the maintenance of the statU..§......9..!:!.2, 
would serve German interests. 
In his speech of July 26 Arnold Ruge presented the 
democratic viewpoint. He insisted that the partition of Poland 
was a crime. The Poles had fulfilled a civilizing mission among 
the Slavs. Furthermore, they had proved their revolutionary 
spirit by the Constitution of 1791 which promised the extension 
of liberty, earlier enjoyed only by the nobles, to all the 
people. The Poles were 11a necessary element in the European 
development$ 111+ 1 They were the most westernized Slavs and presently 
40ibid. ~ p. 1145 
If ~-----=lt-1 ~Ib_i_d_._'==P-·_1_1_8_4_. __ __,......,,..___~ .................. -
126 
the ideal propagators of Western European revolutionary ideas 
among the Slavs. The restoration of Poland would further the 
liberation of all the Slavs, including the Russians. 
Ruge did not share the conviction of Jordan that the 
relations between nations were marked by perennial hostility, 
and that power politics alone could save a nation from 
destruction. Peace between nations, said Ruge, would be assured 
if a European federal union were organized which guaranteed 
the enjoyment of liberty and equality to all the. European peoples, 
including the Slavs. But Ruge did not agitate for a war against 
Russia. He proposed the convocation of a European Congress to 
solve the Polish question. 
On June 27, 1848, when the debates were over, the 
democrats in the Frankfurt National Assembly issued an appeal 
to the German people to support the restoration of Poland in the 
interest of German unification.42 A few days later, on August 1, 
the Central Committee of the German democrats in Cologne 
addressed a Manifesto to the Polish people which agitated for the 
liberation of all the Slavs, including the Poles. The Manifesto 
supported Polish leadership among the Slavs and the inclusion 
of all the liberated Slavs in a future European federation.43 
42 NRZ, 'August 3, 181+8. 
43Ibid., August 10, 1848. 
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NRZ published the Manif estoos of the democrats without 
- -~·-
comment, an indication that the paper did not fully agree with 
the position of the democrats. 
The climactic controversy over the question of Polish 
restoration in the Frankfurt Assembly gave Engels the opportunity 
to discuss extensively ~'s viewpoint on this matter in a series 
of articles published between August 9 and September 7. Engels 
attacked the opponents as ·well as the defenders of Polish 
restoration. According to him neither the past failures nor the 
past achievements of a nation had any significance in relation 
to the question whether this nation had a right to independence 
or not. 
Whatever Poland might have achieved in the past, Engels 
·- declared, did not bestow upon the Poles any right to an 
independent existence in the present if the Poles were not the 
carriers of a new historical task. Engels ref erred to the fate 
of Southern France. In the Middle Ages it created a sr)lendid 
aristocratic republic, but later on it became a stronghold of 
reactionary feudalism. Consequently, v1hen its independence was 
destroyed in the French Revolution, nobody objected to this 
"merciless" historical judgement because the creation of one 
nation under a centralized government meant progress in contrast 
to the outdated social order and the separatism of Southern France. 
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Engels admitted that Poland had been crushed because 
it had not participated in historical progress. However, nobody 
had the right to decree that the Poles must forever submit to 
·the death sentence passed by history. The Poles had gained the 
right to revolt and to place the 11brazen foot of history on 
the neck of their oppressors" because they sided with social 
progress. 4l~ 
As before the revolution Engels claimed that the Poles 
had outgrown the feudal mentality and mere nationalist 
aspirations. The foremost preoccupation of the insurgents in 
Cracow and Poznania had been the overthrow of the whole feudal 
order and the creation of a peasant democracy. The social 
revolution would automatically have effected the liberatio11 of 
the Poles from foreign rule because the new leaders had no ties 
with the foreign oppressors. Engels insisted that the Poles 
had become conscious of the need for political and social changes 
before the Germans ever did. In the preceding decades, while 
Germany was still involved in 11 trivial constitutional and 
extravagant philosophical ideologies," Poland was already 11the 
seat of Eastern European democre.cy. 11 
--- 44rbid. ·:-August 26, 18L~8. 
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In Engels's opinion the Poles, not the Russians, were 
destined to become the revolutionary leaders of the Slavs. They 
were the first Slavic people who had understood that the peasant 
democracy was "the only possible means to liberate the Slavs 
from an "outdated feudal absolutism. 1145. Engels predicted that 
soon the Poles would stage an agrarian revolution in the area 
between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which would turn the 
enslaved pe.asant masses into free owners of the land. The Poles, 
not the Russians, would initiate the overthrow of the old order 
in E9.stern Europe. The Polish peasant democracy would become 
the true bulwark of European revolutionary progress. 
When Engels preclicted an imminent agrarian revolution 
in Poland, he actua.lly ascribed revolutionary initiative to the 
peasants. For the sake of propaganda Engels reversed the 
statement in the _Qg~~_jJ~nif eE.,tO that the peasants were unable 
to stage a revolution and must be led either by the bou.rgeoisie 
or by the industrial proletariat. 
It is significant that in his articles Engels evaded an 
analysis of the revolutionary tactics necessary to bring about a 
victory of the peasant democracy. He restricted himself to 
rhetorical phrases such as--that Poland was ell.ready "the seat of 
Eastern European democracy," or that "the Poland of the peasant 
-----· __ .,...,,,,. __ , 
45rbid., August 20 and September 3, 1848. 
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democracy" was llthe strong son" of the defunct democracy of nobles 
and would surely be victorious. 
By exaggerating Polish radicalism, Engels justified 
the principle, which he had repeatedly stressed in his ~ 
articles, that only a nation which progresses has a right to 
national independence. Engels claimed that Poland was such a 
nation. The Poles were on the brink of a radical revolution. 
A restored Poland would defend democracy. 
Engels insisted that the restoration of a democratic 
Poland ought to concern all the Europeans, particularly the 
Germans. The Polish nation was one of the "necessary nations" 
in the nineteenth century. It was destined to safeguard liberty 
in Europe. Polish restoration was "for nobody more necessary 
than for- the Germans. 111+6 It would free Germany from the 
traditional Russian tutelage. 
Engels had undertaken the task of steering his 
argumentation in defense of Polish restoration safely between 
the cliffs of the basic anti- and pro·-Polish arguments used by 
Jordan and Ruge. But Engels came dangerously close to Jordan's 
position. He had layed down the principle that the condition of 
Polish restoration was the creation of a peasant democracy. If 
this was not achieved, one might as well forget about Polish 
liberation, and the death sentence passed by history would be final 
-----~~"l'-~~~~-L~ b.l b _i ;:}. • , August 20, 1 848 . 
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Obviously a major objective of Engels's line of defense 
of Polish restoration was to ridicule the democratic principle 
that all nations had a rj.ght to independence. Engels never 
returned to the argument of the peasant democracy. Many months 
later he preferred to use the Hegelian concept of the historical 
nation to defend the right of a nation to independence. At that 
time ~ was engaged in a defense of the Hungarian independence 
movement against Austria. Engels maintained that the Hugarians 
had a right to natj_onal inde1)endence because they were a 
historical nation, and he applied this same argument to the Poles~7 
The argument was also used as a tactical means to undermine the 
democratic nationality principle. 
The Bo~~estion: Poznania and Galicia 
Whenever in 1848-49 Engels spoke of the restoration of 
Poland, he meant the restoration of the borders of 1772.48 
February 15, 1848. 
I+8cr. the comment by Lew:Ls Namier on tho agitation of the 
German liberals and radicals, includj.ng Marx and Ezngels, for the 
restoration of the borders of 1772. He saj_d that they made a 
big mi.stake in assuming that a Polj_sh state in j_ts pi·e-1772 
frontiers was viable and would be powerful. "If in 181+8 the 
national character o:f a country could still have been determined 
~y the language and politics of the landowning cle.ss and the 
~ntelligentsia, these vast territories would have been Polish; but 
in treating them as such • • • the German liberals took no 
account of the peasants' hatred of the landlords ••• Such regard 
~or social superiorities and disregard of the rights of the masses 
J.~ comprehensible in middle-class intellectuals, but is comic when 
displayed by men who professed- socialist principles and preached 
c~ass war: in reality • • • the radicals and Marx and Engels 
d1ffe:rod but little from their milleu • • • the basic nri.sappre-
hensj.o:r.s and nonsense of contemporaries aro remarkably alike. n 
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occasional remarks indicated that an even larger territory should 
be guaranteed to the Poles. 
The restoration of Poland cannot mean that of a. sham 
Poland, but of a state which is capable of maintaining 
its independence. Poland at least has to have the 
extension of 1772. It must not only possess the 
territories but also the mouths of its great rivers, 
and must own at least a wide maritime country on the 
Bal tic Sea.Li-9 
several months later Engels declared that it was a vital question 
for Poland "to own the Baltic Sea coast from Danzig to Riga." It 
was a "question of the free development of all the resources of a 
great nation. 115° At that rioment Engels apparently supported also 
the cession of East Prussia to Poland. It was the only time that 
Engels made such an extreme statement in favor of Polish 
aggrandizement • 
.. As to the western borders of Poland~ supported not 
only the inclusion of Galicia but also of the whole Grand Duchy 
of Poznania into a restored Poland. With respect to Poznania 
~ defended a much more extreme position than. the democrats. The 
Poznanian question became an important propaganda means against 
both the Prussian reactionaries and the dcmocrats.51 
~W.in:r.er;-l.§1-1-~$; , The. 11.e..Y_o..l~:.tion o.:L the In.tellectuals, 
Proceedings Of the Bri ti.SIT Academy' Vol. YXX (:COnaon: creo1frey 
Cumber le ge Amen House, 1 9L1-6) , p. 50. 
49~, August 20, 181:.8. 
50ibid., February 15, 1849 .. 
51For detailed information on the treatment of the 
Poznanian question in the Berlin and Frankfurt Assemblies cf. 
Namier, £.P· cit., pp. 71-91. 
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On June 9 Engels opened the discussion of the Posen 
question with an article on the "Seventh Partition of Poland." 
The occasion was a report on the Poznanian events submitted to 
the Berlin National Assembly by a special committee of inquiry. 
The main theme of this article and of the following ones on the 
Poznanian question was that the partition of Poznania was in the 
interest of Prussia, not of Germany. 
Engels accused the Prussian government of having 
betrayed the Poles in Poznania and the German Revolution. He 
admitted that the Prussian liberal ministry under Camphausen 
had been willing to support the liberation of the Poles in 
Poznania. But it was not determined enough to defend its position 
against the reactionary landowners and the generals who demanded 
the suppression of the Polish movement in Poznania. The 
vacillating Prussian policy led to the Poznanian insurrection 
in April. Although this "civil war" was actually forced upon 
the Prussian ministry by the bureaucrats, the ministry was 
ultimately responsible because it had failed to remove the 
supporters of the Prussian Monarchy. 
Engels accused the bureaucrats of using the uprising 
of the Poles to regaj_n their powerful position, even at the 
price of slaughtering the people, a job which was carried out 
by the Prussian soldiers. Engels spoke with sarcasm of: their 
services to the counterrevolution. The soldiers performed 
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''heroic deeds • • • not during the war • • • but after the 
war." Engels declared that the cruelties perpetrated by the 
Prussian soldiers against the Poles were only equalled by the 
atrocities of the Thirty Years' War. He even pitied the 
persecuted priests although they ranked normally among the top 
reactionaries against whom terrorism was advocated. On July 8 
NRZ called the suppresion of the Poznanian uprising a ''fanatic.al 
-
war of exte_rmination conducted by the Christian-Germanic race 
together with the :profit-hungry Jews against the Poles-~·a fight 
of absolutism and bureaucracy against democracy." 
~ did not mention that the Polish landowners in 
Poznania h.si.d also sided with the Prussian reactionaries. Even 
·before the outbreak of the April insurrection they he.d appealed 
to the Prussian government for support against the restless 
peasants who attacked the estates. But NRZ did not denounce their 
-
policies. It evaded in general derogatory statements about the 
Poles. Thus, a picture of strong contrasts emerged from the 
reports on Poznanj~a. On the one side stood the reactionary 
pO\'lex·-hungry Prussians, on the other, the lj_berty-loving Poles. 
A discussion of social tensions in Poznania was not undertaken. 
Prussj_a was blamed for having disrogci.rded justice and the rights 
of the Polish :people in Poznania. It failed to honor the 
principle that political relations must be governed by the moral 
law. 
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Engels was particularly critical of the manner in which 
the whole question of the reorganization of Poznania was handled 
bY the Prussian King. When on April 24, 1848 Frederick William IV 
·ordered the partition of Poznania, he acted independently as if 
the Berlin and Frankfurt Assemblies did not exist. The same was 
true with regard to the proclamations of General Ernest v. Pfuel 
of May 12 and June 4 which limited Polish autonomy to an 
increasingly smaller area of the Grand Duchy. Engels considered 
this procedure as a perfidious manoeuvre to push. the borders of 
the reorganized Grand Duchy ever further east until its autonomy 
would finally be liquidated. Engels did not mention that the 
partition cf Poznania was actually supported by the growing 
German opposition to the radical Polish demands for the 
restoration of the western Polish borders of 1772. 
According to Engels the Prussian officials had falsified 
the number of Poles and Germans living in Poznania in order to 
support the manoeuvres of the Prussian government. They claimed 
that 50% of the people who lived in the districts which had been 
incorporated into Prussia were Germans. Engels used the 
information submitted by the Polish Archbishop of Gniezno and 
Poznania Leon Przy~uski to the Prussian government to criticize 
the Prussian official statistical data. Archbishop Przyluski 
stated that 1,200,000 people lived in the Grand Duchy. About 
250,000 were Germans and Jews. Of these only about 100,000 
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"mostly Jews and recent German emigrants," were anti-Polish. 
The Poles were definitely in the majority. On the basis of this 
information Engels assumed that only 24% Germans lived in the 
incorporated districts. Many months later he spoke of only 6%.52 
He insisted that the number of Germans had been artificially 
increased by counting also the Jews who were not Germans. The 
Germans were ridiculed because they had fraternized with the Jews 
for the sake of keeping Poznania, and the Jews were condemned 
because they had placed themselves on the side of reaction. 
Whenever there was an opportunity, ~ supported the 
opposition of the left wing in the Berlin Assembly to the 
Poznanian policies of Prussia. The causes of the insurrection 
·in Poznania remained a controversial issue in the Assembly. When 
the Poznanian question was debated in the Assembly on July 4, 
the left wing agreed with the Polish delegates that the insurrect· 
vras not caused by a deep hatred between Poles and Germans but 
rather by the agitation of the reactionaries who stirred the two 
nationalities into fighting one another. The left wing demanded 
a new investigation of the whole matter. On the same day a 
resolution was passed that a commission be appointed to investigci.te 
the ca.uses of the Poznanian insurrection. ~' which sided vlith 
the left wing, commented that this inquiry was an "urgently 
necessary act of justice towards the Poles." 
--..._.__,--~·----
52NRZ, April 29, 1849. 
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Although ~ supported the attacks of the democrats 
against the Prussian policies in Poznania, it criticized their 
demands for the liberation of Poznania as being too moderate. 
The democrats, who defended the right to national self-determina · 
demanded that the Poznanians should be granted the liberty to 
exercise this right. They opposed the demarcation line in 
Poznania because it was drawn by the Pr·ussian government, not by 
the people.. During the debates on Poznania in the Frankfurt 
Assembly (July 25-27,· 1848),the democrats defended this position 
against the majority of the delegates who desired to safeguard 
German national as well as strategical interests. 
The debates were occasioned by a motion of the Committee 
on International Law to ratify the resolutions of the Federal 
Diet of April 22 and May 2, 1848 on Poznania and to incorporate 
.. 
the predominantly German part of the Grand Duchy into the German 
Federal Union. The supporters of the partition of Poznania, 
mainly conservatives and liberals, referred to the necessity to 
defend the German eastern borders and to unite half a million 
Germans, who lived in the Grand Duchy, with their fatherland. 
Jordan criti~ized the democrats for their willingness to 
sacrifice vital German interests. According to him the German 
part of Poznania belonged to Germany by the same right by which 
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pomerani.a had once belonged to Poland--namely, by "the right. of 
the stronger, by the right of conquest. 11 53 
The Polish delegates from Poznania defended the integrity 
.of the Grand Duchy. They called the partition of Poznania an 
arbitrary act. The partition could not be defended on the basis 
of the nationality principle because the German minority did not 
live together in a compact group. Besides, even if the Poles 
were willing to agree to border rectifications, only the 
government of a restored Poland could make the final decision. 
Meanwhile, the Vienna treaties remained in force, and these 
treaties had recognized the historical right of the Poles to 
Poznania. Even the Prussian King had acknowledged this right 
.when he issued a proclamation guaranteeing the preservation of the 
Pol:ish ~ationality. 5I+ 
The democrats opposed an immediate decision on Poznania. 
They called for a new impartial inquiry into the Poznanian 
question and a popular vote in Poznania. A European Congress 
should act as the arbiter in the Poznanian question. 
The majority in the Frankfurt Assembly rejected a 
postponement of the decision on Poznania. On July 27 the majority 
53§ten~ischer Bericht, II, 1146. 
54~.; II, 1166-69. 
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sided with the right wing which had desired an immediate decision. 
The resolution of the Federal Diet of May 2, which confirmed the 
Prussian partition of the Grand Duchy, was carried by 342 votes 
·against 31, with another 31 registered as abstaining, and 157 
as absent. Sixty-nine of those who had voted for the delaying 
motion declared that since their demand for a further inquiry had 
been rejected, their conscience did not permit them to vote on 
data which.they considered insufficient.55 
On that same day the democratic representatives in the 
Frankfurt Assembly protested against the nnew partition of . 
Polandn which was decreed without having held "definite inquiries" 
into the n~tional origin of the inhabitants of Poznania.56 
On August 1 the Manifesto addressed to the Polish people 
by the democratic Central Committee in Cologne condemned Prussia 
and Austria for not having liberated the Poles. Simultaneously, 
the Poles were urged to give up the historical-right principle 
with respect to Poznania. They should agree to the application 
of the democratic principle of national self-determination to this 
province. A just German-Polish border could only be drawn if 
the people in Poznania were granted the right to decide freely on 
their national status. A European Congress should act as an 
arbiter in the Poznanian question.57 
551.Ei.£.' p. 1238. 
56NRZ, August 3, 1 848. 
-
57Ib:i.c1., August 10, 18lt-8 .. L---·-----------
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Engels sided with the democratic opposition to the 
decision of the Frankfurt Assembly on the Grand Duchy. However, 
be did not identify his own position on the Poznanian question 
with that of the democrats. As in the case of the question of 
Polish restoration, he steered an independent course. He attacked 
both the supporters and opponents of the new demarcation line in 
Poznania. 
In his first article on the Frankfurt debates, Engels 
told the story of a priest who acted .the· part of a benefactor 
for birds whose wings he had mutilated. According to Engels 
Prussia applied a similar method. First, Prussia. deprived the 
Polish peasants of their independence, and then it posed as their 
.benefactor who had improved their lot.58 Engels ridiculed the 
Prussian bureaucrats because they were suprised when the peasants 
58Cf. Engels's reluctance to acknowledge any benefits of 
Prussian rule in Poznania with the statements of the English 
historian John H .. Clapham. He said that the absolutely landless 
peasant was rare in the Prussian Kingdom, and that the Prussian 
peasants were better off than the Polish peasants in Poznania in 
the eighteenth century. 11The Polish peasant had no rights. His 
land, his goods, his services were all at the lord's disposal ••• 
It is probable that he found the Prussian government an 11 improvement on his ORTI, even before Prussia began the €mancipation. 
Clapham said that for political reasons "the Polish peasantry 
in Poznania were sedulously protected, and their position improved 
in every way after 1815. These poor folks were not dreaming of 
their lost kings. 11 Clapham called the Prussj_an policy "an 
interesting case of calculated humanity" which aimed at the 
weakening of the· Polish landowners. John H. Clapham, The Ec~-
1?~~..2..1.QJ?_in.§llL of F~~ .. 2.~ ..... §~.~d_5}er1(~l1Y 1 81 5-1 fil (Cam bridge : 'l'nc 
Univ0rsity Press, 1945), pp. 39, 44. · 
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participated in the Poznanian uprising. The bureaucrats should 
have known that "nothing compensates for the loss of national 
independence, not even the help offered to or forced upon the 
·people. u59 
Engels's statement that national liberty was the highest 
good and that no material betterment could make up for its loss 
can hardly be taken seriously. It clashed with Engels's 
rejection of a basic right to national independence. This fact 
has to be taken into consideration when attempting to evaluate 
Engels's agitation for the complete surrender of Poznania to 
the Poles. Otherwise, the illusions about the sincerity of his 
agitation will be perpetuated, notwithstanding the fact that in 
1851 Engels himself destroyed this illusion. The support of the 
surrender of Poznania was a political expedient to fight 
monarchist Prussia, the 1',rankfurt Assembly, and the democrats. 
The arguments used in the Frank.furt debates that the 
Germans had a right to Poznanj.a because they were more civilized 
than the Poles offered Engels a convenient basis of attack. Engel"' 
ridiculed the Germans for their superiority complex towards the 
Slavs which was not justified, particularly not with regard to 
the Poles. The German emigrants had not promoted any political, 
cultural, or eco~omic progress. 
________ .,. -
59NRZ, August 9, 1848. 
l 
Engels also rejected the need for military security 
and the historical-right principle. He called this principle 
"a garbage doctrine" which the autocrat Frederick II had used to 
defend his claim to the Netze district. However, it was obsolete 
in 1848. The democratic revolution should not be concerned with 
historical rights or wrongs but with the liberation of the 
oppressed. As to the question of military security, the eastern 
German bord.er was safe without the possession of the fortresses 
of Poznania, Kuestrin, Bromberg, and Glogau. 
Engels was particularly opposed to the application of 
the nationality principle in Poznania. He maintained that the 
Germans and the Jews, who had lived for centuries among the Poles, 
·had become de facto Polish citizens. He denied the existence 
of a Polish-German lord er problem. Yet, on another occasion he 
admitted to its existence and expressed the belief that this 
problem could be solved by a reasonable approach. 
According to Engels the supporters of the partltion 
of Poznania did not defend German but Prussian interests. For 
decades the Prussian treasury had immensely profited from the 
confiscati.on of lands belonging either to the Catholic Church 
or to the Polish aristocracy. Most of these confiscated lands 
were situated within the incorporated area. The new border line 
was not determined by "the demands of this or that nationality" 
or by "so-called strategical reasons." It was determined by "the 
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position of the domains, the greed of the Prussian government," 
and by the desire of the Prussian aristocracy to get "a splendid 
estate for nothing." The new border, said Engels, safeguarded 
the economic interests of reactionary Prussia and helped to 
strengthen that state.GO 
In Engels opinion the ratification of the partition 
of Poznania proved that the Frankfurt Assembly had been unable 
to assert j_ts independence from the reactionary forces in Prussia. 
Under the influence of Prussia, Frankfurt decided against a 
democratic Germany. This sj_tuation would continue as long as 
Prussia and Russia were united in the common desire to keep Poland 
divided. The victory of democracy was only possible through 
the res~oration of Poland which would destroy Russia and also the 
Prussian and Austrian Monarchies whose strength depended upon 
·-
Russian support. 
While l"l""RZ followed the debates on the Poznanian question 
in Frankfurt with an intense interest, it paid little attention 
to the development in the Berlin Assembly where the left wing 
. -~ 60'.fbid:.., August 12, 1848. Cf. the view of the Germe.n 
historian M. Laubert who also maintained that Prussia's interest 
in Poznan5.a was mainly of an economic nature. Laubert mentj_oned 
the expropriation of the Polish aristocracy by the Prussian 
government since the time of Frederick the Great and the attempt 
of the government to gain the support of the Polish peasants and 
~he bourgeoisie. Germanization was merely a result of the 
immediate aim to increase the income of the Prussian state. M. 
Laubert, _l2;1§.....J?!..£2:~~i.§.9jie Pol~~.1.91 !±. (3d ed. ; 
Craco\7: Hurgverlag, 19441; pp. 103 f:f. 
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was stronger. Berlin was not willing to ratify the decision of 
the Frankfurt Assembly on Poznania. It adopted a defiant 
attitude to~ards Frankfurt. On October 19 and 23, 1848 the Berlin 
Assembly resumed the debates on the Poznanian question which ended 
with a victory of the left wing by a one vote majority. The new 
demarcation line was considered as "unfair and completely 
arbitrary. 1161 The democrats proclaimed· that the Prussian National 
Assembly war:> more democratic than the Frankfurt Assembly. It had 
acknowledged the democ~atic principle that the sovereignty of 
each nation should be respected. Apparently ~ did not share 
the enthusiasm of the democrats. On October 22 and 26 !!.E& briefly 
reported on. the debates vrl thou t any comment. After this crisis 
the interest in the Poznanian question subsided. In the meantime, 
the Vienna uprising in early October, 1848 had turned the attention 
of NRZ to the events in the Austrian Empire. 
It is interesting that in NRZ's agitation for the 
destruction of the Austrian Empire, the Galician question did not 
play the same role as the Poznanian question in the fight against 
Prussia. Although ~ repeatedly stated that the destruction of 
Austria was as necessary as the destruction of Prussia to free 
Germany from the Russian yoke, neither Austria nor the Frankfurt 
Assembly were attacked for not having decreed the liberation of 
t Galicia. ~ limited itself to reporting news about Galician 
6Tcf. Sten~f-12hische Berj.chte der Preussischen National-l J!.ersai~:...I'll, 16', f rf;-qu"obd in B:le""Ck, )lP·-~~· 55. -
r~-------... 
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events, rarely accompanied by any comments. This was another 
.indication that the Poznanian question was mainly a convenient 
propaganda means because it was a much more explosive question 
in Germany. 
After the outbreak. of the German revolutionary movement 
no uprising had occurred in Gaiicia. The Poles had merely 
addressed petitions to the Austrian Emperor for Polish autonomy 
in Galicia and to the Frankfurt Vor-Parlament for the immediate 
surrender of Gaiicia. The.ir conviction that the whole Galician 
province was Polish was contested by the Galician Ukranians 
(then called Ruthenians) who addressed separate petitions to 
"'"'.,... ttn. • .a.""',...-.; ... ._11 _ ... Ji. ..... ____ 62 
-~· J.""4.".U.V..U..J.-~ """'W."VUV~ • 
The f.ight between Poles and Galician Ukranians vra.s 
continued at the first Pan-Slav Congress in Prague (June 1-12, 
1848). The Poles tried to convince the Ukranian delegates :from 
Galicia that in the future a restored Poland would avoid the 
mistakes of the old Polish Republic which had been a federation 
62For information on the Galician question in 1848 
cf. the treat.ise of Ivan Bryk "Slavjanskyj Kongress v Prasi 
v 1848 i ukraDiska sprava" ('.'The Slav.ic Congress of Prague in 
1848 and the Ukranian Question"), CXXIX (1919), 141-217. This 
treatise is most useful because Bryk extensively quoted from 
documents which are no longer available. 
l ________ ____. 
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only in name. It would become a true federation based on "general 
liberty. 1163 But the Ukrainian delegates remained hostile. 
Ivan Borisikevich, a leader of the Ukrainian movement 
in Galicia, made a strong statement against the restoration of 
the Polish borders of 1772. He said that the Ukrainians, because 
of their memories of Polish oppression, did not wish to become 
members of a restored Poland. He agitated for the liberation 
of the two .and one half million Galician Ukrainians from Polish 
rule and for their recognition as a separate nationality. The 
ul tirna te goal of the "Ruthenia.n movement, 11 which had originated 
early in the nineteenth century as a cultural movement, was the 
reunion of the Galician with the Ea.stern Ukrainians (then called 
·Little Russians) and the formation of a separate nation of "fiftee 
million" people free from Polish or Russian over lordship. 6Lr 
,!'IR~ repeatedly covered news on the tensions between the 
Poles and the GC3.lician Ukrainians due to the 11 Ruthenian" national 
movement. But in this connection NRZ never referred to the 
arguments used at the Prague Congress. NRZ strictly defended the 
Polish position. The "Ruthenians" v1ere attacked for being anti-
Polish, pro-Russian, and narrow nationalists who had n.o other 
T5Cf. th; speech of Prince Lubomirski, the Polish delegate 
to the h""'ague Congress, June 1 , l 8L1-8, Narodni Nowin;r (National 
News [Galicia] ), No. 52, 181+8, quoted1nB'.rylt,- pp. 189-190. 
64 . . ~ryk, pp. 180, 190. 
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desire than to safeeuard the "I~uthenian" nationality. The 
11Ruthenian11 movement we.s ridiculed because priests and peasants 
who participated i.n it relied upon "religion and fanaticism" to 
attain their nationalist goal. In some instances ,!!RZ printed 
information that the movement was exploited by the Austrian 
government as a convenient means to fight the more radical Poles, 
in others that the movement had been artificially created by 
the Austrian government for that same purpose. 
Most other news about Galicia consisted Of rumors or 
speculations about a Russian invasion of the province and its 
effect upon Silesia. Nowever, ~did not undertake a propaganda 
campaign for the independence of Galicia. At the time of the 
Vienna insurrection early in October, when Polish hopes for the 
liberation of Galicia flared up again, ~ did not agitate for 
the separation of Galicia from Austria. It me.Lely reported the 
excitement which the Vienna·insurrection had caused in Cracow. It 
also published a Polish £1~nifesto, issued in Vienna, which appealed 
to all the Poles to fight together with the Viennese insurgents 
for the liberty of Poland and all the oppressed peoples. Even 
when tho war between Hungary and Austria had started in December, 
1848, ~ only speculated that a closer Hungarian-Polish 
collaboration might lead to a Polish insurrection in Galicia and 
o the defeat of the Austr:Lans. During the early months of 181~9 
news about a growing opposition to the oppressive 
!' 
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policies of the Austrian government in Galicia (Lwow and Cracow). 
In January, 1849 Austria declared a state of siege in Galicia; in 
February it threatened with an enforced recruitment; in March it 
imposed a new Constitution. But NRZ did not make a special 
issue of it. Even when early in May, 1849 NRZ expected a Russian 
invasion of Hungary, it did not agitate for a Polish uprising 
in Galicia. 
It. is significant that Engels, who extensively discussed 
the Poznanian question'in ~' did not write a major article 
on Galicia. This proves the priority of the Poznanian question 
in the revolutionary strategy of ~· The Poznanian question was 
connected with Prussia, and Prussia was still considered as the 
barometer of the German Revolution. Consequently, all the 
problems of Prussia had to be fully exploited to further internal 
conflicts in that state. 
The Slavic Question in the Austrian ~ 
The development of the Poznanian question, which ~' 
had followed with an intense interest, belonged to the larger 
problem of the future extension of the political borders of a 
united Germany. It was, therefore, part of the explosive question 
of German rule over alien peoples. 
A majority in the Vor-.!_>.§rlament and in the Frankfurt 
National Constituent Assembly supported the creation of 
Q[Q.§...Sdeutschl-2:,D.£, .including Austria and its Slavic dependencies. 
The gr_9~i§ldeutsche solution was also favored by a majority of the 
aemocrats. 65 Only a minority, led by Arnold Ruge, genuinely 
adhered to the nationality principle. They demanded that the 
right to national self-determination should be granted to all 
the peoples under German rule and also to the Austro-Slavs. They 
considered the recognition of this right as the prerequisite for 
the creation of a European federation. The ,g_rossdeutsche question 
contributed to an even ·larger degree than the Poznanian question 
to dissension in the ranks of the democrats. 
Marx and Engels had fought the democratic principle,, of 
national self-determination before the Revolution. They fought 
this principle even rnoro strenuously in 184-8-49, not only because 
they supported the surrender of Poznania to the Poles but because 
the creation of QE.2._12,§.9._eutschland was at stake. Marx and Engels, 
who supported the e;ros_§§!uts~ solution, opposed the wishes of 
the democratic minority for the liberation of the Austro-Slavs. A 
discussion of this controversy regarding the right to national 
self-determination in relation to the Austro-Slav question helps 
to throw light on Marx's and Engels's arbitrary handling of the 
question of national liberty. It reinforces the doubts as to the 
Sincerity of their declarations in favor of Poznania, and it 
a now objective of their pro-Polish agitation. 
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The def enders of the ,grossdeutsche solution in the 
Frankfurt Assembly were merely willing to guarantee the equality 
of all the non-Germans in a united Germany. On May 31, at the 
tenth session of the Frankfurt Assembly, a motion was introduced 
that Germany should not oppress any nationality. Thereupon, a 
resolution was passed which guaranteed equality of civil rights 
to all the non-Germans in a united Germany and "the use of their 
own language--as far as it extends territorially--in religion, 
education, literature, and the internal and judicial adminis-
tration.1166 This resolution did not satisfy all the democrats. 
Early in June the democratic members of the Frankfurt 
Assembly led by Arnold Ruge published a Ma_nifesto which demanded 
liberation of the individual as well as of nations, condemned 
the conquest and oppression of Germany's neighbors, and supported 
the creation of a European federation of 11 free and equal nations 11 
to safeguard liberty and unity. The "Holy Alliance of the peoples 11 
was to j_nc1ude not only a restored Poland but all the "democratic 
Slavs. 1167 
On June 7, at the thirteenth session of the Frankfurt 
Assembly, the democrat Ruge returned to these demands. He 
declared: 
--55':--§ ten 9.i~~ his ch~!._ BericJ~t, I, 183. 
67 Cf. l".ianJ-.f.£.~.£, in NR~, June 6, 184-8. 
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The territorial and nationality problems belong to 
the despotic times. All the peoples should be 
permitted to organize and fraternize as freely as 
·possible.68 
The Germans should grant independence to all the Slavs under 
German rule and collaborate with them on the basis of equality. 
~ printed the declarations of the democrats on the 
nationality question--but v1ithout any comments. This indicate.d 
that the editors did not wish to identify themselves with the 
democratic ~iewpoint that each nation had a right to liberty and 
that all the Slavs should enjoy this right. 
From the outset occasj_onal statements in ~ revealed 
that the editors were not opposed to the conquest of foreign 
nations provided that the conquering nation was more progressive. 
In June, when NRZ repeatedly condemned the Germans for the 
oppression of their neighbors, it also rejoiced that the German 
military campaign against the Danes for the incorporation of 
Schleswig-Holstein might soon end vri th a German victory and German 
rule over the Danes. According to ~ this would be a blessing 
because the Danes were more couterrevolutionary than the Germans. 
The Danes were still immersed in their Nordic past which they 
glorified, and all the social clo.sses wore imbued with "an 
unshakable loyalty to the princes." The Germans were "frivolous, 
civilized Frenchmen'' compared to these "upright barbarians. 116 9 
"b8Ste~gr_~__h;Lscher Beri£h!, I, 21+0. 
69~, June 29, 18L18. 
---......_.,,..,~~ P t M WP& bJliiWWWm\~:~~":·~""!:liilll'-WWWililtet:Wrw"'LGl&L~,rn 
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Several months later NRZ declared that the Germans~had at 
least made a revolution and had progressed. Therefore, the war 
against Denmark was justified. It was "the first revolutionary 
war" of the Germans. Under German rule Schleswig-Holstein would 
be drawn into the revolutionary movement and freed from a sterile 
union with the backward northern nations. 
Germany takes Schleswig by the same right, by which 
the Frenchmen have taken Flanders, Lorraine, and 
Alsace--by the right of civilization over barbarism, 
of progress over backwardness.70 
"The right of historical development," not treaties, counted in 
international relations. 
Finally, in February, 1849 the editors pronounced a 
full~scale condemnation of the democratic principle that each 
nation had a basic right to liberty and self-determination. They 
declared that "justice and other moralistic principles" did not 
count in the relations between nations if progress was at stake. 
As an example they mentioned the conquest of California and Texas 
by the United States of America. This conquest was not a crime. 
It vms in "the interest of civilization. 11 Tho Americans, who were 
more progressive than the Mexicans, initiated a. splendid 
development of the conquered territories which fully justified 
the . 1 t . f i~ • • d d 7 l vio a·ion o. ~exican in epen .ence. 
-----.--.er . _. _ 
1 ~~, September 10, 1811-8. 
7 l Ibi_9:_. , February 1 5, 1 8L;. 9. 
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The editors of ~ treated the question of national 
liberty in an arbitrary manner. To them national liberty was not 
a principle. But whether they made statements in favor of 
national liberty or against it, they always aimed at furthering 
the Revolution. They reverted to the Hegelian idea that the 
nation was the carrier of historical development, and that the 
historical right was on the side of the progressive nation. In 
their propaganda the progressive nation was revolutionary, and 
the backward natj.on reactionary. 
This theory placed a limitation on the right to national 
liberty. It also lent itself to a very arbitrary application. 
It might be conveniently used either to support the liberation 
of a nation or to justify conquest and the overlordship of one 
nation over another in the name of progress or revolution. The 
editors of NRZ applied this theory to defend the restoration of 
Poland e.s vrell as to condemn the Slavic movement in the Austrian 
Empire. They took an extremist position and would neither grant 
autonomy to the Slavs nor the right to preserve their own 
cultural traditions. Marx and Engels supported the complete 
absorpt:Lon of the Austro-Slavs through Germanization. Their 
position was even more radical than that of the liberals, not 
to speak of the democrats. 
The Vor-Parlament had invited the Czechs (then called 
Bohemians) to send delegates to Frankfurt. But the Czechs 
refused to do so. They became the most active supporters of the 
creation of an Austro-Slav state in whj_ch all the nationalities, 
Germans and Slavs, would enjoy equal rj_gh ts. They initiated the 
preparations for the first Pan-Slav-Congress at Prague. At this 
Congress the question of Austro-Slavism was discussed. 
From the beginning the Polish radicals and conservatives 
opposed the political concept of Austro...;Slavism. They supported 
the creation of Grossdeutschla!!Q in Frankfurt. They hoped that 
·n return the provisional German government would grant Galicia 
independence. The realization of an Austro-Slav state would 
have precluded the fulfillment of Polish aspirations in Galicia. 
The Poles were convinced that Austro-Slavism was "a declaration 
of war against Poland" concocted by the Czechs to prevent the 
estoration of the historical Polish borders and to destroy Polish 
- 72 leadership among the Austro-Slavs. They agreed only reluctantly 
to participate in the Pan-Slav Congress. 
The Czechs, in tux·n, displayed much animosity against 
the Poles. They ridiculed Polish claims to the historical borders 
of 1772 as outdated.73 Besides, they supported the demand of the 
·7zCf. Mlnutes of the Preparatory Commj_ttee, May 5, 18li-8, i 
ational Archi veso1'- :Clie Czecfl Flu~seum inl-Tague ;-quoted j_n Bryk, 
l.>· 152--;--andEdmund Chojecki, Rer1~ .. ic;Pisci i s·Y..;.?.P.1.1ictwa wstecz.ne 
("The Revolutionaries and the Upposit1on 11T\13er'Ii11: ~
p. 306, quoted in Bryk, p. 153. · 
73cf. article of a Czech correspondent, published in 
arodaj.. Novi:Q.): (Nati opal News), reprinted in Dz1:_~:qnj-Js_ 1'{?-F.?.d~y;'l, 
People"TSDaily [Lwow] ), No. 47, May 18, 184F," quoted in Bryk, 
• 158. 
i-··· . .._ L ...,.,,~,., ..... ,. ... ---··-= ,,, . .._...~---
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Galician Ukrainians to be recognized as a separate nationality. 
The Galician Ukrainians, on the other hand, favored the Czech 
concept of an Austro-Slav state as a means to liberate themselves 
·from Polish rule. The Czechs also opposed the Polish claim to 
Silesia. They considered Silesia as rightfully theirs. 
Territorial problems helped to undermine unity at the Prague 
Congress. When the Congress was dissolved because of the radical 
Prague uprj_sing on June 12, 1 848, no real progress had been made 
in the direction of Au'stro-Slavism.74 
~ hardly commented on this Congress. The editors 
made no attempt to exploit Slavic agitation against German rule 
at the Prague Congress although in June their propaganda campaign 
against_German oppression of the neighboring peoples was most 
intense. In some isolated statements the Austro-Slavs were 
ridiculed for their political ambitions. NRZ maintained that the 
Austro-Slavs wished to create a new European power between Russia 
and Germany through the organization of a "great Slavic state 
bordered by the Riesengebirge, the Carpathian Mountains, the 
Adriatic Sea, and the BaJ.kans."75 But the Austro-Slavs would be 
too weak to realize this plan against the opposition of Russia, 
Hungary, and Germany. 
774For further information on the Prague Congress cf. Hans 
Ko~n, Pan-~vis~~ It?_History a~d I1eolo~z (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of--rr0tre Dame Press, 1953 , pp. 65-74. 
75NRZ, June 9, 1848. 
r 
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In NRZ's opinion the whole concept of Austro-Slavism 
was reactionary. The Austro-Slavs were accused of merely 
supporting the Austrian Monarchy in order to further their O\'m 
narrow nationalist aims. The Czechs, in particular, were attacked 
Although the Prague uprising was hailed as a revolutionary event, 
soon afterwards the Czechs were dubbed counter-revolutionaries 
whose fate it was to be exterminated by· the Revolution. According 
to ~' Cro.atian support of the Austrian government 1 s fight 
against the Hungarian independence movement was merely another 
proof that the Austro-Slavs preferred the Austrian yoke to 
liberty. 
Actually it was not so much a question for NRZ whether 
the Austro-Slavs were revolutionary or reactionary, but rather 
how the creation of a strong Germany would be furthered. The 
policies of the Austro-Slavs, which aimed at safeguarding the 
integrity of Austria, were a hind1·ance to the gross_geutsche 
solutj.on. Consequently, .fillli advised the radicals against any 
support of the Austro-Slavs. ~ favored the Hungarian 
independence movement because the Hungarians were for the 
destruction of the Austrian Empire. 
Repeatedly I!fili pointed out that the Hungarians were as 
worthy of collaboration with the Germans as the Poles. The 
Hungarians were revolutionary and pro-German. On August 11 NRZ 
referred to debates in the Hungarian House of Representatives 
,. 
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which disclosed that the Hungarians were anxious to support the 
German cause and to collaborate with revolutionary Germany.76 One 
of the deputies declared: "I consider Germany as the torch in 
the heart of Europe. Hungary will play the part of the torch-
bearer." This was the role which NRZ ascribed to the Hungarians. 
At the time of the Vienna uprising in October, 1848, 
when the Hungarians made an attempt to collaborate with the 
Viennese in~urgents, and particularly after the outbreak of the 
Hungarian war against Austria, NRZ's enthusiasm for the Hungarian 
cause kept rising. Meanwhile, the immediate interest of NRZ 
in the Polish cause was pushed more and more into the background. 
However, NRZ continued to praise the Poles for their 
. -
support of the Viennese insurgents and the Hungarian war, and for 
their opposition to Austro-Slavism. On November 9 NRZ referred to 
a recent article against Austro-Slavism published in the Polish 
newspaper hvow Gazeta Powszechna (General Gazette of Lwow). The 
article declared that the Poles had acquiesced in the idea of a 
federo.l Austro-Slav Monarchy in order to prepare the political 
independence of Galicia. The Poles withdrew their support of this 
idea when the Austrian. government made no attempt to realize it. 
~ commented that the Poles, with the exception of a few "fanatics~ 
7bcf. th~ information on the readiness of the Hungarians 
to support the grossdel!_ts,ch.~ solution, in A. J. -!'· Taylor, The ~bsburt)_ Monarcny
4 
1809-191 ~~(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), 
p. 4-5. 
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were not interested in the survival of the Habsburg Empire. They 
did not join the imperial camp "with beating drums" like the 
Slavic deputies at the time or' the Vienna uprising. NRZ hailed 
the Poles as the only revolutionaries among the Austro-Slavs. 
Towards the end of 1848 ~began to report about the 
rising opposition among the Austro-Slavs to the Austrian 
government which had not kept its promise to grant equal rights 
to the Slavic nationalities. NRZ hoped that the growing unrest 
might develop into a new crisis and contribute to the fall of 
the Austrian Empire. This hope was also nursed by the Polish 
democrats. 
On January 22 ~ published a Manifesto of the Central 
Committee of the Polish Democratic Society in Paris which was 
addressed to the Slavs and signed by the Polish democrats Ludvlik 
Mierosrawski, Stanislaw Worcell, and V/ojciech Darasz. In this 
Manifesto the dissatisfied Austro 0 Slavs were warned not to ally 
with the "Muscovites" against the Austrian government which had 
betrayed them. They were urged to collaborate with the Poles 
for the restoration of Poland. This would be the only means to 
destroy the Austrian rule over tho Slavs and to create a free 
Slavic union. 
~ published the Mani~ without comment. The 
editors no doubt disliked Polish support of the independ~nce of 
the Austro-Slavs. But the Manifesto vras useful. It supported 
,. 
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the opinion of the NRZ editors that the Austrian Empire was 
rapidly moving towards a new crisis because of the rising 
unrest of the Austro-Slavs which occured at a time when Austria 
was faced with the Hungarian war. 
However,~ did not agitate for a close collaboration 
of the Austro-Slavs with the Poles or Hungarians or even with the 
German revolutionaries to hasten this event. It merely continued 
to report a,bout Slavic unrest which became very serious when a 
new Austrian constitution was imposed upon the Austro-Slavs in 
March, 1849. At that time NRZ called the Slavic opposition to 
the government "the third disorganizing element" which, along 
with the Hl.lngarian and Italian wars, condemned Austria to an 
imminent end. 
What the fate of the Austro-Slavs would be in case of 
the fall of the Austrian Monarchy, Engels had outlined in a series 
of articles published in February, 1849. In those early 
weeks of 1849, when~ rejoiced over the growing opposition of 
the Austro-Slavs to the Austrian government, Engels pronounced 
the most absolute condemnation of their aspirations to national 
liberty. 
Engels used his articles to attack the policies of 
Arnold Ruge and, in particular, of Michael Bakunin, the political 
r 
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opponents of Marx and Engels since 184l1 .• 77 As was mentioned 
earlier, a German democratic minority defended the liberation 
of the Austro-Slavs and German collaboration with them on the 
basis of equality. They considered the Slavic question as "the 
vital question of the Revolution. 1178 Bakunin maintained the 
same position. 
After the outbreak of the German Revolution, Bakunin 
had continued his propaganda for the destruction of the Austrian 
Empire and the liberat1on of the Austro-Slavs as a major step 
towards the creation of a new Europe, along with the destruction 
of Tsarist Russia. As one of the tvro Russian participants in the 
Prague Congress, Bakunin became the most determined opponent of 
the political concept of Austro-Slavism.79 He also sided with the 
Poles in their fight for the integrity of Galicia and its eventual 
reunion with the liberated Poland although he fought the Polish 
claim to the eastern borders of 1772.80 
'17Marx and Engels, who disliked Bakunin, welcomed the 
repeated accusations that Bakunin was a Russian spy. Already in a 
letter of September 16, 1848 Engels had informed Marx that Bakunin 
was strongly under the suspicion of being a Russian spy. Cf. 
Bakunin, Confession, p. 62. In the summer of 1848 NRZ published 
such sland.er.--- · -
78cr. Man:Lfesto of the democrats in the Frankfurt 
Assembly, ~' June 6, - 1 84-8. 
79Bakunin, £2P.. f,e_?sion, p. 139. 
80The Polish historian Boleslav Limanowski insisted that 
Bakunin tried to dissuade the Galician Ukrain~ans from agitating 
for a partition of Galicia because this wo~ld support the desire 
Of th0 ;,ustrian government to weaken the Slavic cause 
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In the autumn of 1848 Bakunin composed an !J2peal to the 
Slavs at the invitation of the Berlin d0mocrats. In this 
pamphlet he continued his agitation for the liberation of the 
Austro-Slavs. He defended the democratic principl~ of national 
self-determination and demanded that it should be applied to the 
Austro-Slavs. He railed against the old diplomacy which had 
drawn frontiers without considering the· wishes of the people. 
Future bord.ers ought to be determined "by the sovereign will of 
the nations on the basis of their national origin. 1181 But when 
Bakunin touched upon the Galician question, he did not defend the 
right of the non-Polish inhabitants to national self-determinat:inn. 
He merely expressed the opinion that the Polish landovmers were 
ndemocratically inclined and inspired by the spirit of liberty. 11 
Engels began his polemic against the Austro-Slavs with 
an attackagainst the conviction of Bakunin and the German 
and strengthen the-Pan-Slav aims of the Tsar. Cf. Limanowski, 
~a democrac;rfu pols~i.e,j,, p. 200. The Ukrainian Ivan Bryk 
maincairiee.r"fha-ti.ta unin supported the Ukrainian demands which 
weakened the Polish position. Cf. Bryk, op. cit., p. 206. 
Unfortunately, his sources are no longer avafia6Ie. There is no 
evidence that Bakunin stated that the Poles had a right to the 
Galician Ukraine. It is quite possible that he tried to keep 
both parties of the controversy in a friendly mood by supporting 
Officially the Polish viewpoint and in private discussions with 
Borisikevich, with whom he was on good terms, the Ukrainian 
position. 
81 Josef ·Pfitzner, Bakuninstudien (Prague: 1932), p. 102, 
quoted in Hepner, Bakounine et' le panslavisme revolutionnaire, 
p. 267. -
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democrats that democratic governments would end national 
oppression by applying the democratic principle of national self-
determination. Engels maintained that this contention was wholly 
unfounded. The subjugation of nations was not merely the work 
of "despotic congresses" as Bakunin had maintained. Even the 
democratic United States of America had not refrained from 
conquering Mexican territory, and that conquest was justified 
from the vi_ewpoint of progress. 
According to Engels such terms as humanity, liberty, 
equality, fraternity, and independence, which Bakunin had used 
in his .6JJ..P_Q_al, had no meanj.ng at all. 
They are more or less moralistic categories which are 
high-sounding but prove nothing in historical and 
political questions.82 
Nations were on different levels of development. The conquest and 
assimilation of more backward neighbors was necessary to further 
progress. 
Without force and without iron ruthlessness, nothing 
is accomplished in history; and if Alexander, Caesar, 
and Napoleon had been capable of compa.ssion • • • what 
would have become of history.83 
According to Engels the whole principle of national self-
determination was unrealistic. History taught that the higher 
-
02NRZ':-February 15, 181+9. 
83lli£. 
r 
163 
developed nation had a right to rule the leis developed one. 
Although the Austro-Slavs were not fully Germanized, the 
application of the nationality principle to them was not 
defendable. 
Engels rejected Bakunin's claim, shared by Ruge, that 
the subjugation of the Austro-Slavs by the Germans was a crime. 
He adopted the popular argument, which he had earlier ridiculed 
that the Germans had fulfilled ~a civilizing mission among the 
Slavs. He declared that the Slavs had little inclination towards 
the trades. While the Slavs were predominantly involved in 
agricultural activities, the Germans contributed to the develop-
ment of towns and a bourgeoisie vrhich meant progress. Under 
German rule the Austro-Slavs were enabled to participate in a 
higher civilization. 
.. Engels pointed out that history taught that small 
nationalities could only share in historical progress as members 
of large political units. The Pan-Slavs who demanded the 
liberation of the nhalf-Germanized Slavs" did not understand that 
this would be detrimental to them. The Pan-Slavs had no regard 
11 for the most material necessities." In the nineteenth century 
large territorial units and political centralization had become 
an even greater historical necessity than in the past when the 
great monarchies were organized "because of the formidable 
advance in industry, trade, and communications." The Austrian 
r 
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Slavs lacked the geographic, political, and industrial pre-
requisites for the creation of a modern state. 
Besides, according to Engels the Czechs, Croations, and 
Blovenes would not achieve national independence because they 
had never developed into strong independent nations in the 
past. 
Peoples • . • who from the moment when they reached 
the first crude stage of civilization came under a 
foreign domination, or who were only forced into the 
first stages of civilization under a foreign yoke have 
no vitality. They will never be able to attain any 
sort of independence.84 
Engels claimed that the Austro-Slavs did not even have a right 
to national independence because they were not historical nations. 
The Poles and Hungarians, instead, had a right to national 
independence because they had shown the ability to form independent 
- states in the past. They were historical nations. 
Engels used Hegel's differentiation betvroen the historicaJ 
and non-historical nations here. But Hegel vrould not have 
considered Poles and Hungarians as historj_cal nations because 
they were not carriers of world historical progress towards 
liberty as were the Germanic peoples. 
It may be assumed that Engels def ended the right of 
historical nation to national independence because his 
argument that German superiority justified German rule over the 
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Austro-Slavs caused him some difficulty regarding his support of 
Polish and Hungarian national liberation. Obviously Engels tried 
to extricate himself from this difficulty at the cost of 
arbitrariness. 
Although Engels maintained that German initiative 
was superior to that of the Slavs, he was anxious to differentiate 
between the Austro-Slavs and the Poles. He declared that the 
Austro-Slavs were even more backward than the Poles. This was 
certainly an overstatement with regard t'o the Czechs. 
With respect to the Hungarians, Engels's arbitrary 
treatment of the Austro-Slavs was even more obvious. When he 
defended the subjuge.t:Lon of the Slavs by the Hungarians in the 
past, he dropped the argrunent that this was in the interest 
of progress. Indeed, he could hardly have used this argument 
because he himself spoke of the Hungarians as a "barbarian 
people." He switched to the more convenient argument that force 
makes right. 
If four million Hungarians were able to oppress eight 
million Slavs for eight centuries, this proves 
sufficiently who had more vitality and more energy, 
the many Slavs or the few Hungarians.~5 
Engels supported the continuation of Hungarian rule 
over the Slavs in a restored Hungary. It was more important to 
safeguard the interests of a historical nation, like Hungary, 
-
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than to liberate a few backward nationalities. If Slovenes and 
Croatians were liberated, Hungary and Germany would lose their 
outlet to the Adriatic Sea. The 'possession of this outlet was 
as much a 11vi tal question for Germany and Hungary a.s for Poland 
the need to own the Baltic Sea coast from Danzig to Riga." He 
added: 
When it is a question of the free development of all 
the resources of a great nation, then sentimental 
feeling~ for a few scattered Germans and Slavs will 
decide nothing.86 
Ultimately, Engels could always fall back on the argument 
that the Austro-Slavs, were incurable counter-revolutionaries who 
invented the reactionary concept of Austro-Slavism to further 
their narrow nationalist aims. In his opinion the Austro-Slavs 
opposed the reunion of Galicia with Poland at the Prague Congress 
- in order to secure a Slavic majority in the Austrian Empire. 
They had absolutely no interest in the restoration of a strong 
Poland capable of fulfilling a revolutionary role in Eastern 
Europe. Engels insinuated that Bakunin and the German democrats 
who advocated the liberation of the Austro-Slavs and collaboration 
with them were political fools. Anyone truly interested in 
furthering the Revolution was bound to collaborate merely with 
the Poles and Hungarians because they were revolutionary. Since 
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the French Revolutionary Wars, said Engels, the Poles had always 
sided with the revolutionary party against reaction. In 1848 
the Poles and also the Hungarians collaborated with the 
·revolutionary Germans against reactionary Austria. But the 
Austro-Slavs supported the fight of the Austrian government 
against the Italian, Hungarian, and Viennese insurrections. 
As was pointed out earlier, the major concern of the 
editors of NRZ was the creation of a large German state under a 
·-
centralized government. They were convinced that only such a 
state would further industrial progress and ultimately the 
communist revolution. Consequently, they acted in accordance 
with this conviction when they agitated in ~ for the 
incorporation of the Austro-Slavs into a united Germany. The 
question discussed by Engels whether the Austro-Slavs were 
revolutionary, and whether they would be' able to organize 
independent states was merely a convenient means to ridicule 
Bakunin and the German democrats. Besides, Engels exploited the 
Austro-Slavic question to launch a formidable attack against the 
concept of a union of all the Slavs which was ardently def ended 
by Bakunin. 
fan-Sla~ism, a Danger to Germanl 
In the period before 1848 Bakunin had coupled his 
Pan-Slav agitation with the demand for Polish liberation. He 
r 
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continued this line of revolutionary propaganda in 1848-49. At 
the outset of the German Revolution, Bakunin tried to go to 
Poznania to work for Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration 
in order to prevent the apparently-imminent war against Russia. 
His plan was to turn the fight against Tsarism into an 
exclusively Slavic affair. 87 When the Berlin authorities 
prevented Bakunin from going to Poznania, he went to Silesia 
and then to Prague. 
At the Prague· Congress he agitated for the reunion of 
all the Slavs in "a great indivisible political body" based on 
the equality of all its members. 88 According to him the 
destructioR of the Austrian and Prussian Monarchies was as 
necessary as the destruction of Tsarist Russia to liberate the 
Slavs and to unite them. He denounced Tsarist Russia as a state 
where "death, darkness, and the work of slaves" prevailed.89 
However, he warned against the exclusion of a revolutionary 
Russia from a future Slavic union. "Without Russia, Slavic unity 
is not complete ••• without it Slavic power does not exist."90 
In his speeches at the Congress, Bakunin told the Poles 
that a revolutionary Russia would end the oppression of the Poles. 
87Bak . c f . 
_ unin, on es~, 
88 . Ibid. , p. 139. 
89Ibid., p. 141. 
90Ibid. , p. 1 52. 
p. 116. 
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Russia has separated itself from the Slavic community 
by subjugating Poland and even more so by surrendering 
it to the Germans, the common and principle enemy of 
the Slavic race. Therefore, it can only reenter the 
Slavic brotherhood by the liberation of Poland.91 
·But a liberated Poland would not include the former eastern 
provinces. Bakunin maj_ntained that the Poles had no right to 
these territories. White Russians and uLittle Russians" had not 
been Polonized, but merely oppressed by the Poles. The "Little 
Russians," in particular, had been quite successful in preserving 
their ovm "language • • • and culture," even under the Tsarist 
government. 
Bakunin's immediate aim was to fight against the 
territorial partition of Russia. He claimed that a war against 
Russia was not necessary because Russia was on the brink of a 
revolution, and that the restoration of the eastern Polish 
borders of 1772 was absurd because the inhabitants of the former 
eastern Polish provinces would not welcome Polish rule. 
In order to end the threat of a war against Russia, 
Bakunin desired that the Poles should not collaborate with the 
Europeans, rather they should side with the revolutionary 
Russians. In that case the territorial losses of Poland in the 
would be compensated in the West. A revolutionary Russia 
91~., p. 136. 
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would help the Poles to restore the western Polish borders of 1772 
and even support their aim to incorporate Silesia and E.ast Prussia 
into Poland, that is, to partition Germany.92 
Bakunin proved himself to be a staunch defender of the 
extremist demands of the Slavs for the partition of Eastern 
Germany in order to liberate all the Slavic minorities. In his 
~peal t<l .. 1£.~.?Y~ he threatened: 
Truly, the Slav shall not forfeit anything ••• As 
long as the smallest part of our rights is disputed, 
as long as one single member is separated • • • from 
the whole body, we will fight •• ·• until the Slavs 
finalli stand great, free, and independent in the 
world.93 
In the !£.peal Bakunin's anti-German feelings got out of hand. 
The demand for revolutionary collaboration of the Slavs with the 
Italians, Hungarians, and Germans and for the creation of a 
"federation of European republics" contradicted his radical 
Slav:ism. 
It is surprising that the editors of ~ never referred 
to Bakunin 1 s agitation before February, 18Li-9 al though they must 
have been quite familiar with Bakunin's political concepts. Both 
-9-~tin- :V.18.y, 181+8, when Bakunin frequented the German 
democratic club in Breslau, he supported Polish claims to Silesian 
territory. Cf. the German liberal review P}2 Gre~o~en (Leipzig), 
1848, III, p. 343, quoted in Bakunin, Q2E.fession, p. 321). 
93~, February 16, 1849. 
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Marx and Engels met Bakunin in April, 1848, and Marx met him 
again in the summer of 1848. Apparently these meetings were 
rather stormy. 94 
Initially the editors of NRZ limited themselves to 
occas~onal references to extremist Pan-Slav statements which 
endangered the territorial integrity of Germany. In July, 1848 
NRZ turned the attention of the readers· to statistical data 
-
on the Slavs published by a leading supporter of Austro-Slavism, 
.I .,/ / 
the Czech P. J. Safarik. The Czech leader stated that 2,180,000 
Slavs (that is, 1,982,000 Poles and 82,000 Lusatians) lived in 
Prussia, and 60,000 Lusatians in Saxony. 
On July 16, 1848 ~ printed a Manifesto of the Slavs 
to the European peoples which had been composed by the Prague 
Congress early in June. The Manifesto protested against the 
partition of the Grand Duchy of Poznania and declared: 
We expect the governments of Prussia and Saxony to 
refrain from the systematic denationalization of the 
Slavs in Silesia, Lusatia, East and West PruRsia. 
Such statements indicated that the Slavs would not be satisfied 
their liberation from Austrian and Prussian rule, and that 
also aimed at the partition of Germany. !!BE, printed this 
information without comments. 
94cf. the remark of Fritz Brubpacher, quoted in.Bakunin, 
Conf · 116 
_ essio!:!., p. • 
r 
,. 
172 
In those early months, when ~.R.~ repeatedly expressed its 
disgust with German oppression of foreign peoples, the publication 
of the Slavic statements could have been interpreted by the 
readers e.s a support of Slavic aspirations. But in February, 
1849 Engels came out with a sharp attack against Slavic claims 
to Eastern German territories. He declared that the territories 
east of the Elbe river had belonged to the Germanic people 
before thej,r settlement by the Slavs. These territories were 
reconquered by the Germans after the partition of the Carolingian 
Empire when "geographic and strategical ree.sons" necessitated 
this reconquest. In the course of the following centuries the 
territories were completely Germanized. 
The affair has been settled and cannot be reopened 
unless the Pan-Slavists rediscover the lost Sorbian, 
Wendish, and Abodrite languages and force them on the 
inhabitants of Leip~ig, Berlin, and Stettin. Besides, 
it has never been questioned up to now that this conquest 
was in the interest of civilization.95 
According to Engels all the Pan-Slavists were 
reactionaries because they ~ere extreme nationalists. 
Among all the Pan-Slavs nationality, that is, the 
fanciful, all-Slavic nationality comes before the 
revolutj_on. The Pan-Slavs will join the revolution 
under the condition that they shoula be allowed to 
turn all the Slavic nationalities into independent 
Slavic states, without consideration for the most 
material necessities.96 
·-95irRz-, -February 15, 1849. 
96ill.£., February 16, 18lf9. 
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pan-Slav:Lsm was a kind of supernationalism. It would never agree 
with democracy. 
Engels referred to the Pan-Slavic leanings of the 
Austro-Slavs. He maintained that tbe Austro-Slavs, who shunned 
collaboration with the revolutionary Germans and Hungarians, 
would not refrain from collaborating with the reactionary Russians 
in order to realize their nationalist aims.97 According to 
Engels Pan-.Slavism only helped to strengthen reactionary Russia. 
It must be fought to save the Revolution. Whoever supported 
Pan-Slavism was either an "illusionist" or a "villain. 11 
Engels ridiculed the expectations of Ruge that the 
fraternization of the European nations and their union in a 
European federal republic would end the old political and social 
order in Europe. Such expectations were "sentimental 
phantasies. 11 They had been disproved by the rise of nationalism 
in the Revolution and strong national hatreds, namely of the 
Austro-Slavs for the Germans and Hungarians. Ruge and his 
followers, said Engels, should give up their support of Bakunin's 
agitation for an indiscriminate revolutj_onary collaboration 
between the Europeans and the Slavs in general. Such a policy 
would only endanger the Revolution • 
. -- 97Momms~ has pointed out that because of the Prague 
, Congress the Frankfurt Assembly also overrated the ties of the 
l. Slavi? movement in the Austrian Empire with Russia. Cf. Mommsen, l Qp. c~~ :· 117. 
,.,_.......,.....,.._,_,,,,,........_ ..... ___ ~~.-=w ~k _.;~~www:z_.., ________ d 
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It is obvious that Engels, who insisted upon German 
collaboration with the Poles and the Hungarians, wished to keep 
the Slavs divided. The partition of the Slavic areas in the 
Austrian Empire between the Germans and Hungarians and, in 
particular, the partition of Russia through the restoration of 
Poland would destroy Pan-Slav aspirations which endangered the 
very integrity of German territorial possessions. 
While Bakunin urged the Poles to collaborate with the 
Russians and again.st the Germans in order to gain East-Prussian 
and Silesian territories, Engels insisted that the Poles had 
no intention to join the Russians because they had immensely 
suffered from Russian oppression. "With the Poles the hatred 
of the Russians comes even before the hatred of the Germans, and 
most rightfully so. 11 98 Hatred of the Russians, which was also 
"the first revolutionary passion among the Germans," cemented 
the German-Polish alliance against Russia. According to Engels 
there was absolutely no danger that the Poles would enter a 
Pan-Slav union directed by Russia against Germany. They were 
"free from all Pan-Slav desires." 
Engels was right that the Poles were opposed to 
Russian leadership which Bakunin considered as the only guarantee 
of Slavic liberty. Engels, however, v;as wrong when he stated 
98"1mz ~UFe bruary 1 5, 1 8L~ 9. 
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that democratic Panslavism had no adherents among the 
revolutionary Poles. According to the Polish historian Wilhelm 
Feldman "Slavic propaganda was strong in 1848, partly because of 
the disappointment with the Germans. 11 99 
The Polish democrat Karol Libelt had submitted to the 
Prague Congress a project for a Slavic union. The only other 
project submitted to the Congress was composed by Bakunin. On 
the whole, both projects were concerned with organizational 
problems of the union. They proposed the election of a central 
representative body which should guarantee the enjoyment of equal 
rights by all the members of the Slavic union. 100 Territorial 
problems were not discussed • 
. The question of a Slavic union caused dissent among the 
Polish democrats which did not end with the Revolution of 1848. 
Polish democrats who emigrated· to J.Jondon from Paris in 18lt-9 
issued an official statement i.n which they condemned the support 
of the Slavic idea: "Slavism pushes us back into the epoch of 
barbarism when mankind was divj_ded according to race, and when 
blood, not an idea, was the only link between man. 11101 In 1850, 
p. 159. 
lOOCf N d . N ,· N 8 8 t . B 
. , . • a~E~nn;z:., o. 52, 1 L1. , quo ed in . ryk, 
.QJ>. ci;., pp. 1'89-90. 
101 Feldman, op. c1!.!.., p. 159. 
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when Libelt agitated for a federal structure of a restored 
Poland and against a unitary state, he returned to his support 
of a Slavic union. "The future of Slavism can only be a 
federation. The people have acquired a feeling for equality • 
- I - 102 
•• Land for the right toj their own national development." 
Engels chose to ignore the existence of dissent among 
the Poles concerning the question of a Slavic union. He 
singled out the Austro-Slavs and the Russians for his atta~k 
upon R~n-Slavism. He played the Poles and the Hungarians against 
the Austro-Sla.vs and the Russians. His strategy aimed at 
defending the territorial integrity of a future great German 
state. It was fully supported by Marx. Poles and Hungarians 
were considered as useful factors in deterring the Russians 
and in barring the creation of a Slavic union. 
Many years later Bakunin maintained that the anti-Slavic 
propaganda of Marx and Engels in 1848-49 vms determined by 
German power political considerations. In 18'?0, when he 
defended himself from the accusation by the German socialists 
that he was a Pan-Slav, he commented on h:Ls convictions of 18L~8: 
-
As a Slav, I desired the emanc:ipation of the Slavic 
race from the German yoke. But as a German patriot 
l0-2Cf - D, ' . 1 P 1 1 • ( P l' h D . - [P ] ) 1'~ h r:>r: • z1emlJ.1\:. o SKl. o is aiJ.y _ oznan , hare. c.:.o, 
1850,. quoted in tilliarioV.i"ski·,· ·_.li .... P..;..•_c_i_t..;..., p. 238. Cf. also Feldman, 
cit., p. 155. 
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Marx did not admit ••• the right of the Slavs to 
emancipate themselves from the German yoke.103 
J38J'>'.unin added that he agitated for the destruction of the 
Russian Empire and the Prussian and Austrian Monarchies in order 
to achieve the liberation of the Slavs. Marx and Engels, the 
German patriots, could not swallow the attack on German rule 
over the Slavs. The Germans were ridiculous. 
[They love] ••• to identify, very naively, their 
nationality with humanity. In their opinion, to 
detest the German domination and to despise their 
civilization of voluntary slaves means to be the 
enemy of man's progress.104 
Obviously, Bakunin's agitation for the liberation of the 
Slavs had the same power-political aspect as the anti-Slavic 
propaganda of Marx and Engels. If Russia would have been 
instrumental in the liberation of the Slavs, as Bakunin desired 
in l 8L1-8, then Russian influence would probably have replaced 
German influence in Central Eastern Europe, and Germany would 
have been weakened. Marx and Engels vtished to prevent such a 
development. A revolutionary Germany should become a strong 
state in the center of Europe. 
Everything that Marx and Engels wished for Germany--a 
large territory, political and economic centralization, and the 
increase of power resulting from it--would naturally have 
'"""103()~_uvr~~~ de ]e.lf~.mi£, ed. by Max Nettlau (6 vols.; Paris 
Stock, Hf95-1913·5, II, XX (Introduction). 
V lOL1-_Ib~d., III, 16. Cf. also Michael Bakunin, Gesd.1.:~ 
i.erk~ ~ e~ •. by Ervlin Rho~_fs (3 vols. ; Berlin: Verlag, DP.r ndi}~12;~~~ ~--=-" -· __ 
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destined Germany to hold a preponderant posj_tion in Europe. The 
desire of the liberal Friedrich List coincided with that of the 
communists Marx and Engels. 
NRZ 1 s propaganda for a radical German Revolution 
revealed that Mo.rx's and Engels's interest in Poland was mainly 
determined by their concern with Germany. Their statements in 
support of Polish liberation were undermined, to say the least, 
by their defense of the annexionist policies of progressive 
or revolutionary nations. Their arbitrary handling of the 
national question adnd.ts the assumption that in case of a 
successful radical German Revolution, the two men could have 
switched with the greatest ease to a defense of German annexation 
of Polish territories because Germany represented progress. 
Marx 8.nd Engels had no understanding for Ruge and like-
mindod democr·ats v1ho shrank from power politics and the 
concentration of power. Power politics was a law of history. 
Concentration of power had furthered progress because it 
destroyed parochialism. Only the ultimate liberation of man 
by the proletarian revolution would make an end to power politics. 
Until then, power politics were necessary to safeguard that 
revolution. In the meantime, whatever revolutj_onary progress 
might be made, it was only e. prelude to the final European-vdde 
liberation of the oppressed classes. 
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Tho development of the European revolutionary movements 
of 1848 confirmed Marx and Engels in their conviction that this 
final liberation could only be achieved through the overthrow 
of the present social order in England by the Englj_sh working 
classes. On January 1, 1849 Marx and Engels expressed this 
conviction in an NRZ editorial. They called England the real 
center of the counter-revolutionary forces. England transformed 
"whole nations into its proletariat" because it embraced 11 the 
whole world with j_ts giant arms." The industrial and commercial 
development and the social conditions of all the other nations 
depended on England because it was the :master of the world 
market. Whatever changes weL·e realized in the social or economic 
sphere, they would not represent a real victory if they were 
limited to the nations of continental Europe. Revolutionary 
changes would always be threatened with extinction as long as the 
powerful English bourgeoisie was not destroyed by the English 
Chartists. 
The article of January 1 , 18Lt-9 defied the propaganda 
of the European radicals that Russia's fall and Polish restoration 
would be the decisive tu_-rning point in Eu:copean affairs and 
would absolutely safeguard revolutionary progress in Europe. The 
editors of ~ thought di ff eren.tly. 'The Poles, even the 
Hungarians, might be the handymen of the Revolution. The Russian 
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threat might be used as a means to increase revolutionary unrest. 
A victorious vrar against Russia might help save the German 
Revolution and Europe. But the significance of these events 
yfith regard to a European-wide proletarian revolution was 
relative. The fate of that revolution would be decided in 
England. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE POST-REVOLUTION ERA 
Critique of the European Left 
-
In the years following the Revolution of 1848,the 
European Left continued to agitate for the overthrow of the old 
European political, social, and territorial order. F.ach 
European crisis in the fifties--the Crimean War of 1854-56 and 
the Italian War of 1859--intensified the hope of the European 
Left for a European revolution which would completely overthrow 
--
the Vienna treaties and restore Poland. Marx and En.gels shared 
the general expectation for the imminent outbreak of a European 
conflagration. They did not, however, resume their energetic 
propaganda for the restoration of the Polish borders of 1772. 
In the post-revolution era they played no part in the 
conspiratorial activities. Instead, they became observers of 
the European scene. 
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The Revolution of 1848 had deepened the conflicts among 
the European Left. The split between the political and the 
economic Left became more articulate. As a result political 
alignments became more sharply outlined in the post-revolution 
era than in the previous years. This development affected Marx 
and Engels. 
The two friends, who had gone to London late in 1849, 
remained isolated from the political exiles who flocked to this 
city from the continent. Marx and Engels did not participate in 
the founding of new international revolutionary organizations 
in 1850, such as the Mazzinian European Central Committee or the 
Universal Democratic and Socialist Republic which opposed the 
Mazzinian Committee. Nor did they resume close contacts with 
_ any member of the Polish left-wing democrats. Marx and Engels 
did not even continue their collaboration with the German 
Workers Educational League, and their relations with the 
Central Committee of the Communist League were also strained 
after September, 1850. 1 
1rn the period after 1848-49 Marx and Engels did not 
· even own a newspaper with the exception of the Neue_filleinisch.2, 
Zei tu~, ]Oli ti,sch_:,O.~k.OJ.lOmischLBevue, of which C5ii'Iy Tissues 
appeared :Glf85~ Ape.rt from a f ey1 articles which appeared in 
Chartist newspapers--Notes to the
6
PeH£le in 1851-52 and 
~O..]~' s ]?aJ2._er in 1852-54 ancrf85 -- arx and Engels wrote mainly 
fo: the American and German democratic newspapers, Th.~Jiew,.,!9_rk 
~' particularly from 1852-54, and the Breslau Neue Oder 
,!'e:i.tu~g in 1855. 
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In February, 1951, when Engels had returned to Manchester 
to work again with the firm Erman & Engels, the two friends 
exchanged letters in which they congratulated one another that 
the political exiles rejected them. Marx was quite satisfied 
that they were no longer compelled to make concessions to these 
"donkeys." Engels agreed. It was good that they were rejected 
by these "narrow-minded dogs" whom for years they ha.d treated 
as rembers of their party--which did not yet exist-~al though these 
"fools" did not even understand the most "elementary principles" 
of their cause. Engels consoled himself' that the day would 
come when he and Marx would be able to dictate their "own 
conditions 11 to their opponents. Until then they had "peace," 
but, as Engels admitted, they also experienced "a certain 
1 1 . 112 - one iness. 
In Marx's and Engels's opinion the political exiles, 
includ1ng the members of the Communist I.1eague, had not learned 
anything from the Revolution of 1848. In spite of their 
ideological differences the exiles still shared the foolish hope 
that tho mere fraternization of nations would give birth to a 
new age :ln Europe. The :Mazzinian revolutionary theories, which 
Were based on this hope, became the chief target of Marx's and 
,. Engels's attacks. 
~ 
i.f 
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In the fifties Mazzj_ni was the most prominent figure 
among the European democrats. He had not given up his conviction 
that the main objective of a European revolution ought to be 
the liberation of all the people mider foreign rule and the 
defense of free Europe against the 11 encroachments of Russia.n 
He condemned the socialists for their exclusive concentration on 
the social question. In Mazzini's opinion this question was not 
a major problem in a large part of Europe. In Italy, Poland, 
and even in Germany there did not exist a pronounced class 
antagonism because these countries had not yet experienced an 
abnormal development of large-scale industry. Mazzini admitted 
that it was necessary to liberate the proletariat from 11the 
tyranny of capital. 11 However, the social question was still a 
subordinate question and should be solved by the single 
nations following the political reorganization of Europe on a 
federal basis.3 
The European Central Committee became the mouthpiece 
·of Mazzinian propaganda. It \7as founded by Mazzini in the 
summer of 1850 with the collaboration of leading European 
democrats, such as the German Arnold Ruge, the Frenchman Alexandre 
Ledru-Rollin, and the Pole's Wojciech Darasz and Stanislaw Worcell 
3Giuseppe Mazzini, 11 Europe, 11 Westminster Hevi.eY£,; LVII 
series 1, 1852), 457. 
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The first !i~lt;i.festo of the Co1mnittee proclaj_med that all the 
people ought to enjoy "national sovereignty" which was the 
prerequisite of "an alliance" of all the emancipated nations 
on the basis Of their equality. International fraternization 
would bring an end to wars and reactionary governments and initiat 
an era of European peace and liberty. The first step towards 
this goal would be the liberation of Poland and Italy and the 
unification of Germany.4 
Marx and Engels ridiculed the desire of the Committee 
to reconcile all the parties in order to obtain their collaboratio 
for the libere.tion of the oppressed nations. They stated that 
the conflicts between the parties were the result of different 
class interests. If the conflicts were suppressed, this would 
not liberate the people. It would only contribute to "the 
domination of the interests of ·one party--the bourgeois party." 
The class struggle was a reality. 11'he democrats ought to know 
from their experiences in the Revolution of 1848 that not even a 
democratic victory would initiate a "golden age" without class 
struggle. The next revolution would again develop into a class wa.1 
against the bourgeoisie regardless of the "fraternity phrases. 115 
• - · --- l+cf. ~~o of the European Central Committee,), July 22, 
1850, in the radical French newspaper Pros~t, June 1, 1651, 
quoted in Alvin R. Calman, ~~£ll:t,l-E£llin aJ2f'.§.?._L8!tlL et ies :er,oscrii 
Jrag,g,.~}ete~ (Paris: 'l'hcJse ""'011:Cversi·Eaire,-i-92ff; Po TCf3. 
5~e.ue _pho_?.nis..£.b-J: ... ze~fu..-122J~'°=i:.~.;i.s.~Jl::.2ek<?.E.£rQi§.9J1e R~vlli2_, ed. 
by Karl Jvlarx (London and. Hamburg: 1850) ~ with al1'orer1ord by Karl 
Bittel (Berlin: Ruetten & Loening, 1955J, pp. 175, 177, 332. 
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As in the past years, Marx and Engels insisted that 
onlY a revolution which aimed at fundamental changes in the 
economic structure would end social and national oppression. 
TheY criticized Mazzini and his collaborators--Vlorcell and the 
Hungarian revolutionary Louis Kossuth who came from predominatly 
agrarian countries--because they did not formulate a radical 
agrarian program. Without such a program the fight for national 
liberty would merely strengthen the old social order. Marx 
pointed out that this had been proved by the Galician events in 
1846. When the Polish aristocracy fought for national 
independence, the Austrian goverrm1ent had been able to hold 
Galicia by gra.1rting some liberties to the oppressed peasants. 
Only a social revolution would put an end to foreign rule. 
Mazzini, in particular, was sharply attacked when he continued 
to treat the "economic reality" as something unimportant and to 
overrate the "political form of the state. 116 
In their private correspondence Marx and Engels 
ridiculed the "sublime Mazzinian manif estoes" which agitated for 
the liberation of the oppressed nations. In their opinion the 
manifestoes contained nothing but empty phraseology. Marx and 
Engels despised the democrats who imitated the Mazzinian 
. ~-~ --t;Th~ Nm;1 York Tribune Mc'ly 11, 1858. 
- _, 
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prop..-8.ganda style. When Arnold Ruge, in a manifesto, spoke about 
the immortality of Poland, Engels called him one of thos0 North 
German "whimpering democrats" who wished to convince the Germans 
that Poland was "immortal," but there was nothing immortal 
about a nation. 7 
Marx and Engels also spoke scornfully of the Hungarians 
and Poles vn10 collaborated with Mazzini. They disliked Louis 
Kossuth whom they had praised as the leader of the Hungarian 
uprising in 1848. They used the contemptuous term "Polack" when 
they spoke of Da.rasz. Even Worcell, who enjoyed a general esteem 
in emigrant circles, did not escape their ridicule. Marx and 
Engels believed that at the time of the insurrection of 1830-31 
Worcell had been an incompetent mili te.ry leader. They claimed 
that he was incapable of sound political judgment and was a 
b"abbler like Ruge and Ledru-Rollin. 8 
-~s letter to Ma:r.x, January 25, 1851, in !!!QP.:1 
III/1 , 13. 
8Engels 1 s letter to Marx, August 22, 1852, and V.iB.rx's 
letter to Engels$ December 2, 1853, in M:J!!GA, III/1, 384, 515. 
Marx found the Polish exiles who collaborated with the Universal 
Democratic and Social Republic even more contemptible. This group 
proclaimed the end of "all nations and borders" and the establish-
ment of a universal democratic republic. M9.rx felt that this ld..nd 
Of propaganda was even emptier than that of Mazzini. He derided 
the Polish delegates of the London Central Committee who, in 
search of supporters of the Polish cause, also signed the 
manifestoes of the socialist group. Marx's letter to Engels, 
December 2, 1850, in~' III/1, 118. 
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Darasz-~until his death in 1853-·mand \lforcell were the 
prominent leaders of the London Central Committee of the Polish 
Democratic Society. This new center of Polish democracy had been 
founded in 1850, a.n event which divided the leadership of the 
polish democrats in the emigration. As the years passed by, 
the estrangement between the London and Paris centers became 
greater. Ludw:ik. Mieroslawski--the leader of the Polish democrats 
in France--was the only Pole whom Marx and Engels considered an 
important figure in the fiftj_es because Engels believed him to 
be an expert on partisan warfare which would be useful in an 
insurrection. Otherwise, Marx and Engels had neither any liking 
for the Paris Central Committee which soon came under the influenc ·· 
of the Bonapartists, nor for the London Central Committee which 
collaborated closely with Ma.zzini and even vrith the Russian 
emigrant Alexander Herzen. 
Herzen was a friend of Michael Bakunin who had been 
extradited to the Russj_an government by the German authorities 
in 18LJ.9. In 1852 Herzen had come to London. In the circles 
of the political exiles he was faced with the same superiority 
complex towards the Russians and the samo anti-Russian propaganda 
which had exasperated him in Paris in the late forties. Since 
the Revolution of 1848 Herzen had become convinced that the 
world would gi.ve birth to the new age of socialj.sm. He 
that the Slavic world had remained a stranger to Roman 
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la.VI and feudalism which had furthered authoritarianism and 
inequality. Herzen believed, as did Bakunin, that the Great 
Russians were predestined to take the revolutionary initiative.9 
A revolutionary Russia would become the center of a democratic 
and socialist federation of all the Slavs, including the Poles, 
because Russia was "the organized Slavic world," the Slavic 
10 
state par exc§!J.le~. Herzen was confident that the Poles 
would collaborate with the Russians in the overthrow of Tsarism. 
Autocracy was to be replaced by an agrarie.n socialism, based on 
the m;1r, the Russian village commune. 
In view of Herzen's convictions it is not surprising 
that he would not collaborate with the European Central Committee 
which agitated for the restora t:i.on of Poland, that is, tho 
partition of Russia. Although Herzen knew Nazzini, he declined 
the offer to join the Committee. He had also become acquainted 
with Marx in the late forties, but the relations between the two 
men remained very cool and were "limited to distant and transient 
--·%r-. Herzen' s letter to his Moscow friends, Nove~ber 5, 
18!1.8, quoted in Raoul Labry, Herzen et Proudhon (Paris: Edition 
Bossard, 1928), p. 65. ~---------
10cr. Herzen's letter to the German revolutionary poet 
Georg Herwegh, August 25, 18L~9, which was published in the 
radical newspaper of the French socialist Pierre Proudhon, !§. ~Oi7;, 
d~~12].e, November 18, 25, and December 10, 18L1-9, and also in 
1:1azzinivs jom."'nal 1'~ .. c1el .Po.E.21£, November 20, 1849, quoted 
~n. Raoul Labry, !_l~I:~n.dJ.:e. Iyano~820-1870 (Paris: 
Edition Bossard, l92ITT, p. 55"r. 
r 
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Herzen preferred to entertain close relations 
with the Polish Central Committee in London. He was particularly 
attracted to Stanislaw Worcell who had socialist leanings. 
Early in the 1850's the Central Committee had organized 
a printing plant in London for the purpose of issuing Polish 
propaganda material to be distributed in Poland. With Worcell's 
help Herzen established a Russian section at this plant in 1853 
in order to print Russian propaganda literature which agents of 
the Central Commj.ttee were to smuggle into Russj_a. 
M:;i.rx knew about the preparations for the collaboration 
between Herzen and the Central Committee. On June 14, 1853 he 
informed Engels about them without any further comment. Marx 
and Engels could hardly have been pleased with Herzen's 
publication of appeals to Russians and Poles for their 
revolutionary collaboration since the sunnner of 1853. 
In 1853 Herzen, vlith the help of the Polish Central 
Committee in London, published his treatise, Du develo ement des 
idees rfu~naire __ c;_n B£s.,:Si§., in which he elaborated the 
political ideas he had formulated since the Revolution of 1848. 12 
dedicated ·11To Our Friend Bakunin." In the 
--------1~1~--.. ~~-
Vera Piroschkov, llixandq~ He.~~--~nbruch !,!ne.r.J!.LC2.P1.~ (Munich: A. Puster;-19() ff; p. 121. 
12
rrhis treatise was first published in 12..E2.\!ts,..q!1e 
na.t£~~F1:.iLt fl-!2! E~l,=ht~~~§2!1~CJ:l?-_f_!J13nst .. }:ll1d~~l?~J'.!, Nos. 1, 
' ' 10.) • 
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foreword Herzen payed tribute to his Polish "friends" who had 
made the publication possible. This was "another proof of the 
fraternal alliance of revolutionary Poland with the Russian 
revolutionaries." 
In his treatise Herzen advised the Western Europeans 
to abandon their illusion that Western Europe could be saved by 
the restoration of Poland. The Poles lacked the ability of the 
Russians to organize "a strong and independent state. 111 3 They 
would be unable to withstand Russian aggressiveness which had 
destroyed them in the past. Only a social revolution of the 
Russian people would save Europe from certain destruction by 
Russia~ Herzen insisted that the Great Russians were the true 
leaders of the Slavs. They were more genuine representatives 
of the anti-authoritarian Slavic character than the Poles who 
had become partially Westernized, that is, corrupted by their 
conversion to Catholicism. Herzen warned the Western Europeans 
that the people in tho Russian Empire were as much against the 
territorial parti ti.on of Russia as the Tsarist government. The 
in particular, were absolutely against a reunion 
because they shared common traditions and a common 
the Kiev state, with the Great Russians. 
,.. . l 3Al~ksandr Ivonovich Herzen, p-~ _ _gfv0loJ2.12f!:fept, ~s idees 
evolut~E~J·~~~],!,~~~' by A. Iscander '{pS'e'Udonym) {2d ed.; 
non: Jeffs, Libraire, 1853), p. XXI. · 
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When Herzen addressed himself to the Poles, he warned 
them not to expect any support of their liberation from the 
western Europeans. Most of the European states were subservient 
to the Tsar, particularly Germany which was actually governed 
by "the pro-consul of the Tsar ••• the King of Prussia. 111 4 
Herzen declared that the liberation of the Poles, as well as of 
the Russians, would only result from their revolutionary alliance 
which in turn would become the nucleus of the Slavic Union under 
Great Russian leadership. 15 
Herzen was as aware of the power factor as Bakunin. 
He was fascinated with the territorial extension of the Russian 
Empire to the Pacific Ocean and the Russianizing of the peoples 
in Siberia. It was easy to foresee that if, through the 
initiat:Lve of the Great Russians, a Slavic union were created, 
Great Russia would unite under its rule all the territories from 
the Pacific to Southeastern Etu·ope. Indeed, the Slavic union 
would be a formidable power bloc j_n which the Western and 
Southern Slavs would represent the defense line of Russia against 
Western Europe. Its realization would completely overthrow the 
balance of power in Europe and allow Russia to establish its 
.supremacy in European affairs. 16 
ili. __ _ 
1J2.:h£.. ~ p • 8 . 
15~.' p. 138. 
16Tiie French historian Benolt-P. Hepner ma:tnta:lned the.t 
was free from the "veritable chauvini~m 11 which Bakunin 
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It is amazing that the London Central Committee was 
willing to collaborate with Herzen although he expected the Poles 
to renounce the restoration of the eastern Polish borders of 1772 
and to accept Great Russian leadership in Ea.stern Europe. 
Marx knew about the publication of Herzen•s treatise. 
In a letter to Engels of August 23, 1853, he stated that the 
book was well received in English circle·s. l 7 He made no further 
comment. Apparently he had not read the work. He merely 
expressed his general dissatisfaction with the miserable Russians, 
including Herzen. They were "donkeysn and veritable "intriguers" 
exhibited in the-late forties. He stated: 11If it is true that 
Bakunin was.the first to profess a belief in revolutionary Pan-
Slavism, with Russia as the center of the general conflagration, 
it would be most exaggerated to see Herzen's ideas of the 1850's 
in the same light ••• His [Herzen 1 s] messianism does not turn 
into Pan-Slav expansi.onism. 11 Hepner attacked Marx and, among 
- modern writers, Alexander von Schelting, who wrote a work on 
Russ land und Euro~ (Bern: A. Francke, 1 91+8), for having 
ic.fentI1'J.ed the aims of Bakunin and Herzen. Benoi t-P. Hepner, 
Bakounine et le p~nslavisme revolutionnaire, p. 233. 
17MEGA, III/1 L1.28. In this same letter Marx commented 
at length aoout Herzenls attempt to defend Bakunin from the 
renewed accusation of having acted as a Russian spy in the late 
forties. In a sunnner article in the Englj_sh newspaper The Morning 
;!1_v:._cr~J:.?er, Herzen had insinuated that "Dr. Marx" was greatly 
responsi1ll'e for the slander against Bakunin because he had cast 
suspicion on Bakunin in an~ article in 1848. In that same 
neVTspaper Marx rejected Herzen's contention. Marx stated that he 
merely published the information he had received from a "Polish 
refugee," and that in spite of it he had continued to praise 
Bakunin for his participation in the radical revolutionary 
movement. Herzen, however, was not impressed by these statements. 
Cf. Vera Piroschkow, op. ci_t., p. 123. In his letter to Engels, 
Marx mentioned that the fi"Polish refugee" was actually the German 
Hermann Ewerbeck, his liaison man in Paris in 1 aLi-8. 
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who used English and American newspapers, among them the London 
Advertiser and The New York Tribune, to influence public opinion 
in favor of Russia. 18 He ridiculed Herzen's propaganda that the 
Russian people were democratic and had nothing in common with 
the official despotic Russia represented by the Tsar and the 
aristocratic bureaucrats who were of German stock. Marx commented 
that consequently 
Germany.must be fought in Russia, not Russia in 
Germany ••• Like~ise, the Teutonic donkeys hold the 
Frenchmen responsible for the despotism of Frederic II 
• • • as if backward slaves do not aluays need 
civilized slaves for their training.19 
As in 1848, Marx was exasperated that the Russian emi-
grants combined their anti-German propaganda with the claj_m that 
Russia, _a backward nation, should play a leading revolutionary 
i 8MEGA, III/1, 428. Regarding 1'h~ N2.w York Tribune, 
Marx appareii'ITY thought of Count Adam Gurowski,-a:--15o1ish 
renegade, who collaborated with the American newspaper in the 
fifties. Since the thirties Gurowski had published a number of 
books on Russia and the Pan-Slav question. He was convinced that 
Russia would soon become a highly industrialized and wealthy 
country, and he urged the Poles to collaborate with Russia. A 
Polish-Russian customs union would enable the Poles to par~icipate 
in the Russian industrial development and to find a "na.tura.l 
market" for their goods in the Russian Empire. In his articles 
for The New York Tribune Gurowski fought the European propaganda 
for tlie~destruction·of--i<ussia and agitated for the dissolution 
of the Austrian Empire because it was a mere "anomaly." Cf. 
G?sammelte Schriften ~n. Karl .. f1arx und F~iedrich ,Engels, 18~f. ~oy N. ""!(Jasanoff (2 vols.; 2a ed.; Stuttgart: • H. 
Vr;--:Die"fz Nachf., .GmbH, 1920), I, XXXVI-XLI (Introduction)~ . 
l9Yiarx 1 s letter to Engels, September 7, 1853, in~' 
III/1, 501. 
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role in Europe. Marx's old opponent Arnold Ruge also resented 
Herzen's ~ermanophobia. He told Herzen in 1854: 
I doubt that the Slavs would play the role of the 
friends of liberty should German power be destroyed. 
The system of government under i.vhich they have been 
educated0 has affected their reason and hardened their hearts.2 
It is surprising that Marx and Engels did not attack 
the Polish Central Committee in London ~or its collaboration with 
Herzen. They preferred to criticize the Mazziniem revolutionary 
policies which were pursued by both the European. Central Coiruni ttee 
and the Polish Central Committee. 
The revolutionary propaganda of the Polish democrats 
stressed the need for improvised uprisings in order to achieve 
national liberationo In 1851 the Polish Democrat, the organ of the 
London Central Coro.mi ttee, published an appeal to the Poles to 
stage another insurrection which might "succeed or fail. 1121 When 
Russia got involved in the war with Turkey in 1853, the Polish 
Democ:r:tl appealed to the Poles "to make the most of the Turkish 
War ••• , that is, to stage an insurrection .. 1122 
·2o Arno~d~ge' s Briefwechsel und Tagebuecher aus den 
Jahren 1825=f8[o t2 vols. ;13erlin: Weidmann, 18'8b), IT, f47·. 
21 Marceli Handelsman, Adam Czartory_?.Ei, ed. by Stefan 
Kieniewicz, Rozprawy h.i.storyczne, Vols. XXIII-XXV (3 vols.; 
Warsaw: Towarzy_stwo Naukowe Warszavrnkie, 1 948·-50) , III/1 , 182. 
22Boles3::aw Limanowski, Stanisa'.aw Worcell (Cracow and 
New York: n .. p.: 1910), p. 370. 
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Marx and Engels were as opposed to the propaganda for 
improvised uprisings as to the emphasis on the fight for 
national liberation. Revolutions were not brought about by 
proclamations and by commands. Marx stated: 
Since the terrible experiences of 1848 and 1849 there 
is more needed than paper decrees issued bi distant 
leaders to call forth national uprisings.25 
Moreover, Viarx and Engels did not believe that the revolutionary 
forces in Europe, includ_i.ng the Polish ones, were strong enough 
to support new insurrections after the defeats of 1848-49. 2L~ But 
they did not relinquish their own expectations for an imminent 
outbreak of a revolution. 
In the fifties 118.rx still regarded England as the country 
where the "real revolution" would occur. At the outset of the 
fifties ho believed that a new economic crisis would cause an 
uprising of the English workingmen followed by the overthrow of 
the whole social order in England. 25 Marx interpreted the wave of 
strikes which spread to the great coal and iron centres in the 
second half of 1853 as a promising sign o:f approaching changes. 
He was enthusiastic about the worY-J.ngmen parliament which was 
organized in VJ.anchester at that time by the Chartist leader 
Ernest Jones, an acquaintance of Marx. 
---z't -
. .:.>Gesammelte Schr:!-fte_n, ed. by Rjasanoff, I, 100. 
24Enge1s's letter to Marx, Hay 23, 1851, in~' 
III/1, 252. 
25Gesarn.melte §cb3~~' I, 118. 
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In M~rx's and Engels's opinion collaboration with the 
Chartists vras a true measure of revolutionary zeal. Only the 
collaboration of the European revolutionaries with the Chartists 
would further the overthrow of the old European order. However, 
the m~jority of the exiles would have nothing to do with the 
Chartists. Mazzini and his European Central Committee opposed 
them. Even the Polish Central Committee in London did not 
sympathize with the Chartists although they supported the 
liberation of Polan<l. 26 
Marx repeatedly warned the European democrats against 
any collaboration with the Enelish or French governments. The 
existing governments would never support. truly revolutionary 
changes. Collaboration wj.th them was a betrayal of the European 
revolution. When, early in the fifties, the unfounded rumor was 
spread that Mazzini, Kossuth, and also Lelewel, who still lived 
in Brussels, had taken up contacts with Napoleon III, Marx only 
too readily believed this. In a letter to Engels he remarked 
that the leaders of European democracy had a prefer0nce for 
Bonapartist conspiracies. 27 In a New York Tribune article he 
--""*~~--
stated that the democratic leaders looked for questionable 
su1)porters of the revolutionary cause. 28 
~b"Lirn;:i.~owski, opt. £.:J:b_, pp. 31 0-11 • 
27Marx's lotter to Engels, August 30, 
III/1, 471. 
1852. in MEGA 
" ~--' 
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When England and France declared war against Russia 
on March 28, 1854, Marx hoped that the Crimean War would cause 
an uprising of the English proletariat which would change the 
local war into a European ·war against the reactionary forces. 
He ridiculed the democratic exiles in England because they 
hoped that the war would lead to the destruction of Russia, 
and that the English and French governments would support the 
restoration of Poland. The Polish exiles were convinced that 
the English statesman Viscount Henry Palmerston was a "gallant 
protector" of the Poles, and that he wished to liberate Poland. 
Marx and Engels did not share the expectations of the 
democratic exiles. They did not even acknowledge that Palmerston 
was determined to check Russian expansionism in Asia and in 
Southeastern Europe. Their interpretation of Palmerston's 
foreign policies was dictated by their conviction that the 
established gov0rnments were incapable of understanding their 
most vital interest--the destruction of Tsarist Russia. Thus, 
they maintained that the English government and Palmerston pursued 
a reactionary foreign policy which aimed at the preservation of 
the Russian Empire9 Even before the outbreak of the Crimean 
Viar, at the time of the Turco-Russian conflict in the Balkans, 
Marx had :presented this :point of view in a series of sarcastic 
articles on "Palmerston and Russia". which were published in the 
~le's Pa]_G!, a Chartist newspaper, between October and 
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December 1853. According to Marx, Palmerston's foreign policies 
in the past years proved that he merely assumed the role of a 
protector of the Poles. Palmerston was actually pro-Russian; 
that is, a.reactionary. Marx maintained that Palmerston did not 
try to.prevent the suppression of the Polish insurrection of 
1830-31 by the Tsarist government. He did not support the 
proposal of other European powers to take a firm stand in favor 
of the Polish insurgents. Nor did he protest against the 
occupation of Cracow by the Austrians in 1846 although this hurt 
English commercial interests in Cracow. 29 Harx said that 
Palmerston's policies revealed the reactionary role which bngland 
played in Europe. He insinuated that the Poles who believed in 
Palmerston's pro-Polish sympathies were duped by that man. 
In V.Jarx's opinion Palmerston's treatment of the Polish 
exiles also proved that he was not a sincere supporter of the 
Polish cause. Marx believed that the English Literary Society 
of the Friends of Poland, to which English aristocrats and 
followers of the conservative Polish leader Prince Adam Czartoryski 
elonged, was a "blind tool in Palmerston's hand. 11 Palmerston 
nnually received the delegations of the Society merely in order 
maintain his "anti-Russian reputation." When in August, 1853, 
t the time of the Russian occupation of the Danube principalities, 
r 
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a delegation of the conservative Czartoryski camp in Paris 
congratulated Palmerston on his interest in the Polish question, 
he assured the delegation of his sympathies for Poland. However, 
he declared that he did not receive the delegation "as a member 
of th_e Cabinet but ••• only as a private person. 113° According 
to Marx this confirmed that Palmerston evaded any deeper 
involvement in the Polish cause. 
Ma:r:-x was outraged that in spite of the obvious 
insincerity of Palmerston even the Polish Central Committee in 
London continued to have confidence in the English government. 
At the time of the Crimean War the Polish democrats organized 
a number of meetings in England in support of the Polish cause. 
Worcell, Kossuth, and Mazzini, who spoke at these meetings, 
not only appealed to the English people for their support of 
Polish liberation, but also to the English government. The 
democratic leaders maintained that the "war against Russia • • • 
[was] a fight between liberty and despotism," and that it was a 
revolutionary war.31 Mazzini insisted that the restoration of 
Poland would be the first step towards a complete reorganization 
of Europe,, In addition to the partition of Russia the 
3'0The New York Tribune, Septemb0r 5, 1853. 
31cr. Kossuth's speech made in Sheffield, June 5~ 185Li-, 
in support of the Polish cause, in Gesammelte Schriften, II, 1 • 
.----------······'"'''"""""------~-----~ 
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reorganization would also include the partition of Turkey 
and the Austrian Empire. Mazzini hoped that the Crimean War 
would ultimately result in the destruction of the territorial 
arrangements of 1815 and the reorganization of Europe on the 
basis-of the nationality principle. 
Marx was most dissatisfied with the Polish meetings.32 
He felt that the democratic leaders betrayed the revolutionary 
cause because they merely asked for the national liberation of 
the Poles. Moreover, Marx insisted that the appeals to the 
government for Polish liberation from Russian rule vrere illusory. 
The English government was not revolutionary. It would not use 
the Crimean War to overthrow the old territorial order. Contrary 
to the convictions of the democrats, the Crimean War was a 
conservative war. It served "the maintenance of the balance 
of power and of the Vienna treaties, that is, of those treaties 
VThich suppress the liberty and independence of nations. 1133 
The only time Marx expressed a great enthusiasm for 
any of the Polish meetings was in the surn.t'"ller of 1855. On 
August 8, 1855 the conservative Czartoryski camp organized a 
meeting at St. Martin's Hall. In a special report for the 
------xCf. also Marx's letter to Engels, February 13, 1855, 
j_n !iIP.Gfl:, III/1, 101-02. 
33Gesammel~~~E., II, 1. 
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~L9.::1£r z.ei.tun,g (Breslau), Marx stated that this meeting was 
instigated by the English government. Its aim was 
the formation of a Polish legion, ••• the renewal 
of Palmerston's popularity, and. the delivery of any 
possible Polish movement into his hands and those 
of Bonaparte.34 . 
According to Marx the majority of the audience were 
Chartists, but Polish democrats were also present. They 
collaborated with the Chartists against the followers of 
Czartoryskic They supported the following anti-government 
declaration 
That the destruction of this Polish nationality was 
mainly due to Palmerston's perfidious policy from 
1830-~.6; that as long as Palmerston remains a servant 
of the Cro·vr.a, any proposal for the restorati,on of 
Poland is nothing but a trap and a deceit.35 
When Lord Harrington, the president of the meeting, refused to 
read the declaration, the radicals took over the meeting. They 
distributed leaflets which declared: 
Poland condeULns any allian~e with the present 
European powers. It does not wish to be restored by 
any of the exj_sting governments and to become a tool 
of diplomatic intrigues.36 
Marx maintained that the meeting was a def eat for Palmerston and 
for the English bourgeoisie which he represented. 
34rbi-d., -pp. 340-L1-1 • 
35Ibid., p. 3Li-1 • 
36~. 
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The Czartoryski camp was convinced that Moscow had 
caused the scandal through payed agents.37 This rumor was spread 
by the government circles. Marx ridiculed these rumors. "Any 
suspicion of a conspiracy" was invalidated by the fact that the 
relations between the Polish democratic emigrants in ]~ngland 
and the Chartists were not at all friendly. 
Alexander Herzen was as opposed as Marx to the 
propaganda activity of the Poles at the public meetings during 
the Crimean War. In his diaries he expressed his surprise over 
Worcell's political shortsightedness: 
How could Worcell assume that England would encourage 
Poland to stage an insurrection, or that the France 
of Napoleon II would instigate a revolution there.38 
When the Crimean War was in its second year, even 
Mazzini became dj_senchanted with the war because it had not 
developed into "a war of liberty against European despotism." 
He criticized the English and French governments because they 
did not vigorously support the liberation of the Poles and the 
Balkan Slavs which would lead to the dissolution of the Austrian 
57The Polish historian Mo.rceli Handelsm,9.n declared that 
the meeting was intended as a "semi-official manifestation for 
a Poland allied with the England of Palmerston and the France of 
Bonaparteo 11 It was regrettable that the meeting turned into a 
"manifestation against the government, 11 which prevented the 
organization of a PoliGh legion. Marceli Handelsman, /t§,E:.12! 
!2~.i, III/2, 503. 
3811..1exa11der I. Herzen, Er1ebtes und Gode.chtes (Weimar: 
1953), p. 380, in Bobinska, p. 1()I(7~- . - ~-
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Empire and the independence of Italy. In V.iarch, 1855 :Mazzj_ni 
remarked that England failed to p0rform the great task "to 
organize a living barrier of young associated nations around the 
:Muscovite Empire." Neither Austria· nor Turkey, the two 
decaying states, were "a valid defense against the young, 
growing, and compact Russian power. 1139 
The endeavours of the Polish democrats to obtain 
effective support of their cause from the English people and the 
government remained unsuccessful. The Polish meetings, organized 
in many cities to further the Polish cause, were received with 
enthusiasm everywhere, but aside from the collection of money 
nothing else was e.ccomplished. In vain, Worcell tried to win 
the favor of the government circles by excluding radical elements 
from the Polish meetings. As the war dragged on, the interest 
of the English public in the Polish cause cooled, and the 
members of Parliament refrained from any official involvement. 
The Paris Treaty of 1·1arch, 1856 v1hich ended the Crimean 
War greatly disappointed the Eur·opean democratic exiles. The 
Polish democratic emigration in England and on the continent lost 
its confidence in Western European willingness to support Polish 
rcctoration. After the Paris Congress the Poli~h Democrat 
r 
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declared that "in the futu_re, Poland cannot expect any support 
from any of the European governments."40 In the following 
years the opposition of the Polish left-wing democrats to the 
old democratic program which had been formulated by the Polish 
Democratic Society in the~~ of 1836 was increasing. 
/ 
Franciszek Z<3.wadzki in Paris and Zenon Sw:Letoslawski in London 
e. 
renewed the propaganda for an agrarian socialism which had been 
the ideal of the Polish emigrant group A'd.d .... ~glski in :E~gland 
in the thirties. Simultaneously, the desire for a closer 
revolutionary collaboration with the Russian radicals was 
voj.ced. l+ 1 But Marx and Lngels did not comment on this 
development. 
_!~uestion of Ge.rm~C,21£J.tY. 
Marx's and Engels's opposition to the European Left 
was not only determined by the revolutionary polj.cies and tactics 
of the Left, but also by their concern with German security and 
with border questions. As in 1848-1~9, in the post-revolution era, 
Marx and Engels repeatedly defended the need for safeguarding 
German territorial interestso 
--~ 4-v~L ·· ~ k" \1l .,, 11 imanows. J., ~' p. 397. 
41Bobihska, ~__.£};!~!.' pp. 179-800 Bobinska ma:Lntained 
that Marx and Engels were in favor of a collaboration between 
tho radical Poles and Russians. But she did not quote any 
statements of }.-:Iarx and bngels which would support her contention. 
Cf. l111.£., p. 165. 
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At the outset of the fifties the French government under 
President IJouis Napoleon took increasingly severe measures 
against French radicalism, a policy which prepared Napoleon's 
cou:p. d I etat of December 2, 1851. Farly in 1851 the political 
_.. .• .i~· 
exiles in London were in a state of great excitement. They 
expected the imminent outbreak of a French uprising against the 
government of Louis Napoleon. They speculated that this uprising 
would call :forth an anti-French alliance of the reactionary powers 
as in 1792 and ultimately result in a general European 
revolutionary movement. 
Marx and Engels shared the general expectations of a 
French uprising. However, Engels, who prided himself on being 
an expert of military affairs, was convinced that the French 
uprising would end in failure because the French radicals were 
not strong enough to withstand an enemy attack. This thought 
greatly relieved Engels because he feared that a successful 
French revolution would lead to an encirclement of Germany and 
endanger German territorial integ:t."i ty. In Engels 1 s opinion the 
Italian and Polish revolutionaries would support the French 
desire to annex the German territories west of the Rhine in 
order to obtain French assistance in the destruction of Austria. 
Engels v1as convinced that a revolutionary Poland would be as much 
interested in tho 11dismemberment 11 of Germany as a revolutionary 
France and Italy. As a result he abandoned his earlier support 
~=-a Ga~man~Polish alliance. 
~~~~,~~-™w wwwtmwa.c::t."""_asa.za:wm::;;:aaz:..~~.•Wprnt;;;.<5~.f'm':.·.cr.~~~r: 
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In his letter to Marx of May 23, 1851 Engels declared 
that under the present circumstances it was necessary to look 
for new allies. He proposed an alliance of revolutionary 
Germany with revolutionary Russia. "Aside from Hungary, Germany 
would only have one possible ally, Russia, provided that Russia 
would bring about a peasant revolution. 1142 Engels's arguments 
in defense of a German-Russian alliance· were surprisingly similar 
to those of. the German democrat Wilhelm Jordan whom Engels had 
ridiculed in 1848. 
Engels maintained that a German-Polish alliance offered 
no advantages to a revolutionary Germany. In case of a 
military engagement with Russia the Poles would be no match for 
the Russ.ians because their military power was too weak. At the 
most they could raise an army of about 20,000 to 30,000 men. 
Engels bluntly stated that such a weak nation had "no right to 
have a word" in international affairs. The Poles were finished 
as a nation. The "immortality" of Poland was a mere fiction. 
According to Engels the Poles might serve best as an 
"instrument" in the overthrow of the old Russian order through 
an agrarian revolution. When this task was accomplished, "Poland 
would have absolutely no other reason to exist. 1143 However, 
( 
43l&Q...., Pe 207, Cf. also Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
Corre_§l?2ndence 1 184:6-1892_Lfl Selection With Co11).me11tary and Notes, trans. and ed'. by bona-1'forr(LonuOh:M:J.,awFence;Lta·. , T934) ~ 
p. 38. 
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Engels doubted whether the Poles would be able to accomplish 
this task. He stated that even their past history was a failure 
because the Polish aristocracy had alvmys been so "stupid" and 
"quarrelsome" and preferred to live the life of the "idle 
cavalier." 
In E:ngels's opinion the Russian aristocracy was much 
more active. The aristocracy had furthered modern progress by 
engaging in· busj_ness. Engels was rather convinced the.t "due 
to the national character and to the greater development of 
the bourgeois element in Russia" an agrarian revolution would 
first break out in that country. There, it would also have a 
much greater significance due to the territorial expanse of 
Russia. 
Engels insisted that the Poles would not be suitable 
military or revolutj_onary allies of the Germans. Besides, they 
would only enter the alliance with the Germans under the condition 
of territorial concessions to them. This would endanger German 
territorial integrity which must be defended by all means. Engels 
told Marx how satisfied he was that in 1848 they had not incurred 
"any positive obligations towards the Poles, except for the 
unavoidable one, the restoration of Poland with suitable borders," 
but on condition.that the Poles would carry through an agrarian 
revolution.44 
--~-4411EGA III/1 206. ~-' ' 
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Disregarding his statements of 1848-49, Engels now 
maintained that the Polish demand for the restoration of the 
Polish borders of 1772 was not justified. He pointed out that 
most of the people living in the former Polish territories were 
totally indifferent to a reunion with the Poles. The restoration 
of Poland could only mean the restoration of ethnographic Poland. 
The western borderlands of the old Polish Republic had been 
subjected to a long process of Germanization with the result 
that 11one third of the ·proper Polish section • • . • was 
Germanized." Simultaneously, the non-Polish people in the former 
eastern territories of the Polish Republic--including the German 
and Jevlish minorities·--had become Russianized. Engels claimed 
that the Poles bad been unable to solve the nationality problem 
because they lacked tho ability to organize a centralized state 
which would have supported the Polonization of the foreign 
elements. Russia~ on the other hand, had solved the nationality 
problem because tho Russians were able to centralize power and 
to exercise it. A proof of this Russian a b:Lli ty was the 
Russianization of the foreign peo1)1es in the area of the Black 
Sea, the Caspian Sea, and in Central Asia~ Engels suggested that 
Rurasj.an history revealed a certain greatness which Polj.sh hj_story 
lacked. Russianj_zation, like Germanizatj.on, meant progress 
becauoe it destroyed particularism. 
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The concern for the eastern German border drove Enge1s 
into expressing an insane desire for the complete destruction 
of the Poles. He advised the Germans 
to take away from the Poles what • • • they can, to 
occupy the:Lr fortresses, especj.ally Poznania, • • • 
to send them into the fire, devour their country, and 
put them off v;ith the prospect of getting Riga and 
Odessa.Lt-5 
Communist interpreters have been concerned with Enge1s 1s 
violent anti-Polish statements. N. Rjasanoff attributed them 
to the policies of the Polish emigre democre.ts who, "in the 
fight between democrats and communists, sided with the 
democrats. 1146 According to Rjasanoff, Engels reacted with a.n 
outburst of anti-Polish feelings due to his impulsive nature. 
But it was a passing mood of no consequence. Rjasanoff 's 
judgment may be questioned. There is as much reason to interpret 
Engels' s pro-Polish agitation in 18L~8-4 9 as a passj_ng mood. 
Engels's basic attitude in 1851 agreed with the opinion he had 
expressed in 18L1-5 that after the Napoleonic Wars the Germans 
should have annexed as much Polish territory as possible, and 
that the failure of the Germans to do so was regrettable. Besides 
' 
since the Revolution of 1848 neither Marx nor Engels had returned 
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to a defense of the surrender of Poznania and West Prussia to 
the Poles, nor did they do so after 1851. 
As was :pointed out previously, Engels and Marx were in 
favor of the large centralized state as an instrument of economic 
progress and revolutionary action. Consequently, from the 
beginning Polish inability to create a strong state represented 
an immense deficiency in the eyes of Marx and Engels even though 
they expressed a genuine enthusiasm for the bold readiness of 
the Poles to fight in all kinds of revolutionary.movements. 
On the other hand, since Narx and Engels considered empire 
building as a sign of national vitality, they must have felt a 
certaj.n attraction for the Russian Empire in spite of their 
violent antis·Russian propaganda. This is confirmed by their 
admiration for the bold policies of Peter the Great.47 Moreover, 
the sudden denial of the Polish right to a. free national existence 
was not extraordinary because national independence was neither 
a principle for En.gels nor :tJ..arx. Any nation might become a pawn 
in the game of revolutionary strategy. Thus, in 181+8 the 
Czechs ha.d been sentenced to national death by ~ because they 
hindered revolutionary progress and the creation of 
Grossdcrntschland. 
~----~ ... ,_,~·--· 
47N. Rjasanoff, "Karl Mci.rx ueber den Ursprung der 
Vorherrscha.ft Russlands in Euro1Ja, eine kritische U:ntersuchung, 11 
Dj.e Neue Ze:Lt, XXVIJ. Supplement No. 5 (:March 5, 1909), 23. 
--~·-~ 
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Engels had discussed the need for German-Russian 
collaboration in a private letter to Marx. No public statements 
were made in support of such a policy. But Engels contj_nued 
his cri tj_que of Polish claims to the western borders of 1772 
in an article, "Poles, Czechs and Germans," published on 
March 5, 1852 in The New York Tr;i-bul}2_. In keeping with his 
letter of May, 1851, though in a less violent manner, he 
agitated against any diminishment of Germs.n territorial 
possessions. He stated that their preservation had been a major 
aim of the German "progressive party" in 18Li-8-49. According 
to Engels the propaganda of this party for the restoration of 
Poland had been prompted by the necessity to invigorate the 
weakening revolutionary initiative in Germany. Only a \'la.r with 
--
Russia could have achieved this aim. 
Considering that even a partial national restoration 
of Poland would inevitably lead to .such a war, ••• 
the progressive party in Germany supported the Poles 
who demanded the Polish borders of 1772.48 But Engels declared 
that the ttprogressivc partyu had never thought of giving up the 
Grand Duchy of Poznania and West Prussia because these provinces 
had undergone a :process of Germanizat:i.on. He frankly admitted 
that the propaganda for the surrender of these :provinces to the 
Poles in 18L1-8-~.9 had been nothing but a farce. 
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According to Engels German superiority over the Poles 
entitled the Germans to hold Poznania and West Prussia. The 
Germans had promoted the urban development. They ushered 
poznania and West Prussia into the modern age. Besides, it was 
too late to undo the Germanization process in these provinces .. 
Engels maintained that already in 1772, at the time of the 
First Polish Partition, the Polish~German border had become 
"obsolete • • • as the demarcation line between tho Polish a.nd 
German nationalities 11 because the Germans had settled east of 
that border.49 After 1772 the old border had become even more 
outdated because of the rapid progress of Germanization. As a 
result, the restoration of the Polish borders of 1772 would have 
had disastrous consequenceso Nobody could have wished it in 
181+8. Engels asked whether it would have been reasonable to 
surrender 
whole tracts of land chiefly inhabited by Germans 
[am{\ large entirely German tovms • • • to a nation 
which had not yet given any proof of an ability to 
progress beyond the state of feudalism based on 
serfdom.50 
Engels applied to the Poles the same argmnent which he had used 
in 18L~9 to fight the Czech demand for independence--namely, that 
the more progressive natj.on has a right to domJ.nate the less 
progressive one. 
----~-· --.l·~Ib. d 
.;:..2;_., pp. 60-61 • 
Engels argued that in case of a common German-Polish 
war against Russia in 181+8 a victory over the Russians would 
have enabled the Germans to turn the interest of the Poles 
eastward.· 
If the Poles had received large territories in the 
East, they would have become more tractable and 
reasonable in the West. After all, Rige and Mi.tau 
would have been as important to them as Danzig and 
Elbing.51 
Certainly Engels' s interpretation of the fox·eign policies 
of the ttprogressive party 11 in 1848-49 was not merely another 
e:iqiression of his dissatisfaction with the Poles. In later years 
neither Marx nor Engels ever again made any public statements 
in support of Polish aspirations to the western Polish borders o:f 
1772. 
In his New :f.££L!£.i.~un2_ article of March 5, 1 852 
1ngels connected the Poznanian question \ij§_th the Austro-Slav 
question. He repeated the old argument that the Czechs had 
profited from German rule. It made no sense to liberate them. 
He also addressed a warning to the Pan-Slavs who desired to 
partition Eastern Germany. He insisted that for several centuries 
"all the inhabitants" of Eastern Germany were Germans, with the 
exception of 11a hundred thousand souls," who did not count, the 
Kassubians in Pomerania and the Wends or Sorbians in Lusat.ia. 
-5"1Ibid. p. 61. 
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Several days later, on March 15, 1852, Engels published 
an article on "Pan-Slavis!u11 in The New York Tribune. He used 
this article to discredit the claims of the Poles that a 
restored Poland would become the bulwark of Europe against Russia. 
In the customary fashion Engels maintained that the Pan-Slavs 
intended "to subject the civilized West to the barbarian East 
and the towns to the primitive agriculture of the Slavic 
serfs. 1152 He warned that this aim could be achieved if Russia 
became the actual leader of the Slavic world. The Russians were 
the "only energetic 11 Slavs and their expansionist drive was 
tremendous. If they v1ere able to conquer the Balkans and 
Constantinople with the help of their Pan .... Slav supporters, all 
of Europe would soon become "the domaj_n of the Slavic race, 11 
especially of the Russians. Although Engels declared that the 
Poles, with the exception of the nobility, had never been 
"seri.ously entangled in these Pan-Slav traps, tt he suggested that 
they were no match for the energetic Russ:I.a:ns. 
Some of the arguments which Engels used in his discussions 
on Russia in 1851-52 were remin:Lscsnt of those V!hich Herzen, 
though for different purposes, had employed in his treatise, Du 
.9§.Y2J~si,,~m0n:~~9J.ui~.Q.™'~Il-1i~~o Herzen 
52rb·a 6" 
--2--..:.. , p • 'i· • 
216 
maintained that the Russians were the most energetic Slavs. 
Since the Middle Ages, and more so since the time of Peter the 
Great, they had distinguished themselves as great state builders. 
As a result, nineteenth centuxy Tsarist Russia had become an 
immense Empire which extended from the Pacific Ocean to Central 
Eastern Europe. Herzen admitted that this immense Empire was 
a threat to Western Europe. He stated: "Germany exists in name 
only.n53 His conclusion was that if the Germans were unable to 
withstand Russian control, a restored Poland could certainly not 
become a barrier against the tremendous expansionist drive of 
Russia because in the past it had been unable to defend itself 
against Russian aggressiveness. 
Early in the 1850's Engels also claimed that the Poles 
would be unable to defend Europe from the Russian danger. He 
insisted that the Germans together with the Hungarians were 
called to become a barrier e.gainst Russia because they were "more 
energetic." Germans and Hungarians had already diminished the 
Slavic danger because they had been able to subjugate the Czechs 
and the Croatianse 
Although in the fifties Marx and Engels continued to 
warn Europe against the danger of Russian expansionism, they did 
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not resume their propaganda for a German war against Tsarist 
Russia, not even at the time of the Crimean War. Since 1850 
Harx and Engels had become interested in the Eastern Question. 
They expected that Russia would soon try to conquer Constantinople$ 
"the key to its house." They speculated that a Russo-Turkish 
conflict would develop into a European war and eventually cause 
the outbreak of a European revolution •. However, Engels was no 
longer convinced that the revolutionary continental armies 
would be able to destroy the power of the immense Russian Empire. 
In 1850 he referred to Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign 
in 1812. Engels maintaj.ned that in a future war the destruction 
of Russian power would depend upon the military collaboration 
between England and Sweden and the conquest of Odessa e.nd 
Petersburg. 11Without Petersburg and Odessa, Russia is a giant 
with cut-off hands," said E...ngels in 1850. 54 No mention was made 
of the Pol0s as a decisive factor in the struggle against 
Tsarist Russia. 
Early in 1853, when the tension b0tween Russici. and 
Turkey was rising, Engels appe.3.led to England and Fre.nce to 
imitate the "s1Jlendidll disregai"'d of Napoleon I for e.ny k:Lnd of 
st~~us gu.2_ and to overthrow the weak Turkish rule in the 
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Balkans.55 This would remove the danger of Russian aggression, 
a.nd it would also result in a "European war" and lead to 
revolutionary changes. It was in the interest of the people to 
support the overthrow of the status·guo. Change was the law of 
history. It furthered progress.56 
Engels speculated that the liberation of the Balkan 
Slavs would strengthen the anti-Russian ·bourgeoisie. He said 
that the Serbs had a right to overthrow the Turkish rule because 
they were more progressive than the Turks.57 They would emerge 
--- .5'5c'f·.· Engels' s article, ttTurkey," The New York Tribune, 
April 7, 1853, in Karl Marx The Eastern Question, ed. '6'y-1fleanor 
Marx Aveling and Eduard Aveii'ng-Ci,ondon: S:-Sorilienschein & Co., 
1897), :p. 2. Cf. also Gesalli)Tiel];.~ Schriften,, I, 145. Regarding th-
articles on the Eastern "Question, they were the result of Marx's 
and Engels's close collaboration. Some were written by Engels, 
others by Marx, and some by both, but all were signed by Narx. Cf. 
Maximilian Rubel, Biblio~aphie des oeuvres de Karl Marx avec en 
- ~i?J2£E:..c!i~e. un_r.iR~r:-l~yea.es oeuvr"es a,e li'riearich WdF-L.§. (Par-is:-
Librairie Fla.reel Riviere et ere, 195br;--p. 1Db. 
56Engels stated: uwho, through historical studies, has 
learned to admire the eternal change of human history, ••• who 
has f ollowod the iron course of history whose wheels relentlessly 
roll over the :ruins of great states and crush whole generations 
without mercy, who, therefore, is able to understand that •• • no 
revolutionary proclamation can be as revolutionary as the simple 
naked facts of the history of mankind, ••• such a man will 
certainly not shy away from asking himself this historical 
question [the Eastern Question] only because its correct solution 
would result in a European war." Friedrich Engels, "What should be 
done with European Turkey?" The New York Tribune, April 21, 1853, 
in Gesammol te Schriften, I, 1 '67. · . · -
57when the Ukrainj.an ·socialist V. Levynskyj discussed 
Marx's and Engels's attitude towards the Czechs and the Serbs, he 
was annoyed by their arbitrary approach to the question of 
national liberty. While Mci.rx and 1ngels condemned the Czechs to 
L~o:..d0at0h~- the~=:~.th~·===~he se::__J 
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as the new leaders in the Balkans. In order to maintain their 
position they would be forced to turn to the West and to adopt 
western political and educational ideas. The construction of a 
railroad would increase trade relations with Western Europe, and 
this would also counteract the Russian influence. 
In 1853 Engels supported tho modernization of the 
Balkan era as a means to withdraw it from Russian influence, that 
is, a Balkan policy which in the forties had been advocated by 
Friedrich List, the defender of Grossdeutschlo.nd. · Unlike List, 
Engels did not ascribe this task to the Germans in particular, 
and he did not specifically state that the Balkans ought to 
become a German sphere of influence. But it must be kept in 
mind that Marx and Engels, as List had done, wished for the 
- creation of Grossdeutschland. List had pointed out that a strong 
German state which would also command the collaboration of the 
Hungarians would be predestined to obtain a predominant position 
in the Balkans. It may be assumed that this was also taken into 
consideration by Marx and Engels. 
tevy11skyj co111Illen=Eed that Engels wavered between Hegel's theory 
that only historical nations have a right to exist and a 
revolutionary theory that also non-historical nations have this 
right if they are revolutionary. Levynskyjdeclared that only the 
latter theory was worthy of a socialist. Cf. V. Levynskyj, 
Soc_iali.stychn;Li International i Ponevoleni Narod~ (.1'The Socialist 
lnlernafional ana tlielJppressed Ifat':i .. ons~(1tiev an Vienna: n.p., 
1920), p. 35. 
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Indeed, in the mid-fifties Marx and Engels defended 
List's basic foreign political concept that Grossdeu.tschland 
---.--·~~ 
in collaboration with Hungary and the modernized Balkan area 
would become a true barrier against Russian expansionism, not 
Poland. They regarded s.ny increase of Russian influence j.n 
the Balkans as an imminent danger to Austria and ultimately 
Germany. 
The Balk.an crisis flared up when in June, 1853 the 
Russians invaded the Turkish vassal states of Moldavia and 
Vlalachia and the Turks reacted with a declaration of war. In 
the following months }JE..rx's and Engels's agitation fo.r a war 
of the Western European powers, England and France, against 
Russia became more urgent. In his articles of August, 1853, 
Marx warned that Russia desired to conquer Constantinople. Should 
Russia be able to achieve this traditional aim, its "supremacy 
in Europe" would be strengthened. The conquest of Constantinople 
would become the instrm.:ient for further Russian aggression--the 
conquest of the whole Balkan area, as well as of Hungary and 
Bohemia, and the destruction of Austrie.n power which acted as a 
barrier against Russia. According to Marx the Western powers 
did not understand the significance of Constantinople for the 
preservation of European liberty. "Only the revolution" 
r 
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resulting from the Balkan conflict would save Europe from "the 
demoniac influence of the Rome of the East. 11 58 
While Marx and Engels agitated for western European 
intervention in the Balkan crisis, Herzen became increasingly 
concerned about it. On February 20, 1854, shortly before the 
outbreak of the Crimean War, he addressed an open letter to the 
radical English newspaper, the Eng_li:sh .. -~l!..1:?1.i£, in which he 
advised the -Europeans not to prevent the Tsar from conquering 
Constantinople. It was Russia's mission to restore Slavic unity, 
and only Constantinople could become the center of the rising 
Slavic world. Herzen warned that a European war against Russia 
would probably meet with the same fate as Napoleon's invasion of 
Russia. Besides, it would certainly accelerate the dovmfall of 
Tsarism and the advent of the socialist revolution. This would 
increase Russia's influence among the Slavs. Then the Russians 
might be able to destroy the German, Turkish, and Hungarian 
rule over the Slavs and to organize a Sle.vic unio11 "from the Volga 
to the Elbe river, and from the Adriatic Sea to the Archipelagoo" 
Herzen indicated that a war against Russia might call into 
existence that formidable Slavic power bloc under Russian 
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1eadership which the Europeans fearea.59 It would certainly not 
result in a restoration of Poland and Polish leadership in Eastern 
Europe. 
While Herzen attacked Western European infatuation vii th 
tbe Poles, he continued to stress the need for Polish-Russian 
revolutionary collaboration. On March 25, 185L~, three days 
before the outbreak of the Crimean War, he published an appeal 
to the Russian soldiers stationed in Poland. The soldiers should 
take advantage of the Tsar's difficulties in the· Balkan War and 
stage an insurrection against the Tsarist government as the 
Decembrists had done. They should collaborate with the Poles 
who waited ·for a suitable moment "to revolt in defense of their 
rights." 
On March 28, 1854 England and France declared war 
against Russia. The professed aim was "to restrict Russia to 
its natural borders." Austria and Prussia vrere invited to join 
the alliance, but they preferred to remain neutral. The lack 
of a united European front precluded a vigorous attack upon Russia 
at the outset of the war and diminished the possibility of a 
reopening of the Polish question. England and France continued 
to make great efforts to draw Prussia and Austria into the war. 
59Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzon, Sobranie Sochinenii 
( 11 Collected Workstr), Vols. I-XIX, XXVII-XXX01oscow: Isdatelstvo 
Akademiia Nauk, 195l+), XIII, 67-71. 
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They promised Prussia the acquisition of more Polish territories. 
Rumors were spread about Polish unrest in Poznania and Silesia. 
Pe.mphlets insisted that if Austria, and particularly Prussia, 
should remain neutral at the instigation of Russia, they would 
almost certainly risk an "internal rebellion and the loss of 
their territorial possessions in Italy and on the Rhine."60 
As in 1848, there was a war party in the Prussian 
government •. This group felt that Prussia should enter the 
Anglo-French alliance in order to eliminate the Russian opposition 
to German unfication. 61 The anti-war party did not share the 
hope of the interventionists that a European ·war against Russia 
would liberate Germany from Russian influence. In the end the 
anti-war party prevailed. 
One of its most prominent members was Otto von Bismarck, 
the Prussian envoy to the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt. 
Bismarck feared that Prussian and Austrian participation in the 
war might divide Germany and endanger a common German policy. 
The small German states might believe that Prussia and Austria 
intended to use the war against Russia as a means to deprive them 
·-·t;oThomas Carlyle, Shall Turkey Live or Die? (London: 
n. p. , 1 8 54) , p. 30 • 
6lcf. F. Heinrich Geffcken, Zur Geschichte des 
Orien~~lJ_schon Krie~_18.?2.:185§. (Berlin: Verlag von "Gebr1;leder ~aetel, 1881), pp. 90-91. Cf. a!So the discussion of the Crimean 
War and German policies in Manteuffel-Scoege, Geschichte des 
P..Ql.nj-_?chen Volkes, pp. 129 ff. 
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of their independence. In order to save themselves, they might 
support a Franco-Russian rapprochement directed against Prussia 
and Austria. This would endanger the chances of a future 
German unification.62 
According to Bismarck the preservation of the status_guo 
in Central Eastern Europe was in the best interest of Prussia 
and Germany. He was against the acquisition of more Polish 
territories-. Prussia could not be interested in increasing 
the number of its Poli~h Catholic subjects. 63 Bismarck was also 
against the restoration of Poland. Neither Prussia nor Germany 
would profit from it. The German support of Polish restoration 
would exposB Germany to Russian revenge and increase the English 
and French influence in Europe which was a greater danger to 
_ Germany than Russia. Bismarck insisted that it was in the 
interest of the German powers to preserve Russia's territorial 
integrity as a counterweight against England and France. 64 
At the time of the Crimean War, Marx's and Engels's 
opinion on the course of action which Germany, particularly 
Prussia, should pursue was surprisingly similar to Bismarck's 
b2Bismarck's letter to the Prussian foreign minister Karl 
von Manteuffel, April 25, 185L1., in Fuerst Otto von Bismarck, Die 
£.B~l}l.el~n Werket-.,.PoJJ:...ti_§)c_p.e Sch~~~' ed. by Dr. Herman von 
Petersaorf'f { 19 vols.; 2d ea-:-;:rserlin: Otto Stollberg & Co., 
1924-35), I, 447. c . 
1854-' 
63Bismarck's letter to Karl von Manteuffel, February 2, 
in Bismarck, .QJ2.! •• cit •. , I, 1+22. 
6L1-J.E.~·, PP~ 1~5L~-55, 
. --· -..---..._ ____ _. ...... .., .............. ..,._,,,_..,......,.,_] 
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basic position. Although Marx and Engels continued to agitate 
for a vigorous war against Russia, they nevertheless supported 
German neutrality, though for different reasons. 
Shortly before the outbreak of the Crimean War, Engels 
had expressed the opinion that, at the outset of the war against 
Rlwsia, Prussia and Austria would not collaborate with England 
and France. Nor would the German powers join Russia if through 
the conquest of the northern and southern Russian ports England 
and France would weakeri Russia and liberate Germ0ny from 
Russian control. In that case Prussia and Austria might like to 
enter the anti-Russian coalition "to profit from Russia's 
difficulties.u65 However, should a military failure of the West 
permit a strengthening of the reactionary powers, this would 
bring about a .revolution from ".Manchester to Rome [and] from 
Paris to Warsaw and Budapest." However, Marx's and Engels's 
propaganda tactics at the time of the Crimean War do not in.dicate 
that they seriously desired the outbreak of a revolution at that 
moment. 
As was pointed out earlier, Marx a.nd Engels were 
convinced that all the European radicals shared the conunon 
desj.re for the partition of Germany. After the outbreak of the 
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Crimean War the two friends were faced with the propaganda of the 
European Left that the war should be turned into an instrument 
for the liberation of the oppressed peoples. The radicals dernande 
not only the restoration of Poland, but also the destruction of 
Austria. The anti-Austrian propaganda vms supported by Herzen. 
:Marx and Engels remained aloof from the agitation for the 
liberation of the oppressed peoples. They did not agitate for 
the restoration of Poland in their articles for the ~ 
Tribune, nor for the participation of the German powers, Austria 
--
and Prussia, in the Crimean War. Nor did they return to a support 
of the liberation of the Balkan Slavs. When it became obvious 
that Prussia would not enter the '\7ar, they did not denounce 
Prussian neutra.lity as a reactionary policy as in 18Li-8. Instead, 
they maintained a conciliatory attitude. Obviously they did not 
desire the extension of the war. 
In his ~~112. article on "Prussian Policy'! 
of May 19, 185~-, Engels defended Prussie.n neutrality against 
its condemnatj_on by English and ll'rench newspapers. According 
to Engels, Prussia would be foolish to enter the crusade of the 
Western powers against Russia, especj_ally because the outcome 
of the war was not yet certain. Prussia was in need of Russian 
protection from ''.the unsated appetite" of every Frenchman for 
the Rhenish provinces. Besides, Engels did not think that the 
Western powers could off er any real advantages to Prussia for its 
, 
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participation in the Crimean \'Jar. Prussia was certainly not 
interested in the acquisition of new Polish territories. 
It can hardly ma.nage that part of the Polish territory 
and people it already owns. Besides, the Prussians 
hate and despise the Poles, and the general feeling66 is adverse to any new acquisitions in that quarter. 
Moreover, Engels insisted that Prussia needed peace 
to remain prosperous. He even permitted himself to praise 
Prussia--a rare occasion. 
The Kingdom is not.rich by 
activity, and thriftiness. 
of peace, and peace6alone, by an untimely war. "I 
nature but by industry, 
These beneficent· results 
may and must be destroyed 
.Any alliance, either with Austria and France or with Russia, 
would threaten the economic welfare of Prussia. 
__ In the summer months of 1854 it became evident that the 
__ Russians were unable to deal with the inefficiently prepared 
campaign of the allied troops. In August$ 1854 the Austrians 
forced the Russians by mere diplomatic pressure to withdraw from 
Moldavia and Valachia. The development of the Crimean War sup-
ported Bismarck's viewpoint that there was no need to check Russian 
power by joining the Anglo-French alliance, that Russia was not 
strong enough to become a danger to the Germans, and that even 
6""6Marx, The Eastern Question, p. 357. 
6712i£. "P· 358. 
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a.n isolated Prussia would be able to defend itself from a 
Russian attack. 68 
When the military weakness of Russia and the poor 
conduct of the war by the Western European allies was revealed, 
Engels suddenly contradicted his earlier prognosis that the 
capture of the Russian seaports would bring about the defeat 
of Russia. He declared that the loss of' the Russian ports and 
their hinterland would not weaken the j_mmense Empire because its 
povrer rested on the massive armies of the interior. 
Russia may loose the Crimea, the Caucasus, Finland, 
and st. Petercburg, and all such appendages, but as 
long as its body with Moscow for its heart and 
fortified Poland for its 9word-arm is untouched, it 
need not give in an inch.69 
Novi, Engels preferred to consider the Polish Kingdom as "Russia's 
center of gravity." Ho said that already Napoleon had recognized 
its importance by the construction of a system of fortifications 
which was it stronger than any other in the world. 11 According to 
Engols the Russians remained unconquerable and a danger to 
Europe e,s long as they were able to "concentrate more than 
300,000 men" in this excellent strategic position. At the very 
moment, when it had become manifest that France and England alone 
·t8Bism~k, Qk_l£2.§'~~mmel~~, I, 474. 
69 11 The iulitary Power of Russia," .TI1Llew_.Y,9£k Y.£i.1.?Jl11e, 
October 31, 185L1., in Marx, .Tii.e )~~ern g;;!.est~, P~ 490. 
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would be unable to overthrow the statl!s .ci-q.e, in Central Ji..E.stern 
Europe, Engels turned the attention of the readers to Poland, 
but only to its strategic importance. He threatened that soon 
Russia would attack Europe and a "real war on a large scale" 
would ensue, finally leading to the revolutionary wars of the 
European peoples against the despots. This, however, was an 
empty threat. 
Early in 1855 lffiss:i.a was still unable to repel the siege 
of Sevastopol by the allied troops. :Nevertheless, Engels, in his 
articles on 11Pan-Slavism," continued to warn Europe against 
an imminent attack of the united Slavs under Russian leadership.70 
Engel.s's agitation against Pan-Slavism was mostly a repetition 
' 71 
of earlier statements. As in 1848, Engels maintained that all 
. ·7oAcc~rding to Rjasanoff, Engels wrote about 14 to 15 
articles on "Pan·-Slavism" for the New York Tribune, but almost 
none of them was published. This was-apparenlly due to the 
influence of the Polish Count Anton Gurowski who, as mentioned. 
earlier, collaborated with the Tribune and was a supporter of 
Pan-Slavism under Russian leaderruuP:- Cf. also the comments on 
Gurouski and the fate of Engels's articles by Paul Blackstock in 
The Russian Menace to Europe by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
A-Cofl"e c ti on o '.r"".i'lr~E:L cJ.es,-speGcnes , 178 flersaoorre\vs~D'ispa tches , 
ed. by Paul w. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz (Glencoe, Ill.: 
The Free Press, 1952), p. 2Li-9. Two of Engels's articles on "Pan-
Slo.vism" were published in the :Neue Oder ZeitunP" on April 21 and 
24, 1855. --~ ~g. 
71Engels's himself did not think much of these articles. 
In a letter to 1.ria.rx of February 7, 1855 ho commented: "Enclosed 
Pan~-Slav:Lsm, number 2, v1here the lack of quality is at least to 
some extent made up by the quantity of the work. With number 3 
I ~inally enter into medias I'..£1§!.·" De~- Br:i._e.f~Y2.Shsel z_yi_sc}f_~}l 
!)'_~22:E;i-g_LlpJte1s _tP.:..cl.J~~--:~J_8Lt.EtS:,8).., ed. ~1:gu~r"Be bel and 
Eduard Bernstein (4 vols.; :Stuttgart: J. Ho Vl o D1e·1.-z Nachf., 
GmblI, ·1919), II, 87. 
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the Pan-Slavs, whether reactionary or democratic, were 
imperialists. Their political program was to conquer Europe 
under Russian leadership. First of all, the Pan-Slavs aimed 
at the conquest of the Balkans and half of Germany. After having 
advanced into the very heart of Europe, they would attempt to 
dominate all of Europe. Consequently, Europe was faced with the 
alternative of either being subjugated by the backward Slavs 
or of destroying Russia, the center of their aggressive power. 
Engels stated that Pan-Slavism was initiated by the Austro-Slavs. 
Russia used Pan-Slavism to further its orm aim, the creation of 
a "great Slavic Empire from the Elbe river to China and from the 
Adr:Latic Sea to the Arctic Ocean. 1172 E.ngels fought Pan-Slavism 
as a German and as a communj_st. He insisted that Pan-Slavism 
threatened the territorial integrity of Germany and the 
achievement of a European radical revolution. 
Although Engels repeated that the Poles were hostile 
to the Russians and were ttmost definitely opposed to Pan-Slavism,n 
he maintained that only Austria constituted a strong bulwe.rk of 
Europe age.inst the· Pan-Slav threat. Austria's function was to 
prevent the unification of the Slavs. It was in the greatest 
interest of Eur·ope to preserve the territori.al integrity of the 
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Austrian Empire. The Slavs should remain subjected not only to 
Austrian and Hungarian rule but also to Turkish rule which likevr.Ls 
was the result of a long historical process. While Engels had 
agitated for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs before the 
Crimean War, he now supported the English and French policy 
which favored the status quo in the Balkans. Engels was 
obviously satisfied that the Crimean War had remained a local war. 
In- 1855 Engels continued to refrain from any declarations 
in support of Polish restoration. Indirectly he.even agitated 
against it. For the first time he maintained that the Galician 
Ukrainians were different from the Poles. He mentioned that 
about three· million Poles lived in Galicia, and that the number 
of Ukrainians living in Galicia and northeastern Hungary was 
about the same. In Engels's opinion the Western Ukrainians were 
a branch of the Russian people. Similarly to the Galician Poles 
they had been separated from "the main body of their nation" by 
the historical development. Consequently, it was inevitable that 
the Galician Poles and the Western Ukrainians gravitated towards 
their "naturaltt centers--Russian Poland and Hussia respectively • 
. Their desire for reunification with their fatherlands would 
become "ever more urgent as civilization and the need for national 
historical activity" spread among them.73 According to Engels 
-
73Ibid., p. 229. 
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the national consciousness of the Poles and UY,.rainians would 
grow with the dissolution of the agricultural society and the 
rise of the bourgeoisie. 
Engels had come fairly close to the viewpoint upon which 
he had expounded in his letter to Marx of May 23, 1851 that 
Polish restoration was to be limited to ethnographic Poland 
which might seI'Ve as a buffer state between Germany and Russia 
but would be too weak to play an influential role in European 
politics. At the very moment, when Engels warned the Europeans 
of Russian expansionism, he backed the claim of the Great 
Russians that they had a historical right to all the lands which 
had been part of the medieve.l Kiev state Rus, including Red RtJs, 
the eastern part of Galicia. In 1893, shortly before his death, 
Engels still supported the Great Russian viewpoint when he 
declared that only the annexation of the Polish Kingdom by the 
Tsars was a v:Lolation of Polish national riehts.74 
Marx's and Engels 1 s hostj_li ty to the nationality 
principle, which had deepened in the fight against the political 
exiles, resulted in the support of the §>J;~.~·U.t?.__~ at the time 
of the Crtmean War. The two friends resumed the policy which 
Engels had outlined in h:Ls ~articles of February, 1849 and 
-~--r~fiied;.ich Engels, "Die e.usvraertigo Poli tile des 
russischen Zarentums," Die Neue Zeit, VIII (January-September, 
1890), 150. ----
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which aimed at keeping the Slavs divided in the interest of 
Germany. ·They supported the preservation of the Austrian and 
Turkish Empires. However, they did not agitate for the 
partition of Russia and the restoration of Poland as in 1848-49. 
They defended a position which was absolutely opposed to the 
revolutionary program of the European Left~-who aimed at the 
restoration of Poland and the destruction of Austria as a 
prerequisite for the reorganization of Europe. 
Three years after the Crimean War, at the time of the 
Italian War of 1859, Marx and Engels again took an isolated 
stand on the question of European reorganization. The Italian 
Wax· released another wave of agitation for the complete overthrow 
of the European territorial order. As earlier, Viarx and ~ngels 
remained aloof from this kind of propaganda. With the 
exception of the members of the European Left, Napoleon III was 
the most determined defender of the nationality principle. Marx 
and Engels interpreted his support of the Italian fight against 
Austria as a convenient means to achieve his ultimate goal, the 
conquest of the Rhenish provinces.75 Therefore, they favored the 
status qup in the Austrian Empire. They desired that the 
-- 75Engels def ended this viewpoint in his pamphlet Po und 
Rhe:!:..11 (Berlin: 1. 859) which apJ?eared anonymously. It was aga:ln-
'PU'blished by Eduard Bernstej.n (Stuttgart: 1 91 5) together· with 
?av9yen, N~.zz~ lµid der Rhein, also published anonymously by Engels 
ii113erlin in 1°1r6o. 
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socialists in Germany spread propaganda for a war of the German 
governments against Napoleon III 11for the sake of Germany's 
existence. 1176 They speculated that a war against France would 
also involve Germany in a war with Russia allowing the "most 
energetic party" in Germany--meaning the socialists--to seize 
power.77 
To the dismay of Marx and Engels their compatriot 
and political partner Ferdinand Lassalle supported the war of the 
Italians against Austria in Germany.78 In his p~mphlet Der 
italienische Krieg, ho declared that the war was 11of the greatest 
advantage to the German nation." If the Italians were liberated 
with the help of Napoleon III, this would also enable the 
Hungarians to get rid of Austrian rule. A partitioned Austria 
would no longer be an obstacle to German unity. "On the day when 
• • • Austria is destroyed • • • on that day Germany is 
constituted.. 1179 
. 7y;Marx11 s letter to Engels, May 18, 1859, in Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels, £orrespondence, 18L~6-1895_, p. 122. 
77 Aus dem lite.rf3.ri2cJ10n Nachlass von K~rl irx, Friedrich 
En.g§Js und F~ssa.T;Le, ed. b:Yll1ra.nz Behring ~ v~
Stuttga!7"t:-'"'Je H. vi. Tirnlrachf, GmbH, 1902), IV, 185. 
78Note: Ferdinand Lassalle,~ became the founder of the 
first workers' political party in Germany in 1863. 
79Der ital,i!i.n.i.sche Krie,g, in Ferdinand J. G .. Lassalle, 
at?.?-nnu.~l te Red en und Schr:_iften, ed. with a Foreword by Eduard 
oernstein [3 vol:s.; Berlin: Paul Cassirer, 1919), I, 61. 
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The Italian Viar caused a controversy between Marx and 
Engels and Ferdinand Lassalle over the proper foreign policy of 
t1the revolutionary party" in Germany. In his letters written 
to ~.arx and Engels from Germany in 1859-60, Lassalle criticized 
the two men for their support of a war against France and Russia 
by the established German governments. If the war were 
victorious, it would only strengthen the counter-revolutionary 
forces. ·Lassalle felt that Viarx's and Engels's reasoning lacked 
"logic" because of their exaggerated Russophobia. Moreover, 
the defense of the territorial integrity of the Austrian Empire 
by the German socialists would alienate the European revolutionary 
forces. 
By adopting this wrong position must we not become 
enemies of Frenchmen, Italians, Hungarians, and Poles? 
Until now we have always preached the solidarity of 
the people, and all the revolutions have failed because 
this solidarity has not been realizedo 8shall we ourselves raise our weapons against it? 0 
In Lassalle's opinion the popularity of the nationality principle 
should rather be exploited to further the revolutionary aim of 
the German socialists--the unification of Germany. He could not 
~ 
understand why Marx and Engels disregarded this possibility • 
.Actually Lassalle was as much opposed to the nationality 
principle as Marx and Engels. 
8bLassalle's letter to 
Aus dem literarischen NachJ.ass, 
Ielter to r;rar:x -of B8pt.em1>er ff, 
He did declare that "democracy 
Marx of mid-June, 1859, in 
IV, 189-90. Cf. also Lassalle's 
1860, Ibid., pp. 276, 278. 
____._ 
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cannot suppress the nationality principle without committing 
. . d ,,81 su1c1 e. However, he interpreted the nationality principle 
merely as the right of the people to cultural autonomy. Only 
the great Kultur-Nationen (civilized nations) had a right to 
national independence. The right of the Racen (nationalities) 
consisted in being assimilated and developed by the great 
nations. In a private letter to his friend Carl Rodbertus-
Jagetzow of .!"Jay 2, 1863 he frankly stated: "I am not an adherent 
of the nationality principle. 1182 In 1859 it was "not the 
principle [but] the policy most suitable for a revolutionary 
development" which caused the controversy between Marx and Engels 
and Lassalle. 83 Otherwise, both parties involved in the 
controve~sy agreed that the aim of the German socialists must 
be the creation of a large centralized German state, 
11G.rossdeutsch1and !£9ins les dynasti.es. u84 
When in 1859 Ma.rx and Engels exchanged letters with 
Lassalle on the territorial extension of a revolutionary Germany, 
the three men agreed that neither the Austro-Slavs nor the Poles 
Lassalle, Gesammel te Re den und Schrift.eP._, I, 70. 
82Briefe von ~erpina1~d. L.ass?lle .. an Car)-, Rodbertus;:.{a_getzoJ.!, 
d. with a Foreword by Adolf Wagner (Berlin:---r:>lltt'Fammer und 
Muehlbrecht, 1878), p. 54. 
83Lassalle 's letter to Marx, mid-June, 1859, in ~ff>- dem 
literarischen Nachlass, IV, 192. 
84Br:Lefe von .Ferdinand Lassalle, p. 54.· 
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under Prussian rule were to be liberatedo In a letter to Marx 
and Engels of H3.y 27, 1859 Lassalle commented on a letter by 
Engels which unfortunately is not available. He remarked: "I 
fully agree with him [Engels] that P-russian Poland is Germanized 
and must be retained." But Lassalle made one reservation: 
As to his remarks on Hungary, I do not agree with him 
because they permit a double interpretation, as if 
Hungary should remain under German domination. I 
consider this neither possible nor necessary and useful, 
but it is certainly important and rather good that they 
[the Hungarians] are dependent on us by their opposition 
to primj_tive Slavism.()5 
Four years later Lassalle argued that the German socialist party, 
"the natural candidate for the German revolution, 11 would establi.sh 
Germany as a poy1erful state in Europe. That party was also 
destined to solve the Turkish question. 86 It is evident that 
in this case Hungary would have truly become an appendage of 
Germany, and that a strong Gerr.mn position in Central Europe 
would have eliminated any considerations of Polish territorial 
claims~ 
In 1859 Marx and Engels opposed Lassalle's desire to 
exploit the nationality principle in the interest of their 
revolutionary aj_m for the same reason they supported the sta..tu_s_gu .. 
-----8'~~L1:~~~!2:..§..ShG_1l_.1f~J.:1..l~, IV, 183. 
86Brj_ef~ von Ferdinand Lassallei p. 56. 
---~--"~-----
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a.t the time of the Crimean War. 'Marx and Engels were still 
apprehensive that any support of the nationality principle, whether 
bY the Western European revolutionaries or by the Pan-Slavs, 
\vould endanger German territorial integrity and prevent the 
creation of a revolutionary Grossdeutschland. In 1859 their 
concern for German security was increased because they suspected 
that Napoleon III and Tsar Alexander II were plotting to ·weaken 
Germany. 'Marx and Engels were outraged ·when in 1859, at the time 
of the European crisis, a German democrat, Karl Vogt, supported 
the application of the nationality principle to Central Eastern 
Europe. 
In his treatise Studien ~.'l£J>egenwaertigen Lage Euro:P.~!=!.' 
Vogt maintained that the Austro-Italie..n conflict offered a chance 
for territorial changes in Central Eastern Europe. He urged 
the Germans to follow the example of Napoleon III and Alexander II 
who supported the liberation of all the oppressed peoples. The 
Germans should liberate the Slavs under German rule. This would 
contribute to the unification of Germany. Vogt also promoted 
Polish-Russian collaboration and the creation of a Pan-Slav union 
under Russian leadership because this would permanently safeguard 
the liberty of the Slavs. 
In 1860 ~1arx published the pamphlet Herr V2_g!_ which was 
mainly an elaboration of Engels's articles against Pan-Slavism 
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of February, 18L~9 and spring, 1855. In this pamphlet Marx 
sharply attacked the German democrat as an agent of the Tuileries. 
Be maintained that the realization of Vogt•s political concepts 
would not liberate the Slavs, including the Poles, but merely 
help to extend the Russian sphere of influence in Europe. This 
would ultimately result in the destruction of Germany's 
independent national existence. Germany would be reduced to a 
buffer state. According to Marx this was the desire of Napoleon 
III and Alexander II. 
Marx insisted that it was in the greatest interest of 
Germany to prevent a Polish-Russian union in order to protect 
the eastern.German border from being further weakened. He 
explaine~ that the border was already too weak from a strategic 
viewpoint. In order to support his opinion, he referred to the 
Prussian field marshal Count August von Gneisene.u who had also 
considered the border as intolerable from a strategic viewpoint. 
Marx repeated Engels's argument that the western border of the 
Polish Kingdom vras criven like "a wedge" between Austria and 
Prussia. The border provided Russia with an excellent strategic 
advantage in case of v1ar which was increased through the 
construction of a number of fortresses near Warsaw after the 
Polish insurrection of 1830-31. According to ¥i.arx these 
fortresses permitted "the complete strategic domination of the 
Vistula territoryo" Their construction revealed the Russian 
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intention to use the Polish Kingdom as a "base for an attack" 
against Prussia and Austria. Marx concluded that the fortresses 
threatened "Germany more than all the French fortifications. 11 87 
According to Marx a Polish.-Russian union would increase 
the danger of a Russian invasion of Germany. But the situation 
would become intolerable should the Germans follow Vogt•s advice 
and surrender Poznania and West Prussia ·to the Poles. These 
territories.would ultimately be absorbed by Russia. Then East 
Prussia, which Vogt had· called the only "truly Ge.rman province," 
would become "a Russian enclave," ready to be swallowed by 
Russia. 88 
Ma~x also warned the Poles against a union with Russia. 
It would not mean their libera.tion but the end of Poland~-"Finis 
Poloniae. " The annexation of Galicia, which had been a Russian 
aim since Alexander I, would be a major step towards the complete 
subjugation of Poland. According to Marx, Napoleon III was 
willing to sacrifice Poland to the Russians. Marx suspected 
Napoleon of having invited Russia to annex Galicia in order to 
win Russian support for his aim to annex German territories. 
In the opinion of Marx the liberation of the Austro-Slavs 
would endanger Germany even more than Polish-Russian collaboration 
87Karl Marx, Herr Vogt (London: A. Petchu u. Co~, 1860), 
PP. 78-79. . . 
88Ibid., p. 79. 
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because Bohemia and Moravia (present-day Czechoslovakia) would 
certainly pass under Russian rule. A Russian Bohemia, located 
"in the middle of Germany" VTOuld be "a wedge" driven between 
Northern and Southern Germany and Austria. 89 In case of a war 
against Russia, German military power would be completely paralyzed, 
and the Russians could easily overrun Southern Germany from 
Bohemia and occupy it. Henceforth, military cooperation between 
Northern and Southern Germany and.German Austria would only be 
possible "under Russian leadership." Marx concluded that, 
contrary to the expectations of Vogt, the surrender of the Slavic 
possessions would not bring about the unification of Germany but 
the destruction of a thousand years of German history, the 
subjugat_ion of Germany _to Russian rule, and ultimately the 
partition of Germany itself. 
According to Marx the Pan-Slavs would not be satisfied 
with the surrender of Bohemia and Moravia. In addition, they 
would demand that a "natural border" be drawn between the Germans 
and Slavs in Eastern Germany. They would not be deterred by 
the impossibility of drawing a just border in that area which 
was proved by the language map of the Slavophile Czech P. J. 
"' ..,, Safar{k. Marx said the map showed that territories where German 
was spoken, such as Silesia, the whole lower Vistula region, and 
l 
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most of East and West Prussia, were wedges driven into the 
Slavic world. He remarked that the Pan-Slavs would not consider 
the existence of the German territories a problem. They would 
simply declare that these territories had once been Slavic 
and incorporate them into the Pan-Slav union. 
Marx maintained that according to Pe.n-Slav plans the 
new German-Slavic border was to extend from the Baltic Sea coast 
near Stolp to the Netze river, then west to Lieberose and Luebbe--
incorporating also Lusatia--from there south to the passage of 
the Elbe river through the Bohemian Mountains and west along 
the Bohemian border. Ultimately the Pan-Slavs would even 
incorporate German Austria as an undesirable wedge between the 
Western and Southern Slavs. They used the nationality principle 
merely to hide their expansionist dream. The application of 
that principle, said Marx, would cripple Germany forever. 
We Germans do not loose anything more by such an 
operation than East and West P-.cussia, Silesia, parts 
of Brandenburg and Saxony, all of Bohemia and Moravia, 
e.nd the remainder of Austria, except for Tyrol (which 
is partially lost to the Italian nationality 1)rinc:iple)-~ 
and our national ex:istence into the bargain.90 
With this pamphlet Marx disqualified the German democrats, 
who defended the nationality prj_nciple, as the leaders of a 
revolutionary Germany. He insinuated that they had no 
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understanding of the factor of power politics. The support of 
the nationality principle would bring about neither German 
unification nor a peaceful coexistence between Germans and Slavs. 
!t would merely promote Germany's disappearance as a power in 
Central Europe. 
When the Marxist N. Rjasanoff commented on Marx's 
pamphlet in 1916,he stated: 
This SO··Called strategic proof for the need of the 
restoration of Poland was not present in the polemics 
of NRZ. 91 . 
Rjasanoff failed to see that the main aim of the pamphlet was to 
defend the territorial integrity of Germany, not to agitate for 
the restora~ion of Poland. Although Marx referred to the need 
for the liberation of 11the Polish nationality," he did not 
promote the creation of a large and strong Poland as a European 
bulwark against Russia. Germany would defend itself from 
Russian encroachments if the borders were preserved. 
Farly in the sixties the popularity of the nationality 
principle reached a climaxo The demand of the European Left 
for the overthrow of all the territorial arrangements of the 
. Vienna treaties became more emphatic. After April 8, 1861, when 
Russian soldiers were ordered to shoot at the Poles who 
91 -Rjasanoff, "Polenfrage," p. 189. 
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demonstrated in the streets of Warsaw against the Tsarist 
government, European attention was focused on the Polish 
question. Numerous pamphlets, many of them written by Poles 
and Frenchmen, demanded the restoration of Poland. However, 
Marx and Engels continued to remain aloof from such agitation, 
even in 1863 when the Poles in the Kingdom rose in revolt 
against the Tsarist government. At that time the two friends 
merely intended to utilize for propaganda purposes the past 
failures of European diplomacy to fight Russian expansionism. 
!:1F2.Pean Foreign Pol~cJes and the Partition of Poland 
Since the mid-fifties Marx had become increasingly 
interested in the diplomatic history of Europe from the seventeenth 
to the early nineteenth century. His studies of the past were 
determined by his desire to understand why Russia rose to an 
. -
influential position in nineteenth century Europe. Several 
months after the end of the Crimean War, Marx published a series 
of articles on "The Revelation of the Diplomatic History of the 
Eighteenth Century11 in which he discussed Russia's relations \'iTith 
the West.92 In the following years he made a more thorough study 
92Marx' s stud.y, The Re-!'.elatio_n of the Diplomatic Histp...£.iY. 
of the ~~~teen~h C_£nturl, was actually composed as an introduction 
to a compreliensive work which he had planned to write but never 
did. In 1856-57 the study was first published in a series of 
artj_cles in the Free Press, the organ of the followers of the 
English Russophooe 15avfdurquhart, with whom Marx collaborated 
briefly. The study was again published under the title Secret 
~iEf?mati~ Histor.Y., of ;!;he Eigh.t.ee_nth Centur,;x., e.d. by Eleanor l-1arx 
LTii"gTlioncfon: s. 'Sonnenscnein &Co~, fB99)o Then it was 
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the political history of the Polish Republic. During this period 
he made excerpts·which he apparently utilized for the composition 
of two groups of manuscripts on the history of the European states 
and Poland since the seventeenth century.93 These manuscripts, 
which were written early in the 1860's, remained unpublished 
until 1961 when the German historian Werner Conze edited them. 
Among the literature which Marx used for his studies 
on the relations between the Western European states and Poland 
and Russia, there was riot a work which went beyond the usual 
historiography and treated social or economic questions.94 
Likewise, Marx's discussions of the European political history 
from the se¥enteenth to the nineteenth century did not touch 
upon such questions. They were not related to the socio-economic 
pu51islied in German by N. Rjasanoff, "Karl Marx ueber den 
Ursprung der Vorherrschaft Russlands in Europa, 11 in Die Neue _?;eit, 
XXVII, Supplement Noo 5 (March 5, 1909), 1-79. FinaIIylhe study 
appeared in a French edition, La Russie et l'Europe, ed. with a 
Foreword by Benol t-P. Hepner (Paris :·-f951~) . · -~ _j 
93cf. Stan:i..slaw Schwann, 11Nieznane no ta tki Karola Marksa 
dotyczace dziejow Polski v! zbiorach Archiwum Zakladu Historii 
Partii c: przy KCPZPR, 11 ( uunknovm Notes of Karl Marx on Polish 
History in the Collection of the Archive regarding the History 
of the Party at the Central Committee of the Polish Communist 
. Party 11 ), Z Pola. Vlalki (From the Battlefield), No. 3,. (1958) 80, in 
Kr:-rl Marx, £1ElnUSErzyZe ue.E._er die pol2~:!:..f?.C£e Frafe ~1~62-1864), ed. 
WJ. th a Forewora by vrerner Conze and lJieter Her z-:E'icllenrode 
(Amsterdam: International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 
1961), p. 55. 
9L~This is shown by the list of books which according to 
Werner Conze, Marx most certainly used for the composj_tion of the 
manuscripts. Karl Marx, ~ill·, p. 55. 
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theory of history on which Marx had mainly been working since 
the mid-fifties. They were charged with his emotions, his 
antipathies, and hatreds. Overstatements occured frequently. 
The articles on "The Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth 
Century" marked a break with the earlier occasional interpretation 
of the responsibility of the European powers for the Russian 
territorial expansion through the partition of Poland. In the 
forties Mar~ and Engels had stressed the responsibility of 
Austria and particularly of Prussia for Russia's westward advance. 
In1845 Engels criticized the short-sightedness of German foreign 
policies at the Vienna Congress. Instead of permitting Russia 
to annex "t:P,e best part of Poland," the two great German states 
Prussia and Austria should have annexed as much of the Polish 
territories as possible, but they were unable to mal~e use of 
pb\•rer politics. Engels consoled himself with the thought that 
soon a complete reorganization of European society would make an 
end to "such imbecilities. 11 95 The statement of 1845 revealed a 
greater concern with the westward advance of Russia and its 
consequences for Germany than with the fate of Poland. 
At the time of the Revolution of 1848-L~9 Marx and Engels, 
as editors of NRZ,malntained that the Germans should have evaded 
any involvement in the partition of Poland which strengthened 
95Rjasanoff, "Polenfrage, 11 pp. 179-80. 
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Russia and weakened Germany. Simultaneously, Engels, in his 
articles against Prussian reaction, ridiculed the lack of 
initiative and bold action in Prussian foreign policies since the 
seventeenth century. He ridiculed the adulation of the 
Hohenzollern by the conservatives. The Hohenzollern were a 
11family of corporals" ~vho achieved Pruss1.a' s aggrandizement by 
contemptible methods--"through breeches of faith, perfidies, and 
legacy hunting." They acquired the western Polish territories 
through treci.sonous policies--by allying with the. enemies of Poland, 
first v1ith Svrntlen in the seventeenth century and then with Russia 
and Austria in the following. Finally, by participating together 
with Austria in the Third Polish Partition of 1793, the 
Hohenzollern helped Russia to destroy Poland completely. 
In the year 1793 three crovmed thieves divided the 
Polish booty among themselves according to the same 
right by which three street robbers divide among 
themnelves the purse of a defenseless traveller.96 
As was pointed out earlier, Marx and Engels had little 
consideration for the question of morality in international 
relationso Their outbursts of moral indignation over Prussia's 
annexation of Polish territories \~rere not too convincing. Much 
more convincing was their contempt for the lack of bold action in 
Prussian foreign policies. What they meant by bold foreign 
policies was defined years later in Marx's lotter to Engels of 
December 2, 1856. 
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In this letter 1'-brx once again ridiculed Prussian history 
He stated: "World history has never produced anything more 
lousy." After having explained that the Prussian rulers developed 
neither a great nation like the French nor a great dynasty like 
the Austrians, Marx added that they had also been unable to make 
true conquests. 
It [Prussia] has not conquered one single powerful 
Slavic nation. During five hundred years it did not 
even succeed to seize Pomerania which was finally acquired 
through an exchangeo On the whole, the Margraviate of 
Brandenburg as it was taken over by the Hohenzollern--
has never made any conquest with the exception of 
Silesia. Since it was their only conquest, this seems 97 to be the reason why Frederic II is called the unique. 
Pruss1a' s foreign policies v1ere characterized by "oscillating 
perfidy ••• [and] sna~ching at some morsels which Russia throws 
before Prussia during the partitions contrived by Russia. 11 Prussic 
had become chained to Russia by her lack of a de.ring foreign 
policy .. 
When Marx wrote this letter, the English Urquhartist 
newspaper Fre_L~ had started to publish his articles 011 
"The Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century." They wore 
presented to the English public a.t a moment when tho excitement 
over the Crimean \'Jar, which had ended in March, 1856, had not yet 
cooled off. 
In these articles Marx maintained that in the past not 
only Prussia and Austria but also England c;i.nd France had fallen 
r 
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under Russj_a' s spell. This new line of argumentation had already 
found expression in Marx's articles on Palmerston's pro-Russian 
policy late in 1853. Marx now develo11ed a· theory of the 
collective crime committe.d by the European powers against Poland. 
The Europeans shared a common responsibility for the increase of 
Russian power in Europe which especially endangered Central 
Europe. This contention reduced the responsibility of the Germans. 
Marx was now inclined to regard German participation in the 
partition of Poland as·an act of necessary self-defense from 
which all of Europe profited. 
In his presentation of the relations.between Russia and 
Western Eur.ope in the past, Marx was very concerned with the 
power factor in international politics. According to him the 
deyelopment of the European state system since the late 
seventeenth century proved that the Western Europeans were wholly 
incompetent in foreign politics. The Western Europeans failed to 
understand the crucial role of power in internat:Lonal relations. 
Therefore, they were unable to cope with the rise of Russia. 
Their unawareness of their vital interests permitted Russia to 
advance steadily VJestward. 
According to Marx the Russian success was not only due 
to the short-sighted foreign policies of the Western Europeans 
but also to the superiority of Russian diplomacy. Marx 
:ridiculed the methods of Russian diplomacy, but. he was quite 
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fascinated that it had achieved the uninterrupted extension of 
Russian territorial possessions. 
Marx explained that the Great Russians became crafty 
diplomats_ through the example set by Ivan I. Vfl1en Ivan I tried 
to get rid of the Mongol rule, he did not act boldly like a hero, 
but after the manner of slaves he used all kinds of "diplomatic 
tricks and subterfuges." Since Ivan I the pattern of Muscovite 
foreign policies was 
to win advantages by the deceitful exploitation of an 
enemy power, to weaken thereby this power, and to ruin 
it finally because it had allowed itself to be used as 
a tool.98 
According to Marx, Peter the Great added a new aspect 
to Russian foreign policies. This Tsar created a 
bold synthesis which united the method of the 
imperceptj_ble penetration of the Mongol slave with the 
world conquering tendencies of the Mongol ruler and 
remained the motivating force of modern Russian 
diplomacy.99 
As did Herzen, :Marx regarded Peter the Great as a most capable 
ruler because the Tsar knev1 what he wanted and how to achieve it. 
Peter's dream was to change Muscovy from "a half-As:tatic inland 
country into a strong maritime power." His dream set in motion 
a series of conquests by which Russia reached the Baltic Sea and 
-.. 
'98Rjasanoff, 11Vorherrscha.ft Russlands in Europa, 11 p. 22. 
99Jbid.' p. 23. 
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the Black Sea and finally swallowed most of Poland with the 
result that Russia became a decisive factor in European politics. 
Marx praised Peter's "immense achievement" of having 
transferred the capital of Moscow to St. P.etersburg--to the very 
border of his state. This testified to the Tse.r's "amazi.ng 
boldness" and revealed his intention to obtain influence in the 
Baltic Sea area. According to Marx, Peter the Great achieved 
this aim in the Northern War of 1700-21 because he had no equal 
in the pursuit of a purposeful policy. Marx condemned the 
European powers for not reacting to the appearance of Russia in 
the Baltic Sea area. England, in particular, should have had 
the greatest interest in keeping the Russians out of that area. 
Instead, England did not try to support Sweden's fight against 
Russia. It became "the tool of Peter and his successors and 
helped to realize their plans." When Sweden succumbed to the 
Northern Alliance, the Poles participated i.n the partition of 
Sweden. They supported Russian aims and signed their "own 
death sentence." The Poles had their share of responsibility 
for the destruction of their country beccnrne they also became 
Russia's tool. 
Marx said that the Swedish partition was of greater 
historical significance than the Polish partition. The Swedish 
partition marked a turning point in European history. It introduce~1 
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the modern era of international politics • • • For the 
first time in Europe the breach of all treaties as the 
basis of a new treaty was ny50only realized but also proclaimed [as a principle] • 
The partition of Poland was merely the logical result of this 
"first great deed of modern diplomacy." :tt.ia.rx declared that since 
the 1720's, when Russian troops were stationed in Poland, Russia 
was practically the master of Poland. Russia initiated the 
partition of Poland, and it was Russia which mostly profited 
from the partition. 
Marx condemned the general European compliance with the 
aggressive foreign policy of Russia in Europe. Even at the 
Vienna Congress the European statesmen did not change their policy 
towards Russia. '1111e Vienna treaties were the result of the 
common Europea.n foolishness.. 'l'hey permitted the Tsar to gain 
"a position without competitors in Europe," mainly through the 
partition of Poland, and to threaten Europe "with the renewal 
of a universal monarchy" should Constantinople be conquered. 
According to Marx mostEuropeans were not aware of the 
historical fact that within a century Hussi.a had achieved 
"monstrous dimensions." It had undermined the European balance 
of power principle and had become a "real power" which must be 
reckoned with. Yet, many Europeans still assumed that Russia was 
weak because it was backv,,rard. In history, Marx said, Russia 
Offered 
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the only example of an immense empj.re whose real power, 
even after world-renovmed achievements, was often still 
regarded as a mere illusion, not as an accomplished fact. 
In 1909 N. Rjasanoff criticized Marx for his concentrat:kn 
on Russian foreign policy and his neglect of the economic history 
of Russia. Thereby, Marx gave the impression that Russian 
history had remained static. Eut Russia had undergone the same 
changes in the social structure as the Western European countries, 
only at a later date. Rjasanoff was right that the preoccupation 
with Russian foreign policies became a real obsession with Marx 
and Engels's in the 1850's. Yet, scattered remarks on Russia's 
internal development prove that since 1848 Marx and Engels were 
aware of the symptoms of internal changes in Russia. However, 
with regard to their revolutionary calculations, which concentrated 
upon Western Europe, these changes were rather insignificant 
because Russia was still predominantly an agricultural country. 
Thus, for Marx and Engels, Russia primarily remained the 
expansionist power l?ar e_JCc.~llence whose advance endangered revo-
lutionary progress as well as Germany. Above all, the articles 
of 1856-57 were intended to prove that the balance of power 
-principle had become obsolete because of Russia's rise as a 
European power, that the policies of the European cabinets were to 
inefficient to stop a further Russian advance, and that a new 
revolutionary fore::Lgn policy was needed to save Europe. 
l 
Marx retained his basic approach to the development 
of the European state system in his two groups of unfinished 
manuscripts--Polen, Pre~~~.E. un_~~~d and Polen und 
frankreich--which he wrote at the time of the great excitement 
..--~---
over the Polish uprising in 1863 and 186i+ respectively. 1 Ol The 
manuscripts were also composed in the traditional manner and 
relied on diplomatic and military events to explain the 
historical development in Europe. Once again Marx's main 
objective was to reveal the short-sighted foreign policies of 
the European stateso This time he treated in detail the events 
which led to the destruction of the Polish state in order to 
prove his pointe He paid particular attention to the impact 
which the weakening of Poland had 011 Germany. 
The manuscript on Pole1}_7__1?.!'_9y.;.§.~E;n q31d Russland was 
mainly an elaboration of :Marx's earlier attacks against Prussia's 
servile attachment to Russia. Marx repeated that the Hohenzollern 
rulers did not rehieve the extension of their dynastic power, 
which was their immediate aim, by bold action but by devious 
political machinations which injured "the general and permanent 
interests of Germany. 11102 Since the seventeenth century the 
Hohenzollern had pursued two objectives: (1) to deprive Sweden 
Of its Pomeranian. possessions and to annex Polish West Prussia 
~itle Polen und Frankre:i.ch was given to the second 
group of unfinished maiiU.SGrTp-E"scy-WeFffer -Conze, the editor of the 
manuscripts. 
102Karl Ha1 ... x, Dif? P,0}:11=!-;S_C}?-_~ F~ ... §1.f.Se, p. 91. . - -
-*>.:.,>:T~mz-~~~~~t .. ~....:' .. .'~~~:'1.RA!L'.~~·~·-_,.,...._..,;,..T~'...::.:-...·.1 .• _~~,};._...._~ . :..."'?',,.:,~~~~~rA'.Z"'"'"~~~~~nr·~~·-fl.~.~ 
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which separated East Prussia from Brandenburg; and, (2) to 
consolidate their power against the German Empire. However, 
the extension of their dynastic pov1er could only be achieved by 
leaning upon a foreign power, and this power was ultimately 
Russia because France in the long run had no interest in 
supporting the rise of another German power along with Austria. 
When Russia entered the European political scene, it pursued 
the same aims e.s the Hohenzollern, the partition of Sweden and 
Poland and the weakening of the Empire, and this became the 
basis for the collaboration between Russia and Prussia. 
Marx condemned Prussia's collaboration with Peter the 
Great in the Northern War. This contributed to the fall of 
Sweden. The destruction of Sweden increased Prussian power. 
But it D?russici] rose as a satell:L te of the Russian 
power and the Russian accomplice in the plundering 
of a ne:Lghbor who had become defenseless.103 
After the Swedish partition, said J:!Jarx, it became Prussia's callin-: 
to make '.'Russian policy" and to be Russia's 11sent.ry 11 j_n Germany 
against the Ilabsburgs. Marx ridiculed the German historians, 
among them Heinrich von Sybel, v:ho glorified Frederick II as a 
great ruler. According to Marx, Frederick the Great had been as 
submissive to Russia as the rest of the Hohenzollern. Frederick 
would have been truly great if he had tried to destroy tho 
Austrian hegemony, "but to reorganize the Empire and to place 
! 
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himself at the head of it, such ambition was far from him. 11104 A 
strong Empire under a central leadership would have freed the 
Germans from Russian overlordship. Marx contended that Frederick, 
"at the head of Germany, V!OUld have·dest]'.'oyed Russia," but at the 
head of Prussia he became its slave. 105 
Marx criticized Frederick for not having made the 
slightest attempt to get rid of Russian.influence by supporting 
the growing.Polish opposition against Russian interference in 
Polish affairs which or.igina ted in 1 709 when a Polish-Russian 
alliance was concluded. Frederick preferred to help increase 
Russian domination in Pole.nd. In 1764 he agreed with Catherine 
the Great to guarantee the old Polish constitution with its 
liberum veto. This perpetuated Polish anarchy and the defense-
lessness of Poland against Russian intervention in Polish 
affairs. "Only a Russian could contrive such a pact, and only 
a P-.cussian sign it. 11106 Finally, Frederick even complied with 
Catherine's desire to annex Polish territories and proposed the 
partition of Poland. 
According to Marx in the First Partition of Poland 
Frederick was "only the instrument which Russia, with cunning 
calculation, ordered to take the initiative. 11107 Marx said that 
l O'lj:"I bid ~ , p. 101. 
l05Ibid., p. 120. 
106Ibid., p. 107. 
-
107Ibid. p • 112. 
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Frederick needed Russia to round off his eastern territorial 
possessions. However, Frederick should at least have understood 
that Catherine was too weak to swallow all of Poland which was 
her ultimate aim. She agreed to a partition of Poland because 
she n~eded Frederick's support against the Poles. Consequently, 
Frederick should have dictated his conditions, but he did not 
dare to demand Danzig and Thorn and allowed Russia to profit 
mostly fro~ the partition. Austria, which participated in the 
partitj_on against its desire, acted more independently. It took 
Lwow in spite of Russian opposition. Besides, the imperial 
government understood much better than the Hohenzollern rulers 
that the further annexation of Polish territories by Russia would 
be a permanent threat to Germany. 
Marx said that Frederick, through his collaboration 
with Russia against Poland, betrayed both Germany and Europe. 
In 1779 Frederick committed an even greater political crime. 
He invited Russia to become a guarantor of the German constitution 
at the Peace Treaty of Teschen which ended the conflict between 
the Hohenzollern and the Habsburgs over the Austrian attempt to 
incorporate Bavaria •. This gave Russia the right to interfere in 
German affairs. Yet, only in 1806, when the partition of Poland 
was completed, and when Germany was weakened by Napoleon, could 
Russia exploit this right--namely, by helping France, the other 
guarantor of the German status guo_, to destroy. the German 
constltution and to partition the German Empire .. 
rr -·c--~-·-·------· 
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Marx pointed out that the Russian influence in Germany 
wa.s coni'irmed by the Vienna treaties. As Engels had done, Marx 
condemned the German governments bE;cause they did not profit 
from their victory.over Napoleon. He believed that Prussia, 
in order to obtain Russian support for its territorial expansion 
within Germany, had even been willing to relinquish its claim 
to Poznania and West Prussia~ This would have left Berlin 
defenseless. Marx said that the English foreign secretary 
Viscount Robert Castlereagh had been against the surrender of 
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw to Russia because this would have 
imperiled the security of Prussia and Austria and Europe. 
Nevertheless, the Prussians permitted the Russian Tsar to annex 
almost the whole Grand Duchy of Warsaw under the title of the 
King of Pole.nd. 11 \Vith the right instinct they forced the 
108 Russian hegemony upon Europe. 11 
Prussia, said Marx, did not profit from the support of 
Russian aims. Russian restrictions upon the commerc:i.al relations 
between the Polish Kingdom and Ea.st and West Prussia after 1815 
revealed Russia's intention to fj_nally destroy Pru.ssiao Marx 
repeated that Prussia's collaboration with Russia had been 
necessary to defend Prussian interests, but it weakened Germany 
and made the political existence of Prussia dependent upon 
Russia's grace. 
p. 11+0. 
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In the manuscript on Polen und Frankreich l'.arx 
--· 7"11 ·--~-
mitigated his harsh critique of Prussj.an foreign policies and 
concentrated his attacks on France. Marx claimed that France 
greatly contributed to the rise of Russia by failing to support 
either the Swedes or the Poles against Russia. According to 
Me.rx the French had never had a serious interest in the fate 
of Poland because their foremost desire was to keep Germany 
divided and weak. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
when Poland was still strong and the Russian Empire did not 
yet exist, the main aim of France was to weaken the German Empire 
through alliances with Poland, Sweden, or Turkey. The anti-
German policy was continued when Poland had declined. This 
contributed to the rise of Russian power and to Prussia's 
eastward expansion at the expense of Poland. 
While Marx in his earlier statements had presented 
Frederick the Great as a man without a political vision, he nov1 
maintained that at the time of the Seven Years' War Frederick II 
had wished to organize a "formidable coalition" against Russia 
which would have been a means to liberate Poland from the Russian 
yoke. But the French betrayed European interests and concluded 
an alliance with Russia. 1rhi.s enabled the Russians to use Poland 
as a military base for an invasion of Prussia. According to 
Marx the results of the French pro-Russian }')Olicy vrere: 
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.Russia establiE;hed its supremacy in Germany • • 
Prussia became its slave ••• Catherine became 
most powerful sovereign in Europe and • • • the 
Partition of Poland took place.109 
• 
the 
First 
Marx claimed that the French were ultimately responsible 
for the First Partition of Poland, but the Poles themselves 
shared the responsibility. They permitted Russia to use Poland 
as a military base against Prussia. Prussia reacted by 
participating in the Polish partition. l·hrx was convinced that 
the French would not have acted differently if during the Seven 
Years' War the Belgians had allowed Prussia to use their country 
as a military base against France. The French would certainly 
have tried "to incorporate Belgium or to destroy its 
indopendence. 11110 
Marx insisted that neither the French revolutionaries in 
tho 1790' s nor Napoleon made e.ny serious efforts to liberate the 
Poles. The French betrayal of Polish national interests reached 
a climax in 1810 when Napoleon agreed vrith Alexander I that the 
name of Poland be forever stric1rnn from tho European map. After 
1815 the betrayal Of the Poles was continued. 1rhe French 
government under Louj_s.Philippe, did not support the Polish 
insurrection against Russia and did not protest when Nicholas I 
violated the Vienna treaties and changed the Kingdom of Poland 
into a Russian province. 
r 
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Werner Conze made the following remark on Marx's 
manuscripts of 1863-6L~: "Marx does not impress us as a historian 
. . 111 
of high standing with these one-sided and partial comp1lat1ons. 11 
It is true that th~ manuscripts are charged with overstatements 
_and contradictions, but as a propaganda piece they are most 
effective. Marx did not approach his subject as a historian 
but as a political man who desired to use his knowledge in the 
fight against Tsarist Russia and the contemporary conditions 
in Germany., 
Whatever Marx said about European policies towards 
Poland, he suggested that the development of the European 
state system would have been different if the German Empire had 
developed into a strong state in the center of Europe. In this 
connection his reference to the Prussian annexation of East 
and West Prussia is revealing. Marx stated that these two 
provinces had once belonged to the Teutonic Knights but wex·e lost 
to Poland in the fifteenth century. If East and West Prussia 
would have been reconquered by a war of the German Empire against 
Poland instead of through Prussia's betrayal, this would not have 
been resented by the Poles, nor would it have excluded German-
Po11· ""h 11 b t. . t th Ru · 112 It o. co a ora ion agains· e common enemy, ssJ..a. can 
hardly be expected that the Poles would have approved of Marx's 
argument. 
4·~-m---
.!E_ict., p. 38 (1ntroductio:n). 
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Since the 1850 1 s Marx and Engels had shovm a great interest 
in European power politics. They were convinced that the 
European state system of the nineteenth century, in which Russia 
played an influential role, originated from the foolish foreign 
policies of the European states in the past two centuries which 
had permitted Russia to annex the greater part of the Polish 
territories. But Marx and Engels did n·ot think that the foreign 
policies of European democracy--in case of its victory--and the 
restoration of Poland would save Europe or Germany from the 
Russian and Pan-Slav threat. They were worried about the 
popularity of the nationality principle which in the 1850 1 s had 
received an unexpected support from an anti-revolutionary source, 
the Fre11ch government under Napoleon III. They believed that 
the realization of the nationality principle would increase 
Russian aggressiveness which would endanger Germany and the 
radical revolution. Only 11 the revolutionary party," meaning 
the communists, would save Germany and Europe because it would 
conduct a vigorous foreign policy. When the First International 
Workingmen 1 s Association was f ouncled in 1 86L~, Marx, with the 
assistance of Engels and his supporters in Germany, tried to 
force an aggressive anti-Russian policy upon the members of 
that organization. 
THE POLISH INSURRECTION OF 1863 
!,!W AttemP.t .§;t Pgiish-EBT~ian Reyolut.i_Q.11§£.L...9.o_lla£9ration 
The Polish insurrection of 1863 was the prelude to the 
fotmding of the First International Workingmen' s Association. 
It marked the end of the period of Polish uprisings in the mid .... 
n:Lneteenth century. As in the years preceding the Polish 
uprising, Marx and Engels avoided public statements in support 
of the restoration of Poland. However, their old opponents 
Herzen and Bakunin became actively engaged in the support of 
the Polish cause. 
The dialogue betvreen Herzen and the Polish left-wing 
democrats, which had begun after Herzen's arrival in London in 
1852, reached a wider audience after the publication of Herzen's 
newspapElr lLC?.1.91~~ (The Bell [London] ) in 1857. This newspaper 
became the center of attraction to the dissatisfied elements 
in the Russian Empire and also to the Poles under Russian rule. 
263 
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The articles on Herzen's activity in London and on his political 
concepts, which appeared in the Polish democratic newspaper 
,!J'z.egl<ed Rzeczi Polskich (Survey of Polish Affairs [cracow] ) afte 
1857, reveal that Herzen probably had as many enthusiastic 
supporters as opponents among the Poles.· Ultimately the dialogue 
between Herzen and the Poles centered around the problem of the 
restoration of the Polish eastern borders of 1772. Whenever this 
problem was.touched upon tensions arose. 
In November, 1958 Przegl§d _Rzeg:zy- Pol.skich published an 
enthusiastic article on Alexander Herzen and the independent 
Russian printing-office in London. The article stated: "Herzen's 
work and that of the Polish democrats is the same • • • Herzen 
is a friend of the Poles. 111 This statement caused Herzen 
_ misgivings. He did not wish his aims to be identified with Polish 
aspirations. He felt that the Poles generally lacked a serious 
interest in the solution of the peasant question. Besides, he 
resented the continuation of their anti-Russian propaganda and the 
demand for the restoration of the eastern borders of 1772. 
Herzen clarified his position in a series of articles on 
"Rossiia i Polshcha11 ('!Russia and Polandu). They were written 
shortly before an<l after the Italian War which rekindled the hopes 
of the Polish emigrants for the restoration of Poland with the 
~468. 
1Aleksandr Ivanovich Herzen, Sobranie Sochinenii, XIV, 
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help of Western Europe. 2 The articles were mostly a repetition 
of the arguments Herzen had used in his treatise on Russian 
revolutionary ideas in 1851. He still insisted that only a 
revolutionary Russia vrould liberate the Poles. Re warned the 
Poles,against the "despotic"government of Napoleon III. Although 
Napoleon supported the nationality principle, the French 
government would not help the Poles restore Poland. Herzen 
claimed that the nationality principle was merely used by the 
reactionary governments as a means to prevent the unification 
of the European peoples which was the prerequisite of their free 
development. Re repeated that the Poles had a right to "a 
political existence independent of Russia," but their claim to 
the former eastern provinces of the Polish Republic--White Russia 
and the Ukraine--was not justified. This time, though, he 
stressed that also the Great Russians did not have a right 
to the possession of these provinces. 
According to Herzen the claim to a foreign territory 
could neither be defended by "long lasting possession" nor by 
"the former rule" over it; that is, by the historical-right 
principle. Since all the states had originated from conquests, 
the basic question was not "how the parts [of a state] had been 
i" 
r joined but whether an independent life was assured to them." F· . 
" ~ 
- 2The articles appeared in Kolokol, Jan.uary 1 and 15, 
1, 1859; March 15, April 1, 1860. 
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Neither the Poles nor the Great Russians had guaranteed liberty 
to the conquered people. Only if the right to self-determination 
were granted by a revolutionary Russia, the oppressed people would 
enjoy an independent life.3 
Herzen claimed that the White Russians, who spoke a 
language which was "closer to Russian than Polish," would 
"naturally wish to be Russians," while the Galician Ukrainians, 
who were Uniates, would feel a stronger attachment to the 
[catholic] Poles. 11 He .was sure that the Eastern Ukrainians (then 
called Little Russians) would demand recognition as a separate 
nationality. Herzen hoped that the liberated people, including 
the Poles, ~ould be willing to unite with the Great Russians 
in a socialist federal republic if their equality were guaranteed. 
He remarked that he did not desire "the dissolution of the 
Slavic world but its free federation. 114 
When Herzen made these statements, Mikola Kostomarov 
and Pantelejmon Kulish, the leaders of the Ukrainian movement 
in the Eastern Ukraine, agitated in St. Petersburg for the 
recognition of the Ukrainian people as a separate nationality and 
for the unification of. all the territories inhabited by 
Ukrainians from the Carpathian mountains and Ea.stern Galicia to 
3 . -1!?2:.£.jpp. 21, 35. 
4!J2i,£., p. 35. 
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the left bank of the Dnieper.5 Simultaneously, they supported 
political and cultural collaboration with the Great Russians 
and fought Polish claims to the Ukraine. 
On January 15, 1860 Kolokol published an anonymously 
written letter by Kostomarov sent from St. Petersburg. This 
letter supp.orted Herzen' s assumption that the Ukrainian radicals 
were more willing to collaborate with the Great Russians than 
with the Poles. Kostomarov stated that the Ukrainians aimed at 
the creation of "a separate political entity comprising all the 
lands where the Ulrrainian language • • • was spoken, 11 free 
from Polish or Russian overlordship. 6 He expressed the hope that 
Alexander I~ would grant judicial equality and cultural autonomy 
to the Ukrainians. This would prepare a peaceful coexistence 
with the Great Russians and eventually the realization of a 
Slavic union.7 
5Mikola Kostomarov (1817-85) and Pantelejmon Kulish 
(1819-9'?) had founded the secret Cyril and Hethodius Society in 
1846 Y1hich fought Polish and Russian claims to the Ukraine and 
demanded the recognition of Ukrainian independence and the creation 
Of a Slavic federation of which Kiev should become the center. In 
1847 the leading members of the Society were exiled from the 
Ukraine. Kulish was permitted to settle in St. Petersburg in 1850 
and Kostomarov in 1859. 
6Kolokol, ed. by A. I. Herzen and N. P. Ogarev (London and 
Geneva: Volnai'a Russkaia Ti pografia, 1857-67) (facsimile ed.; 
11 vols.; Moscow: Isdatelstvo Adademiia Nauk, SSSR, 1962), III, 
502-03. . 
7Early in the 1860's Kostomarov published a number of 
articles in Osnova (Foundation [st. Petersburg] ), the organ of the 
Ukrainophiles, in which he emphasized that the .Ukrainians were 
superior to Russians and Poles because they .were true defender:::: of 
the dGmocratic principles--the right to individual liberty and the 
m WT 
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Herzen's opposition to the restoration of the Polish 
borders of 1772 called forth a strong reaction among the Poles. 
The democrats, among them Ludwik Mierosl'.awski, who favored the 
~reation of a centralized Polish state were particularly outraged 
by Herzen's support of the Ukrainian claim to national self-
determination. In Przegl~d Rzecz)1' Pol?kich, articles had repeate'. 
appeared which condemned the Ukrainian ~ovement.8 In December, 
1859 and January, 1860 the newspaper attacked Herzen for 
advocating the restoration of a small Polish state which would 
be confined to the Vistula basin. Herzen was accused of desiring 
a Slavic union "under Russian hegemony" in order to strengthen 
Russia's pO'sition in Europe.. The newspaper concluded that even 
the progressive Russians were enemies of Poland .. 9 
In his articles of spring, 1860 Herzen evaded any 
further discussion on the controversial Polish territorial 
question. Instead, he emphasized the need for peasant liberation 
through a socia.l revolution and for the creation of a "federation 
of free Slavic countries'' destined to become the pioneer of the 
reorganization of Europe on the basis of federalism and soci~lism!0 
voluntary ass"oclation of the people. Cf. Mikola Kostomarov, 
.§.ob~r_an_ie Sochinenii, I, 35-64, quoted in Dmi tro Doroshenko, Mikola 
Ivanovich Kostomarov (Leipzig: Ukrainischer Verlag, 1924), P.'5'87 
8Cf. Lozynskyj, ~_y_olucyi!!Lj ruch, pp. 16-17. 
9Herzen, Sobranie Sochinenii, XIV, 41, 469. 
10~.' p. 44. 
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In the following months Herzen repeatedly expressed his 
doubts as to the realization of a Polish-Russian reconciliation. 
At times, he was under the impression that the Poles would prefer 
to perish with the old Western world rather than save themselves 
through the revolutionary collaboration with the Russians. He 
admitted that Russian history was cruel; but without cruelty the 
Russian rulers would not have forged Russian unity which was a 
•t• b" t 11 posi ive ac._ievemen • Herzen defended the same position as did 
v~rx, Engels, and L~ssalle that the use of force had furthered 
progress in history and was therefore justified.· Consequently, 
Herzen's repeated declarations that the social revolution would 
abolish despotism and the rule of one nation over the other were 
not too convincing. Force might still be used in order to 
· . realize that unified world of which Herzen dreamt, and in which al 
the national and social distinctions would disappear. 
The Polish radicals continued to pay attention to 
Herzen's statements. They wavered betweAn support of Herzen and 
opposition to him. In June, 1860 :i:,r~e~J4:d Rze~...E..o~cl2 
emphasized the solj_dari ty between the Poles and Herzen al though it 
admitted to differences between thorn. But in October, 1861 the 
newspaper rejected the idea of a federation with 11Moscow ••• We 
want the Poland of 1772. '11hat is our ultimatum. 1112 
TJ 1.b:!:_C!,o ) p. 52. 
12Ib. 1 
• ..:...-2:.S.... ' p • L1.'?0. 
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Late in 1861 Bakunin had arrived in London. He had 
escaped from Siberia where he had continued to agitate among the 
Polish exiles for Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration 
against the Tsarist government and·against Austria and Prussia. 13 
In London he continued this propaganda. He was partially 
responsible for Herzen 1 s consent in 1862 to a close revolutionary 
collaboration with the Polish radicals; 
In.his manifesto Narodnoe Delo ("Goals of the People 11 ) 
Bakunin supported the destruction of the centralized Russian 
Empire, but he did not favor the restoration of the Polish 
borders of 1772. For the first time he emphasized that the 
Russian Empire was a multi-national state, and that the right to 
national self-determination should be granted to all the 
nationalities in that Empire--Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, 
Finns, Latvians, and the people from the Caucasus. As a result, 
the Polish question appeared as only one question of national 
liberation from Russian rule among many others. Bakunin hoped, 
as did Herzen, that if a revolutionary Russia were reorganized 
on the basis of voluntary federation, then all the nationalities, 
including the Poles, would prefer to enter into a union with the 
Great Russians rather than to create independent states. 14 
. 
13Bakunin 1 s letter to Herzen, December 8, 1860, sent from 
Irkutsk (Siberia), in Correspondance de Michel Bakounine, ed. by 
Mykhaylo Drahomanov, p:--i-22. G"f. also ~~efwechsel 
and. Ta~ebueche.r a}LS den Jah~1825-1880, II, 222-23. 
l l~Lozynskyj, .2.J2.:__£i t .. , pp. 110-11. 
r ____ _..__ 
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Obviously Bakunin and Herzen considered decentralization 
and "self-government in the village, the district, the province, 
and the whole state" as the most effective means to preserve the 
unity of the vast territory extending from the Pacific Ocean to 
the western borders of the Polish Kingdom. It was paradoxical 
that Herzen and Bakunin agitated for the creation of a Slavic 
federation. Actually the federal union which they promoted would 
not be based on mere racial affinity because the Finns, the 
people from the Baltic ·provinces and from the Caucasus, and the 
Siberian tribes would also belong to it. 
Notwithstanding the imperialist implication of the 
federal concept of Herzen and Bakunin and their opposition to 
the restoration of the eastern borders of 1772, the Polish left-
wing democrats signed a pact for Polish-Russian revolutionary 
collaboration with The 
conclusion of this pact had been promoted by the events in Warsaw 
in the previous year. On April 8, 1861 Russian soldiers shot at 
Poles who demonstrated against the government in the streets of 
Warsaw. This killed Herzen's enthusiasm for Alexander II whom he 
had only recently praised for the emancipation of the serfs in the 
Russian Empire (March 3, 1861)9 It renewed Herzen's sympathy for 
the oppressed Poles and weaken.ed his suspicion of them. The 
Warsaw shootings increased Polish unrest in the Kingdom. 
Preparations were made for an insurrection. Early in 1862 the 
r 
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insurrectional committee in Warsaw invited Jaroslaw D~browski 
to become a member as the representative of the military circles. 
Dabrowski was an officer in the Russian army and had come under 
'-
the influence of the Russian Nikolai Chernyshevsky (1828-89) who 
advocated an agrarian socie.lism. D<ebrowsh:i' s membership meant 
the strengthening of the left-wing Polish democrats. He believed 
firmly in the necessity of a social revolution as a basic 
prerequisite for a successful Polish insurrection. Moreover, he 
hoped that a.n uprising in the Kingdom would be the signal for the 
outbreak of the agrarian revolution in Russia. Dabrowski favored 
c:. 
Pol:Lsh~Russian revolutionary collaboration against the Tsarist 
government. It was mostly due to his influence that in 1862 the 
National Central Committee in VJarsaw communicated with Herzen in 
London afl well as with the Russian revolutionary organization 
~]X§..iJ!ElYa (Land and Liberty) in st. Petersburg, which was 
under Chernyshevsk.y's influence, and with officers of the 
Russian army stationed in the Polish Kh1gdom. When Dabrowski 
c 
was arrested late in the summer of 1862, his successor became 
Zygmunt Padlewski who had also been influenced by Chernyshevsky, 
shared D~browski's convictions, and continued hts policies. 
When the rumor of an impending Polish uprising spread in 
Western Europea1~ radical circles, only a tiny rninori ty, foremost 
the French socialist Pierre Proudhon-·-vrho lived as a political 
exile in Belgium--objectecl to the preparations for ite Proudhon 
Was convinced that the insurrection would have no other aim 
I 
~; 
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than the restoration of the historical Polish borders of 1772 
because it would be led by the szlachta. 
In the forties Proudhon had become acquainted with 
Marx and also with Herzen. While Proudhon and Marx soon became 
political enemies, Proudhon continued to have closer relations 
with Herzen. In the mid-fifties the question of Polish 
liberation began to undermine their relations. By that time 
Proudhon had become strongly opposed to the nationality principle, 
"that humbug of a revolutionary theory."15 When he knew about 
Herzen 1s collaboration with the Polish Central Committee in 
London, he tried to dissuade Herzen from supporting Polish 
aspirations. because they had nothing to do with democracy. 16 
The Italian War turned Proudhon definitely against the 
nationality principle, whether supported by Napoleon III or the 
European radicalso He feared that the Italian War was merely 
the prelude of ever more terrible wars in the name of the 
nationality principle. He was convinced that the crusades for the 
liberation of the peoples under foreign rule would merely diminish 
liberty. Such wars would undoubtedly result in the reduction of 
r5P!'oudhon 1 s letter to Herzen, July 9, 1854, in Pierre 
Joseph Proudhon, Cor~e~~on~anc~, ed. with a Foreword by J. A. 
Langlois (14 vols7;15aris: A. Lacroix et ce, 1875), VI, 39. 
l6Proudhon 1s letter to Herzen, July 23, 1855, in Proudhon 
Correspondance, VI, 219-22. Cf. also the excellent account of ~owing estrangement between Proudhon and Herzen due to their 
different approach to,,the Polish question in Ra~ul Labry, Herzen 
!t~oudho~ (Paris: .Edition Bosserd, 1928)._ . · 
,. 
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the number of independent nations and in the partition of Europe 
among two or three great powers. They would also impede the 
European socio-economic development and the final liberation of 
the oppressed classes. 17 
In view of such dangers Proudhon composed his book 
La Guerre et la Faix which he terminated in October, 1860e In 
this work he appealed to the European radicals to help def end the 
territorial_ sta.Es quo in Europe instead of agitating for its 
overthrow. In Proudhon's opinion the peace which had been 
promoted by the Vienna treaties had permitted Europe to enter a 
new era. The rapid progress in the economic sector and the 
increasing ?.den ti ty of laws and morals had already furthered the 
assimilation of the European nations. The preservation of peace 
would finally lead to the dissolution of the European states, 
the end of wars, and the liberation of the oppressed nations. 
According to Proudhon it would be criminal to interrupt 
this promising development by plunging Europe into a war for the 
resurrection of nationalities which had perished because they had 
been unable to compete with stronger and more progressive nations. 
Proudhon said that throughout history le droit de la force (the 
law of force) had governed the creation and survival of states 
17Proudhon's letter to Gouvernet, May 3, 1860, in 
Proudhon, Correspon~a~~' X, 47. 
~------------------·~-,--~--_....---.. ---·------
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and the conquest and assimilation of foreign nationalities. The 
use of force, which implied superiority, had furth0red "the 
progress of civilization" which would have stopped had the 
nationality principle been recognized in the past. 18 
On the basis of such considerations Proudhon became the 
most violent opponent of the restoration of Poland. He held 
that the partition of Poland was not a crime. Poland had "perish, ' 
through its own dissolution'' due to its unruly aristocracy and 
its absurd constitution. 19 Russia had vanquished the Poles 
because Russia was a stronger and better organized state. It 
would be foolish to plunge Europe into a vm.r for the liberation 
of the Poles because Russia was in the process of changes from 
which the Poles would profit. Proudhon advised the Polish people 
to wait for their liberation until the day when all the European 
--
:·. oppressive states would be overthrovm through the process of 
~ 
economic evolution and the assimilation of the European peoples. 
The emancipation of the serfs in the Russ:Lan Empire on 
March 3, 1861 strengthened Proudhon's 011posj_ tion to a war for the 
restoration of Poland.. He celebrated th:Ls event as the dawn of 
the socic:;.l revolution in Russia. Progress was on the side of 
- -
- l ff,p. - J h Pr lh L ~ J . . ierre osep ~ouc on, a_guerre e.~-=:!:..~~:1.x, in ~l!_vres completes, ed. with AnnotatTOns-ancfunpubj_Tsnea Documents 
Y cr.--13oug!e--et'H. Moysset, VII (2d ed.; Paris: Marcel Riviere, 
1927), 503. 
1 9!._b.i.£. .. ' p. 506. 
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nussia, not Poland. 20 Proudhon remained unperturbed by the 
Warsaw massacres of April 8, 1861. He was annoyed when Herzen 
became emotional over the shooting of the Polish demonstrators 
in Warsaw~ In a letter of April 21 Proudhon advised Herzen 
not to support the national aspirations of the Polish aristocracy. 
Rather, Herzen should help to prepare the Polish people 
for a more radical revolution which will bring about 
the disappearance of the great states and all the 
national distinctionso21 
Proudhon. complained that the European radicals, by defending the 
nationality principle, furthered the reactionary policies of 
Napoleon III who tried to "divert the social revolution" by 
sup1Jorting the liberation of people under foreign rule. 22 
__ In spite of Proudhon's entreaties Herzen continued to 
support the liberation of the Poles in the Polish Kingdom. On 
September 20, 1862 he published in KolokC21, a statement by the 
revolutionary Central National Committee in Warsaw on the aims of 
a Polish insurrection. The statement was intended to fight the 
- 2b 
- Proudhon, Q.orre_spo~~, X, 339. 
21 ~·, XI, 23-4. 
22Proudhon's opposition to the restoration of Poland 
called forth a violent reaction among the French democrats who 
maintaJ.ned that Proudhon was a reactionary and a Russian agent. 
But Proudhon stuck to his convictions. _ He wrote a "Polish 
biography" in order to inform his compatriots about their "stupid 
democracy" and the reality of French foreign policies. Cf. 
Proudhon's letter to Rolland, November 1, 1861, in Proudhon ~tr£::L2.E .... «2.;}:.to~en R?l~fl, ed. by Jacques Bompard (Paris: Grasset, 
1946), pp. 226-2z:--11ne 11Polish biography" was not published. The 
manuscrj.pt re111ained in the poscession of Proudhon's family. 
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rumor circulatfJd in Russian, French, and German newspapers that th 
polish szlachta prepared an insurrection which merely aimed at the 
restoration of the historical borders of the old Polish Republic. 
The Committee declared: "The main aim of a Polish uprising is the 
recognition of the peasant's right to self-government. 11 In a 
revolutionary Poland the peasants would become ovmers of the 
land in return for a monetary compensatfon to the former landovmers 
paid by the.government. Political equality would be granted to al 
social classes. The ne\7 Polish state would be composed of 11a 
nation of free and equal citizens." The Committee also referred 
to the territorial question. It demanded the restoration of a 
Polish state which would include IJithuania and Rus--Vfhite Russia 
and the :t.Jkraine"·- 11 free from the hegemony" of the Polish nation. 
The right of the Lithuanians, ·white Russians, and ill;.rainians to 
national self-determination i'Jas acknovrledged. The Committee was 
convinced that these nationalities would collaborate with the 
Poles in a people's insurrection and enter into a 11voluntary 
union" with the Poles. 23 
Compared to the Manifesto of the Polish Democratic 
Society of 1836, the revolutionary program of 1862 contained one 
new concession, the recognition of the right to national self-
determ:Lnation of the non-Polish nationalities who had been under 
Polish rule. However, the Polish democrats who acknowledged that 
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poland could no longer be restored as a centralized state ruled 
bY the Poles were a minority, and their influence in the Warsaw 
committee was fleeting. 
The insurrectional program ·of the Committee revealed 
that the Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration rested on 
weak foundations. Although Polish and Russian radicals aimed at 
the overthrow of the Tsarist government' and at political and 
social changes, the territorial question divided them. Both 
parties were willing to acknovrledge the right to. national self-
determination of the Ukrainians, \Thi te Russians, and Li thuan1.ans. 
But the Great Russians hoped that these nationalities would 
collaborate with Great Russia, while the Poles assumed that they 
would prefer to collaborate with Poland. From such contrary vieviS 
tensions were bound to develop. 24 Herzen tried to forestall them 
by emphasizing in Ko1oko1 that the common aim which united Polish 
and Russian radicals was the liberation of the peasants and the 
recognition of the right of each nationality to national self-
determination. 
The rapproch2~ between the Warsaw Committee and Herzen 
was strongly opposed by the Paris Central Committee under 
-ZL1.The -Polish democrat Boleslav Limanowski pointed out that 
the territorial question was an obstacle to a successful Polish-
Russian revoluti'onary collaboration. Limanowski, op. cit., p • . 323 .. 
The East German Marxist Felix Gentzen in his previously quoted 
wor~, Qr-o~~l} iIQ..__~~lar2.ufst~, omitted any reference to the 
nat:i..onali ty probTem in the former Polish Republic. Consequently, 
he underrated the obstacles in tho way of Polish-Russian revo-
lutionary collaboration at the time of the Polish uprising of 1863e 
r 
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Mieroslawski. In his organ Bacznosc he maintained that the 
Warsaw Committee had sold Lithuania and Rus to the "Muscovites." 
Be supported the restoration of Poland as a centralized nation 
state. He would not acknowledge the existence of a nationality 
problem in the old Polish Republic, and he insisted that the 
success of the Polish insurrection depended upon the proper 
solution of the peasant question.25 
Ruch, the organ of the Warsaw Committee, sharply 
-
criticized 11ieroslawski's agitation for a centralized Polish 
state. The Committee maintained that the people of Rus had been 
alienated from the Poles because the Polish Government had not 
fulfilled the stipulations of the treaty of Hadziach (1658) which 
granted equal rights to the people of Rus. White Russians and 
mcrainians would only collaborate with the Poles if liberty were 
granted to them. 
Territories and people are not held together by 
centralization and by force • • • but by liberty 
and individual rights for which our forefathers 
have given a solemn example in the Lublin Union and 
in the treaty of Hadziach • • • We desj_re a union 
based on equality, not on the oppressive domination 
of the Poles over fraternal peoples.2o 
On the first day of the Polish insurrection (January 22, 
1863), the Provisional National Government issued a Manifesto 
320. 
25Baczn~sC:, June 1, 1862, quoted in Limanov1Ski, o;p. cit., 
26Limanowski, ~it., pp. 325-26. 
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which promised liberty and equality to all the people who lived 
within the borders of the old Polish Republic. The peasants 
were to receive the land \7hich they had worked, and those rural 
v1orkers who would fight in the ranks Of the national army were 
to receive land from the national domain. 27 
In the beginning the insurrection was supported by the 
Russian organization Zemlya"i V~lY:..a· Revolutionary Russian 
officers, stationed in the Polish Kingdom, took part in the 
insurrection and tried to keep the Russian soldiers from fighting 
against the Polish insurgents. 28 Meanwhile, l1ieroslawski 
continued to oppose the collaboration with the Russian radicals 
and the right to national self-determination of the Lithuanians, 
White Russians, and Ukrainians. He had hoped to assume 
dictatorial powers and to lead the insurrection. But he gained 
no influence over it. Instead, after February 8, 1863 the 
conservatives (Whites) steadily increased their influence in the 
Provisional Government, until they controlled it in the summer 
of 1863. Their insurrectional propaganda concentrated on the 
demand for the borders of 1772. Because of the victory of the 
- . 
2
'l Stefan Kieniewicz, Wy~or tekst6w zrodlo\~{1ch z historii 
~lski w late.ch .1795-1864 ~'3elec ed documents on Hie History of 
o1anafrom 179;5'=f8'6~-1 ry (Warsaw: 1 956), p. 739, quoted in Gentz en, 
.21?• c~t., p. 285. 
28Jozef Kowalski, pie ru~sische revolu~ion~er~ Demokratie 
!!!ld der_J?olnische Aufstand (Beriin7Huetten & Loen:1ng, 195if J, · 
pp. 1'13"" f f • 
r 
281 
consorva ti ves the Russian revolutionary circles defj.ni tely lost 
interest in the Polish cause. 
The Polish democrats (Reds) had been unable to assert 
themselves against the conservatives because they were divided 
between a left and right \'Ting pursuing different aims. The defeat 
of the Polish insurrection which ended in April, 1864, has been 
attributed to this lack of unity. 29 There has been a tendency 
to understate the apathy of the peasants. Hovrnver, from the 
beginning the insurrection was not actively supported by the 
peasants of Galicia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine. The peasants 
did not believe in the promises of the revolutionary manifestoeso 
They feared that in case of a successful Polish insurrection, 
they might again loose the rights they had been granted in the 
Austrian and Russian Empires in previous years. The Ukrainian 
peasants in the Fastorn Ukraine actually fought tho Polish 
landowners who in turn appea1ed to the Russian authorities for 
help and received j.t .3° Herzen' s and Bakunin's assumption that 
popular feeling in the former Polish provinces did not favor the 
restoration of Poland was confirmed by the development of the 
insurrection. But their hope that the Polj.sh insurrection would 
the Russ:Lans into action was not fulfillcd.31 
-z9 · ·.·-
Ibi£.; p. 115 1 Cf. also Gentzen, OJ?.. cJ_i., p. 1L~2. 
30correspondance de Bakounine, p. 65. 
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Soon after the insurrection had started, Bakunin and 
Berzen recognized the futility of their hopes. In February, 1863 
Bakunin observed that the insurrection had strengthened Polish 
as well as Russian nationalist feelings.32 Some time later, when 
he accompanied a Polish liberatj_on expedition from Kiel (Northern 
Germany) to Haelsingborg (Sweden), the majority of the Poles 
resented his presence because he was a "moskal11 (Muscovite).33 
After his arrival in Stockholm the Polish leaders opposed his 
intention to participate actively in the insurrection in the 
Polish Kingdom or in Lithuania. 
In spite of the Russophobia of the Poles, Bakunin 
remained convinced that the cause of Polish independence was 
11 inseparable 11 from the emancipation of Russia.34 In a letter to 
Herzen of August 1, 1863 Bakunin insisted that it was necessary 
to support the Polish insurrection in order to weaken Russian 
imperialism. "I will rejoice over the destruction of the Empire 
from whatever side it may come. 1135 
However, as the weeks passed by, Herzen increasingly 
resented tho alliance with the Poles. He claimed that from the 
I beginning he had knovm that the alliance was doomed to perish 
.. 
i 
f' 32Bakunj~'s letter to He:czen from Kiel, February 2~., 
1863, in Corres_.£.opdan~e de_Bako~ine, p. 153. 
33.Q..orre§J?.opj.~g f?..aj:>:..0~1l1.tJ'.!.~, p. 165. 
34~., p. 166. 
35Ib:);£., p. 187. 
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because it had been a matter of convenience for the Poles, not 
of deep conviction. He reproached Bakunin for having drawn him 
into this affair against his better judgment. This had resulted 
in compromising himself and his newspaper Kolokol in Russian 
. . 1 36 progressJ_ ve circ_ es. 
In spite of Herzen's critique Bakunin remained convinced 
that they should continue to support the alliance and assume full 
responsibility for its outcome. Above all, they should fight 
Mieroslawski's propaganda against the "abstract and destructive 
tendencies of Kolol~ol and its impractical aims. 11 Bakunin held 
that the revolutionary program of Kolok9J:. vms far superior to that 
of MierosJ:awski because Kolokol supported the principle of self-
government and of free federation~37 Yet, towards the end of 
1863 Bakunin had also given up hope for the success of the Polish 
insurrection and Polish-Russian collaboration. By November he was 
on his way to Italy. 
Shortly before the Polish insurrection ended, the 
Tsarist government had issued a decree on March 2, 1864, which 
promulgated agrarian reforms in the Polish Kingdom. The peasants 
were liberated from all feudal obligations. All the land worked 
by the peasants, including the land which the aristocratic 
---..._._..~--.-~--
J .!.l1.£., Cf. also p. 1 91 • 
37 l..1?.1£.' p • 13Lh 
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landowners had appropriated to themselves since 181+6, became 
peasant property without compensation. Even the landless received 
land so that the entire peasant property in the Kingdom rose 30%~ 
The landowners were deprived of their judicial and police power. 
Through these agrarian reforms the government sought to weaken 
the aristocracy and the Roman Catholic Church. However, the 
aristocratic landowners retci.:Lned their immense estates and thereby 
a large measure of their influence. Thus, the agrarian reforms 
which had been the object of many Polish manifestoes were carried 
through by the Tsarist government, not by a Polish insurrectional 
force. 
Herzen welcomed the agrarian reforms. He became convinced 
that changes could only be brought about by collaborating with the 
established government. This exasperated Bakunin. To him it was 
utopian to believe that Alexander II would realize socialism. 
During a visit to London, when Bakunin met Marx :for the last time 
on November 3, 186L1-, he attributed the failure of the insurrection 
to the refusal of the Polish aristocrats to proclaim "peasant 
socialism. 11 He told Ma.rx that from now on "he would take part 
only in the socialist movement. 11 38 
The Polish quest:ion remained a controversial issue 
betvreen Ball.:unin and Herzen in the years following the ruthless 
-
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suppression of the Polish insurrection by the Russj_an government. 
The progressive Great Russian cj_rcles who had supported Kolokol 
in previous years had now turned against Herzen. They called 
him a traitor because he had collaborated with the Poles who 
aimed -at the partition of the Russian Empire. They accused him 
of being responsible for the insurrection~ Herzen tried to 
defend himself. He insisted that he had been against the 
insurrection, and that he had pleaded with the Poles not to 
disturb the liberal trend in Russia by a premature act. Vfl1en 
Herzen was unable to regain his former influence in Groat Russia, 
he became very bitter. He continued to blame Bakunin for his 
involvement in the Polish affair. Bakunin ridiculed Herzen's 
attempts to win back the confidence of the former Great Russian 
supporters. He kept his conviction that the Polish uprising 
against the des1)otic Tsarist government was justifiedo He 
accused Herzen of being as super-nationalist:Lc as the Great 
Russians who condemned the insurrection in the name of "the 
integr:Lty of the Empire." Thus, the Polish question ca.used an 
ever deepening estrangement between Bakunin and Herzen until 
Herzen's death in 1870.39 
......._.__"""""...,,.._...,.~,-
39cf. Correspondan~~~' pp. 219-20, 226, 257. 
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Marx's and Engols's Comments on the Polish Insurrection 
;....---"'I>'-- ,. ... ___ •• - • ----- ------------ .. 
Unlike Herzen and Bakunin, Y.iarx and Engels had not 
established a close contact with the Polish radicals before the 
insurrection, and during the insurrection they refrained from 
public statements j_n favor of Polish liberation. They preferred 
to exchange their vievrn on the development of the insurrection 
in their letters. 
When the Polish insurrection broke out, Marx and Engels 
hoped that it might lead to a European revolution. Vlarx greeted 
the insurrection as the beginning of a new "era of revolution 
in Europe," but the ebullient enthusinsm of 184-8 had vanished. 
In a letter to Engels of lt,ebruary 13, 1863 Marx stated: 
The comfortable illusions and almost childish 
enthusiasm with which we greeted the revolutionary 
era before February, 1848 went to the devil ••• 
~roday vre know what part stupidity plays in revolutions, 
and how the latter are exploited by scoundrels.40 
Marx and Engels follorrnd with great interest the policies 
of the European eovernments towards the Polish insurgents, 
particule.rly of the Prussian government, then under the premiership 
of Otto von Bismarck since 1862. On February 8, 1863 the 
Pruss:i.an government concluded a military convention with Hussia 
which was directed against the Polish insurrectiono Bismarck was 
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determined to prevent the encirclement of Prussia and Germany 
through a Franco-Russian alliance. As the Prussian ambassador 
to St. Petersburg (1859-62) Bismarck had become concerned with 
the pro-Polish policies of Alexander II. After his accession 
to the throne (1855) Alexander II had appointed the Polish 
Margrave Alexander Wielopolski, who was a Germanophobe, as the 
head of the entire civil administration in the Polish Kingdom. 
Bismarck feared that the pro-Polish policy of the Russian 
government might lead to a Franco-Russian understanding which 
was favored by Prince Alexander Gorchakov, the Russian foreign 
m:Ln:Lster. The Polish insurrection of 1863 offered Bismarck the 
chance to prevent such a development as vrell as a European 
conflict which might have resulted from it.41 
In 1863 Bismarck \'las as much against a restoration of 
Poland e.s he had been at the time of the Crimean Viar. Re had 
remained convinced that the restoration of Poland would not agree 
with the vital interests of Prussia.42 In his statements on 
the Polish question of 1863 he maintained that a restored Poland 
was more dangerous to Prussia than the Russian Empire. An 
. ·~41\vern~; Frauendienst, "Prussian Ci vie Consciousness and 
Polish NaU.onalism, 11 in ]':~§.~52!'n G~l?.;n~p. Handbook, ed. by the 
Research Cammi ttee, Goettingen-rGermany) (2 vols.; Wuerz burg: 
Holzner Verlag, 1963), II, 197-98. . 
42cf. Bismarck, Die Gesammel ten \'leF,]E .. 0:_, IV, 63 ff., 
101 ff c; XIV, 752 •... k --·· • -· ----
288 
independent Poland would become "a French encampment on the 
Vistula." Prussia would be faced with the threat of a Franco-
Polish encirclement. Bismarck warned the British and French 
diplomats that Prussia would not tolerate an independent Poland. 
When the Polish insurrection was debated in the Prussian House 
of Representatives, Bismarck declared on February 18, 1863: 
I admit that Russia does not make Prussian policy; 
it has not been called to do so ••• But I ask 
whether an inder)endent Poland which claims the 
territory of Danzig would make Prussian policy. 
Apart from such considerations, Bismarck favored the suppression 
of the Polish insurrection by the Russians because he feared that 
the insurrection might develop into a 1u.ropean revolution against 
the established governments. 
· 11arx and E':ngels condemned Bismarck's policy which 
supported the maintenance of the :S~f!.tUs__g..£2. in the Polish 
Kingdom. They were exasperated that Bismarck was against tho 
Pol:Lnh insurrection although it was directed against Russian ruleo 
In thGir eyes this proved that Bismarck was the handyman of 
Russia. He continued the traditional Hohenzollern policy which 
had subjected Germany to Russian hegemony in order to preserve 
the integrity of the Prussian state. The Russo-Prussian military 
convont:Lon confirmed that P-.cussia remained an obstacle to the 
Unification of Germany. 
' 
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The Prussian liberals supported Bismarck's anti-Polish 
policies.· On February 27, 1863 Baron Georg von Vincke stated in 
the House of Representatives that only a partitioned Poland 
guaranteed the existence of the Prussian state. On Vi.arch 24, 1863 
Marx commented in a letter to Engels: 
Indeed, Vincke and Bismarck have correctly interpreted 
the Prussian political principle according to which the 
Prussian state ••• cannot exist without present-day 
Russia nor at the side of an independent Poland. The 
whole Prussian history leads to this conclusion • • • 
Since Poland is nec~ssary for Germany, but cannot 
coexist with a Prussian state, this state has. to be 
eliminated. The Polish question is only a new proof 
that it is impossible to assert German interests as 
long as the Hohenzollern stat~ exists. Down with the 
Russian hegemony in Germany.43 
Marx and Engels hoped that German-Polish collaboration would soon 
[ replace ~he Prusso-Russian one. This would also eliminate the 
I danger of a Polish-French or Polish-Russian collaboration which 
t 
t 
l 
i 
Marx and Engels feared as much as Bismarck. 
From the outset of the Polish insurrection both the 
conservative Czartoryski camp in Paris, which worked closely 
together with the French government, and the democratic 
Mieros::tawski camp had expected French intervention on behalf of the 
Polish insurgents.44 In their letters Marx and Engels sharply 
43~1EGA, III/3, 132. 
44since the fifties Mieros3'.awski had urged the French to 
collaborate with the Poles for tho restoration of Poland. In 1856 
he warned the French that Germany was too weak to protect France 
from the Russian danger. Only a restored Polanq would guarantee 
Peace t~ France. Louis Mieroslawski, De f.a p,e,tiop._ali_t_{ J?Olonaise 
~ng~SJ.1',ili bre ~ (Paris : I. 'Chamerot, 1 '83bT, p. ;i6. 
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criticized the policies of the Polish democrats. As did the 
polish conservatives, the democrats supported Napoleon III in the 
hope that he would help liberate the Poles. According to Marx 
and bngels this policy actually contributed to weaken the Polish 
insurrection. They were convinced that Napoleon had smuggled 
followers of P-.cince Adam Czartoryski into the revolutionary 
government in Vlarsaw in order to overthrow it, and that 
Palmerston supported the intentions of Napoleon.45 
:Marx and Engels believed that the willingness of the 
Poles to collaborate with Napoleon III endangered Germany more 
directly than did the Polish insurrection. They feared that 
Napoleon might use the Po1ish insurrection to strengthen hts 
position in France through a war against Germany. In a letter 
to Engels of February 21, 1863 Marx wrote: 
Wbat I fear most in the Polish affair is that the 
Sau-BonaT)arte (pig~Bonaparte) will find a pretext to 
acfvan'c"elo .... -:Ene m1ine and thus be enabled to piss on 
the dreadful situation.46 
Many months later, on January 3, 186Li-, Engels still complained to 
M:u·x about the "Plon-Plonism" (a term used by Marx and Engels to 
describe the enthusiasm for Napoleon III) of the Poles and the 
Hunge.rJans. Ho remarked that these people could only be cured 
from their Francophile attitude if a revolution broke out in 
---~Cf.hYia:cx's letters to Ene;els, July 6 and August 15, 
1863, in ~' III/3, 1L~8-L~9, 153. 
46!.t@, III/3, 131. 
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Berlin and Vienna, and if the German revolutionary governments 
made "sufficient concessions" to Poland and Hungary. However, 
Engels conoidered it to be more likely that the Polish 
insurrection would bring about the restoration of the Holy 
Alliance for the preservation of the partition of Poland. This 
would correspond to the highest expectations of Napoleon. 
Could he [Napoleon] desire more thari the restoration 
of the Holy Alliance and a war both for the Rhine 
and Poland supported by England, Italy, and all the 
small European stat.es?l+7 
Such a development would endanger Germany. Although :Marx and 
Engels did not approve of Bisme.rck's policies, they shared his 
apprehension that the crisis of 1863 might lead to an encirclement 
of Germany. 
·-:Marx and E'ngels were much less worried about Kolokol' s 
~ · propaganda for Polish-Russian revolutionary collaboration. 
l" wondered whether Herzen and fukunin would actually support 
' 
They 
the 
~ 
' 
i 
liberation of the Polish Kingdom from Russian rule. Soon after 
the outbreak of the Polish insurrection Marx asked Engels, who 
understood Russian, "to watch Kolokol." He added: "Herzen and 
Co. have now the opportunity to prove their revolutionary honesty, 
at lea.st as far as it is compatible with their Slavic 
predilections. 111i-8 A few days later Engels reported about the 
lII/3, 
47Ibid., p. 163. 
48Narx's letter to Engels, February 13., 1863, in MEGA, 
127. 
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violent controversy which had erupted between Bakunin and 
Mieroslawski regarding the territorial extension of a restored 
Poland. He told Marx that he had subscribed to Kolokol in order 
to hear more about it. Marx and Engels must have relished this 
contr_oversy which revealed that the Polish-Russian collaboration, 
which they had opposed for years, was built on unsafe grounds. 
They must also have ·welcomed the Russophobia of Mieroslawski. The 
Polish Colqnel Teofil !.apirtski, whom Bakunin found unbearable 
because of his violent· anti-Russian feelings, wa_s quite 
acceptable to Marx. !iapinski hated the Russians not only because 
they oppressed the Poles but because in his opinion they were not 
Slavs. He.objected to Polish-Russian collaboration and 
supported the restoration of Poland under the rule of the Poles. 
In a letter of September 12, 1863 to Eng&, Marx commented 
approvingly: "Instead of the struggle of nationalities the 
latter [Lapinski] only acknowledges the struggles of races. 11 49 
Two years later, in 1865, when Marx read the book by the 
,, 
Frenchman Elias Regnault La guel§.tion europe~nne faussement 
n.omm~f2_, "l§l __ questij:m polonai~~' '·' published in 1863, he understood 
that !,apinski had been influenced by the Pole Franciszek 
Duchinsk..i.. Since the 1850' s this Polish nationalist used a racial 
theory in support of the restoration of Poland. He maintained 
49Ibid., p. 155. 
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tllat the 11Muscovites 11 (Great Russians) belonged to the Turanian 
or Mongolian race as did the Turks, Jews, and Chinese, while the 
Slavs v10re Indoeuropeans like the L'.1tin and Germanic people, 
that is, members of the Aryan race.· According to Duchinski tho 
.Aryan$ were creative, attached to the soil, and had formulated 
the concept of prj_vate property. The Turanian race, instead, was 
servile, preferred the nomadic life, uniformity, and business 
activities •. It was an inferior race. 
/ On the basis of this racial theory Duchinski claimed that 
the eastern Polish borders of 1772 along the Dvina and the Dnieper 
rivers marked the natural borders of the European and Slavic 
world and the beginning of Asia. A restored Poland would become 
the easternmost out1)ost of Europe against the barbaric world. 
~chifiski rejected the right to national self-determination of 
the V/hite Russians, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians. He claimed that 
these nationalities had been Polonized. Therefore, Polish rule 
over them was justified.50 
Marx welcomed Duchinski's racial theory as an excellent 
means to fight the Russians and Polish-Russian collaborationo He 
wished "that Duchinski was right, and that his theory would 
- ·~--~'- )o'/ - - ---
Elias Regnault, an OpJlOnent of Proudhon, used 
Duchinski' s racial theory in defense of his view· that the Great 
Russ:Lans should be excluded from a future reorganization of 
Europe o In 1864 Duchj_nski agitated for tho restoration of Poland 
as an outpost against the Asiatic world in his book PeUJ?l..~.e- arJ.Y.§lS 
~7~~£ll~1-!'.:6~..§! f).L.!1..£121:.?.:..q~ (Paris: F. Klinc:ksJ.ecK, 
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prevail among the Slavs." This would certainly 11cause a dreadful 
end to Pan-Slavism. 11 51 
Although Harx and Engels were not in favor of Polish-
Russian collaboration, yet, at the outset of the Polish 
insurrection they hoped that the latter would develop into an 
uprising of the peasants in the whole Russian Empire. During 
the second months of the insurrection Marx and Engels began to 
have misgivings as to its outcome because a vigorous peasant 
movement did not mater{alize in the Polish Kingdom. However, 
Engels still clung to the hope that the insurrection in the 
Kingdom might be strengthened by a peasant uprising in Lithuania{2 
But, early ~n June, Marx and Engels became convinced that the 
insurrection lacked vitality because neither in the Polish 
L Kingdom nor in Lithuania nor in the Ukraine was it supported by ~. . 
~ . 
! 
f 
i 
I; 
the peasants. Marx was surprised that even the Great Russian 
peasants had remained apathetic.53 But until the disastrous end 
of the Polish insurrection Marx and Engels continued to hope that 
it might still be saved by a European revolutionary movement which 
this time might start in Berlin, rather than in Paris. 
~l~, III/3, 276. 
p. 135. 
52Engels 1 s letter to Marx, April 8, 1863, ~' III/3, 
53Marx's letter to E-11gels, -June 10, 1863, ~' III/3, 
Pp. 143 .. 44. 
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It seems that initially Marx and Engels intended to 
conduct an active propaganda for the liberation of the Poles. 
In a letter to Engels of February 20, 1863 Marx proposed to support 
the Polish insurrection with a proclamation and a pamphlet on the 
Polish situation. Engels was enthusiastic about this idea. He 
suggested that the pamphlet should be entitled Deutschland und 
Polen. Poli tisch-mili taerische Betrachttu_lgen bei Sielegenhei t d~ 
I.o.lnischen Aufstandes von 18§}. The pamphlet was to cover the 
following problems: Russia's military position in relation to 
Western and Southeastern Europe before and after the three 
partitions of Poland, as well as after 181li-; the position of Russia 
and Germany. after a restoration of Poland, including some state-
ments on_ "Prussian Poland, linguistic borders, and statistical 
data on its population. 1154 From these scanty remarks it may be 
derived that Engels proposed the same kind of propaganda which 
Marx had employed in his pamphlet Herr Vo_gl. Therein, Marx had 
emphasized the Russian military threat to Europe and Germany 
through the destruction of Poland, but he did not support the 
surrender of Prussian Poland to the Poles. 
As mentioned earlier, in the course of 1863 Marx 
composed a group of manuscripts on ?olen, Preussen und Russland, 
Which remained unfinished and unpublished at the time. In these 
52tMEGA III/3 130-31. 
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raanuscripts he concentrated on the condemnation of Prussia's 
collaboration with Russia as an immense obstacle to any political 
or social changes in Germany and Poland. The restoration of 
Poland would push Russia out of Europe, reduce it to the "level 
of an ·Asiatic power," and depose it from its "candidature to 
world power. 11 55 Deprived of its Russian support, the Prussian 
state would be ruined. It would become a mere German province 
in a united Germany. Then, Germany would be liberated from the 
"'11artar yoke of the Muscovites" wh:Lch had been consolidated 
through the Polish partition of 17950 
As in his pamphlet against Karl Vogt, Marx warned that 
the complete incorporation of the Polish Kingdom into Russia 
would pe:cmi t tho Tsarist government to unite all the Slavs under 
its rule and deprive Germany of tho Polish barrier against the 
"Slavic deluge. 11 Marx declared: "For Ge1~many all the foreign 
poJ5tica1 questions are included :in one single problem: the 
restoratton of Poland. 1156 This would be the major aim of 
revolutionary Germany. Marx refra:i.ned from making any definite 
statements on the territorial extension of a restored Poland., 
However, he expressed his concern for the safety of the eastern 
German border as he had done :previously. This indicated that 
....._.______.,_---~.:.-
5511arx, .P~~lnJ.ss;_l}e .. fi£..~~' p. 93. 
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revolutionary Germany would not promote the surrender of the 
Grand Duchy of Poznania and West Prussia to the Poles. From a 
Russian outpost agaj_nst Germ.any, Poland was merely to be changed 
into a German outpost against Russia. 
The question arises why did Marx not try to finish 
his manuscripts for publication. Obviously, Marx andEngels were 
hes:i.tant about getting involved in the Polish affair when the 
insurrection did not promise to develop into a European 
revolutionary movement in \Vhich Germany participated. \'/hen in 
the spring of 1863 the German Workingmen's Association issued a 
proclamation in support of a collection for the Polish 
insurrection, Marx's name was not mentioned although the 
proclama~ion betrayed h:Ls authorship. The proclamation stated 
that the restoration of Poland, v1hich was necessary for Germany, 
depended upon the support of the working classes because the 
bourgeoisie collaborated with Russj_a. The German workers were 
urged to hold mass meetings and agitate for the liberation of 
the Poles. 
While Harx and Engels avoided public statements in 
support of the Polish insurrection, although they hoped that it 
would cause a European conflagration, Proudhon became actively 
involved in the agitation against the Pol:Lsh fight for liberty. 
When the Polish insurrection broke out, he was convinced that this 
Was a· foolish undertaking. In 186Lt he published a pamphlet, 
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§.L.l_e~LlJ&te:s .cl~,, 1815_~l}t C..£§~§_9:~.f2Sist_e~, in which he 
condemned the Polish insurgents for their attempt to overthrow 
the stipulations of the Vienna treaties. 
There is something • • • exorbi{;ant in this sacrifice 
of the interests of a whole continent to the 
satisfaction of one nationality which has been 
abolished for more than a century.57 
Proudhon repeated that European progress could only be safeguarded 
through the maintenance of the sta~,tld:;s. gug_o He appealed to the 
Polish insurgents to lay down their arms, and he urged the 
European radicals not to support the Polish insurrection and to 
prevent a European war. 
Proudhon insisted that the ~_lacll!.§... would not bring about 
any changes in Poland. They had no political sense. They had not 
even talrnn advantage of the constitution granted to the Polish 
Kingdom by Alexm1der I in 1815 in order to promulgate the 
necessary agrarian reforms. Thereby, the ~.l§..2!rt§i:. might have 
promoted the modernization of the Russian Empire.58 Instead, 
the aristocracy permitted Russj_a to take the :Lni tiative in the 
liberation of the peasants. Proudhon said that this deprived the 
Polish e.ristocrats of their tradit:i.onal argument that the Tsarist 
government had prevented them from freeine the peasants. 
-·--;?l}")j_~;;-;-Proudhon, §J:.J:f.~t£§..Uis !l~e. 181_.2_;:int .. cesse 
~e~~bste~ (Paris: E. Dentu, li:i.nraJ.re-Tiditeur, IB6L1.T,P- 65. 
581!?..=h.1., p. 90. 
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Proudhon also repeated his warnings against the 
"monstrous" wholesale condemnation of the Russian people. He 
argued that the Russians were actually superior to the Poles 
because of their political qualifications. It was criminal 
to present the restoration of Poland as the salvation of Europe 
from Muscovite barbarism. Proudhon regarded the racial theory 
of Franciszek Duchinski, Vlhich denied the Russians the right 
to belong to the civilized world, as one of the vilest examples 
of anti-Russian propaganda. In Proudhon's opinion Duchinski's 
contention that the natural borders of the Polish nationality 
extended to the Dvina and Dnieper ·was absurd. "The Lithuanians 
are not Poles, and the inhabitants of Fast Prussia and of 
the Grand Duchy of Posen, partly German or Germanized, cannot 
become Polish again. 1159 
According to Proudhon the essence of the Polish question 
was the desire of the Poles to replace the Russian hegemony in 
}astern Europe with their own. However, this would hinder the 
development of the Polish people and European revolutionary 
progress because a restored Poland would become the supporter of 
the reactionary forces to an even greater degree than Russia. 
Europe would best be protected by Russian progress in civilization 
and the liberation of the peasants. 
-------~-3~9~1-b-.-d----- 0 6 
--2:_., p. ;/ • 
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Proudhon's condemnation of the Polish insurrection called 
forth a strong reaction in France. The critique of Proudhon was 
summed up by the Frenchman Constant·Portelette in 1864. He 
accused Proudhon of being deaf to human suffering. The Poles 
had a right to fight for their liberty, even if this endangered 
the p0ace of Europe. At times, it was necessary to sacrifice 
peace in order "to save liberty." It was immoral to sacrifice 
the Poles to some uncertain higher goal--disarmament and universal 
peace: 
Yes, war is terrible; but if we have to do our duty, 
we have to defend the oppressed people,. and we should 
not speak of the monstrosities of war.oO 
MaTx and Engels did not refer to Proudhon's anti-Polish 
propaganda in their correspondence. Yet, it is hardly possible 
that they remained unaware of the controversy between Proudhon 
and the French republicans. Not only were there differences in 
the political outlook of the tvTO friends and that of Proudhon, 
but also striking similarities. Vf.aile Marx and Engels believed 
that the victory of socialism depended upon a European 
conflagration, Proudhon supported the status_guo in Europe because 
he was convinced that socialism would be the result of a 
:peaceful evolution. Therefore, he was opposed to a war against 
Russia. This would not further progress. After all, the approach 
- 60 Co1?-s tan t Porte 1 et t e J. La .. Po }-~f?:-n_e_e_,t_1_8_1~2...-.·~--R_e ..... p_o_n_9_e_a_M ~ 
.!1:.2ydhop (Paris: E. Dentu, 18b4J, p. ~?. . 
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of both Harx and Engels and Proudhon to the Eastern ~uropean 
problem was dictated by their interest in the victory of 
socialism. This hindered a realistic approach to the Russian 
problem and consequently to the Polish problem. Certainly 
Proudhon's approach to Russia was more superficial than that of 
Marx and Engels. Russia's foreign political aspirations, which 
were strongly criticized by Marx and Engels, apparently did not 
concern him. He did not perceive, as Marx did, the bitter irony 
that the Russian government, while it favored the liberation of 
the Slavs under foreign rule, simultaneously oppressed the 
national minorities in the Russian Empire. 61 
In spite of their different views on the Polish 
insurrection Marx and Engels and Proudhon shared the same 
approach to the nationality principle. Both parties were 
convinced that the higher developed nation had the right to 
absorb the less advanced people. In their opinion the emphasis 
on national liberation distracted from the real problem of the 
age--the reorganization of the socio-economic order. The victory 
of socialism would ultimately solve the problem of national 
oppression. 62 Yet, Marx and Engels continued to favor the Polish 
6 l Cf. l"r~ H V t 90 · rx, err og , p. • 
62such similarities were overlooked by the socialist 
V. JJevynskyj. He maintained that while Marx and Engels vlished for 
the assimilation of the non-historic nations Proudhon desired 
their independent development. He referred to Proudhon's theory 
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opposition to Russian rule as a means to weaken Tsarist Russia 
a.nd to bring about tho European revolution. Proudhon, on the 
other hand, rejected the exploitation of national aspirations for 
the purpose of furthering the reorganization of the ~uropean 
socio~·economic order convinced that wars would only prevent it. 
Proudhon died early in 1865. But his ideas exercised a strong 
influence on the formulation of a foreign policy in the First 
International \'lorkint:,Pmen' s Association. 
OTTCcTera'.liSmV/fiich Proudhon had elaborated on in his book, 
Du • • n/1/ t"" +. d ] / •t/ d t"t 1 '• ~£J.ncJ_.:eQ..2..<2.S era 1.r_ o" _2~..9S:.2.§SJ_ 9 .e re9_op.:s 1 ue.£._~~Sh 
de 1a-revo1ut:Lol1Tf8b3;:- According -ro-:Levynskyj the theory of 
federalism g1.i.a.ranteed not only to each individual bu.t also to each 
collective unit, consequently to a nation, "full material and 
spir:Ltual devolopment. 11 After the destruction of the capitalist 
system it would be possible to realize the federalist system by 
conclucUng bilatera1 contracts which would preserve the liberty, 
sovereignty, and initiative of each partner. V. Levynskyj, 
~~~;Ls.t;y_c~J'.lGGl:}l?~l.£.3:., pp. 35 ff. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE QUESTION OF A FOREIGN POLICY 
IN THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL 
~I1L~ Fip;_~t .. fo_r an Ag_g:r_e..§>~=hY.£ Forej:.gn Pplic;y_ 
The end of the ill·-fated Polish insurrection marked the 
definite termination of the period ·when the European Left 
unanimously agitated for the restoration of Poland. After 186~. 
Proudhon's opinion that sympathy for the Polish people must not be 
combined vrlth an agitation for the j_mmediate rostoration of Poland 
vra.s widely adopted in French and Belgian socialist circles. This 
had an impact upon the First International Workingmen's 
Association vrh.ich was founded on September 28, 1864 in London 
to promote the collaboration of the European workers against the 
established governments. The Pob.sh question stood at the 
cradle of the F'irst International. This national question 
developed into ono of the most controversial j.e>sues in the 
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International and contributed to an increase of the internal 
tensions in the organization which led to its early dissolution 
in 1872. 1 
The initiative for the founding of an international 
socialist organization came from the leaders of the English trade 
unions, among them George Odger and Vlilliam Cremer. When the 
English government would not grant military aid to the Polish 
insurgents, the English labor leaders organized mass meetings in 
favor of the Polish cause. Late in 1863 they p~oposed to the 
Parisian workers to address a common petition to the English and 
French governments for the recognition of Poland as a belligerent 
povrnr in its fight against Russia. They also suggested a 
permanent collaboration between the European workers. The 
fraternization of the people was necessary "to check the existing 
abuse of power • • • and to discuss the great questions on 
which the peace of the nations depends. 112 
The Polish insurrection was over before any definite 
action in its support had been taken. But the insurrection 
. For general information on the First International see 
Julius Braunthal, Geschichte der Intern?-tionale (Hannover: 
J. H. W. Dietz Nacfi~, GmbH, 1961), pp. ~
2The appeal was published in the English newspaper 
Bee-Hive, December 5, 1863, quoted in Archives Bakounine - Bakunin 
Archiv, edo by A. Lehning, A. J. C. Rueter, P. Scheibert under 
the auspices of the International Institut voor Socia.le 
l
l --G-e~s._c_h_i_e_d_e_n_i_s_,_Am_s .... terdarn (2 vols.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961-65), II, 383. 
r 
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had contributed to the birth of the First International 
Workingmen' s Association at the historical meeting at St. Jl1artin' s 
Hall in London on September 28, 1864. The meeting was mostly 
attended by Western Europeans. The Poles were the only 
repre?entatives of the Slavs. Marx was also present, but did 
not speak. He and his friend George Eccarius were elected as 
German representatives to the Central Provisional Committee 
(roplaced in 1866 by the General Council as the head of the new 
association) in which Harx soon gained great influence.3 In the 
following years Marx attempted to extend his control over the 
different sections of the International against the opposition 
of the followers of Proudhon and after 1868 against that of 
Bakunin. 
The Inaugural Address which Marx composed at the 
---""~--... -
invitation of the sub-committee (appointed by the Central 
Committee to draw up a programme and statutes) in the autumn of 
18611. was moderate e It was a clever combination of his own views 
with insignificant concessions to his opponents. The Address 
appealed to the workers to fight for their liberation through 
-----3".-T-1h-·e· German work:Lngrnen' s movement was not represented in 
the International in the first years of its existence. Lassalle 
who in 1863 had founded tho first German workingmen's party 
.:SJ1.gef!l.§.=!-ner ~Dn~utscg_§£. Arbei terve~ei.E_ had been killed in. a duel on 
August 31"";1861j~1orfryDefore tho meeting at Sto Martin's Hall. 
His successor in the presidency became J·. B. von Schweitzer, but 
under him the Arbeiterverein did not join the International. It 
Was not until 1868, when the German Social Democratic Party was 
founded 1 that the Germans entered the International. 
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"the conquest of political power" in each country and to formulate 
a common foreign policy which v1ould counteract the exploitation 
of national prejudices by the governments. The .Address maintained 
-~-~ 
that the workers would deal with a reactionary country like 
Russia more efficiently than the European ruling classes who with 
idiotic indifference • • • have witnessed • • • 
heroic Poland being assassinated by Russia [and] tho 
immense and unresisted encrochments of that barbarous 
power, whose head is at St. Petersburg and whose hands 
are in every cabinet of Europe. 
It was the duty of the workers 
to vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, 
which ought to govern the relations of private 
individuals, as the rules paramount of the inter•a 
course of nations.4 
When :Marx composed the f:r:.'..2.!.=h.~Jo~J:~_By.les of the 
International, he had to insert into the Pr..£_e.rr:..~ another 
reference to ntruth, justice, and morality" as the basis of 
personal and international relations at the request of the sub-
committee. 5 In a letter to Engels of November Li-, 1864 Marx 
remarked that be had put these words in such a manner "that they 
cannot do any harm. 116 He VJas determined to keep the nationality 
4D--;cuments of the International The General Council of 
1Qe _First Tnternaf:LoiLir;:.lF6'4-f8'6b.--H~es:J'., ·:--c17oncfon"!-La\vrence 
& TJ:G,=nar-r-;-110c.fa:E'"€t)~-21fo. --------·-
5Ibid., · p. 289. 
6~.A, III/3, 198. 
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problem out of the foreign policy of the Internationale He 
told Engels: 
As far as the question of international politics in 
the Address of the working classes is mentioned, I 
do speak o1 countries, not of riationalitiQs, and I 
denounce Russia, not the minores gentium.r 
Marx wished to give an anti-Russian slant to the foreign policy of 
the International. All of socialist-minded Western Europe was to 
be aligned against Russia. The anti-Russian slant of the Address 
was not mitigated by a.declaration for a collaboration with the 
progressive Russians. Even in 1864, when an agrarian socialist 
movement existed in Russia, Marx would not officially acknowledge 
any changes in the Russian Empire and remained reluctant to 
differentiate between the government and the people. 
As in 181+8, Marx considered the war against Russia a 
"part of the general fight for the emancipation of the working 
classes.'' He insisted that the liberation of Poland should be 
included in the program of the International. Due to his 
instigation the following resolution was adopted by the Central 
Committee on November 25, 18640 
(1) That the Polish war of independence was conducted 
in the general interest of the people of Europe, and 
that by its defeat the cause of civilization and 
human progress suffered a severe shock. (2) That 
Poland has an unimpeachable claim upon the leading 
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nations of Europe that they contribute in every 
possible way8towards the restoration of its national sovereignty. 
:Marx used the Polish question not only to strengthen the 
anti~Russian front in the International but also to diminish the 
French influence. Many of the English intellectuals who favored 
the International, among them Prof. Edward Beesley, who had 
presided over the meeting at St. Martin's Hall, had great 
sympa.thies for France, its revolutionary tradition, its foreign 
policy, and even for Napoleon III. When Peter Fox, Beesley's 
friend, wrote a Polish address at the invitation of the sub-
committee, he stated that French foreign policy had traditionally 
favored the Polish cause. Marx suspected Fox of having tried 
"to present the Anglo-French alliance, under a democratic form, 
as the nucleus of the International."9 In a letter of December 10, 
1864 he informed Engels that in the sub-committee he had strongly 
criticized Fox's exaggerations of French pro-Polish foreign 
policies. In order to undermine Fox's pro-French position, Marx 
had "listed the irrefutable historical facts regarding the 
continuous betrayal of the Poles by the French from the time of 
Louis XV until Bonaparte III. 1110 Marx's objections to the address 
---~n schriftlichen Protokollen des Zentralrats, 11 
quoted in Rjasanoff, "Polenfrage," p. 192. 
9MEGA, III/3, 21 l+. 
1 o.l£.:L1. 
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by Fox vvere accepted by the sub-committee, and Fox was invited 
to change the address. 
The controversy with Fox induced Marx to vrrite the 
earlier mentioned pamphlet on Polen t!i1d Frankreich which remained 
unpub~ished at the time. In this pamphlet Marx maintained that 
France had never seriously supported the liberation of Poland 
because j_ t needed the support of Russia in order to keep Germany 
disunited. He sc..id that no changes of the traditional French 
policy could be expected from Napoleon I!I who was "on the throne 
by Russian permission," and who desired to partition Germany. 
"With the approval of the Tsar, Louis Bonaparte would, if necess:;i:ey~ 
incorporate the Rhine province into France, dismember Germany in 
the interest of Poland, and compensate the Tsar with the 
incorporation of Prussian Poland into Russia. 1111 According to 
Marx the foreign policy of Louis Napoleon III was the climax of 
]'rench anti-European policj~es, that is, pro-Russian, anti-German, 
and anti-Polish policies. The Poles could not expect any help 
from France against Russia. Only revolutionary Germany would 
guarantee the liberation of Poland. 
The first clash between the members of the International 
over the question of Polish restoration occurred at the London 
1 i . ----:--· 
Marx, Die poln:i~§~_F'r;3_g§_, p. 1 95. 
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Conference late in September, 1865. 12 The preliminary program 
for _the first general congress of the International, to be held 
in 1866, had been elaborated by th~ sub-committee in the 
preceding months. It was amended and approved by the Central 
Committee on July 25, 1865. Point 9 of the program, for which 
Marx was largely responsible, read: 
The Muscovite invasion of Europe and the re-
establishment of an independent and integral Poland. 13 
When the program was submitted to the delegates at the London 
Conference, a heated debate developed over point 9 during the 
session of September 27, 1865. 14 
- - -
17originaily it had been planned to hold the first generaJ 
congress of the International in Brussels in the summer of 1865. 
Against _the opposition of the Parisians and the Swiss, Marx was 
able "to transform the public congress, to be held in Brussels, 
into a preliminary private conference in London." Cf .. Marx's 
letter to Engels of July 31, 1865 in Der Briefwechsel zwischen !'rJcdri£.h__~@l~und Karl Marx 1 BL:-4 bisF i B8~, ed. by August' Bebel 
and Eduard Berns:Eein L~ vo s.; Stu tgart: J. H. \'I. Dietz Nachf., 
GmbH, 1919), I, 213. The London conference was attended by a 
limited number of delegates from England, France, Belgium, and 
Switzerland, by tvlO German delegates of the German Workers 
Educational League in IJondon, by Narx and Hermann Jung as 
corresponding secretaries for Germany and Switzerland respectivel~ 
and by George Eccarius as vice-president of the Central Committee. 
13 11Report of the sub-committee, 11 July 25, 1865, in 
~nts of_the International, I, 117. 
14rn order to reconstruct the controversy regarding 
point 9, the following three reports which vary in tone and 
completeness were used: "Extract from the Minutes of the London 
Conference:1 (session of September 27, 1865) and "Extract from the 
Report on the London Conference," J?Ublished in the English radical 
newspaner, The Workman's Advocate (London), on September 30, 1865, 
in Document801':111_F1.!i~.er,i].I§-~, I, 246·-47, (Cf. also Archives 
! 
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Point 9 aimed at an aggressive anti-Russian policy, 
that is, 'the restoration of Poland through the destruction of the 
Russian Empire. Although the delegates agreed that the Polish 
·people should be free, they did not unanimously support a war 
against Russia for the liberation of Poland. In general those 
delegates who supported point 9, mostly Englishmen and Germans, 
held that Russia must be destroyed because it was the most 
dangerous threat to European progress. The opponents of point 9, 
foremost among them the French and the Belgian d.elegates, felt 
that it was unjust to single out Russian despotism as the main 
danger to European progress because the Western European govern-
ments were-no less despotic. It was argued that if the Poles had 
to be f;reed from Russian oppression, then the Irish who suffered 
under English rule should also be liberated. 
Several propositions were submitted regarding the 
definite formulation of point 9. The fOQrth proposition by the 
Pole Konstantin Bobczynski was thus worded: 15 
139,kounine, II, ~2"7-29), and the most complete report by Pierre 
V~sinier, a member of the Central Committee and opponent of Marx, 
"Pierre Vesinier surla conference de Landres," in Archives 
~?~nin~, II, 233. · 
15rn the mid-fifties Konstantin Bobczynski was a leading 
member of the London Centralizationo He participated in the 
Polish insurrection of 1863, was nominated a member of the 
Central Committ~e, September 19, 1865, corresponding secretary for 
Poland, May 8, 1866, and was re-elected a member of the General 
Council at the Geneva Congress in September, 1866. 
l-----~------' 
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That it is imperative to annihilate the invading 
influence of Iffissia in Europe by applying to Poland 
the right of every people to dispose of itself, and 
re-estaplishing that country on a social and democratic 
basis.lb 
The Frenchman Victor Le Lubez proposed, "that only the latter 
part ·Of the proposition be retained, that is--that peoples have 
a right to dispose of themselves. 111 7 Then the demand for Polish 
liberty would be of universal significance. Although the English 
delegate John Weston supported the amendment proposed by Le Lubez, 
he opposed the introduction of political questions into the 
program of the International. This would only cause dissent. 
The Belgian Cesar De Paepe, a })rominent participant 
of the I_Jondon Conference, was among the most outspoken opponents 
of point 9. He demanded that the Polish question should not be 
put on the agenda. The restoration of Poland would not be in 
the interest of progress. It would only serve the Polish 
magnates, the gentry, and the clergy, not the people. De Paepe 
rejected the unilateral condemnation of Russia as a danger to 
European liberty. The Russians were not worse than other people 
and could not be held responsible for the destruction of Polandv 
----16' -·- . . Documents of the International~ I, 246. In 
The workman's- Acfvocaf'e' ~of-Sep'temoer-.3o-;-·TTo65 the resolution was 
VTOraedsomewn-a-f'{f:[ff8r°entJ.y: II • • • and tO re-establish that 
country upon its native democratic basis, 11 in Archives Ba1';:ouni~, 
II, 228. 
17 . Docu~ents of the International, I, 246e 
-~...,_,.-------"'-----~ $1 ·-
~ 
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If it were necessary to destroy the influence of the Russian 
government in Europe, then it was equally necessary to check the 
influence of the other European governments. De Paepe asked: 
·
11Is the influence of the Prussian, 'Austrian, English, and French 
governments less baneful than that of Russia? I say no. 111 8 
Besides, it would be unjust to mention only the Poles because so 
many people suffered under foreign rule. 
When Bobczynski replied to the objections raised against 
the introduction of the Polish question into the. program of the 
International, he insisted that the restoration of a democratic 
Poland was the "key to European freedom." Bobczynski warned 
against separating the political from the social questions. 
"Political reforms must precede social advancemento 111 9 
The Chairman George Odger, who supported Bobczynski' s 
viewpoint, insisted that the International originated from the 
concern for Poland. The International would stand or fall with 
the Polish causeo The Englisman James Carter also opposed the 
separation of the political from the social questionso The 
liberation of the Poles was necessary to prevent the spread of 
despotism. 
18Ibid. 
19 . Archives Bakounine, II, 229. 
~----....-
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When the Chairman put Bobczy1lski' s proposition to the 
vote, it was adopted by an overwhelming majority. When the 
Frenchman Pierre Vesinier demanded that the names of other 
oppressed nationalities be included in the resolution, the 
Chairman declared that this was against the rules since the 
question had been resolved. 20 
In the official reports on the controversy over point 9 
at the London Conference the narne of Marx did not appear. Vesinier; 
nho was one of the more impressive figures at the conference, was 
only briefly mentioned. Yet, he was an outspoken opponent of 
Marx. This can be derived from Vesinier's report on the London 
Conf0rence. Vesinier was dissatisfied with the London program 
becaus0 it lacked a "rational plan." His critique centered on 
point 9 which called for the fight against Russia and the 
restoration of Poland.. Vesinier said that Marx, who suffered from 
1a Hussophobe monomania," was its main inspirator. :Marx had not 
been satisifed with introducing the Russo-Polish question into the 
111.~.ral Address. Ho had also entered it into the program of the 
--'2-a-~ 
Pierre Vesinier ( 1821+-1 902) was exiled from France after 
the coup d'etat of Louis-Napoleon of December 2, 1851. On 
September 19, 1865 he was elected a memb0r of the General Council. 
Re v1rote a number of works against Napoleon III and Bonapartisme 
In 1870 he b0carae a member of the Paris Commune. After the fall of 
the Commune he went back to Eneland and was active in the French 
branch of the International. He was strongly opposed to the 
General Council which tried to centralize the administration of 
the International. 
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International. This vms "completely inopportune and contrary to 
the aj_m pursued by the Association and to the principle of right 
a.nd justice, 1121 Vesinier condemned the delegates who had 
·supported point 9. 
According to Vesinier Marx's victory was due to two 
fa.ctors: (1) the pro-Polish sympathies o:f the influential 
Parisian delegation; and, (2) the presence of a great number of 
Poles at the conference. Vesinier claimed that the Parisians 
were naturally predisposed to adopt Marx's position. In 1864 
they had addressed a petition to Napoleon III for his intervention 
in favor of Polish liberation. Evidently they were willing to 
support the restora.tion of a reactionary Poland. 22 As to the 
- - . . . 
2
-
1 
"Pierr: Vesinier sur la conference de Londres, 11 in 
Arcl]l.y~s .Bakoy.nin.~, II, 233. 
22obviously Vesinier was mistaken in his judgment of the 
Parisian delegation represented by Henri-Louis Tolain, Charles 
Limousin, Louis-1ugene Varlin, and E.-E. Fribourg. In his book on 
the First International, Fribourg stated that the Parisians were 
strongly opposed to the introduction of point 9 in a socialist 
congress because it was a political question. According to him 
the Parisian position was supported by Fran~ois Dupleix, the 
delegate of the French section of Geneva. But among the members 
of the Central Committee only De Paepe vms against point 9, while 
Karl Marx, Peter Fox, and Le Lubez rrnre for it. Fribourg 
maintained that even V~sinier fought the omission of the Polish 
· question and attacked the opponents of point 9 as agents of the 
French Emperor Napoleon III who was believed to be a Russophile. 
Doubtless Fribourg was mistaken in this. Cf. E.-E. Fribourg, 
L'Association International des Travailleurs (Paris: Armand Le 
mieV'ai..:Cer,--:lli:rfeur', T87'tD, pp. 44-45. IJ:'hereport of Cesar De Paep 
corroborates Vesinier's. According to him Vesinier demanded that 
if the Polish Republic were to be restored, the former Venetian, 
Roman, French, ana Mexican republics should als.o be restored o De 
~aepe remarked that Vesinier, T9lain, and Fribol;lrg were se:riously 
:i..p.tor::;.sted in tho debates on point 9. Cf. Archives Bak.ounine, 
r,~ ·=-· -____ , __________ ~ 
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Poles, Vesinier held that they acted as a pressure group. In 
their speeches the Poles addressed themselves to the emotions 
of the delegates and created a climate of opinion favorable to 
their wishes for Polish restoration. They insisted upon an 
indiscriminate condemnation 6f Russia and did not distinguish 
between the Russian people and their government. Vesinier 
mentioned that some delegates went so far as to demand that 
11Russia should be driven back into Asia. 11 
According to Vesinier, Marx did not participate in the 
heated debates. Since he vms 11 completely inc~pable of speaking 
in public • • • he merely supported the well-defended 
proposition with a gesture and his influence. 1123 V/ .. esJ.nier 
maintained that Marx achieved hj.s goal because, instead of 
logical reasoning, emotions prevailed in the debates on point 9. 
Even the opponents were touched by the efforts of the Polish 
exiles to keep the Polish question on the agenda, and they 
hesitated to contradict the Poles. They feared that they might 
be considered as supporters of Russian despotism. Vesinier 
remarked that when De Pae1)e, in spite of his sympathy for the 
oppressed Polish people, dared to condemn point 9, he practicalJy 
asked the audience to forgive him and not to consider him as a 
"Russian agent. 11 
r 
! 
' 
}17 
Evidently Ves:inier was very attracted to De Paepe' s 
argun10nts because ho shared the basic assumptj_on of the Belgian 
delegate that Russia had already entered a period of progress. 
Accordingly, he reported more extensively on De Paepe's speech. 
De Pa_epe did not believe that the restoration of Poland would 
guarantee liberty to the peasants. The Polish nobles were still 
too powerful, and they v1ere only interested in the territorial 
restoration of Poland and in the preservation of their 
privileges. Therefore, the peasants could only expect their 
final liberation from Russia v1hich had already improved their 
lot. 
Vesinier's report on his own speech reveals that he was 
as embarrassed as De Paepe when he opposed the adoption of 
point 9. As did the Belgian delegate, Vesinier upheld the right 
of the Polish people to liberty, but he opposed the restoration 
of Poland because the people vmuld not prof:Lt from it. A 
restored Poland would become a reactionary state dominated by the 
nobles. Vesinier also defended the right. of the Russian people 
to liberty. It was unjust to treat the Russians as outcasts. 
'11hey were neither responsible for the crimes co:nm1itted by their 
despotic rulers, nor were they as backward as was generally 
maintained. The peasants and also the members of the Russian 
intellieentsia, among them the exiles Herzen and Bakunin, hoped 
for a socialist revolution. According to V6sinier even the 
r 
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Russian government was not altogether unaware of the needs of 
the modern age. It had introduced peasant reforms and planned 
to connect Europe with India, and China through the construction 
of railroads. Therefore, it would be a grave mistal-re to place 
11a gr.eat nation, a whole human race, under the ban of Europe." 
Vesinier insinuated that Russia was not a threat to Europe 
because its main interest lay in Asia where it played "a great 
civilizing end emancipating role." 
Vesinier insisted that the extremely one-sided anti-
Russian foreign policy of the International, as proposed in 
point 9, was even less justified \7hen considering that 
dictatorship, centralization, and militarism were not restricted 
to the ~ussian Empire. The audience reacted violently when 
Vesinier declared that Napoleon III was worse than Alexander II. 
While the Russian Tsar had at least liberated 50,000,000 serfs, 
Napoleon III had helped to destroy the Roman and Mexican 
republics. He had enslaved the French nation and conspired 
v1ith Bismarck for the establishment of the supremacy of the great 
mil:i.tary nations. Vesini.er suggested that Marx should be more 
immediately concerned with 11 tho Prussian ambition and the 
Bismarckian influence" in Europe than with the "Muscovite" 
danger. He concluded that the formulation of a foreign policy 
of the International was only justifj_able j.f it includGd 11the 
liberation of all the oppressed nationalities" because it was 
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the primary task of the Internatj.onal to further the frate:cnizatio:n 
and solidarity of all the people. 
A few months after the London Conference V6sinier 
attacked the introduction of point-9 in the preliminary program 
of the International in the Belgian newspaper Echo de Verv:le_:r~ 
on December 16 and 18, 1865. He ascribed the adoption of point 9 
to the "regrettable influence" of Marx,- the Parisians, and the 
Poles. Their one-sided view of the European situation resulted 
in the condemnation of Russia at a moment when, through the 
emancipation of the Russian and Polish serfs, this country had 
proved to be more progressive than the Polish nobles and priests. 
In the opinion of Vesinier the adoption of point 9 
endangered the very foundations of the International. Vesinier 
mainta~lned that many Poles wished to join the organization so 
that they might use it to further their own nationalist aims: 
111rl1us, because of the mist.31te of the Central Committee, the 
Association • • • has been turned from its real aim--the 
liberation of la bar. 1124 V esinj.er charged the Central Commit tee 
with having degenerated into a ncommittee of nationalities under 
tho influence of Bonapa.rtism. 11 The International could only be 
sewed by the election of new delegates to the Geneva Congress 
and the nomin<.::i.tion of a General Cotmcil which sould be composed 
I 
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of workers from each nation who alone would have a real interest 
in the liberation of labor. 
Vesinier's article appeared at a time when the 
·controversy over point 9 continued in Paris. The reaction of the 
Paris office of the International was as negative as Vesinier•s. 
When the Parisians published a brochure, ~e ~!}E.r~s. 9....U1!~£§., in 
1866, the paragraph on Russia and Poland was omitted. But when 
the French historian and politician Henri Martj_n reported on the 
London Conference in the Paris newspaper Le Si~cle on October 14, 
. -~-4---
1865, he gave a full statement of the program for the Geneva 
Congress to be held in 1866 and defended point 9. 25 According 
to Hartin the demand for the restoration of Poland on a soctal-
democratic basis had already been stated in the revolutionary 
decrees of the Polish insurgents in 1863. Point 9 was "the 
reply of true socialism and social progress, in concordance with 
justice and liberty, to the communist despotism of Muscovy.u26 
Martin's position vras cri ticizcd by the French Proudhoni.st. 
August Vermorel in the Paris newspaper b,e. Presse on October 17, 
1865. Vermorel declared that the Poles had as much a right to 
natj_onal self-determination as did all the other people under 
~~~~jl!~~ ~5The report vms reprinted in the London newspaper 
~E2,.JI.2rls!P~~-~~~v.9ca~§., Novembor 18, 1865, quoted j_n b:r£1~ 
~01.~1£, 11, i;.2'1. 
26Docuri.ents of the First International, I, 141 • 
...--.-'<JC!:. ~ ,--~----~..- ... ~--..... ::::ua<·lt< "'"~ 
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foreign rule. However, true socialism would not be furthered if 
the International supported a war against Russie.. This would 
only divert the workers from their immediate aim: ttto accomplish 
the task of economic emancipation which needs peace and liberty 
as an essential condition. 1127 
Marx, who closely followed the reaction to the London 
Conference, referred to the Parj.s controversy in a letter to 
Engels of November 20, 1865. He was highly satisfied that the 
l:Lberal and republican newspapers had reported on the London 
Conference, and that point 9, in particular, had received their 
approval. This had helped to publicize the International and to 
drow11 the opposition. Marx did not hide his feeling of triumph .. 
He commented in his letter to Engels: 
Our Parisians are somewhat flabbergasted that the 
greatest sensation is caused by the pa:,r.g.graph on 
Russia and Poland which they rejected.2o 
:Marx's satisfaction with the warm reception of point 9 
by the non-socialist commentators was certainly surprising. It 
suggests that Narx, who preferred to weaken his opponents by 
ind:Lroct maneuvers, agitated for an active support of Polish 
liberation in order to fight his strongest ideological opponents 
in the International-... the Proudhonists who were mainly French. 
Tho Proudhonists could be expected to disagree with a belligerant 
--~r..,--:~ . 
f.1rc4_i:ve,s. ~aj7.:,2~2.:n.£, I I, lt28 o 
28~, III/3, 280. 
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policy of the International, and since the Polish question had 
not yet lost its appeal, this might lead to their isolation. 
The assumption that Marx aimed at the isolation of the 
Proudhonists is born out by the later development. The London 
Conference had accentuated his hostilj.ty towards the Proudhon:ists. 
Marx became convinced that they suffered from a superiority 
complex believing themselves to be the real representatives of 
the International, but actually they were traitors. In a letter 
to Engels of January 5, 1866 Marx remarked that a:t the Conference 
the Polish question was 11 the true nerve of the polemic." Those 
who attacked point 9 were imbued with the "Muscovitism of Proudhon 
and Herzen." :Marx concluded that the Russians found in the 
"Proudhonized part of Jeune France their newest allies. 1129 He 
---
branded his ideological opponents as supporters of Russian 
imperialism. Russophobia was to be the badge of the true member 
of the International. 
Marx had conceived a particular dislike for Vesinier 
whom he regarded as a leading member of the "Proudhonist gang" 
which had infiltrated the Belgian and London French sections of 
the International., Marx was enraged that Vesinier had interpreted 
the defense of Polish restoration under point 9 a.s a defense of 
the nationality principle. He had.as little interest as Vesinier 
., __ . '""'2'9I"bid:-:- p. 302. 
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in turning the International into a defender of the nationality 
principle. In a letter to Engels of Jauuary 15, 1866 Marx called 
Vesinier a 11 jackass. 11 The Frenchman had not understood that "our 
declaration for Poland" was not influenced by the Bonapartist 
nationality principle or Polish ascendancy in the International 
30 but by the opposition to Russia. 
A month later ¥~rx composed an official answer to 
Vesinier's·article for the Central Committee which appeared in 
L'Echo de Verviers on February 20, 1866 and was .signed by Georg 
Jung. Vesinier was ridiculed for having assumed that the 
introduction of the Russo-Polish question, that is, a political 
question, in the provisional program of the International was 
an innovation due to certain "regrettable influences"--meaning 
the Pole's and Bonapartism. Marx declared that the Inaugural 
Address was certainly above suspicion of having resulted from a 
conspiracy. However, the ~~had also voiced the demand for 
the destruction of the "Muscovite influence in Europe." Point 9 
« 31 
merely repeated this demand. 
As the Geneva Congress drew nearer, Marx apparently 
became quite concerned with the opposition to point 9. At his 
request Engels wrote a series of articles entitled, 11VJhat have 
3brb·d 
--2:....·' p. 
3l Documents of the First Internationa.l, I, 325. 
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the \'Jorkine Classes to do vri th Poland, 11 which were published in 
the English newspaper ~lli.2J..lwea\~.h on March 24, 31 and May 5, 
1866. In these articles Engels defended the introduction of 
point 9 in the program of the International against the opposition 
of the Proudhonists. He declared that since the forties the 
working classes had pursued a pro-Polish policy which aimed at 
"intcrvent:Lon [and] a war against Russia as long as Russia 
meddles with Poland. 1132 According to Engels the International 
continued the traditional pro-Polish and anti-Russian policy of 
the 11progressi ve and thin1dng11 workers. 
The Proudbonists who objected to point 9 were branded 
as Russophiles who opposed the wishes of the majority in the 
International. According to Engels they pursued the same 
reactionary policy as the Tories in England who hailed Russia 
as the most progressive nation on earth which should not be 
excluded from civilized Europe. 
As Marx had done in his manuscrtpts of 1863 and 186L1., 
Engels minimized the German responsibility for the partition 
of Pol~md. The main culprit v1as Russi.a, while Prussia and 
Austria, who were Russian vassals,. had been forced to comply 
with the wishes of their Russian overlord to destroy Poland. 
~. 'II ' ,.,., ""'z--,..~·~~ 
_.1C!Rjasanoff, 11 Polenfrage," p. 212. 
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Engels objected to the demands for a distinction between the 
Russian government and the people which had been voiced by the 
opponents of point 9. As long as a class conscious industrial 
proletariat did not exist in Russia, the Russian people were as 
responsible as their government for the oppression of the Poles. 
The case was different in Germany where the class fight had 
started. The German workers were not responsible for the anti-
Polish policy of Prussia. One of their main aims was German 
unification which could only be achieved through. Germany's liber-
ation from Russian vassalage. Therefore, the German workers had 
a "greater interest" in Polish liberation than the workers of 
other countries. 
The essence of Engels's arguments was that the German 
workers were the most nrdent promoters of an anti-Russian foreign 
policy and;therefore, the foremost defenders of European liberty. 
Should the German workers fight Russia to prote~t their own 
interests, they would also protect all of Europe. Gerllk.'Ul and 
European interests coincided. The important political role of a 
revolutionary Germany in Europe was stressed even more when 
Engels insinuated that there was no absolute reliance on Polish 
hostility towards Russia. The Poles might suddenly submit to 
Russian rule hoping that this might bring about a partial 
restoration of Poland "with the Russian Tsar as king." Engels's 
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line of argumentation imperceptibly led to a defense of German 
leadership in the International and in Europe because the German 
workers represented the true revolutionary spirit, not the 
Frenchmen. 
Engels was particularly anxious to refute the contention 
of the opponents of point 9 that the support of Polish liberation 
meant the adoption of the nationality principle by the 
International. As he had done in the past, he defended the 
territorial integrity of the "historical nations" who originated 
from the assimilation of different nationalities in a long 
historical process. He said that it would be absurd to destroy 
the historical nations in order to liberate nationalities which 
would be unable to remain independent. The Poles, however, 
were not a nationality. They were a "large and well definedu 
historical nation as were the French, Italians, Hungarians, or the 
English. They had the same vitality to lead an independent 
national life. This justified the Polish demand for the 
restoration of Poland and the support of that demand by the 
International. 
Although Engels defended the creation of large political 
units through the annexation of foreign nationalities, he did 
not apply the same criterion to the Russian Empire. According 
to him Russia did not belong to the European historical nations 
because it had been unable to integrate the conquered people. 
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Therefore, the partition of Russia was justified. Russia had 
become the "retainer of an immense amount of stolen property 
which would.have to be disgorged on the day of reckoning. 1133 
Th:Ls time Engels maintained that the nationality principle 
was "a Russian invention concocted to destroy Poland." The 
Russians had used it to incite the Ukrainians and \Vhi te Ru.ssians 
age.inst: the Polish government and to swallow most of Polando The 
Russian propaganda for a Pan-Slav union was merely "the 
application of the nationality principle" to the Slavs under 
German, Hungar:i.an, and Turkish rule. The aim was the destructioi.l 
of the Austrie.n Empire and the conquest of the Balkans and 
Constantinople. This proved, said Engels, that Russia would 
never gtve up its rule over Poland without a fight. 
When Engels defended tho restoration of Poland, he 
adorJt:ed the i:>osj_ tion of the Polish left-·wing democrats. He 
stressed the point that the restoration of Polan.d meant "the 
restoration of a state composed of at least four different 
nationalit:Lesn--the Poles, the non.,Slavic Lithuanians, the White 
Russtans, speaking a language 
between Polish and Russian but nee.rer the latter • • • 
[and] the Little Ru.ssi.ans • • • whose language, 
according to the best authorities, is now considered 
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as being completely distinct from the Great Russian, 
or commonly called, Russ:Lan languag0.34 
No longer did Engels endorse the popular argument that the 
nationalities of' the former ea.stern Polish provinces had been 
Polonized, nor did he revert to hts opinion of the fifties that 
they had been Russianized. He admitted that the Poles as well 
as the Russians had failed to assimilate the foreign nationalities .. 
Yet, he :i.nsisted that the former eastern Polish territories 
belonged to Poland by historical right because they were under 
Polish rule long before a Russian Enpire existed. 
Engels's defense of Polish claims ended with the 
conclusion that Poland must be restored because j_t had :formerly 
existed. This was contrary to the basic convictions of Engels 
shared by Marx. In the past years Engels had repeatedly declared 
that a nation had a right to dominate foreign people if it were 
eithe:t' more :progressive or more revolutionary. Apparently in the 
m:Ld-sixties he did not believe that the Poles wore either a 
revolutionary or a c:Lvilizj.ng force among the .Slavs. He insisted 
that the destruction.of the Polish Republic was due to its 
backvmrdness. Simultaneously, he made no attempt to prove that 
a Polish revival was at hand although the Polish ... Russian customs 
union of 1856 had already effected economic changes in the 
Polish Kj~ngdom. Since Engels had often denied that backrmrd 
~t:w 
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nations had a right to an independent national existence, the 
logical conclusion would be that in his opinion the backward 
Poles had forfeited this right. Thus, Engels's agitation for 
Polish restoration acquired a futile character. However, it 
helpe_d to fight ideological opponents in the International. 
Besides, Engels's polemic against the nationality 
principle gave him the opportunity to indirectly defend German 
rule over the Slavs. If non-Polish provinces were to be 
restored to Poland on the basis of the historical rj.ght principle, 
the Western Slavs, including the Poles in Poznania, were not 
just:lfied in demanding their liberation from German rule. 
The effort Engels had made to marshall support for 
point 9 was not too successful as can be seen from the 
proceed:Lngs of the first Congress of the International which was 
h.cld half a year later in Geneva in September, 1866. Marx and 
Engels v1ere not present. But Marx had composed a memorandum for 
the Central Committee in which the reasons for the formulation 
of point 9 were stated. He insisted that as iong as Russia 
remained the center of European reaction, the aristocracy as well 
as the bourgeoisie v1ould always find protection from the 
11.J.ropean labor movement o The victory of the working class 
depended upon the destruction of "the sinister Asiatic powert1 
Ru.ssia. through the restoration of Poland. Marx said that it was 
the special "duty" of the German workers to take the initiative 
r 
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in the liberation of Poland. The destruction of the Holy 
Alliance would further revolutionary progress in all of Europe. 
As did Engels, Marx ascribed a leading role to the German workers 
in the revolutionary scheme.35 
Marx's arguments did not gain much support at the 
Geneva Congress. The French delegation became the center of 
opposition to point 9 which read: 
That it is imperatively necessary to annihilate the 
influence of Russia in Europe by applying to Poland 
the right of every' people to dispose of itself and to 
re-establish that country upon its native deinocratic 
basis.36 
The French delegates wished that the following version be adopted: 
That it is necessary to annihilate the Russian influence 
in Europe in order to apply the right of the peoples to 
dispose of themselves and to reconstruct Poland on a 
democratic and social basis.37 
In their memorandum the French delegates stated: 
As defenders of liberty we declare that we are against 
any kind of despotism, that we definitely condemn and 
reject the organization and social tendencies of Russian 
despotism, inevitably leading to a communism vn1ich kills 
the mind, but that we as delegates to an economic 
~~~~~~:~t~0c~~~e~~i~:v~h!np~~l~~c~~t~~~i~;~tlgnm~ep~~~d.38 
During the debates on point 9 E.-Eo Fribourg, in the name of the 
French delegation, made a motion that the Congress should not 
35cr. Documents of the First International, I, 350. 
361.1?1.£., p. 314. 
3711?1:£., p. 350. 
38Fribourg, £1?.!, _citu p. 59. 
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vote on this question. Fribourg said: 
One should desire and also demand the emancipation of 
the people in Russia and in Poland, and condemn the 
traditional policy which incites one nation 8.gainst 
the other.39 
The Congress, hovrever, should limit itself to a declaration that 
it abhors despotism under any form and in any country, but would 
not interfere with the very complex questj_on of the nationalities~ 
The rejectj.on of point 9 by the French delegation was suppox·ted 
by the delegates from French Switzer·land. Fran~ois Dupleix 
claimed that the Polish question only concerned the Germans and 
should be omitted.L:.l But the English delegates, particularly 
Odger and Carter, supported the resolution on Poland, and so did 
---~--~9 ~Yf~J:E.£, II, 238. 
L~O Johann Philipp Bocker, "Der Kongress der Internationalen 
Arbeiterassoeiation in Gonf, 11 Der__Y,'2_.E.,bot.s:., Politische und sozial-
ooko110E1:i.sche Zeitschrift ( GeneVaJ, November, 1866, No. 2; central 
organ of the German-s1)eaking section of the Internationalt ed. by 
Johann Philipp Becker (1866-67); (facsimile ed.; Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag, GmbH, 1963), p. 165. Becker's report offers the most 
co1nplete information on the Geneva Congress. It was published in 
Do.;°f:Jorb~, September, October, November, and December, 1866, 
NO. 9-::fZ, and January, February, e.nd March, 1867, No. 1-3. The 
G01ieral Council released two very brief and incomplete reports 
on the Geneva Congress nb.ic;h were published in the Courrier 
In~~£rnat.i2.lli=11 (London), Larch 9, 16, 23, 30 and Apr:.rr-67131 20, 0', f8b'7 and :i.n The International Cour~Ler, (London) Harch 2U, 27 
and April 3, 10,~1"'?~Zfi.';-~r8t1/:--~-
41Franqois Dupleix, member of the French s0ction in 
Geneva, editor of the ~Ul?d_,,_de,- ;t~~s9.E1£~,t!:_m1 l!l~ ... 9£.DEi~~lct d.§§. 
Travai1101u:·s (Geneva) and of B12·afite ('GonevaY:-~ ..... ,.,_,.~ .... ~~-- u 
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the Germans--Eccarius from the Central Committee and Johann Becker. 
the delegate of the German section in Switzerland. 
Although Becker was in fe.vor of point 9, he did not 
share the radical Russophobia of Marx and Engels. He distinguifhe 
between the Russian government and the people. He claimed that 
point 9 did not imply a declaration of war against the Russia.ti. 
people. The International, he said, aimed at the destruction 
of all despotic governments and at the emancipation of all the 
oppressed people. In Becker's opinion the liberation of the 
Poles would accelerate that of the Russian people. Until then 
Russia continued to be a real threat to European culture and 
progress because of its backward poli.tical, economic, and social 
structure and its aggressiveness. The annexation of the Polish 
provinces had augmented the military power of Russia because 
these territories were mo1'"'e densely populated and. more developed 
and provided the Russian army with a military elite. 
According to the unofficial report by Card, a delegate 
of the French section in Geneva, Becker admitted that the Polish 
question might be co.lled a German question because the Germans 
had an immediate interest in the liberation of Poland.42 However, 
Becker added that the Polish question did not only concern 
-----~-f. ~;tract from the Report by Card on the Geneva 
Congress," in &-.~ld:..y_e.s2ako!l~f?,., II, 237. 
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Germany but all of Europe. The restoration of Poland would 
destroy the "aggressive potent:Lality" of Russia and the danger 
of the creation of a Slavic world empire under Russian rule. 
It would accelerate the "internal evolution" in Russia e.nd 
contribute to the emancipation of the people from the oppressive 
TsaT·ist rule. Becker insisted that the abolition of standing 
armies, on which the delegates to the Geneva Congress had voted, 
would not be possible without the restoration of Poland as a 
barrier e.gainst the Russian Empire. Therefore, Polish liberation 
was 11the concern of the norkers and of all mank:Lnd. 11!~3 
In spite of such arguments the majority of the delegates 
favored the French viewi1oint. ¥!hen unanimity could not be 
achieved, Becker proposed to add the following declaration to the 
minutes: 
Since it is the task of the International \'forking 
Men• s Association to em<J.ncipate the working0gclasses 
of all the countries and to fight any kind of 
despotism in order to realize the equality of all 
men and nations, the elimj_nation of the imJ)erialist 
influence of Russia and the restoration of a social 
democratic Poland are an j_ntegral part of its 
aspirations. Li-4 
According to Beck0r's report this declaration vras 
supported by the Gorman delegates, including those of German 
. ·-43Cf. ·,~tract from the Report by Johan.n Ph. Becker 
on the Geneva Congress, 11 in !E.2111-.Y~,~ .~~~E_£, II, 238-39. 
4Li-_!r~fE-~UD:i~, II, 239. 
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Switzerland, and by the delegates from the Jura region, and it 
v1as unanimously adopted together with the motion of the French 
delegation. But Becker did not mention that the opposing parties 
agreed to further amendments which bridged the difference and 
made some kind of general consent possible. The French 
amendment to the original motion read: 
The Congress is convinced that through the development 
and the consolidation of the International Working 
Men's Association all despotism will disappear, and the 
restoration of a democratic Poland will be realized.45 
The Becker arnendment was similar to that of the French. 
The Congress is convinced that through the strengthening 
and expansion of the International Working Men's 
Associat:Lon, the destruction of the despotic influence 
of Russia in Europe and the restorat:j,.on of a social 
democratic Poland will be realized. L~b 
The two c:i.rnondments were simply added to the minutes of 
the meeting after it had been decided that no vote would be taken 
on th:Ls political question/i-7 Both represented a compromise. 
They approved of the restoration of Poland but omitted the 
aggressive tone of the original point 9 as proposed by Marx. The 
---'Lj.'~:-- . Fribourg, 9J2G_ cit .• , p. 67. 
46Ar , · Bak-. • II 387 cn1veE?__:._~9y.p.];.E-.~' , • 
47The amendments \Vere not published in the official 
re1)orts on the resolutions of the Geneva and Brussels Congress. 
In the report on the Geneva Congress which appeared in lit_..C..2 .. ll.rFie£ 
International the French amendment vms attributed to Becker, 
1'1llfi.e~n:rsaii1endment vras al toeether omitted. Cf. 11 E.xtract from 
the Report on the Geneva Congress," published in Le Courrier 
liliEP.§~:ip)}~l, in !-r_c]1i_yre.? •.. l?Q-15£_11.11.Jd!£, II, 237. 
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def eat of Russian despotism and the liberation of the Poles were 
not expected from a war against Russia. Changes in Eastern 
Europe would be the result of the victorious advance of the 
International Working Men's Associ~tion, that is, of general 
internal changes in the European countries. The formulation of 
the amendments funde1nentally agreed with the basic concepts of 
Proudhon who was convinced that the liberation of the people 
under foreign rule would be accomplished through an evolutionary 
process. 
After the Geneva Congress the French delegates published 
a memorandum in Brussels entitled: Q.£g_gr~de Geneve. Memo ire 
,S_es D§lf,q,Y_§s J."'.l:illl£~-(18,§..Qo They expressed their sympathy 
for the independence of Poland and their hope for the liberation 
of the peasants and workers after the complete overthrow of the 
old political and socio-economic order o Hov;ever, they criticized 
the English and German delegates for their attempt to combine 
the support of the Poles with a condemnation of all things 
I?ussian.. If this policy of identifying the government and the 
people were a})pJ.ied to the other European countr:tes, then the 
Germans, in particular, would certainly not fare weli.48 
The Brussels section of the International, led by 
De Paepe, supported the French pos1.tion in a report on the 
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Geneva Congress~ It was declared that the French delegates 
were right to reject the traditional policy of inciting one nation 
against the other. Besides, the restoration of Poland would not 
guarantee the liberation of the peasants. It would only mean 
the restoration of the aristocracy and of Catholicism.49 
Marx did not respond to the French and Belgian 
statements. He had lost the battle fo1.; an aggressive anti-
Russian foreign policy of the International. The controversy over 
this question had proved that the majority of the socialists did 
not share his Russophobia., As long a.s the International remained 
in ex:istence, Fiarx did not try to reopen the question of the 
restoration of Poland. Hor1ever, when Bak.unin entered the 
International in 1868, Marx was alarmed. He still considered 
Brikunin as a Russian nationalist and a Pan-Slav, and he feared 
that Ba..lrunin rn:lght impose his ideas on tho International. In 
order to prevent such a development, Marx fought him indirectly as 
he had done in the past. This only strengthened &Jnmin' s 
opposition to tho Slavic policies of Yiarx and Engels. In the last 
two years of the International he analyzed Marxrs views on the 
state and foreit;n policies in order to reveal the inherent dangers 
of Marx's views regarding a peaceful coexistenc0 of the European 
people. 
u-n-4•9Cf ~- ·~,Ekt"ract from the Report on the Geneva Congress' II 
published in ~L~E2~'b,.£!:'!:pe~9:_g_,J?e~aj.,~, the orgon of t~e Belgian 
socialist Cesar de Paape, in ~rclflvos B~s_e_lJ]-l=b,p.£.., II~ 238. 
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Bakunin's Fight against Marx 
- . -· . 
After the Polish insurrection of 1863 Bakunin's views 
on the revolutionary reorganization of Europe had undergone a 
definite change. This was due to his observations at the time 
of the insurrection. Bakunin was appalled that the Polish 
insurgents merely wished to replace one oppressive centralized 
state with another, and that the progressive Russians were 
willing to ·put up with their despotic government in order to 
preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire. Bakunin 
became convinced that the centralized state was the greatest 
obstacle to the liberation of the people in Europe, and that the 
destruction of that state was necessary for a revolutionary 
reorganization of Europe. 
In 186~-, in the same year when the International was 
founded, Bakunin tried to organize the International Brotherhood, 
or International Alliance of Socialist Revolutionaries, in Italy. 
In the revolutionary program which Bakunin composed for the 
Brotherhood he omitted any reference to his earlier revolutionary 
postulates--the creation of a Slavic union under Great Russian 
leadership and the revolutionary mission Of the Slavs in Europe. 
Now he emphasized the need for 
the complete destruction of all enforced 
unions ••• and the radical dissolution of the· 
centralized paternalistic and authoritarian 
state.50 
0 .. 
5 Archives Bakounine, II, 29. 
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A nation was to be formed through the voluntary federation of 
individuals, communes, and provinces. All the administrative 
units were to enjoy autonomy. In order to prevent anarchy, the 
.national government should have 
the right to demand that the constitution and 
particular legislation of a province which desired 
to belong to the federation and to enjoy national 
protection, ought to conform to the national 
constitution and legislation on essential points.51 
At the first Congres.s of the League of Peace and Liberty, 
held in Geneva from September 9-12, 1867, Bakunin had the 
opportunity to propagandize the ideas which he had elaborated 
since 1864. The Congress was organized by prominent European free 
masons, am?ng them Bakunin who was a member of the Central 
Committee of the League. The aim of the Congress was to discuss 
the creation of the United States of Europe. 
On September 10, 1867 Bakunin delivered a speech in which 
he demanded the destruction of the centralized European states, 
including the Russian Empire, and the unification of Europe. In 
his opinion Europe could only be saved through federalism and 
socialism. The federal principle, not the nationality principle, 
would guarantee each nationality the right to "self-determination." 
Several weeks later, on October 26, 1867, Bakunin 
submitted his brochure, F~deralisme, so,cialis.me .et anti-
theologisme, which summarized his convictions, to the Central 
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Committee of the Leaguo. He declared that the centralized 
:European states originated from conquests and became permanently 
chained to their expansionist drive, resulting in militarism 
and despotism. The reorganization of Europe depended upon the 
destruction of the centralized states. It should be based on 
the "interests, needs, and natural inclinations of the people" 
and on "a voluntary federation" of individuals and administrative 
units--communes, provinces, and nations.. All the demands for 
natural, political, strategical, or commercial borders and, 
likewise, the historical-right prj_nciple should be abandoned. 
No nationality should be forced to remain a member of a state, 
even if it had voluntarily joined that state. Bakunin stated: 
"The right to a voluntary reunion as well as to a voluntary 
secession is the first and most important of all the political 
rights.u52 
Although Bakunin defended the "natural right" of each 
nationality to self-determination, he condemned the nationality 
principle because it was used by Poles, Italians, and Hungarians 
to disguise their real aim--the creation of a strong centralized 
stateo According to-Bakunin any increase in the number of 
centralized states in Europe would heighten the threat of war. 
Consequently, j_t was wrong to assume that the restoration of 
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Poland would guara11tee peace in Europe. Only the destruction 
of all the despotic states, including France and Prussia, would 
establish 1)eace in Europe. 
Bakunin's formulation of a European policy for the 
League was influenced by the continuation of the one-sided anti_-
Russian agitation in Western Europe. He vras familiar with Marx's 
anti-Russian propaganda in the International. The Geneva 
Congress of the League was attended by members of the 
International, and at tho opening session the Inaugural Addres~§., 
in which Marx had expressed his hostility towards Russia, was 
read,, 
Moreover, on the second day of the Congress (September ·1 o, 
1867), Borkhci:m, a friend of Marx, delivered part of an anti-
Russian speech whj_ch he had prepared for this occasion.53 He 
claimed that the Russian masses were kept "in a state of healf-
bestiality" for the sole purpose of subjugating all of Europe. 
The danger of Russian ae;gression had been increased through the 
liberatton of the serfs (1861) which facilitated the recruitment 
--53Som;-;eeks before the Geneva Congress of the League, 
on August 27, 1867, Borkheim had sent a letter to :V.tarx with 
:Lnformation on his intended anti-Russi.an speech. He said that he 
would present the Russian question as "the main question in 
Europe" and would urge the Luropeans to conclude an alliance for 
the prevention of an invas:Lon of }:iv.rope by the backward .Russians. 
He asked Marx and Engels for their comments on his intended 
speech. There is no trace of an ansv1er to his request.. Cf. 
At><:J1i:;:g,§_£1r::i.£?::-~L';~, Internatj_onaal Institut voor Socia.le 
Geschicder..is""Tl\mste1--clam), quoted in ~ive~~EHb"0:=bE..£, II, 249-51. 
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of soldiers. Only the restoration of Poland would guarantee 
peace in Europe because it would allow for the unification of 
Germany. 
As long as Poland is not restored, Prussia \7ill 
never become German, and as long as Prussia is not 
German, war between Germany and France will be a 
normal Qccurrence • • • constantly fomented by 
Russia.'4 
In consideration of the Russian danger, Borkheim held 
that it ·was a mere mockery that 11certain Russian publicists 11--
meaning Bakunin and Herzen--had tried to spread pro-Russian 
propaganda in Western Europe. According to these Russians 11 the 
beaut:i.ful young and j_nnocent Russia" was the classic country of 
socialist institutions; the realization of "the Russo-Slavic 
paradise" had only been impeded by German immigrants and the 
Tartars. But, said Borkheim, only a few people in Western 
Europe, among them the late Proudhon, expected from Russia "the 
salvatj.on of the world." 
Borkheim urged the European nations to unite against 
Russia. They should collaborate with the North Americans in 
order to stop Russj_an expansionism and "to force the Russians 
to be conceriwd with- themselves and to \'!Ork honestly ••• This 
would be a blessing for Russia. 1155 Borkheim concluded that the 
principle question in Europe was "the Russian question." 
---"'511-~t:~~~_,£, II, 2lt7. 
55.f...biSlo, Po 2li.8. 
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Bakunin was quite annoyed by Borkheim 1 s speech. He 
regarded Borkheim as a 11strange man, a kind of maniac detesting 
all of Russia and the Russians." He assumed that Borkheim 1s 
speech, if not written by Marx, had certainly been inspired 
by him. 
Bakunin's friend Karl Vogt, vtl1om Marx detested, 
insinuated in the Swiss newspaper peue·Zuericher Zeitung late in 
September,. 1867 that Marx was the anonymous author of Borkheim's 
speech. Marx was furious about this identification. He disliked 
the speech and was upset that Borkheim wished to publish it in 
several languages. In a letter to Engels of October 4, 1867 
Marx remarl';:ed that the publication of the speech would reveal 
how stupid it was. 
With the exception of some catchwords which I have 
breathed into him, it [Borkheim's speech] is nothing 
but an insiEid babbling and more often a mere 
stupiclity.5 
It is difficult to understand why Marx reacted so 
violently against Borkheim's speech. He could hardly have 
objected. to Borkheim' s violent anti-Russian declarations. 
Apparently it was Borkheim' s propagation of an un-Mci.rxian idea 
that peace in Europe could be achieved merely through the 
collaboration of the Western nations which irritated Marx. In 
any case, Marx refrained from public statements against .Borkheim 
. 55MEGA I II/3. 428 • 
_,  
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because Borkheim was "his personal friend" and 11a valuable man" 
in the party. 
Marx did not object when in F'ebruary, 1868 Borkheim 
continued his polemic against the Russian political emigrants 
in Western EuropeM~meaning mainly Herzen and Ba.kunin--in the 
radical German newspaper Qe~10fr.£§ltJ.-.EEJ?-~e.§>_1:'..Q2henblatt. Borkheim 
decle.red that if the Russian emigrants were truly democrats 
and socialists and enemies of the Russian government, they should 
join the Western European radicals and fight against Russian 
expansionism. They should condemn the subjugation of Poland, 
Finland, a.nd the Baltic provinces and the Russian aim to 
annex Turkey .. 57 
It was not u..11til the second Congress of the League of 
Peace and Liberty, held in Bern from September 22-26, 1868, that 
Bakunin replied to Borkheim's insinuation that the Russian exiles 
were not true enemies of the oppressive Russian government. The 
occasion was the speech which the Pole Valerien Mroczkowski de-
livered at the fourth session of the Congress (September 25, 
1868). 58 When Mroczkowski a.gitated for the liberation of the Poles' 
from Tsarist rule, he declared: 
-97"Russische ;pol:l.tische Fluechtlj_nge in Westeuropa," 
Del]l(2~~;.~1e s \:[Q9_hen b~, _ _Q.:iz.,e;.2;!l .... S,\,e;:.__,§21:l t,_§.£ll~JLY2.l~t e i, 
February 1 , ~1 o6b,q_uofed in £}.r~hj.J.:.G_~1::\~kO~l,~}.ii;E;--J:T, 3~ 
58 < Valerien M:coczkowsJd_ vms a Polish soc:i..al democrat. 
was a member of the Central Conunittee of the League and of 
Balnmin 1 s organization. the International Brotherhood or 
International Alliance· of Soc1a1ist Revolut-i.onaries. 
He 
We desire neither the restoration of the old state 
nor the restoration of the historical right of Poland, 
. but we wish to assert our national right • • • to be 
inde11enden t. 79 
l"rroczkowski did not wish to discus:;; the future borders of a 
"people's Poland." He merely indicated that they would depend 
upon the outcome of a war against Russia. However, since he 
insisted that the Poles would respect Hthe rights" of the 
nationalities who had once been under Polish r.ule, he certainly 
assumed that these nationalities would become members of a 
restored Poland .. 
Bakunin, who was dissatisfied with M.roczkowski 1 s speech, 
improvised an answer which developed into an attack against the 
territorial claims of the Poles and their German supporters, among 
them Borkheim and M.arx. 60 According to Bakunin the problem of the 
"-591-froczk~~ski' s speech was printed in Bulletin 
Stenograµhiaue du IIG Congres de la Paj_x et de IaL:I'5erte e 
S,ten:of?:fi~~~~:su:r~r~}~?Z11~a:i~;r..1e-~~l!P·d · 1.§:rrtG~~~..2?26l:fJS£.~,§_~13ern: . f8b3), PI?· ~1T-2T ::>, quoted in 
LozynskyJ, E21El'SYJ...1-_~rp..s~~.J-E..~1P..;t;l_L1.!.£h., p. 113. 
60Bakunin' s speech was printed in Bulletin Steno~,aphi_q~ 
d.Ll~"~po~~~_J . .,~J: :pa~~~t~-J~~;.:t{!.-=~~~-~riEisc es 
l3ulletin des zwe:Lte11"1~riE")dens-und Ereitskongresses <..~68), 
p137~T4-2~,5,and"J.n15:is~s.-.Plg~~g};~f ~~~~ .. J~~aix et de 
.Le. Liberte a Berne 11$1;'8 par hl"Io Hroczkovrski et Bakoun1ne "'{cr~r~riiI'i:fr;ltr;--rffb*9J.--1~1~o·czEo\vs'.K:rrssp0ecli \•ias 
reprinted in [olC2k~, December 1, 1868. In that same issue 
Bakunin's speeCh was also referred too It vms deplored that only 
fragments of this "magnifj_cient" speech could be reprodu.ced. 
However, it may be doubted that Herzen would have been interested 
:Ln printing the complete speech of Bakunin which agttated for the 
destruction of the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire. 
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reorganization of Eastern and Central Eastern 11irope could only 
be solved if the principle of centralization, which prevented 
the liberation of the people, was rejected by Russj.ans, Poles, 
and Germans alike. Thereby, he implicitly rejected the exclusive 
condemnation of Russia. Simultaneously, he repeated his demand 
for the destruction of the Russian Empire. He insisted that l;lis 
agitation against the preservation of the territorial integrity 
of the Russian Empire should have convinced the German socialists 
of his opposition to the subjugation of the people by the 
centralized Russian government.6 1 
Bo.kunin reiterated the argument which he had used in his 
manifestoes of 1862 that the Russian Empire was a multi-national 
state under the rule of Great Russia which tried to enforce unity. 
He pointed out that recently the Russian government had initiated 
a campaign for the systematic suppression of the Ukrainian 
language, a policy which vras simultaneounly applied to the Polish 
language. '11his revealed the determination of the Tsarist 
governnlGnt to bring about the com1)letion of the centralized state 
and should be a warning to all the Pan-Slavs outside the Russian 
Empire6 
Bakunin insisted that the problem of the liberty of the 
nationalities would not be solved by the restoration of P,oland. 
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He pointed out that the Polish Republic had also not granted 
autonomy to the nationalities. Particularly the Ukro.:L:nians he?.d 
suffered as much under the oppressive rule of the Poles as under 
.that of the Great Russians. They wished to be united and free 
from Great Russian and Polish rule. 
As to the Baltic provinces, Bakunin admitted that they 
were presently ovmed by Russia nby the right of conquest, that 
is, by a flagrant injustice.n However, neither the Poles nor 
the Germans who had previously owned these provinces had a right 
to them. Bakunin attacked the German socj_alists because they 
did not condemn the oppression of the Lithuanian peasants by the 
German nobility, the bourgeoisie, and the Lutheran clergy 
although the German' minority supported the Tsar's oppressive 
polj.cies. 
Bakunin had arrayed his arguments in order to prove 
that the solution of the Polish question vwuld be quite simple 
if only the Ukrainians, White Russians, and Lithuanians--formerly 
ruled by Poland and now by Russia--were granted the right to 
national self-determination. Bakunin argued that after their 
liberation it would be 
most probable and most desirable that Little Russia 
[Eastern Ukraine] should first form a national feder-
ation with them [the Galician Ukrainians and White 
Russiansl which was independe:nt of Great Hussia and 
Pola:na..62 
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The Lithuanians might like to join the union. It was not 
improbable that at a later date this new federal state might 
enter into a voluntary union with either Poland or Great Russia 
provided that the equality of the member states were guaranteed. 
In conclusion, Bakunin was anxious to convince the 
assembly (1) that the restoration of the Polish state, even 
under a republican democratic government, was not desired by the 
Ukrainians., White Russians, and Lithuanians who had experienced 
Polish rule; and, (2) 'that Russian power politics would come to 
an end if the oppressed nationalities were granted the right to 
national self-determination and to the creation of independent 
states. ~ae question is whether the reorganization of F.a.stern . 
Europe, as envisioned by Bakunin,would really have made an end to 
the Great Russian hegemony. 
Evidently, Bakunin expected that the new buffer state 
between Poland and Great Russia would lean towards a union with 
Great Russia. He emphasized that there would be no obstacle to 
a union with the thirty-five million Great Russians once 
centralization in Great Russia was destroyed. Consequently, a 
weak Poland would be faced with a formidable union in which the 
leadership of Great Russia, based on its larger population and 
the Asiatic dependencies, would be safeguarded. The· Poles would 
still be burdened with the question of national security. This 
seems to indicate that Bakunin's plan for the. temporary 
r 
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creation of a buffer state was devised to isolate the Poles. 
Apparently he still consj_dered Polish aspirations, v1hich were 
supported by the progressive Western Europeans, as the greatest 
danger to the Great Russians. 
Bakunin was especially concerned with the agitation of 
the German socialists for the restoration of Poland. He warned 
the Poles that the German socialists had no real interest in 
Polish liberty. The German socialists, who condemned the 
oppression of the Poles by Russia, did not oppose German rule 
over the Poles. They did not agitate for the partition of the 
Prussian state although its expansionist aspirations endangered 
the Ruropean peace as much as Russia. This proved, said Bakunin, 
tha.t the German socialists were not enemies of the centralized 
state wh:Lch stood for "violence, oppression, exploitation, and 
injustice. 1163 He implied that their policies wore not different 
from those of Tsarist Russia. 
Bakunin repeci.ted his demand that the centralized state 
should be abolished and that Europe should be reorganized on the 
basis of a voluntary federation of individuals, adLlinistrative 
units, and nationalities. Only this would guarantee peace and 
liberty to the Eu.ropeans.64 
r 
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When the members of the IJeague did not support BaY.:unin' s 
extremist federalism, he withdrew from the organization in 
September, 1868, two months after he had become a member of the 
International. Meanwhile, he had organized a workers' association, 
the International Social Democre.tic Alliance. In mid-September 
the Central Office of the Alliance petitioned the General Council 
of the International for admission as a separate branch. When 
this petition was rejected, the Central Office dissolved the 
All~Lance in February, 1869, and its sections were then admitted 
into the International. Bakunin joined the Committee of the 
Geneva section of the International of wh:Lch Philip Becker was 
a leading member. 
Balrnnin's entrance into the International deepened the 
old hostility between him and Marx. Ultimately this contributed 
to the dissolution of the First International. A brief encounter 
in London in November, 1 864 between the tr!O men, which Ma.rx had 
solicited, had not improved their relations. While Bakunin 
became increasingly concerned with Fia.rx' s anti-Russia.."1 agitation 
in the International, Ma.i"'x, on the other hand, could not have been 
expected to v1elcome Bakunin's concept of absolute decentralization 
nor his insinuat:Lon that the German socialists were less 
revolutionary than the Slavs. 
From the beginning, when Bakunin entered the Internation'L\ 
Marx and Engels regarded him as a dangerous opponent.:~-~i.:~~jno 
L, .... """'--~~-=-=-=-.,,,,,,=~-...,_., .. ,,,,, __ """"'_ .... ___ .......... ____ _ 
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must be eliminated. They suspected Bakunin of plotting to 
overthrow the constitution of the International with Becker's 
help and wishing to become 11the dictator of the working-class 
movement. 1165 In his letter to Marx of July 30, 1869 Engels 
suggested to undo the influence of the "fat Bakunin" by asking 
the question: "Can a Pan-Slav be a member of the International 
Workingmen's Association? 11 Engels added: "He should not think 
that he can play the role of the cosmopolitan communist with the 
workers and the fanatically nationalist Pan-Slav with the 
Russians. 1166 
Several weeks later, at the fourth Congress of the 
International, held from September 5-6, 1869 in Basel, Wilhelm 
Liebknecht, a friend of Marx, spread the old slander that 
Bakunin was an agent of the Russian government. 67 After the 
Basel Congress Borkheim continued the defamation of Bakunin, and 
Moses Hess, another acquaintance of Marx, published an article 
against Bakunin in the Paris newspaper B§~ on October 2, 1869. 
b3cf:l:ra.rx 1s letter to Engels, July 271 18691 and Engels's letter to Marx, July 30, 1869, in~' III74, ~13, 215. · 
66~, III/4, 215. 
67Wilhelm Liebknecht, 1826-1900 German socialist. From 
1849-61 he lived in London, v1here he collaborated with Marx. 
After his return to Germany he became a member of Ferdinand 
Lassalle 1s Arbeiterverei]l• When Lassalle had died, Liebknecht 
became the C1ii0:fCOl"'Iai)Orator of Marx and helped to spread the 
influence of the International in Germany. 
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Bakunin was convinced that Marx was responsible for the 
agitation against him. Yet, when he wrote a lengthy defense 
for B,eveil,he abstained from attacking Narx and merely denounced 
·"the German Jews 11 Borkheim and Hess. Herzen, who disliked the 
reference to "the German Jews, 11 prevented Bakunin from publishing 
his article and wrote a moderate statement for Reveil. 
Marx did not participate in the controversy. In the 
meantime, a new situation developed in Geneva which offered 
an opportunity to weaken Bakunin's position in the International. 
Late in the summer of 1869 Bakunin, together with his friend 
Nikolaj Ivanovich Joukovsk~, had founded a Russian newspaper, 
Narodnoe D.EJ.£, in Geneva. They edited only the first issue of 
September 1, 1869. Bakunin soon left Geneva, and the following 
issues were edited by two Russian exiles N. Utin and A. Trusov. 
Utin, an ambitious young man, did not shrink from intrigues 
against Bakunin in order to become the leader of a Russian 
section of the International which had originally been &.kunin's 
aim, nor did Utin hesitate to utilize a part of the program 
Bakunin had earlier composed when he planned to organize a 
Russian section. The passage concerningfue Slavic question was 
copied almost word for word from Bakunin's text. 68 
68Cf. Zemfirij Ralli 11lfichail Aleksandrovic Bakunin. 
Iz moich vospominanij 11 ~'Recoliections'~A Minuvsie G~_s!;y (Past 
Years [st. Petersburg] ), October, 191b, pp. 1)3~, quoted in 
Archives Bakou~, II, 1+32. 
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Utin repeated Bakunin's accusation that Pan-Slav:Lsm 
:Lmpeded the progress of the international socialist propaganda 
among the Slavic working classes of the Austrian and Turkish 
Empires who were still inclined to look to the Russian Tsar for 
their liberation. He also re1)eat.ed B.:"1.]_1.:unin' s condemnation of 
the "policy of conquest" and of the oppression of Poland by 
the Tsarist government. All the Slavs were invited to organize 
local unions and to join the International. Only this 
organization guaranteed the complete social and political 
liberation of the Slavs because it would grant absolute freedom 
of association to each individual, nation, and nationality. 
On l1arch 8, 1870 Utin appealed to Becker and on March 11, 
1870 to Jung, the corresponding secretary for Switzerland, to 
support his petition for the admission of a Russian section into 
the International. On March 12, 1870 Utin also addressed an appeal 
to :Marx in which he st;;i.tod that he was an opponent of Bakunin and 
intended to fight him. 
Twelve days later, on IvJ.arch 24, N.arx; in the name of the 
General Council, info:r.med the Russian sectj_on in Geneva that it 
had been admitted in:to the International, and that he was willing 
to represent it in the General Council.. In reference to the 
program of the Russian section which denounced the Russian 
11imperial yoke" as an obstacle to the political and social 
liberation of Poles and Russians, Marx stated: 
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You might have added that the brutal seizure of Poland 
by Russia resulted in the formation of military regimes 
- in Europe, including Germany • • • Therefore, the 
Russian socialists who w:Lsh to break the chains of 
Poland have assigned themselves an immense task: to 
abolish militarism which is absolutely necessary as 
a prerequisite for the general liberation of the 
European proletariat.b9 
It was paradoxical that Marx dj.d not object to the 
propaganda for an extremist federalism in the Russian program 
which Utin had adopted from Bakunino Apparently Marx ignored 
this propaganda because it came from Utin, as yet an insignificant 
yolmg man who might become a tool in the fight against Bakunin. 
In his official letter Marx did not abstain from indirectly 
attacking Bakunin. He admitted that Russj.a had begun to 
11participate in the socialj.st movement of the nineteenth century o ' 1 
He mentioned the socialist Nikolai Chernyshevsky as one of the 
foremost revolutionary Russians, and he e.dded that the socialists 
in Russ:ta had helped to unmask ''the Russian optimism propagated 
by the so-called revolutionaries on the contj_nent." 
Evidently :Marx felt quite uneasy about_his collaboration 
with the Russian section. In a letter to Engels of March 24, 
1870 he said tho.t he found hj_mself in an 
···----c;"9~;;-~njJ,1_e, I~, 259~ Marx's letter to the 
Russian section 111 Geneva was printed i11 ~rOdJ?._o~J?.ol_o (Geneva), 
April 15, 18700 · He also wrote a confidentiaI'"'10tter fo the 
Russian section which has not boen rediscovered. Cf. Archives 
§..1Js..q~n.£, II, Lr32. --
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odd position • • • as the representative of young 
Russia. Man never knows which paths he may cross 
and to which strange fellowship he must subject 
· himself. 70 
Marx informed Engels that in his letter to the Russian section 
he had strongly advised the Russians "to work for Poland, that is, 
to rid Europe of the Russian neighborhood, 11 and that he had 
refrained from any particular reference to Bakunin. 
Yet, in his ill-famed Confidential Communication of 
March 28, 1870, which .Marx addressed to the Central Committee 
of the German Social Democratic Working Men's Party in 
Braunsch\~eig (Germany), he did not impose the same restraint upon 
himself .71 In this document Bakunin was portrayed as a 
conspirator against the General Council, as a backward 11Muscovite,' 
and as a man who lacked personal integrity. He was accused of 
collaborating with a pseudo-socialist Pan~·Slav party in Russia 
in order to receive their financial support. Marx advised the 
German socialists to shun Bakunin and to collaborate with the 
11honest 11 members of the Russian section of the International 
whose main polj_tical aim \Vas "the fight against Pan-Slavism," 
and who would soon unmask Bakunin's intrigues. 
7D ~, III/4., 296. 
71The German-Austrian socialist Kat'l Kautsky J,?Ublished 
this document for the first time in Die Neue Zeit, XX {1902), 
1+72-80. 
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Philipp Becker, the leader of the German section in 
Geneva, welcomed the admission of the Russian section into the 
International as the most significant event in the fight against 
the despotic Russian Empire and its influence in Europe. In a 
letter of April 10, 1870 to the Russian section, Becker expressed 
the hope that the section would help to destroy the Pan-Slav 
propaganda, which the Tsarist government used to realize its 
expansionist goals, and to bring about the fraternal alliance 
between the Slavic and Western Europe~m workers. In case of a 
Western European revolution the Russian section would have the 
task to organize an insurrection in the Russian Empire in order 
to prevent any counter-revolutionary moves of the Tsarist 
govex·nment. 72 
When Bak.unin J::..new about the admission of the Russian 
section into the Internatj.onal, he wrote to his friend Joukovski 
that Utin had acted 11af'ter the manner of Harx. 11 Yet, Bakunin 
also welcomed the adm:Lssion as an important evente The presence 
of the Russians in the International vrould help to weaken the 
reactionary forces in Western Europe which supported Russian 
despotism .. Bakunin-informed Joukovski that he agreed with the 
basic convictions of Marx that (1) reaction in Germany could not 
be destroyed un.less Russian despotism was also destroyed; and, 
r 
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(2) Pan-Slavism was nothing but a "latent despotism" propagated 
by Russia with the intention to subject the Vlestern and Balkan 
Slavs to Russian rule: 
It must be acknowledged that our Slavic brothers promote 
the Tsarist propaganda by their exclusive nationalism, j_ust as the Prussians assist it in Silesia and our Poles 
in Little-Russian Galicia.73 
Bakunin added that the Russian socialists ought to fight this 
evil. 
Although he approved of Marx's _opinion concerning Russian 
Pan-Slavism, he remained dissatisfied that Marx did not apply the 
same severe critique to Germany or Pan-Germanism. On April 15, 
1870, when P.§lrOd;tJ:£~ ,Delo published the official letters of Marx 
and Becker addressed to the Russian section, the newspaper also 
printed a critique by Bakunin of Marx's views on Russia and 
Germany. Within the next two years &Jr,:unin' s opposition to 
Harx!s political views reached a climax. 
Bakunin had observed with growing apprehension the rise 
of Prussian influence in Germany since 1866. He had never had a 
predilection for the Germans and. Germany, but after 1870 there 
occurred a truly volcanic eruption of a burning hatred and 
contempt for Germany. The defeat of France in the Franco-German 
War of September, 1870 and the subsequent unification of Germany 
---73Zemfuij Ralli, "Bakunin," p. 155, quoted in Archives 
~c,,o,uni]22., II, 433. 
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under Prussian leadership on January 18, 1871 convinced Bakunin 
that a strong Germany dimin:Lshed the possibility of the 
liberation of the Slavs under German rule. In the early seventies 
Bakunin wrote a number of lengthy treatises in which in continued 
his agitation for a voluntary federation of individuals, 
administrative units, and nations as the only means to guarantee 
peace in Europe and to solve the problem of German-Slavic-
relations. 7L~ His treatises developed j_nto a formidable attack 
upon Marx's political concepts, his policies in the International, 
and upon the German Social Democratic Working Men's Party 
founded in 1869 under the lee.dership of WiJ.liam Liebknecht and 
August Bebel who were followers of Marx. 
When discussing the posttion of a united Germany in 
Europe, BaktnJin maintained that Germany was an expansionist power 
,,. ··--74111 ~~871~0 rmblished L' emp:i.J:e-1sr1ou-tQ.:-l5~!~c;.nique et la. 
revolution sociale in Geneva. In.-tlie same year-lie aiscussed ""the 
ITG.i-iuan:'.S:favfC q1.l8Stion in an appendix to a pamphlet against 
Giuseppe ¥J.CJ.zzini, ~.~~IE t £l~n~~:1£ ~..1, _!JE:~Eh-12..=h., . The appendix 
remained unpublished, but tne parupnlet was :published as part one 
of La theologJe 32olitique d.e Mazzini et 1 1 Internationale by the 
Comrr1Issi"Oi1'd'Cl?ropat;8.i1cie:Sc>c1aJ3J11el.i1115'?'17'"15e ·EweerlF'ebruary 1 5 
and March 11, 1872 Bakunin composed a long letter to the members 
of the federation of the Jura sections of the International on 
German~Slavic relations. In }larch, 1872 Ba1nmin composed another 
manuscript, wl)ich remaj_ned unpublished, ,!:~~~ 
commun:Lsme d'etat. In 1872 after the Hague Congress of "&he 
:CD.Ternaf:i,0nar;1w composed his last lengthy manuscript of this 
period, ~t~g.£P...:t£.2~.l':.£3;£;:>s, which also \'Jas not published at. the 
time. Bakunin consj_dered this m&i.:n.uscript as the continuation of 
b' ~mpi;t.:,e .. lgi~<?];"t_O_:-~g~e,rng_p.,:1.9.11.£. 
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~E.~~..£.£1l~. r.I1he recent German policy of conquest towards 
France disproved the contention of Marx and his supporters that 
the despotic Russian government was the greatest threat to 
European liberty. Germany \'ms far· more dangerous. Only Germany 
had the sufficient material power to threaten the independence 
of the European nations, including Russia, through an aggressive 
war. Bakunin claimed that Germany, str·engthenec1 by its 
political unification, would certainly embark upon an expansionist 
policy on a large scale. According to him Bismq.rck aimed at the 
completion of his "gigantic [political] projects" through the 
creation of a Pan-Germanic state which would have no equal 
in Europe.75 But Bakunin's assumption was not born out by 
Bismarck's political career. 
According to Bakunin the German character revealed a 
basic brutality which predestined the Germans to create a very 
powerful stci.te. 'rhe Germans, said Ba.~unin, had always been an 
aggressive people because they had never experienced true liberty~ 
The cult of the state, introduced by Protestantism, prepared the 
Germans to submit willingly to the despot:Lsm of the governments~ 
It was in Germany where, since the seventeenth century, militarism 
and the cult of authority had developed, and it was Germany which 
359 
became the "permanent school of the despot:Lsm of the Euro1')ean 
states," not Russia. Even in the nineteenth century the Germans 
had not abandoned the cult of the state. Germany was not unj_ted 
through a revolution of the people but by the despotic Prussian 
state, the "epitome" of aggressiveness. In Bakunin's opinion the 
Germans were "a people enslaved by their orm choice and presently 
the greatest threat to the liberty of the Ymrld. 1176 
Bakunj_n claimed that the collaboration of the Jews with 
the German state increased the danger of German·aggression. He 
believed that the Jews held a pov;erfuJ. position in Western 
Ifuropean economic and cultural life, particularly in Germany. 
The Jews were the natural allies of the Gorman bourgeoisie with 
whom they shared the cult of the centralized state and the lust 
for power. .According to Bakunin the Jevrs used their influence 
in Germany in order to prevent the libere.tion of the Slavs from 
German rule. Desiring to extend their economic povrer, they 
supported the German ~-P.2£.J:_ .9.~~' Pan~Germanism, and the 
complete Germaniz.ation of the Slavs as they had done j_n 1848. 
Bak.tmin was convinced that an aggressive German policy 
v10uld result in a terrible clash between Germany and Russia. But 
Germany, not Russia., as :Marx and his followers mainte.ined, would 
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be responsible for it. AJ.1y attempt to create a centralized Pan-
Germanic state and to completely Germanize the Slavs under 
German rule would help the Russian government to rally the Slavs 
under the Pan-Slav banner. The Western Slavs would collaborate 
with Russia not because they were pro-Russian but because they 
assumed that Russia's backwardness would save them from the completB 
destruction of their national identity. However, in the eyes 
of Bakunin a victory of Germany or Russia vmuld be equally 
disastrous, leading to the despotic hegemony of either the one 
or the other state in Europe. Euro1Jean progress would be ended 
by German militarism or Russian barbarism. Europe could only be 
saved from such a disaster through the liberation of all the 
Slavs, including the Russians, and the creation of a "great 
federal republic o 11 
According to &Jw.nin a yj_ctory of the German socialists 
would not solve the problem of German-Slav relations. Therefore, 
it would not end the danger of a clash between Germ.any and Russia. 
Bakunin maintained that the German socialists were supporters of 
territorial expansionism because they were influenced by ~rx who 
was a "partisan of the sate, 11 that is, of the policy of conquest. 
On the basis of his observations of Marx's policies in 
the International, Bakunin had come to the conclusion that Marx 
was a German nationalist who tried to introduce principles into 
the organization vrhich were foreign to its true spirit. According 
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to Bakunin the majority of the socialists fought for the 
solidarity of all the Europec:i.n people and for the "economic 
emancipation of the workers." Marx, instead, in his Inaug_Ufal 
Addre§_s, had combined the demand for the conquest of political 
power by the workers with an explicit Russophobia and an implicit 
Slavophobia. Although :Marx condemned Russian expansionism, he 
did not demand the abolition of the centralj_zed state which alone 
vmuld end territorial expansionism.. This proved, said Bokunin, 
that Marx was a supporter of the centralized state and of the 
policy of conquest but wished to reserve the right of conquest 
to ttthe nations representing modern civilization," foremost 
to Germany 0 77 Marx's policy was typically German and would be 
disastrous for Europe should the German socialists ever stage a 
successful revolution in Germany. 
Bakunin's concern with German forej.gn policies under a 
socialist government was reflected in his repeated attempts to 
analyze the impact of Marx's and Engels 1 s ideology upon the 
organization of a future socialist stateo The two friends had 
always refrained from definite statements on this problem. They 
s1)oke about the socialist revolut:Lon in which the workers would 
achieve thej_r liberation through the seizure of political power 
and the creation of a people's state, and they predicted the 
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withering of that state leaving a big gap between the tvro phases. 
Bakunin accused Marx and Engels that the core of their ideology 
was not a yearning for liberty but for the conquest of power. 
According to Bakunin, Marx and Engels were strongly 
influenced by the traditional German cult of the state. This 
was shown by their interpretation of history. They maintained 
that the rise of the absolutist state, that is, of the centralized 
state, had definitely marked a progressive phase in the development 
towards the ultimate liberation of the people because it helped to 
further the social revolution by promoting the economic growth 
of society and the rise of new classes. In Bakunin's opinion 
the absolutist state had not benefited humanity. Its only aj.m 
was to preserve and increase its power which resulted in a greater 
enslavement of the people. 
What was true of the centralized monarchical state, 
would also be true of the people's state because the very nature 
of the state was an obstacle to liberty.78 Contrary to the 
contention of Marx and Engels it would not bring about the 
emancipation of the workers. Marx's political progre.m, said 
Bakunin, vms 
a framework for strongly centralized and very 
authorite.rian economic and politica.1 institutions, 
without a doubt sanctioned like all the despotic 
II, 203. 
l 
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institutions of modern society by universal suffrage, 
but nevertheless subjected to a very strong government, 
to use the expression of Engels, the alter e.rs£ of Marx. 79 
In a people's state the common man would be enslaved to 
an even greater degree than in the monarchy because the government 
would be extremely complicated and central:Lzed. The government 
would not restrict itself to the political rule over the masses 
and the administration of justice. It would also control 
the production and distribution of wealth, the 
cultivation of the land, the establishment and devel-
opment of factories, the organization and management 
of commerce, and finally, the use of capita18for production, the state being the only ban_'k:er. 0 
The people's state would be under the rule of ttthe man of science? 
the most aristocratic, the most despotic, the most arrogant, and 
the most contemptuous of all regimes .. 11 He added: 
There will be a new class, a new hierarchy of real and 
fictitious scholars, and the world will be divided into 
a dominant m:Lnority and an immense ignorant majority in 
the name of science. .And then look out, you mass of j.gnorants. 81 
Bakunin quoted Engels as having said that the new government would 
noed a strong army to keep these millions of j_JJ.i terates, who 
would wish to destroy progress, subjugated. Tho people's state, 
said Bakunin, would not only continue to exploit the masses but 
also the expansionist foreign policy.. Decades before a commun:Lst 
r 
state was established in Europe, Ba....~unin predicted the essential 
nature of that state--j.ts super-centralization and oppressiveness-
which was described by the Yugoslav communist Milovan Djilas in 
his work The New Class published in· 1 956. 
Bakunin implied that Marx and Engels were fully aware 
of the consequences of their political program. They devised 
it not to bring about the emancipation bf the European workers 
but to establish the "German hegemony in Europe. 11 Bakunin accused 
Marx and Engels of applying the Darwinian law of_ the "struggle 
for survival 11 to the races. This was contrary to the socialist 
principle. of the solidarity of all the European workers. According 
to Bakunin,. Marx and Engels believed that only the Germanic race 
was cap~ble of progressing, and that it was "the legitimate 
representative of humanity. 11 Consequently, they wished for the 
creation of a large German state which would not only include 
the Slavs, presently under German rule, but also all the 
territories inhabited by the people of Germanic descent--"Holland, 
a great part of Belgirnn, three quarters of Switzerland, and all 
of Scandinavia. 1182 The two friends were convinced that the 
greatness of the German state ·was the supreme condition of the 
emancipation of the whole world, and that "the national and 
political victory of Germany 
• • • [was ]a victory for humanity. 1183 
- . 82~· All:eTl1_Mne et. le COrnJ2l.Upisme d I etat' in Archives 
Bais,~rn, lI, 1 U8. 
83Ecrit .s~Ji?..EJC, :in ArchJyes Ba.~~' II, 203. 
r 
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On the basis of his analysis of Marx's political 
program, Bakunin arrived at the conclusion that there was a great 
affinity between the authoritarian aristocrat and monarchist 
Bismarck and the authoritarian social democrat and republican 
Marx •. Although the two men believed in·different forms of 
government, they shared the same "cult of the state," the love 
for power, and the desire to found a "great unitary and Pan-
Germanic s~ate~ 11 Bakunin stated: "Both men are eminently 
nationalistic, and they meet in this political nationalism 
without wishing or searching for it. 11 8L~ 
According to Bakunj.n the only difference between the 
two men Wafi that Bismarck, 11 the greatest statesman in contemporary 
Europe, 11 had a better understanding of European politics than 
Marx. Bismarck carefully avoided any conflict with Russia because 
he needed it as an ally against France, and he supported the 
anti-Polish policy of the Tsarist government and Russian 
expansionism in Asia in order to prevent any further increase 
of Russian influence in Europe, but Marx and his followers 
condemned Bismarck's realistic approach to foreign political 
questions. They preferred to provoke Alexander II by 
agitating for the partition of the Russian Empire. 
84nAux. c·ompagnons de la federation jurassienne," ·in 
Archive~ _ _l.?.~ls.2~' II, 30. 
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Bakunin's \Vritings from 1870 to 1872 promoted a veritable 
encirclement of Germany. Bakunin reversed Marx's propaganda. 
Instead of Russia, Germany was ousted from the family of progressive 
:E.'uropean nations. Bakunin was conv:Lnced that all the Germans 
from the ruling clnsses down to the workers were in favor of 
authoritarianism and expansionism, and that no progress in liberty 
could be expected from Germany even if socialism were 
victorious. 85 
When Bakunin discussed the party program of the German 
Social Democratic \Vorking Hen's Party, issued in 1869, he pointed 
out that its foremost demand was the creation of a "free people's 
state. 11 This proved that like Marx the German socialists were not 
interested in the liberation of the people. State and freedom 
were two contradictory terms. The state meant power, and this 
power would always be used by a small minority to dominate and 
-· . "B5Ti~;·-~stion of liberty and of a foreign policy in the 
German Social Democratic Party, led by Wilhelm Liebknecht and 
August Bebel, vms discussed by the German social democrat Susanne 
Miller in her book Das Problem der li'reihej_t im Sozialismus. 
lt,rej_hei t, Sta.at und ...... He°Vol\if:Con 1i1"cte1~Pro~JJt de!; = -
So~;ialdemokratie von Lassalle bis zum Revisionismusstreit 
(Frankfurt am Main: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 196Li-), pp. 12Li--
133. l'Jillor's analysis disproves Bakunin's assumption that the 
political conv:i.ctions of Harx and the German socialists were 
absolutely identical~ Thus, for example, while Yiarx and Engels 
approved of German unification under Prussian leadership in the 
belief that this.would further the German revolution, Liebknecht 
remained its violent opponent because Prussia was the enemy of 
liberty. 
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exploit the masses. According to Bakunin the program had two 
defects: 
As an essentially political program it subordinates 
the social to the political question and again places 
the workers under therule of the bourgeoisie, and as 
an essentially patriotic program it destroys inter-
nationSJ.1 solidarity and threatens to Germanize the 
Slavs.C56 
Bakunin concluded that the German socialists were nationalists 
e.nd Pe.n-German:l.sts. They vrnre not different from Marx who tried 
to impose his political program upon the. International in order 
to further the German hegemony in Europe. 
After the unification of Germany Balrnnin watched with 
growing concern the policies of the German socialj_sts in the 
Austrian Ei'mpire, Previously he had been inclined to believe that 
the Austro-German socialists were willing to reject German 
nationalism and to join the Austro-Slav workers in the common 
fight for liborty and equality. In the spring of' 1869 Bakunin 
had expressed his enthusiasm about a ~!t . .=btE?...s_t£, issued by the 
Austro~German sociD.lists in May, which demanded the destruction 
of the na.tiona.lity principle and the creation of a united 
socialist organization in the Austrian E.mpire to assure an 
effective revolutionary collaboration of all the workers--Germans 
and Slavs--against the established government.87 
'"'"86~ 1 Appen-dice Slavo-Allemand, 11 in Archives Bakounine, 
I/1, 278. 
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In September, 1871 Bakunin's vision of a peaceful 
coexistence between the Slavs and Germans in Austrj_a in a socialist 
setting faded. On September 26, 1871, at a socialist meeting in 
Vienna, the following resolution was passed: 
That democracy which does not acknowledge historical 
rights, only the rights of man, ••• condemns all the 
attempts to restore ~:Q.cient states which belong to the 
history of the past.~~ 
According to Bokunin this resolution meant the abandonment of the 
earli.er gen·erous policy of the Austro-German socialists tovmrds 
the Slavs. He ascribed this to the influence of· the German 
socialists who attended the meeting, among them Wilhelm 
Liebknecht, the editor of the ~~~ (the organ of the German 
Social Democratic Party). Bakunin vras convinced that the Germans 
had come to Vienna to agitate for the creation of "a great so-
called democratic Pan-Germanic state," and that the Austro-German 
socialists were willing to support that aim. Bakunin insisted 
that he was as opposed as the German socialists to the nationality 
pr:Lnciple. Yet, he would not hesitate to support it as long as 
the Austro--Slavs were threatened by Pan-Germa.nism. 89 
On the basis of his conviction that Marx and his 
supporters favored the centralized state and Pan-Germanism, 
BaJumin concluded that their support of the liberation of Poland 
trs~;-L:1j,~;:~g (Brussels), October 5, 1871, 
~~}:~UE.~££, I7'f; 3Li-3 • 
89~~lol!l"~-l~ le. E.~H)i1.1!,!.l~hs_me ,.ri.t.,~l, in 
1?2,l~illf., I I, 1 1 3 • 
in Archives 
I - --
Archives 
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was not sincere: First of all, :Marx and Engels vrnre not consistent 
when they condemned the partition of Poland as a crime because 
they considered the development of the absolutist and expansionist 
state as a phenomenon which had furthered historical progress.9° 
Besides, Marx and Engels were "ardent patriots" which precluded 
their condemnation of the traditional German aim to conquer . 
the whole area between the Oder, Niemen~ Dvina, and the Baltic 
Sea. Bakunin asked \'That possible interest could Marx and Engels 
have in a country like.Poland which was still predominantly 
agricultural, not yet ready for their ideology. Because of their 
bourgeois leanings Marx and Engels had an "instinctive horror 
of the peasants" and relied upon the workers in the to1ms, 
"organized and even ruled by bourgeois social democrats," to stage 
a successful revolution. 
According to Bakunin the agitation of Narx and Engels 
and of the socialists in Germany for the liberation of Poland was 
only a means to cover their real aim--the complete absorption 
9vBakunin maintained that Proudhon's attitude towards 
Poland was more consistent than that of Marx and Engels. Proudhon 
was an opponent of' the centralized state. Therefore, he was 
against the restoration of Polando He was convinced that a 
restored Poland would again be ruled by the privileged aristocracy 
and would merely increase the number of centralized states which 
enslave the people. Unfortunately, said Bakunin, Proudhon did 
not remain consistent when he dared to describe the policies 
of the Tsarist government as representing triumphant social 
democracy. Cf. Ecrit con ... ~r~ 1'~~r2s_, in Archives Bakounine, II, 1990 
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of Poland. This would remove the barrier which for centuries 
had prevented the "civilizing invasion" of E-:1stern Europe by 
the Germans. Once in power, the German socialists would not 
surrender any part Of the former Polish provinces. In support 
of this stat0ment Bakunin ref erred to the declaration of a 
Prussian socialist leader, Dr. Jacoby, that the Germans could no 
longer undo "the political consequences" of the Polish partition 
although it hci.d been a crime. 
Bakunin remarked that the German socialists were as 
insincere as the lj_beral Russian patriots in their support of the 
liberation of Poland. Each party was only concerned with weakeni. 
the other side. The Germans would like to restore the former 
eastern provinces to the Poles, while the Russians would prefer 
a Poland extending from the Vistula far into Germany. Actually 
neither the Russians nor the Germans would ever seriously try 
to rest.ore Poland, not even partially, because this involved too 
many risks. 
If Russia granted independence to the Polish Kingdom, 
the revolutionary unrest in the former eastern Polish provinces 
v1ould flare up again and endanger the unity of the Russian Empire. 
On the other hand, Germany would face an even more critical 
situation should a. socialist government support the reconquest 
of tho former eastern Polish provinces from Russia and the 
extension of Polish power to the Black Sea. There was no 
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certainty whether a strong PoJ.ish state would become Germany's 
ally. It was rather to be expected that the Poles would try to 
seize the Baltic Sea coast from the Germans. They might also 
attempt to become the leaders of Pa·n-Slavism and to unite all 
the Slavs in the fight against German domination. Moreover, 
the restoration of Poland with German help might have even more 
dangerous consequencesfbr Germany. It might cause a Russian 
revolution which, being "essentially socialist and anarchist," 
might help to destroy the new oppressive Polish state and arouse 
the Slavs under German rule to fight for their liberation from 
the "Pan-Germanic prison." 
Bakunin concluded that there was st:ill another 
alternative. The German socialists, when speaking of the 
restoration of Poland, might mean the creation of "a kind of 
branch establishment of German domination under a Polish name," 
that is, of a German satellite. In any case, as long as the 
centralized state was not destroyed, the Polish people would not 
enjoy lib0rty. Under the present circumstances only two 
possibilities were open to them--to become either Germanized or 
Russianized. If the modern trend towards the elj_mination of 
independent states was not checked in time, it would le~d to 
"the formation of immense military dictatorships, ••• the last 
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logical phase of the historical principle of the sta.te. 11 91 This 
would be the end of liberty. 
Bakunin's analysis of the nationality problem in 
Central Eastern Europe struck at the core of this question. Since 
the mid-sixties Bakunin had become convinced that the liberation 
of the Slavs in Central Eastern Europe would not solve the problem 
of liberty. He said that it would be impossible to draw just 
ethnographic borders either between the Germans and the Western 
Slavs in Bohemia and Moravia or between the Poles and the Germans 
in Poznania, West and East Prussia because Germans and Slavs were 
intermingled. Consequently, said Bakunin, the liberty of the 
people would not be safeguarded by restoring the former western 
Polish provinces to the Poles or by carving new Slavic states out 
of the Austrian Empire, a statement which has been verified by the 
reorganization of Central Eastern Europe after the Second World 
Ware Bakunin argued that while in a German state the Slavs were 
dominated and oppressed, in a Polish or Czech state the Germans 
viOuld be "dominated, sacrificed, and natj_onalized. 11 The 
centralj_zed state would always mean the triumph of one national 
groupo The liberation of the people in the areas with a mixed 
population could only be guaranteed by granting full autonomy and 
the right to voluntary federation to the communes • 
. --~---
9 "Aux cornpagnons de la fedcfration jurassienne," in 
Ar chi V!7§.. Bak.C?EniJlf., II, 42. 
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The polemic against l'.tarx, which Bakunin carried on in his 
treatises early in the 1870's, was the accompaniment to the 
controversy between Marx and Bakunin in the International. The 
struggle between them had been briefly interrupted by the 
Franco-German War, but it flared up again in 1871. Farly in 1871 
Utin, who wished to see Bakunin excluded from the International, 
declared that the Geneva section of Bakunin's Social Democratic 
Alliance, had never been formally admitted into the International 
by the General Council. This was not true. When it took the 
General Council three months before confirming the credentials 
of the Alliance, Bakunin suspected that Marx was behind Utin's 
move. 
_ At the London Conference of September, 1871, which was 
held instead of the General Congress planned for this year, and 
which was only attended by 23 delegates, among them Utin, Marx 
and E.'ngels continued the fight against Bakunin and his supporters. 
A resolution was passed which forbade sections of the International 
to call themselves by sectarian names ••• or to 
form separate bodies under tho na.me of sections of 
propaganda, etc., pretending to accomplish specj_al 
missions distinct from the common puriiOse of the 
Association.92 · 
This resolution was particularly directed against the Geneva. 
section of the Alliance which just before the London Conference 
92Cf.-fustruggle over the organization of the 
International in 1 1 Internationale: documents et souvEmirs, 
ed. by James Gu:!,ll'a1.~r2vois:T-J?aFIST-.soc·r73-:r<.f1Tou:V'8Tiede 
~~~:=>:m>t_,~2~~~~,..!J~:252~~~~~:-.=-Md~O~..,_,,.,., _____ _,,,,•"'-" 
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had adopted the name: Section for Propaganda and Social 
Revolutionary Action. 
After the London Conference Bakunin initiated a formidable 
fight against "the authoritarian" Marx and his "Pan-Germanic 
agency," the General Council. He was supported by the Jura 
Federationr•~composed of the sections in northwestern Switzerland--
which he controlled. Late in 1871 the ·Federation drew up the 
so-called Sonvi;!J.i~F-Cir£Ulc:!, in which the Bakouriinists maintained 
that the General Counc,il must be deprived of the dictatorial 
powers it had usurped and turned into "a simple office for 
correspondence and statistics."93 
In his letter to the Jura Federation, which Bakunj.n 
composed in February and March, 1872» he repeated the demand 
of his supporters that the General Council must be reorganized 
because it had become an autocratic institution. Bakunin 
maj_ntainod that Marx had packed the London Conference with his 
followers in order to finally impose h:i.s "commu:nisme d'etat" 
~'>A<."'\:h.ll'Olli~..Y~~--
(dictatorial communism), which disregarded liberty, upon the 
International. Through the adoption of Marx's political concept 
the International ·was transformed into an "irrmwnse and monstrous 
state 11 under the dictatorship of the General Council, "that is, 
of Marx." Bakunin warned that this was merely the preparation 
r 
375 
for the realization of Marx's ultimate plan to turn the 
International into "an instrument of the greatness and future 
power of Germany. 11 He concluded that in case of a victory of 
Marx's followers in Germany, this c·ountry would doubtless become 
the center of the International which would threaten the liberty 
of Europe, particularly of the Slavs. 
In his letter to the Jura Federation Bakunin once again 
glorified t-he Slavs. He informed his supporters that they 
should not fear the reactionary expansionist Pan~Slavism of the 
Russian government because the antipathies among the Slavs, their 
different traditions, social structures, and languages represented 
a definite ·obstacle in the realization of a Slavic union. Besides, 
the Slavic people would never desire to create a powerful 
centralized state. The Russian Empire had not been organized by 
the Slavic people but against them.. Bakunin assured his friends 
that the recent rise of a modern Slavic movement among the young 
Austrian and Balkan Slavs would prevent the realization of 
Russian Pan-Slav aims because the young Slavs aimed at the 
abolition of the state. Bakunin invited all the Western European 
socialists who were truly interested in the liberation of the 
workers and their fraternization to collaborate with the Slavic 
people, not wit~ the German socialists \'!hose political concepts 
were reactionary. He claimed that only the Slavic people were 
truly revolutionary, while the German workers lacked their 
r 
' 
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burning love for liberty. Bakunin still expected the salvation 
of Europe from the Slavs. 
At the time when Bakunin stated these arguments, he had 
definitely become convinced that the question of German-Slavic 
relations was the central question in the International, and 
that the future of this organization depended upon the 
satisfactory solution of this question. He maintained that as 
long as Marx held a dominant position in the General Council, 
the International could not work for the peaceful coexistence of 
the nations, including the Germans and the Slavs. Marx did not 
represent the true spirit of the Internation8.l. His support of 
authoritarianism and of the domination of the progressive nations 
over less civilj_zed ones was in flagrant opposition 1o the 
federalist and anti-state socialism to which the majority in the 
International adhered according to Bakunin. 
While Bakuntn agitated for the removal of Marx from the 
General Council, Marx was busy preparing the expulsion of Bakunin 
from the Inter11ationa1 .. 94 When, aft0r an j_nterval of three 
years, another General Congress of the International met in The 
Hague on September 2, 1872, the final phase of the long drawn 
out controversy between Marx and Bakunin, which had centered on 
the Slavic question, was reached.. Bakunin had been unable to 
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trB.vel to The Hague.. But Narx and Engels were present at this 
momentous meeting. It was the first and last time that they 
attended a General Congress of the International. 
The majority of the delegates to the Hague Congress were 
supporters of Marx's policies. Against the opposition of the 
Bakuninists the decentralization of the.International was 
rejected and the importance of poli tj_cal action by the workers 
was reaffirmed.. In spite of this victory) Marx knew that he 
was in a precarious position because of the rising influence of 
Bakunin's teachings, particularly in Italy and Spain.. Moreover, 
not only the Jura Federat:Lon had expressed a strong opposition 
to the General Council; the opposition had spread to Belgium, 
Holland, and even to England. In order to destroy the influence 
of the Bak.uninists, Engels, in the no.me of Marx and other 
delegates, proposed to transfer the General Council to New York. 
His proposal was carried by a narrow majority. This meant the 
end of the International. 
Marx's final action was to bring about Bakunin's 
expulsion from the International. At his instigation Bakunin was 
charged with having attempted to organize a secret society in 
order to disrupt the International through the propagation of 
principles which did not agree with those of the International. 
When this did not convince the delegates, Bakunin was accused 
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of having been involved in a fraud. ~'h:i.s was not true. However, 
the accusation finally led to his expulsion.95 
After the Congress in The Hague Bakunin composed his 
/ 
last long treatise Ecrt_i cont.:£2 Marx. He accused Marx of having 
packed the Congress with his own men in order to defeat the 
grow:.tng opposition j_n the International. Bakunin insisted that 
his own agitation for the destruction of political power 
and of the state, that is, of 11 power constituted by the 
bourgeoisie," was in perfect agreement with the basic policies 
of the International. The real enemies of the International were 
Marx and Engels. They would not understand that the vmrkers, 
whom Marx called the "!;urny~11J2.!'.21£.t~:J§._t.," were not interested 
in the _conquest of political power but in the question of economic 
equality. At the Congress in The Hague, said Bakunin, Marx 
fought for the reaffirmation of his political program and 
succeeded, but his insistence upon the polj_tical question had 
endangered the existence of the International. In the_opinion 
of Bakunin this proved that Marx was only interested in increasing 
his own power and had no regard for the wishes of the workers. 
The Congress in The Hague vras 
the battle and surrender of Sedan and the triumphant 
invasion [of the International] not by Bismar-ck.i.an 
but Marxian_Pan-Germanism, imposing the political 
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program of the German authoritarian communists or 
social democrats and the dictatorship of their leader 
.upon the proletariat of all the other countries in 
America and Europe.96 
Bakunin had fought an arduous fight against Marx's 
political program. He believed that the program would not bring 
about the peaceful coexistence between the Germans and the Slavs, 
and would not help to solve the central problem of the Slavic 
question--the liberation of the Polish and Russian people. He 
was convinced that Marx's ideology was devised in order to 
increase German power and to turn Germany into the center of a 
socialist Europe to the detriment of all the Slavs, including 
the Poles. Marx's fight against Bakunin had been as arduous 
because Marx, in turn, held that Bakunin's ideas endangered the 
European revolution and Germany in particular. No compromise 
between the two parties was possible. 
The death of the International marked the end of the 
long drawn out controversy over the Polish question in radical 
circles. In the following years Marx (d. in 1883) and Engels 
(d. in 1895) rarely turned their attention to Poland in spite 
of the socio-economic. changes in that country. The Polish 
question had definitely lost its attraction as a major problem 
in the reorganization of Europe. The interest in the Polish 
96Ecrit contre Marx, in Archives Bakounine, II, 180. 
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question briefly flared up again in the Second International in 
the mid-1890's, when Marx and Engels and their old opponent 
Bakunin were no longer alive. This was the beginning of the 
search for the true meaning of Marx and Engels's views on the 
Polish question. 
CONCLUSION 
In the mid-nineteenth century tpe Polish question was 
considered by the European Left as a part of the question of the 
reorganization of Europe leading to the destruction of the monar-
chical and aristocratic structure of the European states and the 
liberation of the people. This was also the conviction of Marx 
and Engels. However, from the beginning they took an isolated 
stand on the question of the liberation of the oppressed people 
due to their ideology and their interest in a strong Germany. This 
had an impact upon their attitude towards the Polish question. 
Although Marx and Engels paid lip service to the need for 
the solidarity of the European people, their ideology emphasized 
the concept of leadership. Under the influence of Hegel they 
differentiated between the historic and the non-historic nations, 
between the progressive and backward nations, and stressed the 
right of the former to dominate the latter. The concept of 
leadership was extended to the revolutionary fight. According 
to Marx and Engels the industrial proletariat, predestined to 
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effect the final liberation of man, had the task to lead the 
rural proletariat in the communist revolution, while the 
revolutionary nation had the right to dominate the reactionary 
·one. Marx and Engels were convinced that the communist revolution 
would be initiated in the progressive West and then engulf the 
backward East. In the 1840's and 1850's they ascribed the 
leadership of the revolution to England and after the 1850's 
to Germany. 
From Marx's an·d Engels' s viewpoint the Poles belonged to 
backward Eastern Europe. They would not play a decisive role 
in the communist revolution. Their final liberation would depend 
upon the eyents in Western Europe. Consequently, the agitation 
of the .Poles for the creation of a peasant democracy had only a 
relative significance in the eyes of Marx and Engels. At the 
... 
utmost a peasant democracy might help to prepare the communist 
revolution. Marx's and Engels's interest in a Polish peasant 
democracy was shortlived. After the Revolution of 1848 it was 
dropped, partly because Marx and Engels became definitely convince 
that the peasants were a reactionary force, and partly because 
they gave up hope for internal changes in Poland. In the 
following years they did not show any interest in the economic 
development of Poland which foreshadowed social changes. 
On the whole the Polish question interested Marx and 
Engels mainly as a foreign political question .which could 
wm...._ __ .,..,www_....,. ____ ""'"'~-
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conveniently be exploited to ridicule political opponents, to 
agitate against the reactionary powers Prussia, Austria, and 
Russia and against the foreign policy of the Western European 
·states towards Russia, and, above all, to fight Pan-Slavism. As 
a result, the German question emerged as a major factor in the 
discussions on the question of Polish liberation. 
Marx and Engels were convinced that in the past not only 
the foreign policy of Prussia but also that of the Western 
European powers towards Poland had contributed to the rise of 
Russia and thereby to the weakening of Germany. They wished for 
the strengthening of Germany through the creation of 
GrossdeutsGhland which would include the Austro-Slavs. They 
feared that the Austro-Slavs might be attracted to Russia, and 
that Russia might create a Pan-Slav union which would weaken 
Germany to an even greater degree. In order to save Germany from 
a Slavic encirclement, Marx and Engels insisted upon the necessity 
for Polish liberation, and the collaboration of the Poles with the 
Germans. Simultaneously, they condemned the agitation of the 
Austro-Slavs for their liberation from German rule. Marx and 
Engels were quite aware of the inconsistency in their approach 
to the question of national liberation and were anxious to explain 
that the Poles had a right to national liberty because they were 
a historical nation. Yet, this inconsistency permitted the 
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speculation, which was exploited by Bakunin, that at any moment 
Marx and Engels might reverse their support of Polish liberation. 
Certainly, Marx's and Engels 1s ultimate intentions 
·regarding the territorial extension of Poland could only have 
been revealed if during their lifetime a German revolution had 
occurred followed by the establishment of a communist government. 
But there is ample evidence that as defenders of a strong German 
state they.would not have ceded to the Poles the Grand Duchy of 
Poznania and West Prussia. The rest is open to .speculation. 
Under certain political circumstances they might have helped 
the Poles to restore the historical eastern borders of 1772, or 
they might· have come to an agreement with the Russians to form 
a Polish buffer state between Germany and Russia, two possible 
solutions which E-ngels had envisioned early in the 1850 1 s. 
Apart from the question of the territorial extension of 
Poland it is very probable that a communist Germany would have 
pursued the same policy towards a Polish state as did the Soviet 
Union which turned Poland into a satellite after the Second 
World War. As Bakunin pointed out, the political concepts of 
Marx and Engels did not contain any safeguards against the 
increase of the power of the state and its expansionist policies 
wh.1ch would be detrimental to the liberty of the individual and 
of small nations. 
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